The parties compete to sell cerebral oximeters, used by
surgeons and anesthesiologists to monitor the oxygen saturation level of blood
in a region of the brain. Nellcor
alleged that CAS falsely advertised that its oximeter was more accurate than
Nellcor’s, in violation of the Lanham Act and state law. CAS’s claim was based on studies that
compared readings from competing cerebral oximeters to an estimate of the
average oxygen saturation level of blood in the entire brain called “field
saturation.” Nellcor’s main argument was that this was deceptive because field
saturation is only a rough estimate about the entire brain, not a measurement
of the saturation level of the relevant brain region. Nellcor submitted “strong evidence” that
field saturation differed from regional saturation, while CAS submitted
evidence that field saturation was sufficiently accurate; though Nellcor’s
evidence was stronger, the court found that there was still an issue of fact
for trial. The court did grant summary
judgment (1) against CAS for its res judicata defense and (2) for CAS as to
various smaller claims about the study’s unreliability, as well as claims about
a page on CAS’s website that said it linked to summaries of recent studies
involving CAS’s product when three of the ten studies were of Nellcor’s
product. (This last misdescription was
changed soon after the lawsuit was filed.)
CAS’s claim was a “tests prove” or establishment claim. It
can be falsified by showing (1) that the defendant’s test or study was not
sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that
it establishes the proposition for which it was cited, or (2) that the test,
while sufficiently reliable, does not establish the proposition claimed in
defendant’s advertising. As noted above,
Nellcor’s core argument was that field saturation wasn’t accurate or valid
enough to compare the accuracy of cerebral oximeters; without a correct
reference value, it’s impossible to do accurate comparative accuracy
testing. CAS argued that field
saturation was the best available reference value, and that the FDA used it
too. Nellcor responded that the FDA accepted calculations using field
saturation, but didn’t require or condone field saturation’s use as a
reference.
The court found that a factfinder could find that field
saturation is not an accepted or accurate reference value to compare the
accuracy of cerebral oximeters; current measurements are just estimates, and in
any event field saturation is different from regional saturation and oxygen
levels may differ in different regions.
But a factfinder could also accept CAS’s evidence that, in healthy
people, field saturation would be the same as regional saturation, and that the
measurement was accurate enough to rely on.
CAS’s primary witness had a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, not
medicine or physiology. Another CAS
witness published an article in 2012 that appeared to support Nellcor’s
position; the court “look[ed] forward” to hearing him explain himself at trial
and undergo cross-examination. Credibility determinations were for trial,
though. (Or, hint hint, settlement.)
The court did reject several of Nellcorp’s criticisms of
CAS-commissioned studies. None of the
alleged flaws made the studies unreliable.
It was not enough that the doctor running the study dropped some
participants for unknown reasons, or that CAS provided draft abstracts and
reviewed data calculations, when the doctor decided the final content. Some issues of reliability could be explored
at trial, such as whether studies on healthy patients could be extrapolated to
the patients actually in need of oximeters.
As for the incorrect reference to studies on CAS’s webpage,
the articles and their summaries all concluded that use of cerebral oximeters
could improve patient outcomes; they weren’t comparative. Nellcor didn’t show that the false
attribution was material to a consumer’s purchasing decisions, “given the short
amount of time the material was on the web site and the fact that articles only
generally relate to cerebral oximetry.”
As for res judicata, CAS argued that the claims were barred
because Nellcor filed and dismissed with prejudice an earlier false advertising
case. The court disagreed: the claims were based on advertising after the case
was dismissed, and thus could not have been brought earlier. Though one of the
studies at issue was around earlier, it didn’t make the disputed “accuracy”
statements (though CAS subsequently relied on it to do so).
CAS also sought summary judgment on damages for lost
profits. CAS argued that its purchasers
were sophisticated buyers who didn’t rely on marketing or advertising, but
rather on their own evaluations in the field.
(Then why advertise?) Taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to Nellcor, Nellcor submitted sufficient
circumstantial evidence of lost sales: it went from 100% of the market down to
80-85%, with 10-15% now CAS’s (and another company at 2-5%). Nellcor’s evidence
was that CAS’s marketing strategy was to gain market share and get doctors’ and
hospitals’ attention by making comparative accuracy claims as the key selling
point.
Nellcor also sought corrective advertising damages. CAS
argued that Nellcor should already have engaged in corrective advertising,
because a plaintiff seeking such damages must timely counteradvertise unless
financially incapable of doing so. The
Sixth Circuit hasn’t addressed the issue, but the Ninth Circuit hasn’t required
counteradvertising around the time of the false advertising. The Sixth Circuit has allowed separate
recovery of counteradvertising expenses as reasonable business responses to
false advertising. Here, the court
denied summary judgment. If successful,
“Nellcor is entitled to recover the amount of money necessary to engage in a
corrective advertising campaign to correct for any damage to Nellcor’s goodwill
proved to be caused by CAS’s false advertising.”
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