Yellow Group LLC v. Uber Technologies Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014
WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014)
Taxi medallion owners, taxi affiliations (taxi dispatch
services), and livery service providers sued Uber, alleging that it competed
unfairly by misrepresenting certain features of its service, misleading
customers as to an association between Uber and plaintiffs, and encouraging
taxi drivers to breach their agreements with plaintiffs. People who use Uber’s app may end up getting a
driver associated with one of plaintiffs Flash Cab, Yellow Cab, or Your Private
Limousine, and take their rides in vehicles bearing one of those plaintiffs’
marks. The court partially granted Uber’s
motion to dismiss.
Treating the Lanham Act and state law as identical in
relevant part, the court first addressed claims regarding alleged
misrepresentations of rates, licensure, and insurance. Plaintiffs alleged that Uber deceptively
advertised that Uber taxis charged “standard taxi rates,” when in fact riders
were charged the meter fare plus a 20% ”gratuity” that was split between the
driver and Uber. They also challenged an
Uber blog post stating that all uberX vehicles were “licensed by the city of
Chicago, and driven by a licensed chauffeur.” And they alleged that Uber misrepresented the
scope of insurance coverage for uberX drivers and passengers as $2 million and
then $1 million, whereas Uber doesn’t provide any insurance coverage.
Uber argued that plaintiffs lacked standing because they
weren’t direct competitors at the same level of business. But then Lexmark happened, so plaintiffs needed only to an allege “an injury
to a commercial interest in reputation or sales, and that the injury must flow
directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising, such that
the false advertising directly caused consumers to divert their business from
the plaintiff.”
Uber argued that bexause the taxi affiliation plaintiffs and
Your Private Limousine didn’t receive a percentage of drivers’ fares or a
dispatching fee, they couldn’t allege harm from the false advertising. But at this stage, they plausibly alleged
that Uber’s deceptive advertising has caused customers to refrain from using
their dispatch services, harming the economic value of their business and their
reputation. Plus, the taxi affiliation
plaintiffs are direct competitors on these pleadings, since Uber exercises
control over vehicles for hire that compete with plaintiffs.
But—and here the proximate causation reasoning of Lexmark starts to have bite—the
medallion owner plaintiffs didn’t have standing, because they didn’t allege
direct injury. They argued that Uber’s
presence decreased the value of medallions by allowing drivers of non-commercially
licensed cars to pick up fares. But that
wasn’t injury directly flowing from Uber’s misrepresentations.
As to stating a claim, Uber again argued that plaintiffs’
income came from lease payments from drivers, not a percentage of fares or a
dispatch fee, so they couldn’t lose income from diverted fares. However, the
taxi affiliation plaintiffs alleged damage because the value of their business
depended on the number of passengers; more passengers meant more goodwill. If customers use Uber instead, their
reputation would be damaged and, more importantly, they wouldn’t be able to
charge drivers as much for the right to participate in plaintiffs’ services, including
dispatching taxis and livery vehicles. They thus plausibly alleged that misrepresentations
regarding Uber’s rates and uberX drivers’ licensure and insurance caused them
harm.
What about the $2 million/$1 million claim? Uber didn’t say it would provide the insurance policy. Rather it said that there would be an
insurance policy covering drivers and riders of at least $1-2 million, and
plaintiffs didn’t allege this was false.
That claim was dismissed.
§43(a)(1)(A): Plaintiffs alleged that Uber misrepresented an
association with them by occasionally referring to its “fleet partners,” and
using a yellow colored SUV in one of its advertisements that evoked Yellow Cab.
The SUV in the ad didn’t have Yellow Cab’s logo or name, but did include a taxi
number 1317, which was assigned to a Yellow Cab of the same make and model. They
also alleged that confusion was exacerbated by the fact that “when a customer
orders a taxi or livery vehicle via Uber, a vehicle bearing the Flash or Yellow
trademarks will often arrive to pick up the fare.”
