Moderator: Andrew Bridges, Fenwick & West LLP
Shira Perlmutter, USPTO
§512 was intensively negotiated and complex; intended to be
a very careful balancing act, so carefully balanced that the participants would’ve
told you that every small twig was important to the entire edifice. Protection against monetary remedies for
those ISPs who acted responsibly.
Initially controversial, but did begin to function as alternative to
litigation, and over the years exported widely as a model, including to the
European Union, Japan, and China, and others primarily in Asia. 15 years later,
strains inevitably began to appear (RT: which is of course why they called it
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act)
as flaws from real life application and technological evolution occurred. Target in 1998 was websites hosting
infringing content, but now we have P2P, cloud services/cyberlockers, and
streaming services (some licensed and others not). The four covered activities
still broadly cover ISP activities—transmitting, hosting, caching, and search.
But the big question is whether the law is still fit for purpose.
Many issues have been or still are playing out in the courts.
Among the questions: who qualifies as ISP?
How do safe harbors relate to inducement liability after Grokster? What’s the meaning of red flag
knowledge? Settlement of Viacom v.
Google makes that more elusive. What
kind of financial benefit is relevant? What are appropriate repeat infringer
policies? What’s the scope of the subpoena process laid out in §512?
What isn’t covered today and needs attention? What needs
fixing in § 512? Those are the basic debates. Some things people complain
about: P2P, though may be lessening in importance. Addressed in voluntary copyright alert
system. Other area pointed to (RT: by
whom?): foreign sites dedicated to infringement, SOPA/PIPA, spectacular
failure. Also some voluntary initiatives
using the “follow the money” approach with advertisers and payment providers.
Operation of notice and takedown: 3 main issues. (1) Inefficiencies in the system, including
huge volume of notices, and phenomenon of rapid reappearance of content taken down. (2) Misuse of notices for fair use, political
campaigns, copyright trolls. (3) Special
difficulties for individuals and small and medium sized enterprises, whether
rightholders or ISPs.
Initiatives on Capitol Hill: copyright review sparked by
Pallante’s speech. Dep’t of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force—Green
Paper. All sectors perceived problems
with the notice and takedown system, though some entities within each sector
were ok. Some entities wanted to see
legislative change, but most of them strongly opposed reopening the statute.
Given the nature of the problems identified and given problems of moving
copyright legislation forward, especially in the online enforcement area (that
is the most beautiful euphemism of the day), we decided to move forward with
stakeholder talks to improve the situation.
Judiciary Committee held a hearing; similar concerns to what we heard
were expressed, but House members were very interested in seeing what Commerce approach
could accomplish on a voluntary basis before considering legislation.
Initial meeting of multistakeholder forum on notice and
takedown has occurred—archived if you
want to listen. Clear messages to group:
the topic before us was not legislative change, but improvement within context
of current law. True multistakeholder driven process, not decided by USPTO.
Inclusiveness and transparency are key goals. We want to see an outcome by the
end of the year—best practices, memorandum of understanding. Success is (1)
establishing a constructive process that enables real discussion among
stakeholders and (2) making some improvement.
Initial meeting was setting agenda: consensus on a way forward. Periodic public meetings every 6 weeks, alternating
between DC and California. Looking first
at standardization of notices, delivery, and processing. Next meeting, May 8. Focus on challenge of
small/medium size enterprises; will establish a smaller working group involving
self-selected representatives of different constituencies, looking for people
with practical/technical operational expertise. Chatham House rules: no
identification of who said what, but outcome publicly reported. Larger group
will be empowered to take decisions. Nothing will be decided until everything
is decided.
Mitch Singer, UltraViolet (I’m sure Singer’s an excellent
lawyer, but I can’t see the name of his institution without also seeing red at
my horrible Veronica Mars experience, in which the promised digital download on
opening day turned out to be, after I finally, finally reached the overloaded
website, a digital stream locked to the UV platform, which then didn’t work
despite multiple tries. I ended up with
a refund and an increased contempt for anticircumvention measures that interfere
more with legitimate, paid consumption than with people who want stuff for
free.)
People who believe copyright bars innovation see it
differently than the rightsholder who says copyright is a property right; all
these views are legitimate. §512 struck a balance. Disruption: new tech, new court cases.
