Panel VII. Beyond Transformative Use—Other Fair and
Permitted Uses (Moderator, Professor Gomulkiewicz) (partial: I had to leave early, sorry)
Gomulkiewicz: sometimes licenses get a bad rap but they can
be a powerful engine for creativity.
Jessica Litman, University of Michigan: Campbell was set up and constrained by Sony. Sony was filed only a few weeks after the 1976 Act became effective. Issues Congress hadn’t considered: liability
for personal uses; liability for manufacturers of devices. Members of Congress believed
that personal copies were noninfringing; they assumed the extant 1909 Act and
the Act they were working on wouldn’t reach those copies. The scary new techs when Congress was working
on the Act were photocopying and magnetic audiotape. Congress talked about them
a great deal; consumers were using them extensively in the 1960s, and witnesses
assured Congress that they wouldn’t face infringement suits. Instead they were
worried about institutional/business substitutionary copying—most witnesses
said we have copiers in the office and tape machines at home and think they’re
great. Didn’t suggest liability for uses. Not arguing that Act contains
implicit exception for personal copying: more modest argument—b/c Congress
believed that personal copying didn’t mean liability, and b/c no one suggested
device maker liability, Congress had no opportunity to craft relevant
exceptions, limitations, or remedies.
The thrust of copyright owner lobbyists had still been to
ensure that © rights were expressed in very broad language so that it would be
clear that the same rules would apply to the next new scary technology. So it became necessary to use fair use to protect
individuals and device makers; Court ended up settling on noncommercial use =
fair presumption, but the inverse presumption was disastrous, so 10 years later
Souter disavowed Sony, without
repudiating its result. Consumers meanwhile internalized the principle that
recording was fair use; AHRA was supposed to give consumers a free pass for
recording music.
It became clear that applying the clear language of the
statute wasn’t going to work in a lot of situations, but it was hard to get
Congress to enact exceptions for clearly noninfringing uses b/c of fierce
opposition from copyright owners. E.g.,
Register of Copyrights suggested an express privilege for backing up copies on
one’s computer, since backing up files is really important and people should do
it. §117 doesn’t do it if what you’re
backing up is not a computer program. Probably it’s fair use, but then those
copies are “lawfully made” and then those copies could be disposed of. If it wasn’t lawfully made, but then we’re
sending the message that this good, important, harmless thing is illegal, which
is either bad for good data practices or for legitimacy or for both. Yet the
opposition was vehement: no one is actually suing over this, so there’s no
harm; any new exception to reproduction right, whatever it was, would pose a
grave risk of encouraging rampant piracy.
Computer game makers suggested Congress should just repeal §117 entirely
since media were now much more durable and no one needed to back up programs.
This story repeated again and again. All new suggested exceptions are unnecessary
and dangerous. Consider failure of telephone unlocking bills: everyone agreed
it was fine and no one wanted to put it in the statute. But there are always © owners who sue over
stuff Congress didn’t intend to cover; that’s the point of the broad language.
As © expands further, fair use has to stretch to match. If © owners mean that
it’s important to constrain fair use to its mid-20th c. limits, we
need to constrain copyright accordingly, or have a host of new express
exemptions and limitations that would make it feasible to make fair use
relatively narrow.
Anthony Reese, U.C. Irvine: Campbell transformed factor three: seems to boil down to how much
the D took and how important it was. Relatively easy in most cases to measure
how much D took but gives little guidance on how much is too much. SCt before Campbell had no guidance at all; Sony involved 100% copying.
Said that 100% didn’t have the “ordinary effect” of militating against
fair use. Harper & Row wasn’t much help either, b/c it was on the other
extreme of the spectrum: 400 words out of 200,000, or 0.2% of the work. Court acknowledges this is insubstantial in
absolute terms but was “qualitative” heart.
Campbell changes
all that in a few swift strokes: reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
copying. He’s studied results in
appellate cases, 61 in 21 years.
Reviewed 4 judgments on pleadings, 14 on preliminary injunction, 33 summary
judgment, remainder trials. Fair use
found by 30 dcts, 26 not fair use, 1 mixed and 4 no reaching of merits. Appellate: 24 fair use, 31 not fair use, 3
mixed and 3 merits not reached. Not all affirmances despite similarity.
Half the cases (52.5%) explicitly state the reasonableness
principle, quoting Campbell directly
or indirectly. 28 of 61 cases with one
or more uses found fair, 22 of 28 state the reasonableness principle. 33 of 61 finding not fair, or dct erred in
finding fairness, quote reasonableness in 10 of 33 cases. This says nothing
about the direction of causation of course.
35 of 61 involve uses of P’s entire work. 15 Still images:
10 photos/5 graphics. 10 involve texts: 6 books/manuscripts/dissertations (remainder
journal article, student paper, etc.); 10 TV programs, software, sculptural
works, music, sound recordings (Swatch conference call)
Entire work case: 18 not fair use, 5/18 mention reasonableness. Fair use/mixed 16: 13/16 mention
reasonableness. (1 didn’t reach the merits.)
Heavy number of new tech uses involve entire work—search cases; plagiarism search case of iParadigms; Swatch conference call (new tech b/c Bloomberg wouldn’t have used the whole call in any other reporting medium); then Napster & Gonzales, two P2P filesharing cases. In all but the filesharing cases, there’s a finding of fair use with an express reliance on reasonableness. Campbell gives structure to analyze how much is too much.
Rebecca Curtin, Suffolk: Transactional origins of authors’
rights. Don’t mean to imply that commercial norms do or should equal legal
norms. Statute of Anne expressed concerns about social value. Nonetheless, interesting questions about
origins, because if you look just at court cases and statutory recognitions of
literary property, authors are invisible from 1557 to 1710 and then they pop
up. Was this a cover for publishers’
interest? Idea that commercial practices didn’t change used to suggest that
reference to authors was a sham.
If you look at commercial practices before the Statute of
Anne, looks less like a cover story and more like a business model. Petition for copyright from Stationers:
emphasizes detriment to authors, but also the importance of © to their ability
to carry on their business to create alienability: authors who used to dispose
of their copies for consideration or reserved some part for the benefit of
themselves have been harmed by other printings.
What did they mean “reserved some part”?
Something more than mere conveyance of the physical manuscript, even
before there was a concept of literary property. (Couldn’t that just be payment over time,
like a loan?)
Is there evidence on the Register that publishers thought
about copyright, not just physical manuscripts, being purchased? Is there
evidence of sharing of contingent value after publication? Examples: never print again without consent
of the author—dated 1607. Atypical entry
in the Stationers’ Register. Contracts became more complex over time, such as
Milton’s 1667 contract. Building the
rise of the idea of literary property. Idea of subscription projects: authors
extend into the market and interact w/readers: 1694 contract to translate
Virgil w/upfront milestone payments. Printer agrees to make best efforts to get
certain number of subscribers, preserve exclusivity for subscribers until the
edition is done. Once orders are filled, Dryden (author) can advertise himself
for a second subscription. And if the publisher failed to get the subscription
fully subscribed, Dryden had clawback rights.
Conceptualizing author’s right prior to codification again. Contract language doesn’t use “copy”
terminology, but “sole benefit of printing.”
Other contract language resembles a covenant of seizin: given the
investment, author may need to indemnify publisher if there’s no legal right to
sell literary property.
Post 1710 contracts sound very similar. “Copy” means more than the physical
manuscript.
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