Mark McKenna and
Mark Lemley will be sad (compare
a previous Uber case): this plausibly alleged a §43(a)(1)(A) violation. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that “Uber’s
representations and the very nature of its service is likely to confuse Uber
customers regarding an association between Uber and Flash or Yellow Cab, and
that this confusion harms Flash and Yellow Cab’s taxi dispatch business.” Likewise with the taxi affiliation plaintiffs.
However, the medallion owner plaintiffs didn’t state a claim
because they didn’t allege harm from the misrepresentations. Harm from Uber’s
existence in the market depressing the value of medallions was insufficient.
Livery services were also different: Your Private Limousine
alleged that confusion was even worse in the livery context “[g]iven that
trademarks and trade dress are not as prevalent on the livery side of
transportation services.” But that didn’t
work, because Your Private Limousine didn’t allege that its cars bore its mark
or any other indicia of ownership/operation by Your Private Limousine. Its
claims were therefore limited to its allegations that Uber improperly referred to
its “fleet partners.” And that wasn’t
enough to plausibly allege likely confusion.
On its own, that’s not a misrepresentation, “as it could accurately
refer to the owners and drivers of independent livery vehicles that have
contracted directly with Uber.” Without identifying markings, “it is highly
unlikely that a customer would even know that he or she was riding in a Your
Private Limousine vehicle and would therefore infer that Your Private Limousine
is one of Uber’s ‘fleet partners.’”
Plus, “fleet partners” wasn’t a specific, concrete, or measurable
statement. (This is applying
§43(a)(1)(B) puffery analysis to a §43(a)(1)(A), but given that this should be
a §43(a)(1)(B) claim, I’m not too saddened.)
So there was no plausible allegation of misrepresentation or confusion
from “fleet partners” alone.
The plaintiffs who could proceed with these claims could
also maintain a common law unfair competition claim.
Tortious interference with contract: This claim included
allegations that Uber encouraged drivers to violate the trademark clause in the
drivers’ taxi affiliation contracts by providing drivers with Uber branded
“hangtags” to suspend from the cabs’ interior rearview mirrors. Uber also allegedly encouraged drivers to use
their cell phones while driving and required drivers to process credit card
transactions via the Uber app, actions that violate local laws which are
incorporated by reference into the contracts. Plus, these plaintiffs alleged
that by subscribing to Uber in the first place, drivers violate their
agreements that they will not use competing dispatch services. Uber argued that
the plaintiffs didn’t allege harm, but the court inferred damages to their
business through losing customers from their dispatch services and refused to
dismiss the claim.
Again, though, the medallion owner plaintiffs lost out.
Their argument was based on their licensees’ agreement to abide by Chicago’s
rules and regulations, and Uber’s alleged inducement to disobey the same (rules
banning use of cell phones while driving and a regulation requiring that taxis “must
process electronic forms of payment through their affiliations or licensed
medallion managers”). But the medallion
owners didn’t plausibly allege reputational or economic harm from the violation
of these contractual provisions. (Could
the medallion be seized if a driver were arrested for using a cell while
driving? Would that be enough?)
Finally, Uber argued that the court should dismiss the
entire complaint based on Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transportation, Inc., 82 F.3d 484
(D.C.Cir. 1996), which held that a limousine service could not bring a Lanham
Act claim against a competing taxicab company when the plaintiff sought only to
enforce violations of local taxicab ordinances and regulations. The DC Circuit
declined to interpret or enforce municipal regulations; instead, the plaintiff
should take its argument to the Taxicab Commission.
However, the point of this complaint was not that Uber’s
service was illegal. Rather, plaintiffs
alleged misrepresentation separate from the legality of the service. To the extent that the complaint alleged that
Uber violated the Lanham Act or its Illinois counterpart simply by operating
illegally or misrepresenting the legality of its service, those allegations
would fail. (Note that this would not be
the result in California, which does allow its consumer protection law to
borrow violations of other laws.)
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