Quince quashes consumer suit; reasonable consumers must scroll a bit to understand comparison to "traditional retail"

In re Last Brand, Inc. d/b/a Quince Pricing Litig., 2026 WL 3151517, No. 25-cv-09780-EMC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2026)

Putative class plaintiffs sued Quince under the consumer protection laws of nine states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington), and the District of Columbia. They alleged that Quince’s pricing is deceptive, “either because strike-through pricing and a “You save X%” message on each product page mislead consumers into believing the product is on sale, or because information on the product page comparing the Quince product to similar products sold by other retailers misleads consumers into believing that Quince’s products are comparable to or better than the products sold by those other retailers.” Just as Quince defeated a competitor false advertising claim, it did the same here.

On each product page on its website, Quince uses strike-through pricing on what it calls “traditional retail” prices and claims that consumers “save X%” by purchasing the product through Quince. This “traditional retail” price is based on what different retailers charge for a similar product. For example, the “traditional retail” price for the Mongolian Cashmere Crewneck Sweater is based on what J.Crew charges for a cashmere sweater. The price Quince charges is not a “sale” price.

Quince cashmere

Each product page has a table titled “Beyond Compare” below the “Add to Cart” button and product details; on mobile it’s below product reviews. The table compares the featured Quince item to a curated selection of products from high-end brands that are being sold at higher prices than the Quince item. Quince allegedly only includes “higher-priced luxury brands such as J.Crew, Everlane, and Naked Cashmere” in the table and excludes products from “mid-tier or value-oriented brands.” It does not provide links to the other retailers’ products or an explanation of how it selects the products it includes. The table allegedly is designed to highlight attributes of a product where Quince performs well, such as “Free Shipping,” while omitting characteristics where Quince may not perform as well, such as resale value.

The table includes an “i” icon that, if hovered over, shows the text: “Competitor information gathered in [MONTH AND YEAR]; pricing is subject to change.” There’s no similar disclosure next to the product’s price or the struck-through reference price.

Quince also uses terms such as “discounted” and “steals” to refer to its products in advertising and on its website. Its website claims that it “keep[s] prices low by using a factory-direct model that cuts out the supply-chain middlemen and reduces costs.”

Plaintiffs alleged that they reasonably understood the crossed-out price to represent a price at which Quince or other retailers had previously sold identical products, but that wasn’t true.

The parties didn’t dispute that the “reasonable consumer” standard was the same across the states, requiring “a probab[ility] that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers ... could be misled.”

The court rejected both of plaintiffs’ theories of deception (identical item previously sold at higher price; same/better quality than the competitor’s comparator product).

As for the “sale price” theory, the phrase “traditional retail” wouldn’t lead a reasonable consumer to believe that either Quince or another retailer sold an identical product for the higher price and that the Quince price was a “sale” price. A reference price juxtaposed with a selling price can be plausibly deceptive “where the product was sold exclusively by the retailer and had never been sold at the higher reference price.” That can happen with “Compare At,” “Save X%,” “20% off regular price purchases,” and “sale” labels. But “traditional retail” is different: “No reasonable consumer could think that ‘traditional retail’ refers to the regular non-sale price of the same product.” Even if the term were ambiguous, the “Beyond Compare” table on the same page clarifies things. E.g., the “Beyond Compare” table for Quince’s Mongolian Cashmere Crewneck Sweater shows that Quince’s product is made of “100% Grade-A Mongolian Cashmere,” while the compared products are not. “Traditional retail” “clearly refers to prices charged by other retailers for a comparable product.”

Would a reasonable consumer consult the table when determining whether this was a “sale”?

It appears to be a question of first impression whether information partway down a webpage should be considered part of the “front label” or “back label.” While “clicking on [a] question mark icon ... , clicking [a] toggle ... , or [navigating to the] Terms of Use or Frequently Asked Questions ” on a website constitutes “more extensive investigation than simply flipping a product over to read the back label,” there is no such barrier here. A Quince consumer would not need to scroll far on the product page to see the “Beyond Compare” table. While the table appears below the “Add to Cart” button, it is on the same webpage as the product and does not require navigating to another page or clicking on any buttons or toggles. And it is fairly proximate to the “Add to Cart” button. Certainly, scrolling partway down the webpage to view the table in this instance is less onerous than flipping over a physical product to read its back label. Thus, the “Beyond Compare” table should be considered as something a reasonable consumer would see.

Even without the table, the top of the product page, with the strike-through price and “traditional retail” text, was sufficiently ambiguous, with “no obvious discernible meaning; if anything, it begs for an explanation, and thus a reasonable consumer would ‘necessarily require more information before reasonably concluding’” what it means.

As for the comparability theory, it was viable only if plaintiffs alleged that Quince’s products were in fact of inferior quality to the products to which they are compared. The FTC guidelines, which the court found useful, refer to comparisons to “other merchandise of like grade and quality,” and plaintiffs didn’t make any allegations that Quince’s products weren’t comparable in quality.  

Google gets 230 protection for fraudulent apps in Google Play

Hemry v. Google, LLC, 2026 WL 2909299, No. 26-cv-01611-PCP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2026)

Hemry downloaded a fraudulent investment app, Watsans, from the Google Play Store, Google’s main avenue for Android operating system smartphone users to download third-party applications. He sued for violations of the UCL and FAL and common law negligence. Google successfully asserted §230, which is still doing some of its core job.

Google Play’s help pages tout its safety and security and the presence of “safe, high-quality apps,” and Hemry alleged he relied on this. He also alleged that scam apps often make developers’ names include some reference to “5 [stars]” so that users think that the apps themselves have received thousands of five-star reviews from actual users, and that the Watsans page within the Google Play Store exhibited this and other features suggestive of a scam application that should have put Google on notice of the application’s true nature.

The statutory claims were “at least theoretically based on a duty that is distinct from its duties as a publisher—namely, Google’s obligation to ensure that its own representations are not false and misleading.” But a “general statement” of a company’s content moderation policy “is not a specific promise, but a [mere] description of its moderation policy, and thus protected from liability under § 230.” “Google could put apps through safety reviews and check, scans apps to protect users from malware, forbid harmful apps, and ask that all apps comply with all relevant laws, while still hosting dangerous apps despite its best efforts.” The appearance of Watsans in the Google Play store didn’t justify an inference that Google was not conducting the promised 10,000 safety checks or requiring evidence of regulatory compliance, as it allegedly promised to do.