Paramount has sent out 75 million takedown notices in the
last month; add up all the notices and ask whether it’s really impacted illegal
hosting sites’ ability to deliver infringing content. Notices are inefficient and
insufficient. Even in whack a mole
sometimes there’s no mole, but in cyberlockers and P2P, content is often
uploaded faster than we can send notices.
The question is: is this really working?
While it may be working here, it isn’t working in int’l territories that
lack enforcement mechanisms. EU doesn’t
required actual knowledge. Instead,
reasonableness: ISP/cloud service is in the best position to protect against
infringement, and reasonable measures are required. Much more flexible (for
whom?) and tech neutral (for whom?) and makes a lot more sense given today’s
filtering tech. Content ID: YT puts content in its database and stops uploads.
That’s lots better than notice and takedown. It places some burden on a locker,
but is much more efficient/less costly.
ECJ confirmed that blocking infringing sites is a balanced approach
to protect consumers’ fundamental rights. Probably you don’t think that’s right
for the US (SOPA/PIPA), even if the ISP isn’t perfect, if it seriously
discourages access to illegal websites it’s the right balance. Rightsholders like that, recognizes that ISP
is in best position to stop the infringement (how do you know what’s
infringing?); doesn’t allow ISP to turn a blind eye.
Until 2012, we had difficulty getting red flag acknowledgement—courts
shut the door with Perfect 10, YouTube, and Veoh. Post-2012, he’s encouraged that the pendulum
is swinging: MP3Tunes jury found that Michael Robertson was liable for
copyright infringement, because he turned a blind eye to piracy—red flag
knowledge. That changed the way we think about level of proof we need. Two
other cases: Hotfile and Isohunt—focused on red flag knowledge. Maybe things
are shifting. Even in Grokster Court
had to reach to patent inducement to find liability against a bad actor.
What should we do in the digital age? (Insert repeat snark about DMCA.)
If we knew then what we knew now about filtering, would we have required
filtering? Are we going to look at the
EU approach and put a heavier burden on ISPs? Are we going to recognize that
they’re in the best position to stop infringement? Are we going to require
filtering like they do on iTunes and other UGC sites? Are we are going to look
at blocking infringing sites? What are we
going to do about foreign infringement? What are we going to do about digital
first sale? Digital rights
portability?
If he had to guess about opening up safe harbors, it will
sway in favor of rightsholders because of tech advantages today not present in
1998 (RT: if you have enough money/design capacity/don’t worry about infringing
someone else’s filtering patent/etc.).
Michael Carroll,
American University, Washington College of Law
Legal aesthetician in him would address: (1) identify theory
of liability from which you’re given safe harbor protection; (2) verbs don’t
align with exclusive rights—9th Circuit needed 5 pages to explain
what rights “storage at the direction of the user” came up with. §512 hallmarks
of last-minute legislative deal, but courts are accustomed to providing
interpretation to that. What’s the proper allocation of jobs between Congress,
courts, and Copyright Office?
Any revisiting could be worse than what we have; private
dealmaking going on now may make revisions unneeded. (They’re never going to stop complaining
about foreign sites, though.)
“If we knew then what we know now, we’d do it differently.”
Well, maybe, but Congress in the 1990s was all about highly detailed industry
specific enforcement. How’s AHRA working for you now? That’s what legislation often does. The
courts felt the need to expand theories of indirect liability, such as in Napster. Control and supervision theory
once based on respondeat superior expanded so that any terms of use might
trigger it; plus aggregation of users with no business model could trigger the
financial benefit concept. People from
1998 still bear scars of the fight.
Theory of the framework, which was wrong: The deal was: we
need to make the internet safe for content.
Rightsowners will sit on their content, won’t make it available
digitally, unless/until internet is rendered safe. We’ll lock down the
internet/have notice and takedown for leaks. But that’s the wrong measure of
success. Do we see the progress of science & useful arts? Do we see people creating and people
distributing? That should be the
measure of whether safe harbors are working.
And from that perspective the deal is working out pretty well.
Who knew in the 1990s? It depended on where you looked.
