In Re: Prime Energy Consumer Litigation, No. 24 Civ. 2657 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2025)
You
can tell how this will go from the first sentence: “For those consumers seeking
a jolt of energy in caffeinated-beverage form, does the inclusion of a smidgen
more caffeine than advertised amount to a deceptive practice?” The plaintiffs alleged
that Prime’s energy drinks contain 15-25 milligrams more caffeine than the 200
milligrams represented on its labels and in its advertising. The label states:
“CONTAINS: 200mg OF CAFFEINE PER 12 OZ SERVING[.]” On the side is an icon of a
lightning bolt with the language: “200mg CAFFEINE[.]” But, plaintiffs alleged,
“based upon testing commissioned by Plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Products
actually contain between 215-225 milligrams of caffeine rather than the
advertised 200 milligrams.”
First,
the court finds the falsity allegations insufficient, lacking information about
“how many cans of the [Products] were tested, when they were manufactured, when
and where they were purchased, and how the cans were selected for testing.” Merely
alleging that the tests showed extra caffeine wasn’t enough. Even though plaintiffs
aren’t required to disclose all the details of their testing at the pleading
stage, they need some. For example, a plaintiff could rely on a press release
from the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs announcing a preliminary
finding that Whole Foods’ New York City locations had systematically
overcharged customers for pre-packaged foods by overstating the weights of the
products, but the press release explicitly stated that the “DCA tested packages
of 80 different types of pre-packaged products and found all of the products
had packages with mislabeled weights. Additionally, 89 percent of the packages
tested did not meet the federal standard for the maximum amount that an
individual package can deviate from the actual weight[.]”
“That
is more information than Plaintiffs have provided here.” The court noted the
absence of information “as to the number of cans tested, whether various
flavors were tested, whether various lots were tested, and, importantly, how
many cans tested actually contained more than 200 milligrams of caffeine.”
Plaintiffs don’t have to prove the accuracy of their findings or the rigor of
their methodology, but they do need “some non-conclusory factual allegations as
to the alleged testing.”
Separately,
even accepting the allegations, it wasn’t plausible that an oversupply of
such a small percentage was materially misleading. The complaint
indicated that consumers of energy drinks “are generally seeking more caffeine,
not less, as evidenced by their desire to purchase the Product in the first
place (in comparison to, for example, purchasing a cup of coffee or a can of
Red Bull, each with about half the caffeine content).” The label “energy drink”
and the lightning bolt icon indicated that consumers “want a substantial amount
of caffeine. Therefore, it defies common sense to suggest that it would be
material that the Products contain a mere 7-11% additional caffeine — the exact
thing those consumers are seeking.”
Plaintiffs
suggested that the amount of caffeine was always material, particularly where
adverse reactions to overdoses could occur (e.g., with children). “However, it
is inconceivable to this Court that a consumer singularly focused on purchasing
a beverage with a significantly-above-average concentration of caffeine would
be concerned, much less disturbed, by the inclusion of a tiny bit more caffeine
in that beverage.” Children were a red herring; none of the plaintiffs was a
child, nor were there allegations that children consumed the drinks and
suffered side effects. Given the allegations that there is “no proven safe dose
of caffeine for children” and that the cans themselves contain a warning that
they are “not recommended for children,” an oversupply couldn’t be material. this
action.
Also,
one plaintiff alleged that he’d be willing to buy the products again if they
were properly labeled, indicating that the alleged 7-11% difference in caffeine
content wasn’t in fact material to him.
Finally,
and perhaps of even broader import, the court noted in dicta that it didn’t
think there was any injury from merely purchasing a misdescribed product.
(Citing Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 N.Y.2d 43, 56 (1999) (holding that
“customers who buy a product that they would not have purchased, absent a
manufacturer’s deceptive commercial practices,” have not suffered an injury
under General Business Law § 349).) The court disagreed with Second Circuit
cases finding that alleging that consumers either paid a price premium or would
not have purchased the products if they had known the truth sufficed under NY
law.
Claims
under other states’ laws, along with warranty, unjust enrichment, and fraud
claims also failed.
No comments:
Post a Comment