Think is a money service business (MSB) and developer of a
mobile payment system platform called FaceCash, launched in April 2010. Defendants were money transmitters (MSB
defendants) and venture capital funds and individual investors (investor
defendants). MSB defendants included Airbnb, ActBlue, Facebook, Square, and
Stanford. Think alleged that the MSB
defendants hold and transmit funds on behalf of third parties and were its
direct competitors. Think alleged that
they operated without required money transmitter licenses in violation of a
California law that became effective in mid-2011 and that imposed various
capital and other requirements on money transmitters. The investor defendants
allegedly helped/directed the MSB defendants.
Think didn’t acquire the necessary license and voluntarily
stopped running FaceCash when the California law went into effect. Think had no paying customers for payment
services. It alleged violations of California Unfair Competition law, the
Lanham Act, and unjust enrichment. The court only analyzed the federal claim,
finding no Article III standing (this may be a misnomer, though the result
seems foreordained to be the same under Lexmark).
Under now-probably-superseded 9th Circuit
precedent, Lanham Act standing requires “(1) a commercial injury based upon a
misrepresentation about a product; and (2) that the injury is ‘competitive,’ or
harmful to the plaintiff’s ability to compete with the defendant.” This
requires some kind of competition for the same dollars from the same consumer
group. Think shut down FaceCash, so it
can’t have had diverted sales after the California law went into effect. Plus, to the extent Think alleged that
statements in certain defendants’ terms of service before mid-2011 were
deceptive, Think didn’t allege that Think suffered commercial injury as a
result. Once Think voluntarily shut down FaceCash, it couldn’t show that it
competed or suffered commercial injury, so the complaint had to be dismissed.
A bit of a wrinkle: the UCL “unlawful” claims were based on
both state and federal law. But the Ninth Circuit has held that, “where there
is no federal private right of action, federal courts may not entertain a claim
that depends on the presence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331.” The alleged federal violations
concerned laws criminalizing unlicensed money transmission businesses and
mandating record-keeping, neither of which created a federal private right of
action. As a result, the state law claims didn’t involve substantial questions
of federal law, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
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