Moderator – Irene Calboli, Marquette Law School and National
University of Singapore
Carys Craig, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University -
Deconstructing Copyright’s Choreographer: the Power of Performance (and the
Performance of Power)
Feminist approach to conceptualizing artistic creativity can
shed light on choreography as engaged and embodied practice and demonstrate
weaknesses of dominant conception of creativity (myth of romantic author).
Relational approach to ©, reimagining creative practice/authorship.
Deconstructing copyright’s choreographer: the myth of
independent creation; false binaries of mind/body, author/performer; reuse and
transformation of choreographic works as cultural conversation. Unsettling core
constructs of independent authorship, ownership/exclusion.
©’s liberal individualism versus choreography. Copyright’s author is liberalism’s human
subject, depending on Enlightenment ideals of individuation, detachment, and
unity. Establishes moral hierarchy: author as creative genius and everybody
else, the mere copyist. Diminishes value of creative reuse. Gender of genius: conceptions of genius over
time have changed to be whatever attributes are attributed to men: sometimes
passion, sometimes rationality. Feminist theories of selfhood, agency, and
creativity offer a way to reconstruct ©’s author and capture the situated
nature of authorship and the dialogic nature of creativity.
Choreography exemplifies the mismatch between concepts and
practices. Divergence between ideal of authorship and art of choreography is
especially pronounced. In part b/c of fundamental culture of sharing entrenched
in dance historically and today. Body is the instrument in dance—makes dance
something experienced with and through others; necessarily social and
communicative. Dynamically
interactive.
The choreographer as creator: who qualifies as the
author? Formerly choreography was
treated as mere stepchild of drama.
Dance seen as mere spectacle in 19th century—to call it
dramatic composition “is an insult to the genius of the English drama.”
Contributed nothing to art (exhibition of underdressed or undressed women).
Loie Fuller’s Serpentine Dance was refused © on grounds it wasn’t a work but an
idea that a “comely woman is illustrating the poetry of motion.” Poetry is
expression when written, but not when moved.
Finally, Balanchine: “ballet is woman”—“a garden of beautiful flowers,
and man is the gardener.” Women as bearers of meaning under the male gaze; role
of maker of meaning is reserved to man.
Copyright’s ideal type: white male vision of choreographic production,
with gendered and raced performative duties, enshrined as standard for
copyrightability: Caroline Picard. Woman
gives aesthetic pleasure but does not create it.
Choreographer as independent creator: as the limits of authorship are drawn, separating physicality from authorship. Values implicit in this artificial division are gendered. Balanchine says choreographer is sculptor—choreography is a solo endeavor; dancers are the putty/clay and his job is to get them to make real his desired vision. Compare Beiswanger, who says that the relation between choreographer and dancer is dynamically interacting; the molding of vision is mutually creative process. Dancer is filled w/human creative capacity, shared tradition. Only dynamics of power and privilege allow us to recast choreographer as sole author and dancer as raw material. Mirroring the mind/body duality. Textual is privileged over performed. Masculine over feminine.
Improvised dance: Moment of pure expressivity where mind and
body merge: © struggles and recedes from view in the face of that ephemerality.
Doctrinally difficult and practically irrelevant because process is key when it
comes to improvised dance, and © prefers the product.
Dialogic nature of choreographic expression: Traditional
ballet has heterosexual dynamic: masculine power, feminine weightlessness;
strict division of duties in traditional ballet. Virginal/manipulative
ballerinas and supportive/manipulative males. Jones and Zane quoted Balanchine
but changed the gender of who was supported and who supported—angered lots of
people. Choreographer reckons with who
can give weight and who bears it, who initiates movement and who follows, who
is passive and active, who is looked at and who looking.
Dance can challenge power—street culture (initially
male-centered); rap videos—TLC gestures at sexuality but rebuffs male gaze (RT:
see also Anaconda!). Madonna’s
appropriation of voguing from LGBT community. J-Setting comes from historically
black colleges with a marching band and auxilliary section in the front with
the moves: gay men reproducing feminine movements: Prancing J-Settes.
Gender as performance, Judith Butler: think of choreography as
gender performance and vice versa. Powerful strategy for transforming codes and
conventions in dance: continue to exercise discursive agency through
re-presentation and reimagining of established contexts.
Charles Colman, New York University School of Law – Patents
and Perverts
Project started with investigation into fashion ©. Lots of issues around adornment/gender. Fashion has meant women since about the turn
of the 19th century in Anglo-American culture. Effeminacy more broadly as a concern: often
serves as a way to police patriarchy.
Self-imposed restrictions. (RT: I
think of Mary Anne Franks: How to Feel
Like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag: “Law and society typically
regard prison feminization as a problem of gender transposition: that is, as a
problem of men being treated like women. In contrast, this Article argues that
feminization is punitive for both men and women…. One could take the claim, as
it were, on its face: It is terrible to be treated like a woman. Alternatively,
one could read a presumption into the claim: It is terrible for a man to be
treated like a woman. … Unfortunately, the second reading—what I call the
gender transposition reading—is the more common and dominant one.”)
Oscar Wilde: not known as a “homosexual” since that concept
wasn’t yet invented—a sodomite. His diseased behavior was retroactively mapped
onto the decorative objects/aesthetics people in the movement he was involved
in had championed. Henceforth it was dangerous for men to display an affinity
for unnecessary ornament. [Relation to
imperialism/racism: men of other races/cultures often condemned for their own
forms of ornament?]
