Viggiano brought the usual California claims, along with
federal warranty claims, based on Hansen’s diet Premium Sodas labeled as
containing “all natural flavors.” Each soda
allegedly contained two synthetic ingredients, acesulfame potassium (“ace-k”)
and sucralose, used as sweeteners and/or “flavor enhancers.” Each soda also contained at least one natural
fruit extract flavor. Viggiano alleged that consumers would understand “natural
flavors” to mean that the flavors have not been “modified, enhanced and/or
supplemented with artificial and/or synthetic compounds,” and that the “Premium
Diet Soda” name also implied that the sodas were flavored only with natural
ingredients.
Hansen argued that his claims were preempted because the FDA
expressly regulates the use of “natural flavor” labels. A manufacturer can use a “natural flavor”
label even if the product contains artificial, non-flavoring ingredients, so
long as the “characterizing flavor” is, in fact, natural. However, if any added artificial flavor “simulates,
resembles or reinforces the characterizing flavor ... the name of the
characterizing flavor shall be accompanied by the words ‘artificial’ or
‘artificially flavored.’” Other courts
had found preemption in similar situations, distinguishing between unnatural
ingredients and unnatural flavors. The regulations allow “natural flavors” even
when not all the ingredients are natural.
The FDA allows sucralose and ace-k as sweeteners and, for
the latter, as a flavor enhancer—a “[s]ubstance[ ] added to supplement,
enhance, or modify the original taste and/or aroma of a food, without imparting
a characteristic taste or aroma of its own.” Thus, the court held, neither
sucralose nor ace-k were flavors, but rather sweeteners/amplifiers of whatever
characterizing flavor a product already had.
(I don’t know why that doesn’t count as “reinforc[ing] the
characterizing flavor.”) And neither
appeared on the list of artificial flavors promulgated by the FDA.
Since FDA regulations expressly permitted this labeling, any
requirement to use additional or different labeling was expressly preempted. Another decision had held that the FDCA did
not preempt state law consumer claims that an “all natural flavors” label on an
ice cream box was misleading, because a reasonable consumer could plausibly interpret
that to mean “all natural ingredients.”
But that court didn’t appear to have considered the specific flavor
regulations, which made clear that ace-k and sucralose were not flavors. “While the distinction between an enhanced
natural flavor and an unenhanced natural flavor may be one with which normal
consumers are not familiar, the FDA has not precluded food manufacturers from
labeling their products naturally flavored simply because the flavor may be
artificially enhanced.” Moreover, the
general “all natural flavors” label was confirmed by the ingredient list, which
identified the specific natural characterizing flavor for each can.
Even if the claims weren’t preempted, dismissal would be
appropriate, because no reasonable consumer would be deceived. “Flavors” are not “ingredients,” and Viggiano
identified no artificial flavors in the drink.
“In cases where a product's front label is accurate and consistent with
the statement of ingredients, courts routinely hold that no reasonable consumer
could be misled by the label, because a review of the statement of ingredients
makes the composition of the food or drink clear.” Plus, the fact that the soda was clearly
labeled “diet” made clear that it contained artificial sweeteners, because it’s
the absence of sugar that makes a soda “diet.”
Given the ubiquity of diet sodas, a reasonable consumer would understand
that a diet soda contains artificial sweeteners, even if it also said “all
natural flavors.”
The truth of “all natural flavors” also disposed of the express
warranty claims. To the extent that Viggiano relied on the “premium” statement,
that was mere puffery with “no concrete, discernable meaning in the diet soda
context.” Read in context of the other
statements, none of them were actionable; thus, “premium” didn’t form part of
an overall warranty regarding the quality of the product. Unsurprisingly, the
implied warranty claims and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims also failed. The latter failed not just because the state
law claims failed, but also because the MMWA doesn’t apply to warranties
otherwise governed by federal law, as here with the FDCA, and because Hansen’s
label wasn’t a covered “written warranty” in the form of an assertion that the
product was defect free or that it would meet a specific level of performance
over a specified period of time.
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