Johnson-Jack v. Health-Ade LLC, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2022 WL 562827, No. 21-cv-07895-LB (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2022)
Plaintiffs brought
the usual California claims in this putative class action challenging use of
the term “Health-Ade” to market kombucha-inspired beverages, including
Health-Ade Kombucha, Health-Ade Plus, Health-Ade Booch Pop, Health-Ade pop, and
Health-Ade Mixers. “Health-Ade” allegedly misleadingly implied that the
defendant’s products are healthy when they are not because they contain sugar. “Most
courts in this district have found that mislabeling claims based on this theory
(i.e., that it is deceptive to market products with added sugar as healthy
based on studies linking excess sugar consumption to disease) can survive a
motion to dismiss and that the term ‘healthy’ is not puffery.” This opinion
joined them.
The plaintiffs plausibly
alleged that the products were, in fact, unhealthy by citing scientific studies
that allegedly link the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages to negative
health outcomes.
As for deceptiveness, the prominent use of the word “health” and the homophonic connection between “ade” and “aid” made it plausible that reasonable consumers would construe “Health-Ade” to mean healthy. “[T]he use of a cross on some of the subject products …, which evokes the Red Cross symbol, also militates in favor of finding that it is plausible that consumers would construe ‘Health-Ade’ to mean healthy.”
Version of Health-Ade Plus with large yellowish white cross on yellow |
Health-Ade plus with red cross on white background |
Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2019), held — based on dictionary definitions — that the word “diet” when used “in a soft drink’s brand name is understood as a relative claim about the calorie content of that soft drink compared to the same brand’s ‘regular’ (full-caloric) option” and not a promise of weight management. The defendant here argued that dictionary definitions of “ade” and “kombucha” alert reasonable consumers to the presence of sugar. But the issue was not whether the name implied the absence of sugar; the issue was a putatively misleading message of healthfulness. The dictionary definitions did not dispel that. Likewise, as opposed to “100% Manuka Honey” where reasonable consumers know that bees forage, it wasn’t impossible to have a healthy drink, and there was also no basis to hold as a matter of law that reasonable consumers know that beverages with added sugar may be unhealthy.
Was the term
“healthy” puffery? Not necessarily, “because consumers rely on it when
purchasing food products.” Because the definition of puffery is vague/etc.
statements on which reasonable consumers would not rely, “the principal issue
when evaluating claimed puffery is whether a consumer would rely on the
challenged term. Whether a term is easily defined or measured is secondary and
merely informs the reliance analysis.” [In fact, courts go back and forth on
this, usually without explaining themselves, which is why this is a plausible
statement of the law. If consumers do rely on a claim, then the core
justification for calling it puffery disappears—but that may create a
falsifiability problem, if the term is in fact vague/has many meanings. But it
would be reasonable and perhaps helpful to distinguish vagueness from consumer
reliance and deal with vagueness at the falsifiability stage. The embarrassing
part of that approach is that we’d have to admit that “reasonable” consumers
may well rely on vague claims without thinking them through—the reasonable
consumer does not often engage in an extensive exercise of reason for an
average claim encountered in the marketplace, given how many such claims there
are.]
Prior cases have
found that the addition of adverbs and adjectives can turn an actionable
objective term like “nutritious” into a non-actionable subjective term like
“unbelievably nutritious” because
the modifier “unbelievably” makes consumers less likely to rely on those terms.
And the Ninth Circuit has also stated
that the term “ ‘nutritious’ ... standing on its own, could arguably constitute
puffery, since nutritiousness can be difficult to measure concretely.” But district
court cases have found the term non-puffery in specific contexts, especially
given the existence of food-labeling regulations, which consumers might use to
calibrate their willingness to rely on such statements. And, as in a previous
case, “[t]he meaning of the word ‘healthy’ or ‘health’ in this case can be
measured against whether or not Defendant’s products are found to be unhealthy
based on the scientific studies and evidence provided by Plaintiff.” Thus, “if
the plaintiff plausibly alleges the existence of scientific studies showing
that the consumption of the subject product is ‘unhealthy,’ then the court
cannot find that the term “healthy” is puffery when used to market purportedly
unhealthy foods.” The studies “suggest that whether the defendant’s products
are healthy or not can be determined according to scientific standards.”
And there was no
preemption because the challenged term wasn’t a “health” claim or “nutrient
content” claim, which are the relevant types of labeling statements governed by
federal law.
Finally, the plaintiffs
had standing to seek injunctive relief “because the difficult-to-ascertain
nature of the alleged misrepresentation suggests that the plaintiffs will not
be able to rely on the labeling statements in the future.” Inability to rely
was an ongoing injury.
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