The negligence claim was also barred. Hemry alleged that Google was negligent when it undertook to review third-party apps but failed to exercise reasonable care in performing that undertaking. “The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that Section 230 protects an interactive computer service provider from liability to the extent that liability ‘would require [the service] to actively vet and evaluate third-party’ content.” The court noted the moderators’ dilemma: “permitting liability on such a theory could discourage such providers from engaging in any form of content moderation—the negative disincentive that Congress specifically sought to eliminate through the enactment of Section 230.”

court refuses to recognize Lanham Act false advertising contributory liability

CarShield, LLC v. Pelican Investment Holdings, LLC, 2026 WL 2920868, No. 4:25-cv-01566-MAL (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2026)

The parties compete in the market for car extended warranties. CarShield alleged that most car extended warranties involve multiple actors, from the seller or marketing company that promotes the coverage, to the financing company that facilitates payments, to a third-party administrator that manages claims and is responsible for honoring coverage when issues arise. “CarShield’s edge in the business is that they do not outsource claims, but rather their warranties are administered by an affiliated, in-family administrator,” allegedly signaling  “accountability and reliability.”

Pelican allegedly called CarShield’s existing and prospective customers about switching their coverage to a Pelican plan, making false statements such as telling consumers that car dealers and repair shops no longer accept CarShield plans and that CarShield does not administer its own claims.

Defendant Mepco, which financed the policies sold by Pelican, sought dismissal of the claims against it and the court agreed, including by reasoning that Lanham Act false advertising doesn’t have contributory liability even though trademark does. No reasoning other than that most courts of appeals haven’t recognized false advertising contributory liability. Sigh.

CarShield also sought to use agency, apparent authority, and ratification to hold Mepco liable for its state and federal claims.

Agency: The court found that Mepco had no right to control Pelican in its advertising and marketing activities. The parties’ agreement “did not task Mepco with monitoring, supervising, or otherwise overseeing Pelican’s marketing calls to customers.” A provision requiring Pelican to follow all applicable federal and state laws, including laws relating to consumer protection and false advertising, didn’t matter because, “within the boundaries set by federal and state law, Pelican seems to have enjoyed free rein in deciding how to market and advertise the vehicle service contracts.” Without the right of control, alleged knowledge alone does not give rise to an agency relationship under Missouri law.

Apparent authority also failed. Apparent agency is created by “any conduct by the principal which, if reasonably interpreted, would cause a third person to believe that the principal consents to the acts of the agent.” Even if it were the case that Mepco represented that Pelican was acting on Mepco’s behalf, the complaint didn’t allege that customers believed Pelican possessed authority to act for Mepco and changed their position based on this.

Ratification arguments also failed because that requires a principal-agent relationship.

Kalshi's gambling services aren't so clearly illegal as to make its offerings false advertising

Ho-Chunk Nation v. Kalshi Inc., 2026 WL 2676018, No. 25-cv-698-wmc (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 11, 2026)

[Discussing only false advertising aspects; other aspects of this case, which are about tribal power to regulate Kalshi and its ilk, are more important, but beyond my expertise. The court is allowing an interlocutory appeal on those issues.]

The Ho-Chunk Nation argued, among other things, that Kalshi’s advertisements for “legal” sports betting were false or misleading in violation of the Lanham Act; the court dismissed the claims because, under the current state of the law, there was no “clear and unambiguous” authority resolving whether Kalshi’s sports event contracts are legal. Courts have so far reached “mixed opinions” as to the legality of Kalshi’s sports event contracts. The Nation argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act clearly applied on tribal lands, making Kalshi’s operations clearly illegal and thus reviving the Lanham Act claims. But the court found IGRA’s statutory language is not as “definitive” or “unambiguous” as all that. “Not only does that statute not expressly address multiple, complex questions at issue here, including whether Congress must authorize federal regulation of gambling before an agency may claim that right, but to date, the only two courts to have considered the specific question regarding IGRA and online sports events contracts have reached differing conclusions.” Thus, even though the Nation showed a likelihood of success on its IGRA claim, that wasn’t enough for falsity.

Nor was there a false advertising problem with calling Kalshi’s services “sports betting” or “sports gaming”; that was true, even though Kalshi changed its business strategy to emphasize its betting as “sports event contracts” to make its preemption claims.

court finds "dupe" label probative of intent to confuse and likely confusion

Sol De Janeiro USA, INC. v. MCoBeauty Pty Ltd, 2026 WL 2937438, No. 24-cv-8862 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2026)

Sol sued MCo, its competitor in the market for cosmetics, for false advertising, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition by copying Sol de Janeiro’s fragrance mist products, in violation of the Lanham Act and New York General Business Law. The court found trade dress claims insufficiently pled but trademark infringement (always the exception these days) was plausible because MCo used Sol’s marks as tags.                           

Sol’s mists are sold with an

elongated, opaque, cylindrical white cap [that] has stylized wording in the same white color embossed on the cap; the cap includes a diamond or rhombus shape with letters or words inside the shape; the geometric shape outline on the elongated, translucent bottle (below the cap) … stretches from one side of the bottle to the other when viewed from the front; inside the oval on the elongated bottle at the top of the oval are the stylized words “Sol de Janeiro” or “Brazilian Crush” in white font; inside the oval on the elongated bottle below the text and approximately in the center of the oval are numbers in script font in larger font size than the words above it and below it; the smaller text below the numbers is also in white font and contains a description of the fragrance profile; no writing, font, or graphic elements appear on the bottle underneath or otherwise outside of the label; and a different colored translucent bottle is used for each of the nine fragrances.

Sol fragrances

Sol alleged that the bottles’ design is synonymous with Sol de Janeiro and that it has made substantial investments in advertising and promoting its products in the U.S., selling over 100 million units of beauty and cosmetic products, including the Mists. It also alleged that it had won multiple awards, was Sephora’s 2023 biggest seller in body care, and had a high number of U.S. social media followers.

