Showing posts with label patent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label patent. Show all posts

Friday, August 07, 2026

IPSC Closing Plenary Session: AI Everywhere All at Once

Plagiarism or Transformation Machines? Evidence on Copyright, Economic Substitutes, and AI, Stefan Bechtold (with David Abrams & Christian Peukert)

Prevalence rate: OpenAI v. NYT litigations includes statements about how often users use ChatGPT in order to generate potentially infringing output. OpenAI: normal people don’t use it the way the NYT did, more than 99% of the time. NYT says 14-24% use for information search, raising © concerns. Corporate research: for OpenAI, non-work use has risen from 53% to 73%; Microsoft says that work & career topics lead desktop usage 8am-5pm and relationship conversations surge on Valentine’s Day.

Used Wildchat dataset: 1 million ChatGPT conversations from real users April 2023-May 2024, mostly GPT3.5-Turbo. Currently focused on random sample of 10,000 prompts in English. NYT rewrites are relatively uncommon: more common: write a six sentence para summarizing A Tale of Two Cities; Write a Simpsons episode where Homer becomes addicted to drugs; tell me what I need to know for my chemistry exam. Some overprotection: write the lyrics to Rocky Road to Dublin in English w/native Irish beside them—that request was refused despite the public domain status of the work.

Looking for whether users are looking for potential infringements or potential substitutes (e.g. replacements for chemistry textbook) and also looking for whether the output is refused b/c of guardrails.

Results: 3.7% of sample prompts and outputs, model identifies © infringement risk. Guardrails only trigger in 0.13% of cases. 1.19%-over 2% potential economic substitute risk. According to classification, the substitute/© infringement groups don’t overlap a ton.

Next steps: OpenAI says 28.1% of their users are asking for writing tasks; our data around 34.5%. Thinking about different classifier refinement, e.g. what happens w/minimal prompt to our classifier, feeding it a © textbook, classifying w/other LLMs.

The AI Penalty in Trade Secret Law, Camilla Hrdy & Mike Schuster (with Joe Avery)

Bias against self-driving cars (crashes are perceived as more serious) as well as AI-generated works. Trade secret liability often turns on whether improper means were used. Does this vague and morally charged standard lead to arbitrary distinctions in misappropriation cases?

Scenario: website provides insurance quotes; no TOS limit on request; confidential quote database underlying it. Defendant competitor queries database & recreates underlying dataset/trade secret. Human: $100,000 spent on 20 hourly employees over 5 weeks to systematically request different quotes. AI: $100,000 spent on specialized AI that systematically requested different quotes.

500 mock jurors were asked: would you have brought this lawsuit, were means improper, etc. Outcomes: significantly more likely to find liability, higher compensatory damages, less ethically acceptable w/AI. (Note that liability/improper means were above 50% for human use too.) Only not statistically significant result was on punitive damages.

AI penalty makes more sense in trade secret than in patent & ©. Improper means is open-ended concept. We’d expect more bias. 11th Cir. 2020: while manually accessing quotes is unlikely ever to constitute improper means, using a bot to collect an otherwise infeasible amount of data may well be. That case was scraping w/o AI, but AI is a subset of automation.

AI trade secret (AI used to “steal” trade secrets) cases are coming; there have already been a smattering. Agentic AI will be a perfect accomplice, whether from direct prompts or “escapes.”

Don’t want a bright line rule/reasonable measures should still be required, but this all makes sense. It’s important to update rules over time. Flying over a plant is very different in 1970 and 2026.

The Value of Knowing What Works: AI and Unprotectable IP, Sarah Polcz

Interviews w/researchers at frontier AI labs. Spending enormous sums to poach researchers—$100 million/year reported salaries. How can individual researchers possibly be worth so much? Most valuable IP is the least protectable—high level insights that are short, abstract, and easily carried from lab to lab in heads of researchers. IP like specific blocks of code or weights of model is comparatively less valuable. High level insights also move among researchers socially, where there’s no current employment relationship.

AIth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nikola Datzov (with David Schwartz)

AI judging: models showed no meaningful prompt sensitivity; shockingly accurate/capable depending on complexity of the case. Key driver is AI’s confidence in outcome. Patent cases appear more complex but show the same trends and capabilities. AI models can identify which cases they can and can’t accurately decide; courts could prioritize remaining cases for human/faster review; parties could determine whether appeals were worth pursuing.

The Terms and Conditions of Generative AI, Andres Sawicki (with John Newman)

Allocating generative AI output ownership—looking at TOS. Meh news: provider obtains a license to the input to provide the desired service. Standard broad terms: nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, sublicensable, etc.—for inputs and outputs.

Worse news: permitted uses are not limited to specified purposes. A small fraction say they only use the inputs to provide the service to you, the user. Plurality say they use them to provide service to you and other users. Also see a large percentage with “any business activity,” some with no explicit limit, and a small number where the permitted uses vary by tier. 55% of licenses to inputs are restricted, and 52% of licenses to outputs.

Notably—45% take unrestricted license to use the inputs—so photographers should worry.

TOS also try to make users responsible for any harm/infringement w/hold-harmless and indemnification provisions written quite broadly.

Implications: these provisions undermine ownership in © materials. Shifts liability risks to users [though it’s hard for me to imagine that litigating indemnification wouldn’t be more expensive than it’s worth so I’m not sure that’s true]. Risks to democratic deliberation and self-government.

Q: re AI penalty—human labor is linear; AI is efficient/if you allow it then it will be much easier to do this harvesting more efficiently—so if it’s troubling, then AI makes it worse.

A: similar reasoning to legal protection against plug molds (Bonito Boats) [or mask works]—anticopying logic. Not sure that makes sense forever b/c things change but makes sense.

IPSC Breakout Session 5, IP, Politics & Identity

Intellectual Property and Political Identity, Barbara Lauriat

IP features some strange bedfellows, going back as early as we can find about patent & ©. Project: a book on Intellectual Property & Victorian Inquiry, examining Royal Commissions on Patent & Copyright. Reform and even abolition were debated. Both Whigs and Tories struggled to fit IP into their political identities—not just ideologies but how they saw themselves.

Communism/socialism: Focus on the role of public interest and underlying communitarian principles. Limiting © to lifetime of author was communitarian. Also focused on personal nature of the labor—so socialists could say that the work of the mind was different. But Herbert Spencer made the same argument from completely opposite political beliefs.

John Stuart Mill changed his views over time a bit. Started out very pro-patent as an exception to anti-monopoly, but in his discussion of communism he carved out invention as a potential area where invention would still happen b/c it’s a naturally agreeable thing to do. Cut from the next edition of Principles of Political Economy, though.

Suffrage was also connected to property ownership. Largely uneducated mechanic could become a voter through invention. So wide availability of patents could be seen as democratizing, and Dickens distinguished support for patenting from support for Chartism.

IP and free trade was also part of the discussion.

Lessons: don’t assume the audience agrees on the fundamentals. Adapt arguments for different audiences. People did change their minds when arguments appealed to their political identities (forget about political theory). Free traders who opposed patents suggested rewards/prizes; this seemed to involve more gov’t regulation and so practical arguments pushed that faction into further & further extreme positions that eventually failed.

Christian Nationalism and IP, Lucas Osborn

Definition: a political ideology that seeks to entangle Christianity with political life. Heavy version: Being a Christian is very important to being truly American; it is very important that the US president be Christian; the Bible should have at least some influence over US law; and when the Bible conflicts with the will of the people, the Bible should have more influence. Only about 3% of Pew respondents endorsed all 4 propositions. Lighter version: about ½ of Americans say laws should be influenced by Christian morals.

What would this mean for IP? Depends on the kind of Xianity. Looked at Biblical principles important in theories of property.

Imago Dei: Genesis—“let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” G-d is a creator, so that’s an area of overlap. Dominion mandate: humans have dominion over all the earth. Caretakers/stewards of creation in ways different from other animals.

Private property: Exodus: thou shalt not steal. Dominion mandate is consonant w/private ownership. Property rights viewed as necessary for human flourishing and social stability—humans are bad and selfish, so private property provides a structure to control our worst natures. The Bible supports giving people the fruits of their labor, whether wages or property rights.

Examples: start from that foundation and yet come to pretty different conclusions. Ruth Okediji: Is the Public Domain Just? v. James Edwards: To Invent Is Divine.

Okediji: private property is in tension w/, though not irreconcilable with, stewardship. Need conception of what it means to be human to shape sustainable conditions for flourishing life. Edwards: mass flourishing coincides w/private property rights.

IP Rights: Okediji says that optimal production of knowledge goods is important, but so is optimal consumption. Stewardship includes private rights and service to others. Edwards: private ownership is what you need—leaves service to others outside bounds of legal duties.

Okediji: need ongoing assessment of IP law, including traditional knowledge. Edwards: Founders were right, should broaden patentable subject matter, make injunctions easier to grant, affirm that patents are private property, not government grants.

Takeaway: Xianity doesn’t get you to a 20-year patent term or automatic injunctions, so be careful. What would Xian IP look like? You can imagine limiting © protections for obscene, pornographic, and potentially blasphemous content, though they also profess respect for the First Amendment. False witness: you could imagine strengthening attribution rights.

Patents: reintroduce/strengthen moral limits on patents.

Fred Yen: creators/inventors have unpaid debts to inventors/creators before them. What does that mean for their rights going forward?

Rosenblatt: were our laws written by Xian nationalists to start? [Or deists?] Tam & Brunetti seem to move away from this. In modern rhetoric, Xian nationalism isn’t just the Xian part but also the nationalist part/white nationalist. National treatment seems vulnerable; internationalism does seem vulnerable too. [which would also have implications for traditional knowledge] Do you care about theology or Xian nationalism?

RT: I don’t see why these are Xian instead of moral views w/Xian characteristics and I say that advisedly b/c China does all these things (limits patents on moral grounds, bars obscenity/sexual material, etc.). We can plug in lots of moral frameworks to these propositions. Compare Pope’s recent pronouncements which do seem to make claims about what Xianity requires in substantive output.

Zahr Said: how much work is G-d doing in this project? Versus self-regarding system imposing majority’s views. Musk’s tech libertarianism is another possible comparator.

Q: human chimeras/patents on parts of humans—what perspective?

Q: could argue that injunctions should not be allowed b/c you’re not an owner but a vessel for G-d’s creation and thus shouldn’t control.

Trans Patents, Andrew Gilden (with Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec)

Inventions that cover gender-affirming care or other inventions with potential for trans people. Patent texts can be archival—how tech is viewed then; as speculative visions for culture; as strategic parts of sales/FDA approval pitches; and as political—vehicles for shifting social norms around taboo topics, such as patents for recreational cannabis granted long before many states legalized.

Political backlash against trans people has often focused on denying them technology, so patents are relevant. Patents using terms that expressly recognize trans people and sex/gender reassignment: 372 granted patents, 3 in 1980s, 4, in 1990s, 7, in 2000s, 112 in 2010s, and 246 since then. Even though trans people and trans-affirming care have been around for a while. Primary focus on trans population: 21; intended users 196; remainder otherwise incidental/cited. Topics: Hormone therapy, phalloplasty, vaginoplasty, breast augmentation, breast concealment, genital concealment, clothing, sexual devices, other health/pharma, AI, and data processing.

Trans people often presented as one of many populations who benefit from claimed invention—methods for treating excess androgen skin changes can help w/PCOS, etc. Or “there are many reasons that people bind their breasts.”

Patentees rely on studies focused on trans people/bodies. Even if trans people aren’t disclosed as target population, trans/cis medicine are inextricable from each other.

Some patentees emphasize uniqueness/unique needs of trans people, whether anatomical or social. Sets up claims limited to trans people as point of novelty. Also nods to consumerism—an underserved marketplace (e.g., genital concealing underwear for trans women; shopping recommendation system that imagines trans women looking for shoes).

So far, no noticeable drop in grants under Trump 2.0. But: FDA warning letters to chest binder retailers, distributors, and manufacturers. Some recipients of the letters had granted patents.

State and marketplace are vying for control over transgender existences. Control over gender expression: property rights can be tied to gender identity; infringement could require jury to find that user is a “trans male.” Disconnect b/t patenting and commercialization—patentees who offer various treatments to cisgender population but have patents for trans populations.

Patent activity maps poorly onto history of innovation in transgender medicine, but may reflect perceived social change or help measure cultural anxiety—patenting activity closely matches rise in mainstream awareness & fear/backlash. Rhetoric mirrors that in other areas of law & politics: opponents fear experimental/off label gender-affirming care; equal protection arguments about state denying trans people access to care available to everyone else; due process arguments about need for access to gender affirming care.

Said: what about coded references? E.g. medical codes can be changed by sympathetic doctors; there might not be explicit acknowledgement.

A: yes, we are tracking a bubbling to the surface.

Rothman: look for patents in the same spaces that don’t use the magic words.

A: Scandinavia would be a place to look there.

Rosenblatt: can this tell us anything about trans self-help and user innovation? Medicalization is partially good but also has big downsides.  

The Value and Values of Patent Ideology, Tejas Narechania

One view: there’s a perfect number of patents that’s just right. His view: there’s no pure vision of patent law. There are multitudes that are incommensurable, irreducible to utils; these are necessary and desirable outgrowth of living in a free & plural society.

Founders: innovation, national security, morality (or even natural rights), distributional concerns—all the policy considerations were there at the beginning.

The State Law of Federal Patent Enforcement, Paul R. Gugliuzza

State bad-faith statutes: motivated by mass demand letter campaigns by bottom feeder trolls against end users. Effect: reduce cost asymmetry b/t accused infringers and NPEs. Permit finding bad faith based on inadequate info, lack of investigation, false/misleading statements/ unreasonable deadlines/settlement demands; some laws apply only to suits against end users or by NPEs.

Key issues that have repeatedly arisen: who can sue and where? Personal jurisdiction via demand letters; federal subject matter jurisdiction over state-created claim? One of these cases has finally reached the Fed Cir. Should courts imply a private right of action where the state laws aren’t explicit? Otherwise it’s left to state AGs with resource & collective action constraints.

What conduct is regulated? Core version is bad faith assertion—but courts have disagreed over what constitutes an assertion or demand letter—analogy to declaratory judgment standing.

Courts also differ on what will ultimately establish bad faith—is including a claim chart evidence of good faith or should the court examine the claim chart for misleadingness/correctiness?

The preemption overlay: objective baselessness as a prerequisite, according to the Fed Cir. Bad faith is not enough if it’s just subjective and the underlying infringement theory was not objectively baseless. Resembles the Fed Cir’s tests for willful infringement and attorneys’ fees overturned by the Supreme Court, so should this test survive?

Remedies: actual damages from assertion, statutory damages, attorneys’ fees for the bad faith litigation (against anyone involved in the assertion), and bonds.

What about anti-abuse measures for assertion of the statutes used abusively? Reverse fee shifting. Doesn’t like categorical exemptions based on patent asserter identity. Geographic gaps—California and other states don’t have these.


Thursday, August 06, 2026

IPSC Opening Plenary Session: IP Openness, Secrecy, and Enclosure

Selective Exploitation, Kristelia GarcĂ­a

Justifications for deference to rightsholders in enforcement context are less persuasive than justifications for deference to rightsholders in exploitation decisions. These aren’t infringers—outside of ©’s standard infringement/remedies scope. Conduct at issue: shifting content from Peacock to Hulu, pulling shows from streaming services once they’re cancelled, making them impossible to access. Denying a platform access to a work that a platform has decided is not worth continuing. Batgirl pulled for tax reasons. Disappearance clusters around mergers and quarterly reporting where they want writeoffs; independent of consumer demand. Subsidizes content removal in a bad way. Accounting-driven disappearances.

Reputational concerns also lead content to disappear—race-changing makeup in 30 rock; Dr. Seuss edited to remove what are now understood as racist caricatures.

Consequences: for access; for competition/raising cost of competition; for creators—lose residuals when removed from popular platforms like Netflix.

Conventional tools aren’t helpful: fair use; antitrust—pacing and breadth problems; statutory licenses siloed by medium & tech and don’t speak to suppression or streaming; misuse is closest but that’s a defense targeting license term rather than refusals to license.

Proposed interventions: nonuse reversion rights; reducing write-off incentives/introducing a public access credit; broader conception of consumer harm; open-access analog—currently FCC or FTC lack jurisdiction over streaming but we could impose some preservation mandate.

Trademarks as Gatekeepers in Open Culture, Aman Gebru

Open platforms invite community investment but retain a less visible, restrictive layer of control—descriptively, use TM on the back end. Welcome your investment until the platform is mature, then strategy of being more restrictive. Case studies.

Reliance-based information asymmetry: encourage people to contribute resources for free, then take ownership of the value thus created. Case study: WordPress: widely used nonprofit open-source content management system. Automattic v. WP Engine: competitors in for profit services built on WordPress—TM claims made against competitor; blocked access to wordpress.org. Divided community—some say that for-profit entities should have to donate/help out; others say that a single person shouldn’t control open access resources.

Dungeons & Dragons: open game license in 2000; updated in 2023 with an even more permissive and irrevocable public © license. Independent publishers invested resources developing compatible products, but leaked documents indicated Wizards of the Coast intended to substantially limit those permissions and demand royalties for projects making over $750,000.

SSRN: acquired by for-profit Elsevier in 2016. Widespread concerns about restrictive commercial practices, but concerning & unclear changes to permissions.

Musk v. OpenAI—unjust enrichment b/c OpenAI was founded in 2015 as a nonprofit research lab. No ruling on the merits, but does demonstrate reliance concerns for investment early on that is then exploited.

Reasonableness of reliance: public is not unreasonable to expect continued access to a platform. Cultivation of openness goes beyond terms & conditions, even if they preserve the power to restrict.

Q for Gebru: in past, this happened with cable retransmission of broadcast—a new business model for profiting from what was freely distributed. What’s the history?

[RT for Gebru: distinguish impersonation? AO3, which is nonprofit & open source, deals with commercial exploitation that puts user privacy and security at risk, e.g. if users input their passwords through an unofficial app; confusion is a real risk for some unauthorized uses. Maybe the answer is that most use of AO3 is to post stories and that’s the core promise of the platform, but more details would help.]

Know-How, Dan Traficonte

Know-how is a legal concept used to mean many different things. Methods and techniques: The trade secret equivalent of a method/process patent. Trade secrets are a subset of confidential information; general knowledge, skill, and experience overlap with confidential information but not trade secret. Know-how cross-cuts all three: trade secrets, confidential info, and skill/experience.

Matters to doctrine that trade secret has to be described with reasonable particularity. Uncodifiable know-how can’t be a trade secret; hard-to-codify know-how might be a trade secret if codifiable during litigation; hard to figure out how to do that or identify how much codification is enough.

Employee Privacy and (Un)Reasonable Secrecy Efforts, Deepa Varadarajan

Apple allegedly spies on workers’ personal devices while NY limited access to personal social media accounts. Problem: trade secret law doesn’t pay attention to employee privacy, which is problematic given the field’s concerns with (1) commercial morality and (2) employee ability to move. Reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy should not require privacy invasion, but are often used to justify invasions. No court has held RSE unsatisfied due to excessive secrecy.

Unclean hands might be a viable doctrinal alternative.

Strategic Openness in Innovation: When Firms Reveal to Block or Build, Bernhard Ganglmair (with Alexander Kann)

Invention disclosures: in-house journals like IBM’s; commercial outlets like Research Disclosure and IP.com; new platforms like TDCommons (Google, 2015) and proofbox.co. These disclosures are seen and cited in patents. Longer disclosures carry more enabling information and are cited more often. Placement: distance to a firm’s tech core—how central are these disclosures?

Results: mapped length & distance from firm’s core of disclosures. Firms w/longer disclosures place disclosures closer to their own core. Not necessarily industry-specific. Pattern holds even after excluding IBM and other manipulations, over time. Enormous firm heterogeneity.


Friday, January 30, 2026

Santa Clara IP Conference: Where Do We Go From Here?

Moderator: Edward Lee, Santa Clara Law

BJ Ard (copyright), University of Wisconsin Law School

© is often displaced by contract and other regimes in sectors—scaling it up or down would produce minimal impact. Consumer copying for example is often solved by non-© solutions: Spotify changed things, as did rise of cloud-based services which meant people had less to share. Content ID can block fair use but does allow lots of uses that otherwise wouldn’t be fair. Even big-budget productions, like video games, don’t rely on © to deter second-comers but on features that are costly to duplicate, actors/TM/ROP protection, sequelization. It’s not that this sector is representative but hybrid relations that are only partly ©-governed exist across the board. Copyright owners use licensing models to overwrite © provisions. Streaming services continue this trend w/no need for legal enforcement b/c access is built into the system.

© is the only policymaking place where concerns about AI are actually being aired, but © can’t stop AI; big © owners are going to license. Given that © isn’t doing as much work in its traditional domains, we shouldn’t expect it to do work in these new domains. Asking it to solve labor issues, market concentration, privacy is likely to fail.

Colleen Chien (patent): AI’s effects on search for examination; AI can also identify potentially infringing products. AI tools used to digest evidence and make predictions. As we see platforms start to make their own IP infringement determinations, we might find them “good enough” w/o need for lawyers. Discussed need for human review—need to figure out.

Camilla Hrdy (trade secret), Rutgers Law School

Trade secret law is different from other IP; often not defined until mid litigation where you perform “identification,” the law of which is in chaos. California wants you to identify the secret before discovery; courts had maybe been converging on that but the 9th Circuit said no, the Defend Trade Secrets Act has a different standard—not reasonable particularity but sufficient particularity; other circuits say different things. Lack of clarity on fundamental initial issue. What does it mean to keep something secret? Not clear; jury left on its own. What does it mean for a secret to be readily ascertainable? In California, the most important trade secret jurisdiction, there isn’t a requirement of lack of ready ascertainability—even if you could perform reverse engineering in 8 hours you can still be liable for getting it from an employee. NJ has the same rule. Lots of lack of clarity about workers’ high level knowledge and experience—lots of courts think that asking about that is the same as asking whether something is generally known in the field. Not clear about what it takes for a secret to have independent economic value—lots of courts just look at whether you invested in the information. We need more people thinking about trade secret law! People need to talk to practitioners. We don’t know enough!

Keith Robinson (patent), Wake Forest University School of Law

Uncertainty around what counts as invention. Mental conception doesn’t really match with the evidence we look for (documentary: notebook, emails, other records). Identifying a problem rarely matters. Even a highly specific articulation of a problem is typically insufficient unless paired w/ a concrete solution.

Jennifer Rothman (right of publicity), Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Identity thicket: overlapping rights. People have been registering marks in names/likenesses for a while; current focus on Matthew McConaghey is perplexing to her (and me). But we might highlight how rights are being separated out w/potentially different controllers and licensees. There used to be a lot more distinction b/t people using name as business name/putting it on goods/services. But now the Lanham Act and states protect use of names, voices, and images as marks, at least if we are commercializing them in some way. The PR stunt of the registrations is more interesting: he has a deal for use of his voice as a voice clone that can speak multiple languages—it’s a way to market his deal. False advertising law is also relevant to these uses. © is also relevant and maybe is less peripheral than Ard said. Are digital replicas uncopyrightable? Unclear! There are pending registrations. If registrable, can there be multiple registrations of a digital replica as you can have multiple registrations of photos of a person? If so, what’s infringement? We’ll see people leveraging © this way more. © one’s personality or “character” bible in the same way people © scripts. Music industry has already made © claims that using similar voices is infringing.

At the federal level Take It Down is about intimate images; No Fakes is also under consideration to regulate digital replicas generally. There’s so much going on: that’s the identity thicket. And one person might not control all these rights; rights conflicts are possible, raising serious concerns about a human-centered approach. Compare to EU approach, focusing on concerns about the underlying person being depicted and secondarily on the public.

Capitol Hill: not clear what will happen, if anything. But it won’t help matters very much b/c unlikely to preempt the thicket that already exists. And won’t address concerns about transferring rights away from underlying person, or about deception licensed by the underlying person. Considering model state ROP law to address more of these issues, especially transferring someone’s own name, likeness etc away from them—has seen SAG realize this is a problem. Might see more of an appetite for repealing CDA 230; shifts in tech to build guardrails; we might see shifts in preferences for authenticity—hopes for the renaissance of theater.

Santa Clara IP conference: How It’s Going: What Went Wrong?

Moderator: Zahr Said, Santa Clara Law

Mark Lemley (patent), Stanford Law School

After 40 years of radical change, things settled down for normalcy in the last 10 years until Trump. 1980-2017: we grant 350,000 a year up from 50,000; now mostly computer/bio instead of mechanical; most inventors were single and now they’re teams; most inventors were from US and now they’re mostly foreign. University patenting started in 1980; now significant. Now first to file (not first to invent); now 20 years from filing (instead of 17 from grant). Patent thickets; patent continuation practice—multiplication from a single application to multiple patents. Lawsuit numbers have tripled. Jury trial was starting to become a thing in 1970s but a small percentage; now a vast majority of trials are before juries. Product producers used to file against competitors; now 50% of lawsuits are filed by NPEs. Patents were invalidated in 70s at around 65%; now it’s 43-45%. 1982: patent appeals consolidated in Fed Cir. Before 1980 there was no reexamination; then inter partes reexam and post-grant review; IPR proceedings became the way most patent validity disputes were resolved. Introduced district court forum shopping—ED Tex, WD Tex, D Del were not where we litigated in 1980.

Hatch-Waxman/pharma litigation against generics didn’t exist until 1984, so pharma patent litigation grows from there. Patent claim Markman hearings were created in 1990s, cemented in 1996; before then, we didn’t know the answer to “who decides what a patent means, a judge or a jury?”

Then there are substantive changes: patentable subject matter broadened to almost everything, then narrowed again. Major changes in prior art; major changes in interferences; obviousness law changed in fundamental ways, narrowing then broadening. Utility doctrine weakened, written description doctrine and full scope enablement became things. All real disputes about infringement are resolved in Markman hearings; changed law of inducement; new concept of joint or divided infringement; we strike down large swathes of rules on inequitable conduct. Ebay changes the rules for injunctive relief: no longer injunctions as a matter of course. We introduce apportionment of damages (renewed from 19th century); we change rules on willfullness/advice of counsel and venue.

If you’ve been litigating for 40 years, everything in the system has changed/been in flux, until about 2017. Not much happened since then! A period of normalcy. 62 SCt patent cases 1982-2018, and none in last 3 terms. Recent SCt decisions have had “instinct for the capillary”—clarification of assignor estoppel, not the central issue in patent law. 3 cases on 271(f) about exporting components from the US that are combined outside the US: the only 3 cases on 271(f) of which he is aware. Whether the post office is a “person” under the Patent Act. Not earthshaking! Contrast to KSR, eBay, and patentable subject matter cases before. Substantive cases began to affirm existing law rather than change it. Fed Cir has also settled down: en bancs used to be 2x/any other circuit, but only 2 in last 7 years (1 design patent, another a damages case that was a dud). Fed Cir Dissent rate dropped from 2d highest to one of lowest; many cases now not precedential.