§512(c) did in fact have the digital landlord in mind. But the idea that UGC
business models weren’t contemplated comes from people who weren’t paying
attention. GeoCities was on the radar, and GeoCities was YouTube: we give you
space, we give you a template, and we run ads on your website. That’s YouTube.
Litman’s Digital Copyright has more
on the deal.
We just heard about takedowns being ineffective. Ex parte
relief plus DRM was supposed to make content safe; Paramount can’t keep its
movies offline. We can stipulate that’s true. But what we need to know is
whether a legislative fix is needed. 75 million takedown notices: is that
inefficient? Prima facie too big an
amount? We now have robots sending
notices and robots automatically taking content down. And we’ve heard the story
of disproportionate effects on small authors.
Response: we’re in early days. (I’d also say that 75 million
ought to be compared to the number of links Google indexes.) Also we hear that takedowns are unfair
because Google is making too much money. But: Would you have gotten Content ID
if Congress had drafted the requirement for what Content ID should look like?
He submits that you would not.
Others say: Maybe we should have a sunrise period for owners
to inspect content before it goes online. Or maybe we should require filters.
These are the sort of proposals. Or some sort of burden shifting on
staydown/generalized notice. This shifts balance in favor of rightsholders and
not public interest. We are seeing an explosion of creativity, even if certain
highly capitalized business models are unable to adapt; progress is not under
threat and there’s no reason to reopen this particular deal especially given
the kind of institution that Congress is.
Real problem: failure to license. If more Paramount movies
were on Netflix, they’d be sending fewer takedown notices. (I note he said
nothing about more Paramount movies on UltraViolet.) Netflix is not “unsafe,” but they can’t agree
on the price of content on demand. Consumers are Roger Daltrey: “I want it.”
Rightsholders are Pete Townsend: “You can’t have it.” Consumers should and
ultimately will prevail.
Are we getting enough creativity? Look at Frozen.
We are getting smash hits; we are getting big investments.
What of small producers who find their works on YouTube?
That’s a problem. Next YouTube startup is also a small producer, and shift in
§512 penalizes them. Small/independent
authors are put up in the legislative conversation but they’re not the real
drivers of reform. They’re better off with the battle of the titans, which will
lead to a licensing scheme they can use too.
If we did do something, we should address abusive takedown
notices, giving users right to use lawful use/fair use flag constituting
preemptive counternotice, requiring direct suit against the uploader and
preventing suit against the ISP. Not
everyone will use, but will have powerful educational effect.
Brianna
Schofield, UC Berkeley School of Law, Samuelson Law, Technology &
Public Policy Clinic
Need for further research: difficult to know how §512 should
change, if at all, if we don’t know how it’s actually working. Takedownproject.org:
go to our website. A lot of hidden
decisions on both sides: senders and recipients. Recent and growing automation
has led to vast amounts of data. We’ve
begun collecting and coding. Coding
whether the notice requirements are met; who’s the owner; how many links per
notice; how the allegedly infringing work is identified. Designed to tease out
answers about validity, whether it’s targeting something that’s not a copyright
claim but might be something else, like a privacy claim. Transparency has been
an uphill battle; ISPs have been hesitant despite confidentiality promises
because of fear of scorched earth litigation. Rights enforcement agencies
sometimes use transparency as a portfolio of their work.
We have been asking ISPs about form notices. Some say this
leads to a significant decrease in notices, while others say dramatic increase.
Overall, form notices do seem to lead to greater compliance with statutory
requirements, but not clear if that relates to underlying validity of claim.
Notice and staydown: Not practically/financially feasible
for many ISPs. Content ID took hundreds
of engineers and $60 million to build; not all ISPs can afford that.
Competitive disadvantage; effectively lock out new and innovative services.
Filtering doesn’t account for things like fair use, licensed use, etc.
What about abusive notices?
Notices are used to target competitors’ content, critical speech, claims
masquerading as copyright but really about TM or privacy. The counternotice
provisions are ineffective. Even
problematic notices: the safest thing for an ISP to do is comply. Once they do
that, they notify the users, but that’s super intimidating, especially for
those who wish to engage in anonymous speech. Insufficient legal disincentives
for senders. §512(f) is expensive, timeconsuming, with little prospect of
damages.
ISPs still maintain that §512 is vital: woven into how the
internet functions. Reform must not
disrupt benefits of system.