MCo Mists are packaged in distinctly colored bottles with prominently-displayed numbers in white script font within thin elongated geometric designs, and elongated caps. In its own words, it makes “affordable alternatives to luxury products.” When a consumer types the words “Sol” and “Sol de Janeiro” into a search bar, its website produces results for its products, including MCo Mists. In ads and reviews, MCo, influencers, ambassadors, and reviewers compare its Mists to Sol’s, describing how the packaging and scents are similar. Online posts and comments identify its products as “dupes” of Sol’s. One influencer posted that MCo’s mist “smell[s] exactly” like the Sol Mist and that it would “will last most if not all day long” and “hold[s] better than” the Sol Mist. She stated that Sol’s Mist “has scents of black amber plum and vanilla woods” and the MCo Mist “has scents of black plum and vanilla.” Another influencer described the Mists, stating that they had similar scent notes, and that the MCo Mists’ scents “last all day.” MCo liked the post and commented “Love it!” with a heart-eyes smiley emoji.

MCo fragrances

Product reviews on MCo’s website “include comments that suggest that customers are aware that the MCoBeauty Mists are meant to be duplicates or copies of Sol de Janeiro Mists and smell the same.” Some comments state that MCo’s “packaging [is] very similar to the real one” but that their “[s]cent is a little off and watered down.” Another says that the MCo Mists “smell[ ] exactly like” Sol’s. MCo’s review team monitors the reviews but allows reviews mentioning Sol to remain on the website. (The horror!)

comparison

Sol argued that the comparisons were false and misleading about the smell/lasting all day and about the relationship between the parties. It further alleged that the products weren’t produced with the same materials, didn’t present the exact same fragrances, and didn’t dissipate at the same rate.

The court found that the smell/duration claims were non-false statements of opinion.  “[E]ven a master perfumer’s experiences of the scent profiles of different products cannot be objectively verified.”

However, the court puzzlingly found differently for the use of keywords (Sol’s product names): they weren’t puffery because they weren’t subjective. Hunh? In context, they are comparisons, and the court just held that those comparisons weren’t falsifiable. But the court accepted the allegation that MCo “intentionally attempts to confuse consumers by using” the keywords on its website to indicate that MCo sells Sol products or has a relationship with Sol. [Sighs in Amazon v. MTM.]

The court distinguished between “search advertising” and keyword use on a party’s own website; Second Circuit precedent didn’t support the claim that “customers who already navigated to MCoBeauty’s website will not be confused that MCoBeauty’s products are not Sol de Janeiro’s.” And it was also plausible that the use of Sol’s keywords would likely impact consumer decisions. [Yeah, as comparisons. The things courts find plausible with trademarks that they’d never find plausible with respect to non-trademark false advertising never cease to amaze me.]

The trade dress claims also failed. The court noted MCo’s argument that “the text of the reviews Sol de Janeiro uses to support its claims demonstrates that consumers are not confused and in fact understand that MCoBeauty Mists are ‘dupes’ or ‘lower-cost alternatives,’” which you’d think would also be relevant to the keyword claims.

The court found that Sol sufficiently articulated its “look” and that MCo uses its trade dress, including “prominently-displayed numbers in a nearly identical white script font encased in thin elongated geometric designs, color schemes, elongated caps with script on the caps, fragrances, and ingredients.” And it pled secondary meaning, including because of MCo’s copying, as well as confusion. But it didn’t sufficiently plead nonfunctionality. “[I]t is unclear how the elements convey the elegance and identity of the brand and are not designed for functional reasons like, for example, enabling the user to see the liquid inside.”

As for confusion, the court accepted Sol’s argument that, because dupes are comparable in aesthetic and used the same scent profiles, “consumers may well attribute MCoBeauty’s products to Sol de Janeiro.” Even without anecdotal evidence or survey evidence of confusion, confusion was still plausible because of MCo’s intentional copying: “[E]vidence of intentional copying gives rise to a presumption of actual confusion.” [This conclusion is, of course, ridiculous as to trade dress bearing clear word marks, especially trade dress that could well be functional.] But the court found that MCo’s self-description as “a company engaged in the sales of affordable alternatives to luxury products” weighed in favor of Sol because MCo “expressly capitalizes on Sol de Janeiro’s reputation to gain customers itself.”

materiality divides false advertising and TM once again even with explicit falsity about official partnership

Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC v. Dunican, No. 24-cv-05086, 2026 WL 2937177 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2026)

The Cubs play at Wrigley Field, a historic open-air ballpark. They sell tickets and incur significant expenses to operate Wrigley Field. Defendant Wrigley View

is a rooftop business located adjacent to Wrigley Field, offering views of the Chicago skyline, Lake Michigan, and Wrigley Field. The premises include stadium-style bleacher seating and a skydeck on the rooftop that can accommodate up to 200 guests. From the seats at Wrigley View, customers can see into Wrigley Field over the barriers of the stadium. Defendants sell tickets to the rooftop on days there are games and events at Wrigley Field; in fact, it is only open for business on game days and days with other Wrigley Field events. The Wrigley View website includes a schedule of the Cubs’ home games with hyperlinks to purchase tickets, comparing the Wrigley View experience to that of a ballgame at Wrigley Field.

Wrigley View’s only revenue comes from selling tickets for admission to the rooftop, which includes unlimited ballpark-style concessions. Ticket prices vary depending on, for instance, the opposing team’s popularity, and sales continue despite the Cubs’ installation of semi-transparent mesh screens obstructing the view.

Wrigley View used to have an agreement with the Cubs where it paid royalties and got to use Cubs marks in advertising and advertise a Cubs endorsement, but it expired. Defendants thus reviewed and removed certain website references to the Cubs, including changing its ticket names to simply “Chicago vs. [the opposing team].” But the Wrigley View website still included a PDF brochure containing the Cubs logo. Defendants also continued to include the statement “Official Partner of the Cubs” in its marketing through 2025.

The court found actionable misappropriation. The Cubs “created a product through extensive time, labor, skill or money,” defendants “used [its] product in competition with [Plaintiff], gaining a special advantage ... because [Defendants] bore little or no burden of the expense of development,” and this use caused “commercial damage.” There was no copyright preemption, and the damage came because people would otherwise have to buy tickets from the Cubs or an entity paying royalties to watch live. This also constituted unjust enrichment.

There was also trademark infringement because “the use of a trademark after a license agreement’s termination by itself establishes a likelihood of confusion.”

