Ony, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 2012 WL 1835671
(W.D.N.Y.)
Ony sued over defendants’ publication of an article
containing allegedly false and misleading statements about its product, an
animal derived surfactant known as Infasurf, which is used to treat Respiratory
Distress Syndrome (“RDS”) in premature infants.
Such infants often suffer from inadequate lung development, including
naturally produced surfactants. The parties compete with animal-derived surfactants.
The complaint alleged that Chiesi commissioned a study to
support the claim that Curosurf was superior.
Chiesi hired defendant Premier Research Services to “provide a database
to support the desired conclusion,” and hired three defendant-authors
(Ramananthan, Bhatia, and Sekar) to submit the findings to pediatric medical
societies. The authors and Ernst, a
Premier employee, submitted a study for publication in the Journal of
Perinatology that included allegedly false claims that Curosurf-treated infants
had a lower mortality rate than Infasurf-treated infants, e.g., “Result:
Calfactant [Infasurf] was associated with a 49.6% greater likelihood of death
than poractant alfa [Curosurf].” The
article claimed that this relationship held up even adjusting for patient and
hospital characteristics. The complaint
further alleged that the Journal (whose parent was also a defendant) was
perceived as a reliable source by neonatologists.
Ony alleged that the data used for the article weren’t based
on an actual clinical study, but rather from various reporting hospitals and
doctors, making the study retrospective and “subject to selective distortion.” Specifically, the mortality data were
unreliable because of deliberate omission of length of stay data, since length
of stay is inversely proportionate to mortality. Allegedly, if the length of stay data had
been included, it would have been obvious that the differences in results came
from differences in patients treated.
Ony further alleged that the authors didn’t cite at least one article
contradicting their findings, despite knowing about it, and tha the defendants
submitted the article for publication knowing that it was deficient. In fact, Ony alleged, it didn’t think the
doctor-authors actually wrote the article; some other agents of the
manufacturer/seller did.
Premier allegedly benefited economically from submitting and
publishing the article, which “served as advertising for Premier's database and
related services, and announced to pharmaceutical companies and other providers
of medical products and services ... that the engagement of Premier in
connection with similar self-serving ‘studies' would be to their economic
benefit as well.”
One of the two reviewers found the article’s conclusions
unreliable, but the journal published it anyway. Ony alleged that this was based on part on
the fact that Bhatia was an associate editor at the journal and Sekar was on
the editorial board. The
manufacturer/distributor defendants then allegedly paid the publication fee for
the article, which enabled it to come out in open access format available to
nonsubscribers. They then issued a press
release touting the article and began distributing it to current and potential
customers. Because the journal refused
to retract the article at Ony’s request, Only alleged that the journal and its
publisher the American Academy of Pediatrics “are sanctioning and condoning
scientifically unreliable information which influences purchasing decisions by
hospitals and prescribing decisions by neonatologists.”
Ony therefore alleged that publication and distribution of
the article violated the Lanham Act, NY GBL § 349, and constituted tortious
interference as to the manufacturer/distributor, and also constituted injurious
falsehood as to every defendant.
The authors, including Ernst, contested personal
jurisdiction. None of them were
domiciled in NY, and the article was written and researched outside of NY. Publication was not negotiated within NY;
publication was not negotiated at all but rather conditioned on peer review and
left to the editorial discretion of the defendant editor. The authors weren’t paid. Ony argued that defendant Nature Publishing
Group requires all authors to sign a license prior to submitting any papers for
publication, which contains a choice of law provision choosing NY law and
submitting to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of NY. But choice of law provisions are insufficient
on their own to confer jurisdiction, and a forum selection clause is
meaningless without express consent to personal jurisdiction. The agreement language referred only to
“non-exclusive jurisdiction” and had no express consent to personal
jurisdiction.
The claim against the authors sounded in defamation, and courts
considering NY’s long-arm statute have concluded that something more than the
distribution of a defamatory statement within the state is required to
establish long-arm jurisdiction. For Ernst
and Ramanthan, the only New York contact alleged was the submission of the article
itself, and that wasn’t enough. What about Bhatia and Sekar as participants in
the journal’s editorial activities? An
employee’s contacts with a forum state are assessed individually rather than
according to his/her employer’s activities.
Their duties were limited to reviewing articles emailed to them and
returning comments. This was also
insufficient to justify personal jurisdiction in NY.
Under the facts, defendants’ submission of the article to a
NY publisher was akin to a mere solicitation or placement of an ad, which is
insufficient to constitute doing business in NY. There was no personal jurisdiction over the
four author-defendants.
The court then turned to the motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. Statements of opinion
can’t support claims under the Lanham Act, GBL § 349, or injurious
falsehood/defamation. This includes a
hypothesis or opinion offered after a full recitation of the facts on which it
is based. The claims here were based on
an academic article in a scientific journal, and academic freedom is a special
concern of the First Amendment. Still,
there’s no license to make false statements.
The fact/opinion divide can be assessed by considering (1) whether the
specific language in issue has a precise meaning that is readily understood;
(2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false; and (3)
whether either the full context of the communication in which the statement
appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as
to signal that the statement is opinion or fact. