Abstract:
The copyright statutes governing
sound recordings and musical compositions allow private parties to negotiate
around the respective compulsory licenses and to instead establish private
royalty rates that are frequently adopted, either formally through the
Copyright Royalty Board or rate court’s rate setting procedures, or informally through evolving
industry norms. This phenomenon, herein
termed “private copyright reform,” raises two immediate concerns: First, it
presents distributional justice concerns insofar as it allows for reduction,
and even elimination, of statutorily mandated royalties owed to songwriters,
recording artists, musicians and vocalists.
Second, when presented without full term disclosure, these privately
determined rates can lead to the adoption of inaccurate “market” royalty
rates. Private copyright reform also
challenges traditional intellectual property doctrine; specifically, it questions
the efficiency of compulsory licenses and collective rights organizations,
while also raising questions of fairness around the ability of private parties
to make law. While resolution of these doctrinal questions is outside the scope
of this Article, the recent proliferation of private copyright reform suggests
they are ripe for reconsideration.
If you’re interested in copyright policy and the
relationship of law to practice, read this article. I’d like to see Garcia spend more time
discussing adverse selection—the way in which opt-out and departure by strong
members of collective rights organizations (CROs) can cause the remaining
participants to be lower-quality, thus setting off a downwards spiral that may
have negative welfare consequences overall despite the benefits to
early-departers. Is there reason to
consider mandatory CROs, not unknown to copyright law around the world, as a
response?
1 comment:
One reason that mandatory CROs might prove inadequate:
Agency capture
(exhibit A: the RIAA)
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