However, defendants got summary judgment on the false advertising claim despite the “undisputed” falsity and deceptiveness of the endorsement claim, because there was no evidence of materiality. “While deception may be presumed for a literally false statement, there is no such presumption for materiality.” And there was insufficient evidence that “consumers are more likely to purchase tickets to establishments that are partnered with or endorsed by the Cubs, than those that are not…. An official partnership with the Cubs is not an inherent characteristic to the business of viewing the Cubs’ games.” There was no witness testimony or surveys “sufficient to raise an inference of materiality.”

Google's alleged misrepresentations about sophisticated ad tech weren't "consumer-oriented" under NY GBL

In Re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litig., Nos. 21-md-3010 (PKC), 21-cv-3446 (PKC), 23-cv-5177 (PKC), 21-cv-7034 (PKC), 23-cv-1530 (PKC), 2026 WL 2942363 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2026)

As the caption indicates, this is mostly an antitrust case, which means it’s amazing that a couple of antitrust theories survive (mostly the ones Google is precluded from contesting because of previous losses). I’m only going to talk about the false advertising part.

Newspaper plaintiffs brought claims that Google’s representations about its ad tech were misleading under GBL sections 349 and 350. However, no reasonable jury could conclude that Google’s alleged deceptions were consumer-oriented, as required by the GBL, so Google got summary judgment on these claims.

“[B]usiness entities can qualify as ‘consumers’ if the products or services purchased are consumer goods or their equivalent ....” And “an act or practice is consumer-oriented when it has a broader impact on consumers at large” and is not limited to products purchased “for personal, family, or household use.” But “section 349 is aimed at ‘modest’ transactions rather than complex or unique arrangements in which ‘each side was knowledgeable and received expert representation and advice.’ ”

Google pointed to evidence that the newspaper plaintiffs were “large, highly sophisticated companies with a strong understanding of the ad tech at issue, and that they entered into ad-tech arrangements tailored to their specific needs. Each has characterized itself as a ‘large publisher.’” Plaintiff Gannett’s Rule 30(b)(6) deponent described the company as “quite sophisticated” at “digital ad selling.” Gannett and plaintiff Daily Mail both stated in interrogatory responses that they “constantly monitor[ ] the performance of [their] ad tech partners” and make changes if they are not providing added value. Daily Mail has stated that it “operates a sophisticated tech stack” and that its advertising division employs “programmatic analysts,” “infrastructure experts” and more than a dozen engineers.

Thus, no reasonable jury could find that Google’s alleged deceptions about the functions of its sopisticated ad tech products were consumer-oriented activities:

These highly sophisticated and well-resourced plaintiffs negotiated and entered into agreements to use Google’s ad-tech products, which they used to sell billions of ad impressions and garner hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. These were not “ ‘modest’ transactions” that fall under the GBL’s ambit but “complex [and] unique arrangements” that were entered into and supervised by sophisticated experts. Plaintiffs may be correct that the claimed deceptions affected many other publishers and billions of individual transactions, but it has been asserted throughout this multidistrict litigation that customers of the DFP ad server tend to be sophisticated and well-resourced publishers, in contrast to the small publishers that use Google’s simpler AdSense product. Even accepting the assertions of Gannett and Daily Mail that publishers suffered widespread harm based on Google’s deceptions about bidding practices … the sophisticated customers of DFP retained at least some ability to fine-tune and adjust the ad server’s settings to suit their needs. The magnitude of the transactions and the particulars unique to each publisher’s use of the ad tech preclude any finding that Google’s purported deceptions were consumer-oriented activity.

consumer suit against kratom seller proceeds on failure to disclose theory

Cheswick v. Mitra-9 Brands, LLC, 2026 WL 2949413, No. 1:25-CV-6795-LTS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2026)

The court allowed NY consumer protection claims against a kratom seller to proceed. Kratom is “a plant-derived substance that affects the human body in a manner similar to opioids.” Mitra-9 allegedly touts the “unique benefits” of its kratom products, advertising them as “caffeine-free, non-alcoholic, low-calorie[ ]” “plant-based beverages” that “compliment[ ][sic] active lifestyles every day,” “help [consumers] sail through [their] workday or support [their] post-workout routine,” and “support[ ] overall vitality and well-being, fostering focus and a serene approach to life’s challenges.” It allegedly advertises “the unique benefits of [its] kratom,” which comes from “the verdant rainforests of Southeast Asia” and factors into their “specially designed formula.” This so-called “Mitra9 difference” makes the products “an upgrade” from “ordinary supplement drinks” and a “perfect way to shake things up.”

However, kratom allegedly contains alkaloids that, depending on the dose, can produce either stimulating or sedating effects by interacting with numerous receptors in the brain. This includes the brain’s mu-opioid receptor, which is the receptor that “produces the most addictive or habit-forming effects.” It is allegedly similar to morphine in the risks it poses of physical addiction and dependency, with similar withdrawal symptoms, as well as in the fact that repeat users need to consume increasingly large doses to achieve the same effects. Sudden cessation of kratom use can allegedly produce severe, opioid-like withdrawal symptoms, including “irritability, anxiety, difficulty concentrating, depression, sleep disturbance, including restless legs, tearing up, runny nose, muscle and bone pain, muscle spasms, diarrhea, decreased appetite, chills, inability to control temperature, extreme dysphoria, and malaise.”

Nonetheless, most United States consumers allegedly “do not know what kratom is and have no idea how addictive it is.” Mitra-9, despite allegedly knowing the truth, does not warn them, but instead uses packaging that resembles that of commonplace products like “5-Hour Energy” shots and caffeinated energy drinks like “Redbull” and “Celsius.” The named plaintiff initially purchased Mitra-9 Products as an “alternative for pain relief,” but, after consuming them for several months, he began experiencing withdrawal symptoms including “cold sweats, anxiety, joint aches, extreme irritability, restless leg syndrome, and insomnia.”

The plaintiff pled on information and belief that Mitra-9 “interacted with growers and distributors in Southeast Asia who have disclosed the addictive nature of kratom”; “received numerous user reports about the addictive potential of kratom in the United States”; and possessed “studies regarding kratom addiction.”

The court found that a price premium theory of injury was plausible. It was logical that the class “suffered economic injury because they ... would have paid substantially less for [the Products], if they had known that the Products posed a serious risk for addiction.” This was not the same as pleading they never would have purchased the relevant products absent the deception, which is apparently not enough to plead injury.