Bridges: from the trenches, the safe harbor is not safe once
you get into litigation. It’s great when
the system works. Perlmutter says
designed as alternative to litigation; but if one has to litigate the safe
harbor, life is hell. Even though you should advise an ISP to do it as the
first thing, it should be the last thing litigated, because defending against
every theory of copyright infringement is too hard. D can win sj by winning
three issues: direct (no volition); contributory (no intent); right and ability
to control (vicarious). If you win those you win the case without safe harbor.
If you litigate the DMCA you have to win on eight issues, which is a ton more
expensive. Many of the biggest cases have taken an extraordinary financial toll
on defendants—Google is rumored to have spent over $100 million defending
itself. Veoh: the company that did it
all right, complying with DMCA and signing voluntary MOU on UGC principles. The
idea was a peace treaty. But Veoh got sued, and it won a significant flat-out
victory on the DMCA, and went bankrupt winning the case despite starting with a
lot of money. If you talk about a
voluntary system in which “stakeholders” agree, how will that protect anyone
from expensive litigation by aggressive copyright owners?
Perlmutter: she doesn’t know much about Veoh and won’t express an opinion on the outcome, but voluntary
agreements aren’t intended to be a shield against litigation, though if they
can be that’s great. (So what are they
for? Staving off legislation?) Only
legislation is a shield, and even then there’s no guarantee, because there won’t
be clear bright lines because it will always be a balance. Best practices approach: meant to be a model.
Courts might look at that, but no one will be bound. Or binding agreement
between particular entities, such as the Copyright Alert System, which could
include promises not to sue each other if there’s compliance. Green Paper: stakeholders will decide what
type of output there will be and whether it will be best practices or binding,
but she’d guess it will end up closer to best practices given diversity.
Clarification: we are not in the Green Paper process
endorsing a call for standardization, but asking whether it could be
beneficial.
Bridges for Singer: you were concerned about actual
knowledge as too lenient for ISPs. Safe
harbor comes in only in damages analysis—you’re still entitled to relief. If we
take actual knowledge away, what is the remaining underlying standard for
contributory infringement, where Sony
said constructive knowledge wasn’t enough? Should Sony be overruled? (Grokster may have changed the standard
from knowledge to intent, but assuming knowledge is still in play, then what?)
Singer: He doesn’t know. He’s not making a particular
proposal. There’s something broken with notice and takedown, and there’s a
better way (that he doesn’t know). Not sympathetic when someone knows that the
majority of content posted will be illegal and then says they have no
obligation other than to respond to notices.
Can’t go into detail about requisite knowledge, but at some point when
you receive notice after notice for the same movie that’s in theatrical
release, there has to be something more. Tech exists to take reasonable
measures. Other panelists think notice
is greatest thing in the world (not quite) but there has to be a better way.
Carroll is odd to say that because people are stealing your
content and you can’t stop them, you need to change your business model. No one
should change a business model because people are stealing their stuff. That’s
not the right kind of disruption. (Well,
that depends on the alternatives, is I think the point.) We wouldn’t get to show films in theaters if
we had immediate online distribution.
The response should be “how can we work together to stop trafficking in
stolen goods.”
Carroll: his point is descriptive. You can’t stop the
internet, whether you like it or not. If you don’t shift the business model, you
will get a higher level of unauthorized use than you would in a different
model. I’m not telling you to change, I’m telling you about unsatisfied demand.
Bridges: SOPA was called “stop online piracy.” But there
have been at least a dozen laws since 1982 whose purpose was to “stop” piracy.
What was the metric for “stopping” piracy?
What is the acceptable level without collateral damage to the broader
ecosystem of speech? Microsoft’s goal:
it should take more than 20 minutes to find an illegal copy.
Singer: we won’t stop online piracy. His metric is his son,
who says he can watch a movie within seconds. That’s not the kind of metric he
likes to hear. Difficulty! Accepting notice and takedown isn’t enough. Why not
have a filtering standard, and if you filter you get better treatment? The environment is different for us than for
music, because we don’t release movies except in theaters for the first four
months. The source of that content online is taken from a movie theater, not
from someone’s personal copy. We can make progress just by focusing on that
content.
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