IPRs turned out to have the same invalidity rate as courts at 1/10 the cost. Even patentable subject matter is pretty predictable. There are still cases but they don’t make fundamental changes.

This is generally a good story.

Then Trump. All is in flux. New PTO director dismantling large swaths of PTO, making IPRs essentially impossible to get; increased quotas; refused to hire new career examiners, offers no promotion path; on track to replace examination with AI; Lemley is skeptical. Part of a broader chaos targeting scientific research; 100% tariff on patented pharmaceuticals to somehow magically reduce drug price; taxing university patents; proposing tax on patents’ assessed value at time of filing. Not clear whether normalcy survives.

Mark McKenna (trademark), UCLA School of Law

Conceptual changes that transformed what TM is mostly for the worst. (1) unbounded expansion of the concept of source in TM. Source used to mean actual historical source: who made the thing you were buying. Infringement was very tightly limited to where consumers would believe D’s products came from P. That was passing off. Only someone tricking consumers into buying directly competing goods—very tightly connected to TM’s theory of harm: illegitimate diversion of trade. Courts, primary drivers here, came to regard that definition as overly limited; commerce was changing and courts wanted to capture newer commercial practices, specifically outsourcing of production and expansion of product lines to adjacent areas by companies—wanted to let Coca Cola to license production to independent bottlers and still maintaining rights. Redefined source as “control over quality” instead of actual historical source. Also started to recognize confusion about use of same mark on products that didn’t compete directly, like pancake mix and syrup. Unmoored TM from traditional focus on direct competition and we never replaced it with a real limit. “Sponsorship or affiliation” confusion is the worst; so open-ended that virtually any conceivable connection can be conceived in those terms even though it has different effects on consumers/competition more broadly. Net effect: confusion is performance art—parties need to use that word, but that’s not what the cases are really about, which is rights in gross.

(2) Connected and mutually reinforcing: structural collapse of what used to be a separate but related body of unfair competition law into TM, and resulting expansion of TM subject matter. Once upon a time, only certain things could be TMs, words or devices that didn’t give info about nature of goods/geographic origin: arbitrary/fanciful words/devices that were separate from but attached to the goods. Personal names, descriptive terms, product packaging/product design wouldn’t count; service marks weren’t affixed to anything for sale. Only technical TMs could be infringed; unfair competition law was not about what somebody owned, b/c by definition they didn’t own anything. P had to show that D was passing off even w/o a TM, so there were additional proof requirements and generally much more limited remedies. Would not bar use of descriptive word, etc.

That system collapsed, mostly b/c of Erie. Unfair competition became understood as state law, not common law, and federal courts started to believe they couldn’t have common law, making lawyers worry about 50 different kinds of unfair competition law. That lack of uniformity wasn’t really happening but courts and lawyers worried that it might. Solved by recharacterizing things that used to be excluded from TM and calling them “unregistered TMs.” Those things were previously unregistrable, not just unregistered. Courts started interpreting 43(a) to give a cause of action for infringement of unregistered TMs. Not what Congress anticipated. Huge change. We lost the orientation of unfair competition as a residual doctrine w/more limited remedies and got a huge amount of subject matter where we didn’t have rules about what could be owned. Had to build that law about what could be owned from scratch and haven’t been particularly successful.

These two things amplify each other: TM is redefined as anything that can indicate source as we’ve expanded source beyond recognition. Incremental; radicalism not notice. Courts act like the assumptions they used to hold under the old system still apply, even though the changes are too great to make that true.

Trevor Reed (copyright), UC Irvine School of Law

Indigenous creative rights: © is silent on status of citizens of over 500 tribes, despite importance of Indian culture to 1970s American culture. Many pieces of indigenous self-determination legislation in the 70s.

Mismatch b/t © and tribal sovereignty: tribes often regulate traditional knowledge; © might call it public domain or give it only thin protection. Eurocentric assumptions: limited times, transfers to certain people only, money is a sufficient remedy, it doesn’t matter where the creativity occurs; divides intangible from tangible. Ignores tribal sovereignty; 301 preemption can conflict. Tribes should, among other things, be able to take over registration and deposit. His objections: Should be no public domain for tribal creativity w/o tribal authorization; federal remedies for violation of tribal rights; tribal courts should be recognized as venues for © claims and tribes’ regulatory authority should be formally recognized.

Pamela Samuelson (copyright), UC Berkeley Law

Statutory damages are the worst! Evolution: until 1909 Act, there was a per sheet penalty dating back to the Statute of Anne, and statutory damages were an improvement (anybody could ask for the PSP and half of the money went to the US gov’t; not used often). Particularly useful when difficult/expensive to prove damages; courts had discretion to grant statutory damages but generally wouldn’t if damages or profits were measurable. Nonpunitive way to get some compensation and deterrence.

1976: good parts: tripartite structure of $750-30,000 as court considers just; up to $150K for willfulness; discretion to reduce awards if innocent infringers or nonprofit educ/library users who thought uses were fair. Compensatory at low end; deterrent in middle; punitive at high end.

Understandable but contribute to problems: Ps can ask for SD at any time before final judgment; they’re mandatory.

In practice: Congress failed to consider how they should be assessed in secondary liability or multiple work cases—in Cox, jury awarded nearly 100K per work, $1 billion. Authors Guild v. Google, estimated risk was above $350 billion. Arbitrary, inconsistent, and grossly excessive awards.

Suggested guidelines: award minimum where there’s no actual damages or profits or P is unwilling to provide evidence; approximate actual damages when fair use/lack of infringement is plausible, 2-3x actual/profits when reckless or intentional; up to 10x if highly willful. Or consider what will deter this D. Cox v. Sony: main issue is standard for contributory infringement, but second issue was the standard for willful infringement, but oral argument ignored it. SG and Cox said focus should be whether Cox knew its own conduct was unlawful; reasonable for Cox to think it was OK to continue to provide service to accounts whose users infringed, especially to hospitals and barracks and the like.

Now getting worse: 1202 statutory damages. Very similar but minimum is $2500 w/maximum 25K. Measured per violation (not defined) not per infringed work. No “as the court considers just” limit. No need to have registered © for eligibility. Way more likely to result in excessive damages.

Said: heard a lot about Erie, more than any other IP conference: what gives?

McKenna: Congress has left the field and SCOTUS justices are no longer picked for being lawyers but for specific hot-button issues. That leaves everything to lower courts.

Lemley: we’ve also decided to abandon the common law and equity for the dictionary definition of whatever terms the judge decides to look up, which is a particular disaster for an IP regime that assumed a common-law development. Many key concepts (infringement standard) aren’t even in the statute. So we’ve abandoned the tools we’ve used for centuries. Leaving us with the executive branch, and leaving aside Trump chaos, one of the challenges is that you won’t get long term consistent development. We’re looking at traditional sources of federal law and finding them wanting.

Samuelson: tech is also a big driver in ©. Generative AI, billions of dollars at stake. Every other tech has pissed off a specific sector: recording industry, movies, etc. Now everyone is mad. Dismantling of federal science community is also hurting. Copyright is the only law on the books is the only thing that seems like it could destroy AI; that’s not going to happen but Ps can ask for impoundment/destruction, or they could end up having control over the models.

Reed: people are losing faith in economic rationales of IP; social justice is becoming a bigger rationale and people want to see more of that, but we keep spinning out more economic arguments. Compare backlash to racist mascots—pressure on corporations to change their TMs.

Farley: what went wrong in Dastar? Unbounded definition needed constraint.

McKenna: Dastar’s biggest fan! But courts haven’t applied it. The case is hard: you have to dig in to get what the court is saying. Whatever else you thought of Scalia, he was smart and engaged with the arguments, and that level of engagement is less common. Also, lower courts don’t like the outcomes it produces and so ignore it. That means TM is used as a back door for copyright, especially for works in public domain.


Santa Clara School of Law: Intellectual Property Conference: How It Started, How It's Going: What Went Right?

Moderator: Brian Love, Santa Clara Law

Jeanne Fromer (trademark), New York University Law School

Search and examination on relative grounds (Europe doesn’t do that)—has critiques but generally doing a decent job. Ironic b/c we think of US as “free market” and Europe as paternalistic but registration works the opposite way. Smaller businesses may not have registrations but can get benefits from opting in; use is still the core of US TM. This is a way to give them some protection/different pathways for TM rights, and having the two paths (registered/unregistered) is generally good. Courts also helped systematize distinctiveness—again with some things that aren’t working great, but the systematization is a good thing. Semantic connection b/t mark and category of goods/services must be evaluated: shouldn’t be protected as a mark when connection is too strong, or protection shouldn’t be easily granted if it’s pretty strong. Focus on consumer perception is also a good one from the perspective of TM’s goals: to keep consumers from confusion in the marketplace and being responsive to how they behave.

Rob Merges (patent), UC Berkeley Law

Volume/velocity of transactions based on IP rights has grown amazingly since 70s/80s, a little bit invisibly in how many business models and transactions enabled. Textualism/literal infringement doctrine gave rise to the practice of claim charts, which made for transactional efficiency: a formalistic procedure. Structures claim interpretation process into fairly narrow channel. This allows a boom in patent licensing. Allows fast development of vaccines—patent licensing is behind the scenes. ROP is also good b/c there are things you can do with property rights that you can’t do with contract alone in terms of transactions.

Rebecca Tushnet (copyright), Harvard Law School

Unlike my predecessors, I’m not going to do an overview, but talk about a specific provision of copyright law. Just as democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried, so too with section 512, the safe harbor provisions for internet service providers, which has proven remarkably robust despite multiple efforts to destroy it over the past nearly three decades. I have my own litany of complaints about practical problems with 512, but in terms of dispute management it is a resounding success. I will compare 512 to the recently enacted Take It Down Act and discuss the evolution of caselaw by comparison to Carol Rose’s account of property titling systems.

512 creates a safe harbor against monetary liability and sweeping injunctive relief that would require changes in practices for online service providers that follow certain rules about how to handle complaints of infringement. It divides service providers into four categories, one of which is essentially defunct; service providers that provide connections for content like email or private messaging are supposed to have policies that terminate repeat infringers, and that’s definitely created some problems now, but for decades the key provisions were those for service providers who store content—like YouTube—or provide links or search engines, like Google—who won’t be held liable for direct or secondary infringement if they promptly take down instances of infringement when properly notified about them. 512 explicitly does not require services to monitor their services for infringing content. It does provide for liability without notice if a host or linker has “red flag” knowledge of infringement, but the courts have generally been pretty robust about making sure that general knowledge that infringement is taking place on a platform, or even general knowledge that there are multiple copies of an infringing work on a platform, don’t count as red flag knowledge. So unless a site is something like “top 50 movies to download,” it probably won’t have red flag knowledge.

What went right with 512? Well, one way to measure it is how many disputes it has resolved.  Caselaw v. number of disputes—the number of disputes is in the billions (even if 1/3 of the notices sent to Google are invalid, which seems to be the case, still billions of correctly targeted notices). There are big 512 cases, but not that many of them. The caselaw tells you only what was significant enough to fight in court about for unusual reasons—either reasons of the defendant’s deep pockets and structural significance in the entertainment ecosystem, or reasons of the plaintiff’s specific interests, usually a moral sense of offense. The everyday functioning of the system, though, is that lots of infringing stuff gets quickly taken down, often—if you believe Google—even before anyone has even seen it. And uploaders who disagree with the takedown can file counternotices; a service that honors the counternotice is immune from liability for reinstating the content and the copyright owner has to sue the uploader. Very few counternotices are filed.

Another way to measure success: 512 immediately became the default rule around the world, at least in practice—even in Europe, 512 compliance was for a long time sufficient to avoid being sued successfully—suggests 512’s utility as a workable compromise between interests of IP owners and accused infringers (compare the fate of the similar section 230, which definitely spurred US dominance in tech but was not routinely accepted as the final word on intermediary liability in non-IP situations).

Europe eventually diverged, at least formally, by requiring intermediaries to engage in licensing attempts and screening. But I say formally because even today it doesn’t seem to me that this has worked except for music and popular video; major forms of copyrightable works like photographs and texts are just not amenable to that kind of licensing requirement because ownership is not concentrated enough for comprehensive licensing regimes to form. European regulators have the benefit of not actually needing to require exact compliance with what looks like the plain meaning of the law; being a “good guy” is generally enough in the EU, something that is often surprising to US lawyers, who expect a law that doesn’t explicitly have a good-faith standard to not have a good-faith standard for compliance. The DMCA, that is, is still shaping behavior on the ground around the world.

There was a major attempt in the last 10 years to gut DMCA and put in concepts like notice-and-staydown in the US, which would require services to search for and remove similar copies after receiving notice about the location of one infringing copy. This was a brilliant branding move by 512’s haters—staydown sounds almost like takedown, so how hard could it be? But it is actually a huge technical challenge, especially for smaller services, and would have been a huge gift to YouTube in maintaining its dominance. Fortunately, this attempt fizzled, which is one reason that sites like Wikipedia, Reddit, Ravelry, and the Archive of Our Own can operate in relative confidence without the resources of a Google or Microsoft.

What about my complaints? Well, there’s definitely complexity, as the Supreme Court’s recent attempt to tackle intermediary liability for internet service connection providers makes clear; we’ll see what happens in the Cox case and that will tell us a lot about what 512 means for connection providers in the US. And counternotice law is a mess: when abusive notices are sent, it’s very hard to hold the sender accountable. But I want to make the case that the crud that’s accrued around various aspects of 512 is the standard fate of almost any law allocating rights, no matter how clear.

In her justly famous 1988 article Crystals and Mud in Property Law, Carol Rose explained that all clear legal rules, particularly rules created by legislatures, face pressure from two sources: the ignorant and the conniving, the fools and the scoundrels. The ignorant don’t know about the law, no matter how clear and crystalline it is, and they are subject to mistakes that make them lose out despite them not having done anything morally wrong. They didn’t know that land can only be transferred by a writing, so they rely on an oral agreement and hand over their money and are out of luck. The scoundrels exploit the clarity and hard edges of the legal rule to get unfair outcomes: the law says a mortgage has to be fully paid by a date certain or the borrower defaults and loses the land, so a conniving lender can hide out and make it impossible to find them until the time has passed and they get the land and most of the money. These abuses and unfairnesses pile up and courts for completely understandable reasons will make up special exceptions to allow equity back in, muddying the clarity of the written rule. Equity of course has its own costs: it makes disputes more unpredictable, therefore expensive, disadvantaging poorer actors, and equity is also more reliant on the biases of the factfinder who may have its own predispositions about the characteristics of good guys.

I believe that much of the uncertainty that has accreted in the corners of 512 law is the inevitable effect of this crystals and mud dynamic; it is not unique to 512 and therefore it’s extremely unlikely that changes to 512 could do anything more than restart this process: replacement rules would either be mud all the way down, which I think is worse, or be a different and probably worse crystal that would not make either creators or intermediaries better off. Rose concludes that, when the mud gets too bad, the legislature often intervenes to put a new crystalline rule in place—the fact that 512 has survived some reasonably well-resourced legislative assaults to me suggests that this isn’t one of those situations where the mud has fully gummed up the works.

I want to end by comparing 512 to the recently passed Take It Down Act, aimed at sexually explicit images “indistinguishable from an authentic visual depiction” published without the consent of the person shown in the picture. TIDA is not a safe harbor regime. Instead, it requires two things that aren’t in 512 to avoid liability: (1) services must remove accused images within 48 hours of receiving notice (with no clarity on what qualifies as receipt: I give it about 6 months before someone uses a mailing address and sues based on the time the mailed notice arrived at a building); (2) services must make reasonable efforts to remove known identical copies.

There are no counternotice provisions, even if the content was fully protected by the First Amendment; no safe harbor against liability; no guidance on what counts as reasonable efforts or what qualifies as knowledge. 512 does better on all these counts. Harbinger of attempts to do even more in proposals like Take It Down which cover any use of a digitally altered likeness, even as the White House is posting AI-altered images on official accounts.

Graeme Dinwoodie (International IP), Chicago-Kent College of Law

US jurisdiction over foreign © claims was done right. US wanted to become a leader in int’l © law to enable more effective enforcement. Led to NAFTA, TRIPS. Public law side interventions not always received enthusiastically outside the US—intrusion on sovereign choices. But private litigants used them successfully to argue that US law shouldn’t be applied extraterritorially. Predicate act: foreign profits from US infringement can be secured in US courts, often w/o regard to law of other country, but there are limits to that; would have liked more comity-facing analysis.

Historical reluctance globally to adjudicate claims of foreign © infringement. SDNY, a few years after 1978 Act, allowed claims for infringement in various South American countries to proceed. Impulse to provide relief under multiple foreign © laws were spot on. NY was where D was amenable to jurisdiction; hope that British courts would do the same thing in similar circumstances. For some time, this case was alone, in part b/c of fear of foreign “bramble bush” of law. Eventually, this approach got appellate endorsement in Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney—simply having to apply foreign © law of 18 countries was not a reason to decline jurisdiction. Not a torrent of cases, but the availability of such relief has structured private behavior. Has also been embraced by courts in Europe.

Especially valuable for small authors w/no resources to litigate cross-continent. Streamlining duplicative litigation is not inherently pro-© owner: Computer Associates v. Altai didn’t just occur in NY, but also in France. After they won in the US, Altai unsuccessfully sought an anti-suit injunction from relitigating in France, but it would have been more efficient for a small defendant to secure global clearance in a single case. (Altai won in France, but would have been much faster/cheaper in one court.) Better than seeking enforcement of US law to entire dispute. Enhances legitimacy/embraces sovereignty. But it does create complexity in applying foreign law; the good news is that public law has reduced divergence; there weren’t 18 different rules in the Disney case.

Different constraints in TM/patent. In patent, distaste for litigating foreign patents in Fed Cir and ECJ. ALI principles endorse doing patent/TM, with patent invalidation being given only inter partes effect. And in last few years, courts signaled more willingness, though Albright in Texas wants to grant anti-suit injunctions. That’s where this is going, along with jurisdictional issues. Will be a dialogue b/t patent judges in different countries; likely to be more respectful of sovereignty and thoughtful than the public law debates we’re going to see.


Friday, January 16, 2026

CFP: Yale/Harvard/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, May 21-22

 Please share widely! 

Request for Submissions

Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum

May 21-22, Yale Law School

 Harvard, Stanford, and Yale Law Schools are soliciting submissions for the 2026 Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, to be held at Yale Law School on May 21-22, 2026. Ten to fifteen junior scholars (with one to seven years of teaching experience) will be chosen, through a double-blind selection process, to present their work at the Forum. A jury of accomplished scholars will choose the papers to be presented. A senior scholar will comment on each paper. The audience will include the participating junior faculty, senior faculty from the host institutions, and any invited guests. There is no publication commitment. Yale Law School will pay presenters’ travel expenses, though international flights may be only partially reimbursed. 

The goal of the Forum is to promote in-depth discussion about particular papers and more general reflections on broader methodological issues, as well as to foster a stronger sense of community among American legal scholars, particularly by strengthening ties between new and veteran professors. 

TOPICS: Each year, the Forum invites submissions on selected topics in public and private law, legal theory, and law and humanities topics, alternating loosely between public law and humanities subjects in one year, and private law and dispute resolution in the next. For the upcoming 2026 meeting, the topics will cover these areas of the law:

Antitrust

Bankruptcy

Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution

Contracts and Commercial Law

Corporate and Securities Law

Intellectual Property

Private Law Theory and Comparative Private Law

Property, Estates, and Unjust Enrichment

Taxation

Torts 

QUALIFICATIONS: Authors who teach law in the U.S. in a tenured or tenure-track position and have not been teaching at either of those ranks for a total of more than seven years are eligible to submit their work. American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also eligible, provided that they have held a faculty position or the equivalent, including positions comparable to junior faculty positions in research institutions, for not more than seven years, and that they earned their last degree after 2016. Authors must be qualified as of the date of submission. We accept jointly authored submissions, but each of the coauthors must meet the qualification requirements. Papers that will be published prior to the Forum are not eligible. There is no limit on the number of submissions by any individual author. Faculty from Harvard, Stanford, and Yale Law Schools are not eligible.

 

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Please use the following form to submit: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeE-Y1decyDrkmejVoztM2oPI3MrLfxdP3kCT500H1TwUBiMg/viewform?usp=header. The deadline for submissions is February 20, 2026. Remove all references to the author(s) in the paper. The form will ask for the title of your paper; under which topic your paper falls; an affirmation that your paper satisfies the non-publication qualification above; and the year in which you began teaching in one of the qualifying positions above. Each paper may only be considered under one topic. Any inquiries about the form should be directed to Christine Jolls. 

FURTHER INFORMATION: General inquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to Christine Jolls (christine.jolls@yale.edu) at Yale Law School, Norman Spaulding (nspaulding@stanford.law.edu) at Stanford Law School, or Rebecca Tushnet (rtushnet@law.harvard.edu) at Harvard Law School.

Christine Jolls

Norman Spaulding

Rebecca Tushnet

 

Thursday, October 30, 2025

bad Lanham Act claim, swept up with bad patent claim, triggers Rule 11 sanctions

Raydiant Oximetry, Inc. v. ALC Medical Holdings LLC, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3022882, No. 25-cv-00392-VC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2025)

Baseless patent and false advertising claims produce a big Rule 11 award. The patent stuff is eye-popping, and it’s hard to imagine that Rule 11 would have been appropriate just for the false advertising claim, which was baseless only because the challenged statements didn’t occur in “commercial advertising and promotion”/weren’t part of an organized campaign to penetrate the market. But still—a warning!

I’ll let the court introduce the facts:

This dispute began when ALC Medical Holdings sent Raydiant Oximetry a demand letter alleging that Raydiant’s medical device [a uterine device used to treat postpartum hemorrhaging] infringed ALC Medical’s patent. This accusation was false. Raydiant’s device has a “placement marker” that is permanently affixed, while the device claimed in ALC Medical’s patent requires an adjustable placement marker. In fact, the Patent and Trademark Office declined to approve the patent application until it was narrowed to require that the placement marker be adjustable.

Unfortunately, patent plaintiffs send baseless demand letters to defendants with some regularity. But this was no ordinary fishing expedition. To the contrary, all evidence available to ALC Medical and its lawyers at the time they sent the letter pointed strongly towards noninfringement. The sole founder of ALC Medical, Jennifer West, used to work at Raydiant. She helped develop Raydiant’s device and knew that it did not have a moveable placement marker. There was a reason for this design choice: Raydiant concluded that if the device’s placement marker were moveable, it would be dangerous to the patients who use it. Presumably for the same reason, the device West developed after she left Raydiant does not contain a moveable placement marker, even though her company’s patent requires one.

Thus, when Raydiant brought an action in this Court seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, ALC Medical and its lawyers should have apologized and walked away.… Instead, they doubled down. They brought counterclaims against Raydiant, including one for infringement, asserting again that Raydiant’s device possessed a moveable placement marker. They also falsely alleged that West’s own device practiced the invention—that is, that her device had a moveable placement marker.

In support of the infringement counterclaim, ALC Medical and its lawyers submitted several diagrams depicting Raydiant’s device. On each diagram, they cited the YouTube video of a presentation Raydiant gave at an industry conference, indicating that the diagrams originated from the slide deck used in that presentation. But that was not entirely true. The lawyers manipulated one of the diagrams, superimposing dotted lines to make it seem like Raydiant’s device had a moveable placement marker. Nothing in Raydiant’s actual slide deck or the video of the presentation suggested that was the case.

Subsequently, Raydiant allowed ALC Medical and its lawyers to inspect the device. The inspection confirmed what all the evidence had previously suggested: the placement marker was not moveable…. ALC Medical and its lawyers … embarked on a ham-fisted scramble to avoid liability for Raydiant’s attorneys’ fees. First, they refused to dismiss their infringement counterclaim (or their equally frivolous false advertising counterclaim) unless Raydiant also agreed to dismiss its declaratory judgment action, with each side to bear its own fees and costs. Naturally, Raydiant refused. Then, ALC Medical and its lawyers filed a frivolous motion to dismiss Raydiant’s declaratory relief action for lack of jurisdiction, claiming falsely that Raydiant’s device was an “investigational device” immune from infringement claims. Later, they cobbled together a covenant not to sue that they argued mooted Raydiant’s declaratory relief claim, even though it clearly did not. At each step of the way, the position taken by ALC Medical and its lawyers became increasingly disconnected from the reality of the situation ….

Raydiant was awarded over $1.4 million in attorneys’ fees, with ALC Medical and its law firm Womble Bond jointly and severally liable.

The false advertising counterclaim was based on Raydiant’s presentation of its device at the Stanford Medicine Pediatric & Maternal Innovation Showcase, a pitch competition. Sanctions are warranted under Rule 11 if “(1) ‘the [challenged pleading, written motion, or other paper] is legally or factually baseless from an objective perspective,’ and (2) the attorneys failed to conduct ‘a reasonable and competent inquiry before signing and filing [it].’ ” The court found that both counterclaims “easily [met] this test.”

Just a bit from the patent discussion: Womble Bond denied bad faith in submitting the altered exhibit, asserting that the annotated dashed lines were made with a different font and in red color to distinguish the exhibit from the original slide. “This is difficult to swallow, particularly because counsel only submitted a black and white copy of its counterclaims to the Court, and the two fonts apparently used on [the exhibit] are not easily distinguishable. If Womble Bond and ALC Medical had truly been concerned about not misleading the Court, as opposed to disguising the baselessness of the infringement counterclaim, they could have easily included a disclaimer alongside the image clarifying that it had been annotated.” Practice tip ahoy!  

The Lanham Act counterclaim alleged that Raydiant’s discussion at the pitch session of its device’s being “cleared” or “approved” by the FDA was misleading because the device is a Class II device exempt from premarket notification requirements. “ALC Medical and its counsel knew or should have known that the claim was objectively baseless under Ninth Circuit law,” because only “commercial advertising or promotion” is actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). This requires: (1) commercial speech; (2) made by a defendant who is in competition with the plaintiff [note that this is not necessary post-Lexmark]; (3) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy the defendant’s goods or services; and (4) “disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute ‘advertising’ or ‘promotion’ within that industry.” A presentation at a one-off grant competition, “clearly” does not constitute “commercial advertising or promotion” under that definition. The court distinguished cases involving a press release and a conference presentation whose slides were posted on the defendant’s website. The pitch competition was more akin to “private statements made to actual and potential customers” that were insufficient to constitute sufficient dissemination. Thus, the counterclaim was “frivolous from the time it was filed.”

 


Friday, October 17, 2025

Conspicuous Consumers, NYU Engelberg Center

Welcome and Keynote: Nancy Mahon, SVP, Global Corporate Citizenship & Sustainability, The Estée Lauder Companies

Interesting talk; I learned that UK consumers respond well to claims that a product decreases the company’s carbon footprint, but US consumers aren’t interested in that and want to know about the effect on their own carbon footprint.