“Where, as here, the allegedly deceptive act involves an omission, the plaintiff must show that ‘the business alone possesses material information that is relevant to the consumer and fails to provide this information,’ or that the plaintiff could not ‘reasonably have obtained the relevant information [he] now claim[s] the [defendant] failed to provide.’ ”  This latter path was plausibly pled in light of allegations about the public’s general lack of familiarity with kratom, the fact that kratom was “marketed as providing benefits without disclosure of its addictive potential,” the inaccessibility or incomprehensibility of the medical literature to an average consumer, the unlikelihood that consumers would inquire about kratom when “purchasing from third parties or online,” and packaging that mimics that of well-known supplements and caffeinated energy drinks. “Within this broader landscape, a reasonable consumer contemplating a purchase of Defendant’s Products—which Defendant markets and packages as though they are innocuous health supplements—would have no reason to suspect or inquire whether they contained an opioid-like substance with serious addictive risks.”

Fraud by omission claims also survived.

Court sours on WSI's claims against Quince

Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Last Brand, Inc., 2026 WL 2970363, No. 5:25-cv-10118-EJD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2026)

Williams-Sonoma (WSI), which also owns Pottery Barn, West Elm, and Rejuvenation, sued Last Brand, commonly known as Quince, for state and federal false advertising. The court dismissed the claims. The parties compete in the market for kitchen and home goods. “Quince advertises that it sells products comparable to those of traditional retailers like WSI, but at significantly lower prices. To accomplish this, Quince represents that it partners directly with factories to cut out the middlemen, design and produce Quince’s products, and ship the products straight to their customers—thereby passing on the savings to their consumers.”

WSI alleged that the cost savings were actually the result of cutting corners and compromising quality, making comparisons to WSI’s products false.

First, the court found that Rule 9(b) applied to the Lanham Act claim since it sounded in fraud (even though courts often don’t do this in trademark cases).

WSI alleged that Quince falsely represented that certain products were made of Global Organic Textile Standard-certified (“GOTS-certified”) cotton or organic long-staple cotton, citing a Wirecutter review that questioned the GOTS-certification of Quince’s towels, and then explained that, when reached for comment, Quince confirmed that the certification of the towels was actually under review and that it would be removed from its website. Wirecutter also questioned the GOTS-certification of Quince’s bedsheet sets, but later verified this certification, and expressed skepticism at statements on Quince’s website that its bedsheet sets were made of “organic long-staple cotton” based on a sustainable-fashion expert’s opinion that it is impossible to have cotton that is both organic and long-staple.

WSI relied only on the Wirecutter article, which didn’t satisfy Rule 9(b). It didn’t explain “when, where, or what Quince said as to the GOTS-certification of its towels. As to the bedsheets, the statements made in the Article alone are insufficient to plausibly allege the falsity of the bedsheets’ GOTS certification or Quince’s claim that the bedsheets’ cotton is both organic and long-staple.” Wirecutter’s skepticism was insufficient; neither the expert it talked to nor WSI allegedly actually tested Quince’s cotton or investigated its origins. The article even said that GOTS confirmed the certification, and anyway WSI didn’t point to any Quince ad making the challenged representation. A false advertising claim can’t be based “solely on statements made in a sewn-in label that a consumer would not see until after purchasing the product, as such labels are not considered advertising.”

example Beyond Compare chart

Quince provides a “Beyond Compare” chart on many of its product webpages, providing a side-by-side comparison of each product’s price, delivery cost, provision of warranty, and other considerations. WSI argued that Quince’s charts were literally false because they state or imply that Quince sells the same products that WSI sells but for less. The court found that they didn’t. There was no express statement that the products were the “same,” nor a clear implication. The charts “simply compare the two companies’ products (as well as those of other companies) side-by-side and indicate how the products are similar but also different.”

“Like” Pottery Barn/West Elm/Williams Sonoma statements, e.g. “Like Pottery Barn rugs, but half the price”: Similarly, “like” means “similar to.” It was implausible that a reasonable consumer would conclude based on these “like” statements that Quince and WSI sell identical products.

“Plus, it’s 50% less than other brands for the same product.”: In an Instagram ad, a woman states that “I couldn’t justify spending $300 on bedding at Pottery Barn,” and that she purchased a duvet cover from Quince because “it’s 50% less than other brands for the same product.” WSI alleged that this was literally false, but the court agreed with Quince that, in context, it wasn’t literally false. Among other tings, overlaid text in the ad states that Quince’s duvet cover is “50% LESS than Pottery Barn and [Restoration Hardware],” and reasonable consumers know that Pottery Barn and Restoration Hardware, which are separate companies, sell distinct products. Thus, one “reasonable interpretation of this ad is that Quince sells the same type of product—i.e., duvet covers—as WSI but not the exact same products.” And WSI didn’t allege facts showing misleadingness.

Also, WSI didn’t allege facts to support its conclusory assertion that Quince’s products were inferior. It cited only a single customer review describing a Quince Sectional as being not “comparable to ... [Pottery Barn]” and states “in this case you truly get what you pay for.” “The Court cannot plausibly infer from a handful of negative reviews that Quince’s products are of inferior quality, particularly in light of the number of positive reviews and without any facts as to the comparable quality of WSI’s products.” Even if WSI had alleged such facts, it didn’t plausibly allege deception from “one lone customer review,” who might not even have been misled themselves.

WSI’s claim that the Beyond Compare charts falsely magnify the savings consumers can expect by purchasing from Quince also failed. For example, Quince advertised a handwoven jute rug that it sells for $299.90, and listed a Pottery Barn rug in the Beyond Compare chart as selling for $599.90. WSI alleged that Pottery Barn’s “Haven Jute Braided Rug,” with similar attributes as Quince’s rug, actually costs $399. Quince responded that that rug was not handwoven, as Quince’s was, and that Pottery Barn’s $599 “Delmont” rug had the same attributes as Quince’s rug and is handwoven. Moreover, the charts disclose that Quince gathered competitor pricing information within a specific timeframe and that pricing is subject to change. WSI argued that this disclosure was an admission that the listed competitor pricing was false and misleading, but the court didn’t agree.

