After
remand from the court of appeals, the court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The district court initially
enjoined certain advertising by defendants (claims to have “odor eliminating
technology” for hunting clothing), but the court of appeals held that the
claims for equitable relief had to be dismissed. The only remaining claims were for damages
under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and the Minnesota Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“UTPA”). Under the
state’s private AG statute, individuals can bring consumer fraud claims, but
must show a benefit to the public. The
Minnesota Supreme Court previously held that a case about a fraudulent
one-on-one transaction didn’t meet the public benefit requirement.
Defendants argued that, at this point, there was no
remaining public benefit, just small claims for nominal damages. The court agreed, finding that it had to
evaluate the claims as they stood, not as originally pleaded.
Plaintiffs argued that the UTPA wasn’t subject to the same
public benefit requirement. And it was
true, the court conceded, that the UTPA, unlike the CFA, expressly authorized a
private cause of action for damages. But
that didn’t help plaintiffs, because they pursued remedies under the private AG
statute, not under the UTPA directly, which they did because the UTPA doesn’t
provide for attorneys’ fees and the private AG statute does.
Plaintiffs argued that they satisfied the public benefit
requirement because the misleading ads were distributed to the public at
large. The case law was not clear on
this; some cases concluded that public benefit was lacking despite the
allegedly false/misleading statements being disseminated to the public. The court didn’t think that an individual
bringing a small claim for the amount he lost on a deceptively advertised
product would benefit the public, even if the ad had been broadly
disseminated. (The court couched this as
a hypothetical, but since it’s the exact same facts as the current case minus a
few individual plaintiffs, I don’t see what’s hypothetical about it.) Public benefit requires examination of the
relief sought by the plaintiff. “[A]
public benefit typically will be found when the plaintiff seeks relief
primarily aimed at altering the defendant's conduct (usually, but not always,
through an injunction) rather than seeking remedies for past wrongs (typically
through damages). This is because individual damages, generally speaking,
merely enrich (or reimburse) the plaintiff to the defendant's detriment; they
do not advance a public interest.” Thus,
whatever public benefit existed at the outset of the case no longer existed,
since injunctive relief was out and plaintiffs failed to get class
certification. Nor would a potential fee
award alter the analysis, since it would likely be de minimis in this
case.
Plaintiffs argued that an award would benefit the public
through deterrence, but that would allow every “dog bite” case to come within
the statute’s ambit and was too remote a possibility to suffice. Anyway, even assuming that damages can
sometimes achieve a public benefit, they’d have to be adequate to deter, but
here the only possible award was in the tens or hundreds of dollars. The litigation was “‘so feeble that it is
best to end it immediately’” and was only ongoing because of the potential
fees. Anyway, even if this motion hadn’t
been granted, the court of appeals “strongly suggested” that the ads were
nonactionable puffery, and the district court likely would have felt
“constrained” to agree.
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