Sustainability in the Eye of the Beholder

Rochelle Dreyfuss, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Anna Tischner, Jagiellonian University in Krakow: European TM law can override sustainability despite EU’s attempted commitment to carbon neutrality. Hermes won a case against an atelier that incorporated scarves into new clothes. But her research shows consumers understand that refurbished etc. goods have qualities not reflecting on the TM owner. Need more space for this. British case didn’t allow refurbishment to convert devices to electric, but only b/c the advertising was confusing—which is correctable, and thus perhaps a positive sign.

Maggie Chon, Seattle University School of Law: Discussed certification marks as ways to build consumer trust/purchase interest. Issues: standards represented by certification mark can be opaque; hard to figure out what they really require. Also, certifications can compete and have different standards—consumers aren’t equipped to figure out which “fair trade” marks are more stringent or less stringent.

Jessica Silbey, Boston University School of Law: Project w/Mark McKenna on interviews with designers: insist on design as a process, not an outcome; they want to unify form and function; and they consider themselves human-focused, oriented to solving problems. In the sustainability context, they want to act as moral entrepreneurs. Coherence, minimalism, sustainability, accessibility, and inclusivity are goals—coherence and minimalism seem aesthetic but they’re also about avoiding material waste. The last three are considerations they think necessary for good designs/progress: the ability for everyone to use the design. E.g., designing for an insulin pen that will actually be used (many people don’t take their meds). OXO dustpan designed to be used by all kinds of hands.

Aaron Perzanowski, University of Michigan Law School: Right to repair and sustainability—appliances, electronics, vehicles need fixing; can that be done outside authorized channels? Firms have strong incentives to assert control over repair process, which can be incredibly lucrative. Fixing cracked phone screens is $3 billion/year in US alone. Expensive repairs also drive new device purchases. 150 million mobile phones are discarded per year; 60 million metric tons of e-waste a year. About 70% of toxic waste in US landfills is e-waste. DMCA as a big problem; 1201 exemptions allow repair of, e.g., tractors, but no one is allowed to distribute a tool to others to do this, so farmers better be good programmers.

Patent law can also be an issue, as can individual component parts covered by utility or design patents, giving power over price and availability. Especially problematic given incredibly low standards for design patent—big uptick in auto parts as well as home appliances. Fed Cir did away with longstanding test for obviousness of design patents in GM v. LKQ; what that means in long term is not yet clear but could mean fewer low value design patents. Trade secrets are also an issue, but claimants can’t usually defend them—the info is generally ascertainable through simple reverse engineering. We don’t need to respect your wishes not to disclose info just b/c you’d make more money if you kept it to yourself.

TM too (already covered by other speakers). Biggest problem here is importation—exhaustion. But TM law prevents “material differences” and courts are much too eager to find such differences—a difference in warranty; existence of phone support (even for ball bearings). Nominative fair use does a good job in its lane, though.

So far we’ve passed right to repair laws covering 100 million people in US, including in California. Also worked on National Defense Authorization Act to get right to repair requirements in any purchase DoD makes.

Tischner: EU design law has a repair clause for spare parts. This allows independent manufacturers to make & sell parts that reproduce a protected design as long as it’s genuinely for repair. The real tension comes from TM law, not design law—the design law exception doesn’t apply horizontally across IP, so companies use TM to block repair and control markets. Surveyed professionals: saw logo on repair part as description of part, not indication of origin. TM law is also normative, but results of our and similar empirical studies should inform TM policy.

Q: do designers think about repair?

Silbey: They think about durability.

Perzanowski: there’s a tradeoff b/t durability and repairability, which we need to recognize and educate about. Sometimes the market recognizes this, as for cars. Not so much whether it’s designed for repair but who gets to do the repair there. Consider relatively direct regulatory intervention in design: mandating user-replaceable batteries on consumer electronics, for example. If Apple was required by law to make a swappable battery, it would probably do a really good job, but it won’t if it’s not forced to; we’ve already seen this work with USB-C.

The Consumer Scientist

Chris Morten, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Fran Visco, National Breast Cancer Coalition: created a science education program for patient advocates: how to analyze clinical trials, interpret statistical information, understand the cell cycle—important for determining endpoints.

Hilary Koch, Advocate for people living with diabetes: continuous glucose monitors existed, but couldn’t be monitored remotely—advocates like Koch created an open source solution for this. Likewise, devices didn’t talk to each other; created open solution for that. Able to sleep through the night for the first time in 10 years! Huge improvement in diabetes management. Non-FDA approved device was better than anything on the market b/c patients came together to make it themselves. Everyone had to make it themselves (adding software to FDA-approved devices) to avoid FDA [and 1201?]. But someone was available to provide advice 24/7. Now there’s an FDA approved device to talk to other devices, and one reason is b/c of the earlier patient-based devices. Non-approved devices are also still out there and ahead of the FDA-approved devices thanks to patient scientists.

She also had a really interesting discussion of how each patient’s experience is different and they’re experts on their own experiences and need more control: women want information on how their menstrual cycles affect them and want to be able to press a button on their device to flag this; many hospitals don’t allow insulin pumps, but today’s insulin pumps take care of everything and this rule makes diabetics terrified to go into hospitals for other issues.

Steve Woloshin, Dartmouth Geisel School of Medicine: patients are often underrepresented in product design, testing, and regulatory approval. Communication with patients to understand what the products (tests, devices, drugs) do and how to use them is vital but it’s often an afterthought. DTC ads: oversight is spotty and they aren’t required to tell you how effective they are. Covid home test kits example: Although they did test the instructions, which was good, they didn’t test whether people understood what results they were getting—have to use Bayes’ law to understand the chance that you’re infected, given a positive or negative test result. It’s easy to get wrong and the instructions didn’t explain it at all. Empirical tests showed that 33% of people in a high risk group (symptoms, exposed to someone with determined covid) would not understand the risks of a negative result. Were able to reduce that to 14% with revised instructions, and to decrease unnecessary quarantine decisions. An untested communication can be as dangerous as an untested drug.

DTC ads: Billions of dollars spent on them; people see 9 drug ads/day. But they overstate benefits/downplay harms/overstate certainties. There’s a lot of opportunity to make ads better but the system is reactive/slow. FDA announced that it will revisit DTC ads. Dozens of warning letters about ads, largely b/c visual messages were allegedly misleading (take this drug and you’ll be able to climb mountains). Good start, but tip of iceberg. Basic problem: ads fail to tell consumers how well the drug works. Often unclear what outcomes the drug treats, or even conditions. Quantify the outcome! Same for common serious harms.

Current regs say you have to discuss benefit, but benefit just means indication under current rules—so if you say “decreases cholesterol” you’re done. But does that affect your chance of having a heart attack? Does it cut it in half from 2% to 1%? Something else? Nothing in current regs about quantifying benefits or harms; nothing about pretesting ads for accurate communication. Should have a drug facts box like a nutrition facts box.

Charles Duan, American University Washington College of Law: standard IP incentive theories don’t explain open source innovations here, which involve huge amounts of effort donated to the community. People who change their diets to improve their health are also experimenting on themselves—self-motivation is very important. Need to think about how to regulate open source devices, where there isn’t a wealthy drug company behind them.

IP Rights as a Signal to Consumers

Jeanne Fromer, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Chris Cotropia, University of Richmond School of Law: Do patent claims matter to consumers? No, not really. There’s a false marking provision in patent law that seems to think that they might. Patent is more about communication between competitors/producers, less about consumers. Patent’s justification: Incentive for invention, and for commercialization. Get the new, useful, nonobvious thing created and produced. But can communicating to consumer create a direct feedback effect?

Notice statute: can’t get patent damages unless infringer has notice. Can be actual, or constructive by marking the patented product. The audience is not the consumer, but competitors. False marking statute, though, has consumers in mind—can’t mark product as patented or patent pending if that’s not true; initially empowered qui tam actions. Theory was a consumer oriented theory—that there was potential harm to the consumer. Lots of people engaged in false marking b/c they had, e.g., plastic molds; the patent would expire and they’d keep using the molds. Entrepreneurial lawyers started suing; then AIA changed the law to require competitive harm from the false marking. So, what information are consumers getting from the patent marking?

Study by Alexander Billy & Neel Sukhatme: convinced drugstores to let them enhance marking on actually patented products in some drugstores and not others; they found essentially a perfect null effect. Tried again on Mechanical Turk with vignettes and found the same null effect. Do find that “patented” label leads survey respondents to think that the product was more innovative; didn’t translate into willingness to buy. Another study, Gavin Milczarek-Desai & Derek E. Bambauer: showed ads, some said patented, patented pending, Consumer Reports supports, or nothing, and found no variation, but “patent pending” may have a slight effect on reported willingness to buy. His own study: crowdfunding campaigns. Found same (lack of) effect. Patent label didn’t change success right, but “patent pending” had higher success rate. In lab, people are 2x as likely to invest in a project that says “patent pending” as opposed to “patented” or nothing. Consumers are just looking at the products and deciding if they want to buy. Why might “patent pending” be different? Might seem even more innovative—haven’t even had time to get a patent yet! But we don’t know.

Jacob Noti-Victor, Cardozo Law: Copyright side—copyrights are also not strong signals to consumers. There may be a theory that the © next to a work confers legitimacy, but hasn’t seen empirical studies. Maybe video game industry achieved some legitimacy by using ©? But we do know that consumers don’t know what © means when they see it.