“That WSI points to other similar WSI products with lower prices does not make it plausible that Quince advertised false prices. Nor has WSI pled specific facts to show that a reasonable consumer would be misled into believing that WSI sells no other similar products, at lower or higher prices, than the WSI product listed in Quince’s chart.” Without falsity, there was no need to consider any effect of the disclosure, but it wasn’t an admission of falsity.

Similarly, it wasn’t false not to identify a specific competing WSI product, and WSI’s argument that Quince didn’t substantiate its claims of sameness was irrelevant because lack of substantiation can’t support a private plaintiff claim.

Finally, WSI alleged that Quince misrepresented its product reviews: an ad stating “[Quince’s] Duvet Cover Set Has 1,000+ 5-Star Reviews” was allegedly literally false, and another stating that “200,000 5-star reviews can’t be wrong” was both false and misleading. In addition, WSI alleged that Quince misleadingly rounded up the average number of stars received by a product. For example, Quince’s representation of “***** (447 REVIEWS)” at the top of its duvet cover set product page allegeldy falsely implied that the product received 447 five-star reviews, but the average rating was 4.7. And customers can earn points for leaving reviews; they can redeem 1,000 points for $10 off. This is allegedly false and misleading “because Quince fails to disclose that its reviews are incentivized.”

WSI alleged that the duvet cover set actually had fewer than one thousand five-star reviews in September and October 2025, when the ad was running. Quince’s factual dispute (it argued that WSI miscounted) didn’t matter for plausibility, but WSI failed to plead facts showing materiality or injury.

As for “200,000 5-star reviews can’t be wrong,” which was allegedly false because the Quince cookware set depicted in the ad only had 37 reviews, the court agreed that one plausible meaning was that it referred to all Quince product reviews. It was also plausible that it was misleading, but WSI didn’t plead facts showing misleadingness.

As for rounding up product ratings, the court found that additional context proximate to the “5 star” statements clearly showed that the product received an average of 4.7 stars. “The exact product rating is conveniently available to customers before visiting the product page, as well as displayed at the top of the review section of each product page itself. It is, thus, implausible that most reasonable consumers would not understand that the stars displayed at the top of the product page are rounded and be misled given the surrounding context.”

Review incentives: Quince argued that customers receive the incentive simply by writing a review, regardless of whether the review is positive or negative. And Lanham Act claims have to involve affirmative statements, not pure failure to disclose.

As for unpled falsity, the different kinds of falsity alleged by WSI failed to plausibly allege that “all of Quince’s false advertisements are similar such that the Court can consider them as a whole. Nor does the Court find that WSI has sufficiently alleged representative examples of this larger fraudulent scheme under Rule 9(b)’s heightened particularity requirements.” To be sure “WSI need not plead every instance of Quince’s alleged false advertising,” but the current complaint didn’t offer “any parameters or limitations as to this amorphous false advertising scheme” that would put Quince on notice of the claims against it. “Nor is Quince better situated to know the content of all of its advertisements, as Quince’s website and advertisements are publicly available.”

The court did find that WSI had standing under California consumer protection law, reasoning (correctly in my view) that although UCL etc. false advertising liability requires that the consumer rely on the false advertising, it does not require that the plaintiff do so as long as there is harm causation.

consumer false advertising plaintiffs can't use surveys the way competitors can

Sinatro v. Barilla America, Inc., No. 22-cv-03460-ASK (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2026)

Deception of a substantial number of reasonable consumers, even well less than a majority, can be the basis of Lanham Act liability. But consumer protection cases have difficulty handling this, and so they make up all-or-nothing tests. Here, that means nothing.

closeup on challenged claim

Sinatro sued Barilla for the usual California claims, alleging that the claim “Italy’s #1 Brand of Pasta” on its boxes deceived consumers into thinking it was made in Italy from Italian ingredients when, in fact, that pasta was made in the United States from non-Italian ingredients. (This claim has now been removed.) On each of the relevant boxes, the side label with nutrition facts also included the representation “Made in the U.S.A. with U.S.A. and imported ingredients” in white text directly beneath Barilla’s name and location, which are statements required by FDA regulation.

side disclosure

nutrition panel

In Sinatro’s survey, 57 percent indicated that the statement “does communicate” that “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy,” 32.3 percent indicated that the statement “does not communicate this,” and 10.7 percent selected the “Don’t know / not sure” option. A separate conjoint survey found a 9.9% price premium associated with the claim.

plaintiffs' survey prompt

Barilla’s survey replicated Sinatro’s but included five—instead of just one—possible interpretations. In response, 84.0 percent of respondents answered affirmatively for “[t]he brand is the most popular pasta brand in Italy,” while 42.3 percent did so for “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, Barilla’s surveyor decided to remove certain “inattentive” or “confused” respondents from the sample, reducing the 42.3 percent “from Italy” figure to either 34.2 or 27.5 percent, depending on how you counted, whereas the 84.0 percent “most popular” figure remained nearly unchanged (dropping only to 83.5%).

Barilla survey prompt

I would note that these reduced figures are more than enough to win a Lanham Act false advertising claim. Also, the reduction came from counting misunderstandings of other claims, which is one way of declaring a bunch of actual consumers to be unreasonable. (The 34.2 percent figure comes from eliminating respondents who indicated that a “[n]on-GMO” label means that the product is gluten free, while 27.5 percent comes from eliminating these same respondents and also those who indicated that the Challenged Representation means that “[t]he brand is the oldest producer of pasta in Italy.”)

Did the survey even matter? Front-of-product deception is actionable under consumer protection law despite qualifiers on the side panel, but only if the front is “unambiguously” deceptive. This isn’t the Lanham Act concept: a front label is not “ambiguous” “simply because it is susceptible to two possible meanings” but rather “when reasonable consumers would necessarily require more information before reasonably concluding that the label is making a particular representation.” That is, reasonability is interposed as a separate, normative screen, regardless of what a substantial number of consumers actually think.

The court excluded plaintiff’s survey under Daubert. (Again, there’s plenty of Lanham Act precedent, but courts tend not to cite across regimes, which given the different meanings of “ambiguous” is probably overall a good thing, though a comprehensive harmonization would also be welcome.) The court found the consumer perception survey biased (and also criticized the conjoint analysis because it “impermissibly measures the undifferentiated impact of all interpretations of the Challenged Representation without isolating the impact attributable to only misleading interpretations”).

The survey asked only whether the package conveys that “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy,” and provided only three possible responses: an affirmative answer, a negative answer, and “[d]on’t know / not sure.” This was biased because by only asking that one question, the survey steered respondents “to that very meaning and gives them no opportunity to indicate other meanings.” This seems inconsistent with most Lanham Act survey cases, which generally (1) allow questions about specific messages, at least after an initial “did the ad say anything about?” question, and (2) treat offering yes/no/not sure options as enough to avoid impermissible leading.

The court also held that the survey “fails to capture the possibility that respondents understand the Challenged Representation to have multiple meanings,” and thus couldn’t assist the trier of fact.  The don’t know/not sure option wasn’t enough because the survey design “bias[es] the survey by suggesting to respondents, at least implicitly, that they should believe there is at least some sort of relationship between the different items when the possibility might not even have occurred to the vast majority of consumers who see the items.”

Survey respondents who answered [the] question affirmatively might have never made an association with Italian ingredient sourcing had the survey not fed it to them. And respondents who normally would think the statement means something else entirely may have abandoned that opinion upon intuiting from the survey itself what they should take the Challenged Representation to mean. A “[d]on’t know /  not sure” option does not negate such effects, because the question by its design elicits them before respondents even go to choose an answer.

Query: Under this analysis, is any closed-ended question allowable?

Without the survey, “no reasonable juror could conclude on the remaining record evidence that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Named plaintiffs’ testimony wasn’t enough because, “[a]lthough surveys and expert testimony regarding consumer expectations are not required, a few isolated examples of actual deception are insufficient.”

To the extent that the words “Italy’s #1 Brand of Pasta” make a claim about brand—namely, that Barilla is the foremost brand of pasta in Italy—undisputed record evidence showed that Barilla had leading market share, and the court also found this the most plausible meaning.

So, would consumers necessarily require more information before concluding that the pasta was Italian in origin? The court rejected the most “plaintiff-friendly” reading of 9th Circuit precedent, which would find ambiguous only those labels that “ma[k]e no representation at all” or, like “Nature Fusion,” “[are] so devoid of any concrete meaning that there [is] nothing from which any inference could be drawn or on which any reasonable belief could be based.” That would make ambiguity essentially a puffery defense. The court wasn’t willing to do that; to do so would mean finding the front label ambiguous “because it is at least amenable to the (undisputedly false) meaning that the Plaintiffs here advance—i.e., that the pasta is made in Italy with Italian-sourced ingredients.”

But using this standard “would effectively mean that any label susceptible to at least one concrete false meaning would be actionable.” [Note that this is in fact the rule in Lanham Act cases, where a substantial number of reasonable consumers would receive this message as shown by acceptable evidence of actual consumer reception. This is because Lanham Act plaintiffs are allowed to aggregate consumer behavior even if we accept substantial variation among consumers; probabilistic liability is ok for them, whereas consumer plaintiffs must rely on a presumption that all consumers are likely to be deceived, so courts set the standard higher (even though that’s not strictly logically entailed).] Anyway, to do so would be inconsistent with Trader Joe’s, which found that “100% New Zealand Manuka Honey” could support multiple meanings, including such false meanings as “that its contents were 100% derived from the Manuka flower.”

Thus, Barilla’s front label was ambiguous, and the survey, even if admissible, didn’t address ambiguity and even reinforced the conclusion that the brand popularity meaning was the predominant one.  “[A] reasonable consumer would necessarily require more information before concluding that the statement should instead be understood to mean something else entirely. Accordingly, Barilla has made no ‘unambiguously deceptive’ claim.” And the side label clarified US origin, making it not misleading as a matter of law.

The court further justified its holding as providing an easily administrable rule to lower courts and clear guidance to retailers. “[S]ellers may have confidence that so long as they do not make ‘unambiguously deceptive’ statements on their front labels, they may rely on their back and side labels to clear up misunderstandings.” And if consumers unreasonably persist in being fooled, so much the worse for them!

Schedule A false advertising TRO dissolved for the defendants who showed up

Kiel James Patrick, LLC v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, 2026 WL 3015613, C.A. No. 25-cv-633-MRD-AEM (D.R.I. Oct. 7, 2026)

KJP filed a Schedule A claim against a bunch of defendants for false designation of origin/false advertising; many defaulted, while two answered and got the TRO against them dissolved.  

KJP sells seasonal and festive sweaters; defendants sell competing sweaters. The defendants argued that particularized review of the claims against them was appropriate; KJP disagreed, arguing that the defendants delayed unduly and pointing to the allegations the court had previously accepted in granting and extending the TRO, which thereby became a preliminary injunction. The court was not impressed by KJP’s argument.

False designation of origin: KJP failed to show that the answering defendants used its photos. KJP alleged that, even if they didn’t copy the photos exactly, they re-generated them using AI. (Why this would violate the Lanham Act, especially given Dastar, is left as an exercise for the reader.) The basic problem was that there was no evidence “that the challenged images were copied from [KJP’s] website, altered from [its] photographs, or generated by AI to impersonate [it].” Instead, the answering defendants offered product-image evidence from an “independent sourcing agent, 1688.com,” as their source. “A review of Plaintiff’s website further reveals that the images submitted by the Answering Defendants look dissimilar to Plaintiff’s advertising materials, even if there is some similarity between the sweaters.” That similarity wasn’t confusion about origin.

False advertising: This was the same theory that defendants used KJP’s advertising materials, particularly its website images, without permission. KJP argued that defendants sold “imitation” products. But that’s not a false representation, nor does it show consumer deception. “Furthermore, there is no evidence on the current record that the Answering Defendants copied Plaintiff’s trademarks or made a particular claim about their products that is verifiably false or misleading.”

As Eric Goldman has often noted about Schedule A cases, these allegations, at least as to these defendants, should have been thin enough to deny the TRO; the plaintiff apparently didn’t supply convincing pictures even when challenged to do so.

dismissal of NYC's consumer protection claims against fossil fuel companies affirmed

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2026 WL 3023932, Appeal No. 6583, --- N.Y.S.3d ---- (App. Div. Oct. 8, 2026)

False advertising claims against fossil fuel companies for contributing to climate change are hard to win. The City alleged that defendants engaged in “deceptive ... trade practice[s]” proscribed by the City’s Consumer Protection Law (CPL) “by misrepresenting the purported environmental benefits of using their fossil fuel products” (“product greenwashing”) and “by creating a misleading impression of the role of renewables [i.e., renewable energy] in their businesses” (“corporate greenwashing”). The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the claims.