Piece argues that this discomfort with design mapped onto
the design patent cases. Decorative is
opposed to dishonest. Useful/useless.
Design patent rhetoric, though starting off neutral (passed 1842), eventually
takes on this connotative cluster of value hierarchies. Judges make clear that they don’t like design
and can’t tell things apart. Designs
aren’t valuable. Defer to experts when
the designs are “feminine” but analyze in great detail when the subject is a
saddle. The central theme, which begins
to determine more and more cases, is that objects associated with women =
deference to experts or dismissed in value entirely. Cigar case = nuanced sua sponte analysis; not
other things. Second Circuit was the
court of last resort in most cases because SCt stopped granting design patent
cases after Oscar Wilde. Second Circuit gets increasingly outlandish in
characterization of designs before it.
Case where 2d Circuit says that ties are bought not just b/c of their
utility to the wearer (CC: query what that might be!) but b/c of their appeal
to “others”—says that the purchaser is often a wife or sweetheart.
Homophobia/fear of perceived effeminacy related to analysis
of design patents. Distorted the
jurisprudence that basically erased design patents from IP landscape,
dispersing claims that would otherwise be made to © and TM. Judges were performing gender norms for their
audience, which had an impact on the law.
Demonstrating masculinity by not engaging substantively with subject
matter.
Calboli: This is a very specific US/Canada approach. In Italy and similar jurisdictions,
ornamental design has been strongly protected even before registered designs.
Value of protecting beauty, design, good food: quality of life issues.
Colman: often interest in French things or Asian things was
read as effeminate—suspect or ugly.
Craig: In Canada, we draw on English background but are next
door to the US; but also we have Quebec and civil law influence. Canada protects performers’ rights, including
moral rights for choreographers and performers.
But there’s still a clear delineation between the copyright and the
neighboring right. Parsing the
contributions to figure out what the performer’s right is and what the
choreographer’s right is.
Rosenblatt: you both talked about “negative spaces”—dance
and fashion have functionally opted out of the IP system. Cause, effect,
something else?
Craig: not clear if we’re not using it because it doesn’t
fit or whether it doesn’t fit because we haven’t been using the right ©
concepts. Doesn’t need to be answered: there’s a clear mismatch which makes
legal structures difficult/awkward, which then creates space for dynamic
evolution in the art form, thriving in the absence of protection. Canada: design does extend to fashion, but it’s
unused. There’s just no point pursuing registration and litigation because
things happen so fast. Where you have a
gap between a way the creative community perceives its activities and what
matters, and the way the law works, the law is just irrelevant. And irrelevance
allows vibrant evolution.
Colman: Design patents were created mostly for stove designs
in the US. Even then, though, they said the arguments applied w/equal force to
creators of garments. Rhetoric changes
over time from “designs and inventions” to “designs” and “inventions”; clear
migration over time to designers trying to use misappropriation or
copyright. Cheney Bros.—maybe the subject matter didn’t seem important
compared to news. After Cheney Bros.,
though, you saw more trade dress claims—so doctrine & legislative inaction
pushed the fashion industry in particular directions.
Peter Jaszi: Not sure choreography opted out entirely—selective.
Some owners of choreographic rights enforce them very vigorously and are widely
feared. The most is the Balanchine estate.
Does the work give you any insight into current US controversy over
copyrightability of social dance?
Craig: true, not entirely opted out. Only in the dead white man’s estate have we
been able to fit the © romantic author concept—it’s not an accident that
Balanchine is treated as the lone genius. Contracts also presuppose copyright
ownership, which tends to be how choreographic works are licensed. There’s not
much litigation, but the contracts are much more inclined to require
attribution and some degree of creative control. A moral rights understanding
rather than proprietary/exclusionary one.
Social dance: it’s not clear what an anti-social dance is—is it social
because it’s traditional/historical, or social by its nature? Original arrangement of steps—boundary setting
is very difficult b/c we have a hard time explaining what makes dance, dance
other than that it is useless.
Colman: Sarah Burstein says that it took a while for
Americans to figure out what design was; turned out to be stuff that wasn’t a
sculpture, wasn’t X, wasn’t Y—the salon des refusés. His work suggests an additional explanation.
Clothing is also embodied, with symbolic or spiritual power; people react to
dress as to almost nothing else b/c it’s immediate visual representation of
identity before you say a word.
[for Craig: Performance and the idea of the supplement in
theater—one performance in a chain of performances—that’s the one piece I’d
love to see added to the choreography paper. Cf. Francesca Coppa, Writing
Bodies in Space.]
[1. Compare what happened during the same period in TM,
growing protection for trade dress though also skepticism about value of TM:
more acceptable because language of psychology and commerce, specifically
because of the idea of the advertiser controlling the consumer rather than the
consumer choosing fripperies?
2. So does the turn to design patent represent another step
in the feminization of America? Or does
a billion dollar verdict automatically convert the topic to one of masculine
interest, the same way computer programming switched in value when men started
to do it?
3. Comparative analysis: design patents in other countries? Does
that track with masculinity and its performance in other countries?]
Colman: notable lack of commentary on the fact that design
patents vanished. Janis & DuMont are the exception and he wants to offer an
alternate account. DuMont identifies
nuances he identifies as “mishaps” but these terms like originality etc. are
susceptible to so many interpretations that he finds it difficult to believe
that they aren’t a deep level implementation of norms.
Design patents began being used more when 2d Circuit began
upholding them (late 50s/early 60s) and when Fed Circuit was created—so it
precedes the billion dollar verdict.