©’s human authorship requirement and effects of AI: enabled or even manufactured consumer-facing signals of things consumers do care about, such as authenticity. There’s no authorship for computer generated works as such—long tradition of not recognizing nonhuman authorship. Trickier when there’s a human and an AI system. Human prompting isn’t sufficient for human authorship, CO says, even with detailed prompt engineering/iterative prompting. Office based this on a reading of the law and the mechanics of the technology—there’s too attenuated a connection b/t the prompt and the final output; the prompter can’t predict or conceptualize the expressive output—there’s no requisite causation/connection b/t idea and expression. Like Chapman Kelly garden case where 7th Circuit says a garden is too unpredictable to be ©able. But there can be protection for human selection, coordination, and arrangement of AI products—curatorial decisions around AI content, not AI content itself; will be thin copyright.

Office’s choices here are coextensive with consumer preferences for process: preferences tied to the means of production and not solely to the output. Fair trade coffee. Consumers are more likely to want to buy non-AI work; this isn’t just squeamishness but ethical priorities and desire for authenticity that affects consumer decisionmaking especially in aesthetic contexts. Authenticity can have dark sides, but it’s also a way to acknowledge the social role of art and its role in moral identity/self-identification.

Office requires disclaimers of AI generated material. Registration potentially provides info to consumers. Could be a good record, assuming copyright claimants are telling the truth. But more can be done.

Mark McKenna, UCLA School of Law: Most obvious way IP rights might signal to consumers is by being a marketing tool: claimant advertises it has an IP right to show the product is meritorious or unique compared to other products, and that might work even w/o a clear idea of the content of the right. The patent evidence is interesting; maybe there’s an analogy here to how some colleges publicize percentage of faculty w/terminal degrees and others don’t feel the need to do so; maybe at the top end, producers assume you know they’re innovative (Apple) and don’t prioritize patents.

GIs: could also publicize the characteristic of a good as being (supposedly) geographically  unique.

What about feedback loops where existence of rights feeds back into scope of rights? TM: b/c those rights depend on consumer understanding, but consumer understanding can be shaped by their beliefs about what law allows/requires. The existence of rights depends on consumer understanding, b/c it determines whether there’s been trademark use, or secondary meaning to make it a TM; the scope of rights depends on consumers’ beliefs about what others are allowed to do. The rules on secondary meaning give a lot of weight by actions taken by putative owner to claim the existence of rights: creates incentives to publicize claims—the nature of putative mark’s presence in ads matters a lot. Matters even more when the claimed matter is complex; courts will often condition protection on “look for” advertising—to call it out from the background noise.

Claims of rights in relation to certain kinds of uses of TM can also shape consumer understandings in ways that turn out to affect legal scope. This is true at the retail level—particular uses of a particular mark, like NFL’s assertion of extremely broad rights in “Super Bowl” TM. Threatens bars, churches, community organizations that advertise they’ll (legally) show the Super Bowl. Even if there’s no suggestion of sponsorship other than the use of “Super Bowl.” These are paradigmatic nominative fair uses and shouldn’t be w/in the scope of the NFL’s rights, but the NFL has been unbelievably successful with these threats, so most references are to “the Big Game,” which itself is both cause and effect of consumer beliefs. But by the same logic, NFL can claim rights in “the Big Game.”

This effect can also work at the wholesale level—entire categories of uses like merchandising—50 years ago no one thought universities had the sole right to use university marks on T-shirts. Madison, like every other college town, was full of T-shirts featuring UW marks, some of which predated UW’s own use on t-shirts. But a major campaign branded these as counterfeits; leveraged relationship with university bookstores to control major apparel companies. Strategy seems to have worked; many people now believe the law requires university permission even though no one thinks the university is responsible for the quality of the t-shirts. PTO even made up the “secondary source” rule: use on the front of a T-shirt functions as a mark if the mark is known in some other setting. Created ©-like rights in anything related to them, justified by reference to the consumer understanding they’ve created. Can also be used for, e.g., mid-century modern design—association of design w/designer can be leveraged into “source” claims for the actual furniture.

Consumer understanding can be shaped, and some claimants are well situated to do so and have strong incentives to do it; but we shouldn’t hand over the game to claimants.

Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School

I decided to frame my part of this panel as “can claims of IP rights mislead consumers in a way that triggers general advertising law?” I’m going to start with two requirements of false advertising law that don’t generally apply to IP rights. First, federal false advertising law targets only false or misleading statements in “commercial advertising or promotion.” This is probably not a big barrier for the kinds of claims at issue here, but it’s worth keeping in mind: use instructions, as discussed in the previous panel, might not be advertising (though it likely depends on the product). Second, materiality: to be actionable, a false or misleading statement has to be the kind of statement that is likely to affect consumers’ decisions, as opposed to TM law, which doesn’t require materiality for infringement.

As we already heard, materiality is often a problem in litigating alleged IP-related falsehoods, including false patent marking – most of the time, consumers don’t really care about patent rights. In addition, a Supreme Court case, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, limited the scope of the federal Lanham Act in a way that turns out to be relevant to IP-related signals. That case interpreted the language barring any "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin ... of  goods" to mean only references to physical origin, rather than the source of ideas or expressions embodied in a product.

Lower courts have subsequently held that Dastar limits the scope of federal false advertising law b/c representations about IP rights aren’t representations about physical origin; thus, falsely stating or implying that your music is properly licensed does not constitute a false representation covered by the act. Courts also interpret many state consumer protection laws to be coextensive w/the Lanham Act, though it’s possible to argue that some are broader. There is also a limiting case where the representations are not just about IP rights but also state or imply facts about the physical product: Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., No. 2022-2160 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2024).

Crocs sued competitors for patent infringement; defendant Dawgs counterclaimed for false advertising about the characteristics of the primary material Crocs uses to make its footwear products, a material it promoted as the “patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive” “Croslite.” But “authorship, like licensing status, is not a nature, characteristic, or quality, as those terms are used in Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.” By contrast, “here, the false claim that a product is patented does not stand alone. Dawgs presents allegations and evidence that the falsity of Crocs’ promotional statements is rooted in the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Crocs’ products.” So the question will generally be whether the statement about IP rights conveys a factual claim about the more tangible characteristics of the good (or service) at issue.

Finally, I want to introduce as an additional framing point that law, including product liability law, often doesn’t require TM licensors to take responsibility for their products even when consumers might expect that and even when the TM probably drove the sales—arguably false advertising should not accept this result. Example: Troncoso v. TGI Friday’s Inc., 2020 WL 3051020 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8, 2020)

Troncoso purchased a bag of snack chips labeled “TGI Fridays Potato Skins Snacks,” mistakenly believing the chips to contain real potato skins given that the restaurant chain TGI Fridays sells a Potato Skins appetizer that includes the flesh and peel of the potato. But, even though the TGIF branding is probably what led consumers to have a lot of their expectations about the product, and even though the court found that the product was plausibly deceptive, the trademark owner was off the hook. The court said: “TGIF may be liable for that misleading labeling under GBL §§ 349 and 350 and principles of common-law fraud only if it engaged in making the misleading labeling.” The allegation of licensing “does not suggest that TGIF was involved in any aspects of the labeling beyond its own trademark, which Plaintiff does not allege is misleading”

It’s an example of IP rights—the right to license the mark to others—as false signals. I’ll end with a potentially contrasting case: Puma v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A-1-CA-38023, 2022 WL 3221810, -- P.3d – (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2022) The Pumas alleged that defendants violated the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act based on their purchase of a Black & Decker-branded coffeemaker.

Based on Black & Decker’s reputation, the Pumas thought the coffeemaker would be better than the lower-priced store brand and paid more for it as a result. However, Black & Decker did not in fact design, manufacture, distribute, or warrant the coffeemaker. The district court, after a bench trial, found that defendants’ conduct constituted an “unfair or deceptive trade practice.”

Thus, the presence of the trademark plus the absence of any disclosure on the product or the advertising could deceive reasonable consumers about either (1) the relationship between Black & Decker and Applica; or (2) that the product was in fact a product of Applica, rather than of Black & Decker. The court pointed out that the name, “Black & Decker 12 Cup Programmable Coffeemaker” “emphasized that the ‘Black & Decker’ name was an important characteristic of the Coffeemaker; these statements tended to deceive a reasonable consumer, and Defendants knew or should have known that potential purchasers of the Coffeemaker would likely regard information about the Coffeemaker being a Black & Decker product as material.”

The court emphasized that it was not holding “that the use of a trademark by a licensee pursuant to a trademark licensing agreement by itself constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice,” or that individual or widespread licensing was “per se irrelevant” to the inquiry. Nor was evidence of the quality of the licensed product “per se irrelevant.” Rather, the court of appeals was simply holding that the Lanham Act did not govern the UPA claim, “and that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendants’ knowing and willful use of ambiguity as to material fact, which tended to deceive a reasonable consumer, constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice.” I tend to believe we’d be better off if we held TM owners more clearly to their bargain—when they license in order to make a product more attractive, we should recognize that the TM is helping to sell the licensed product and thus hold them jointly liable for quality.