Product greenwashing: The alleged deceptiveness came from failure to disclose that fossil fuels contribute to climate change, but the connection was already public information. If, as alleged, consumers care about fossil fuels’ contribution to climate change, they couldn’t be duped by failure to disclose. This was true even if the court didn’t apply the reasonable consumer standard but rather the older standard: the effect the statement would have upon a consumer falling within the ranks of “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions.” “Because the statements at issue disclose that the improved products are gasoline, even unsophisticated consumers – given the City’s foundational assumption of near-universal understanding of the link between gasoline use and climate change – would necessarily understand that use of the improved products contributes to climate change.” Comparative statements that improved products would produce fewer emissions than other gasoline products could not “lead even an incautious consumer to understand defendants to be representing that the environmental impact of use of the new products to power private vehicles would be comparable to the impact of taking public transportation, bicycling, walking, or using electric or hybrid cars.” Nor were defendants required to quantify the reduction in emissions in their ads. “Nor has the City come forward with evidence that the reduction in emissions made possible by the gasoline products at issue is so minute, as compared to other gasolines, as to be legally insignificant.”

As to the corporate greenwashing claim, the court concluded that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the statements were “made in connection with the sale” or “offering for sale” of “consumer goods or services” “because none of the clean alternative energy products referenced in the statements were sold to consumers, either in New York or anywhere else.”

Although the CPL bans conduct that “has the capacity, tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers,” “[e]ven an allegation that a statement has the tendency to indirectly deceive a consumer must still be ‘made in connection with the sale’ of a consumer good or services” to fall within the scope of the prohibition.

would-be competitor lacks Lanham Act standing

Onego Bio Inc. v. Clara Foods Co., 2026 WL 3033777, No. 1:25-cv-01131-JDW (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2026)

Onega Bio sought a declaratory judgment that defendant EVERY’s patent covering recombinant ovalbumin protein was invalid and unenforceable and that Onego didn’t not infringe the patent, but there was no imminent, substantial controversy between the parties. I’ll focus on the also-failed Lanham Act false advertising claim.  

Onego, according to the complaint, “specializ[es] in the production of animal-free egg proteins through precision fermentation” and “aims to revolutionize the food industry by offering sustainable and ethical alternatives to traditional egg products.”

“In 2024, Onego secured funding to scale-up production and expand its market presence in North America.” It plans to build a 130,000-square-foot facility in Wisconsin to produce its protein product. “As part of Onego’s expansion efforts in the United States, Onego has shipped its protein products here.”

EVERY competes in the market for animal-free egg proteins (using yeast instead of Onego’s fungi). EVERY allegedly made false representations about its own product by claiming in press releases and presentations that the egg protein it makes is “equivalent,” “bio-identical,” and “nature-equivalent” to what is found in natural eggs, while allegedly EVERY’s egg protein in fact contains up to 13 amino acids not found in natural egg protein, including amino acids from yeast proteins.

The court held that Onego lacked statutory standing; it didn’t plead injury to commercial sales in more than conclusory fashion. The complaint didn’t allege that Onego makes or sells its products in the United States. Shipping protein products into the US wasn’t enough, given that Onego hadn’t even broken ground on its planned production facility.  “At most, Onego’s allegations suggest that it hopes to enter the U.S. market and become EVERY’s competitor. Thus, there is no basis for me to presume that Onego suffered a commercial injury.”

Nor did reputational harm claims fare better. Onego didn’t plead facts supporting its assertion that EVERY’s claims about its own product harmed Onego’s reputation. Nor did alleged risk to the egg protein replacement market as a whole state a cognizable injury, even if that market is nascent.

candy buyers fail to allege difference between pumpkin & Jack-o'-lantern shape

Vidal v. Hershey Co., No. 24-60831-CIV-DAMIAN, 2026 WL 2730302 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2026)

Reese's Peanut Butter Pumpkins with carved face on package

actual candy

There’s a Reese’s Peanut Butter pumpkin. It was advertised with a Jack-o’-lantern package, but the actual pumpkin-shaped chocolate had no such face. The package that says, in all capital letters: “DECORATING SUGGESTION.” (So you’re supposed to carve off little strips of chocolatey coating? With what tools? Hope your house is really cool, given the pliability of the coating at room temperature!) It is possible to make chocolates with molds that would give them Jack-o’-lantern faces.

Jack-o'-lantern molds for candy

 Plaintiffs sued for false advertising under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).

The court found lack of standing due to lack of injury in fact. “A plaintiff may establish a concrete injury-in-fact under a benefit-of-the-bargain theory by showing that they paid for a product but received something of lesser value or that was completely worthless.” FDUTPA “does not provide for the recovery of nominal damages, speculative losses, or compensation for subjective feelings of disappointment.”

Plaintiffs didn’t that the Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins they purchased were not edible or that they suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from consuming the product. Nor have did they allege that the sale of the Peanut Butter Pumpkins was illegal. So there was no benefit-of-the-bargain injury.

This was true even though plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the products at issue “for the novelty/party-display value of the depicted faces, not merely for generic chocolate-and-peanut-butter candy.” Still, “their only injury is their subjective disappointment.” And the disclaimer “DECORATING SUGGESTION” was next to the image of the carved chocolate pumpkin; while the product may not have the “cool looking carving of a pumpkin’s mouth and eyes,” it does have “a novel pumpkin shape.”

A price premium theory also failed despite allegations that, “[i]n retail commerce, Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins are priced higher per ounce than regular Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups across mainstream retailers and the manufacturer’s website.” But they only alleged a price premium at Target, Walmart, and Hershey’s, not at Publix where they bought. (This seems like a perfectly reasonable inference, though, and plaintiffs did allege that this was representative. Ah, the manipulability of Twiqbal.) But also, that still didn’t show economic injury, because plaintiffs still received candy actually shaped like pumpkins, which could also justify a price premium.

Amicus in section 230 false light case

 The EFF, Eric Goldman, Jess Miers, Mark Lemley, and I filed a brief in Does 1-10 v. Freesites in the Fourth Circuit, arguing that context--the other third-party content surrounding a post--cannot be the basis for a false light claim against a host site.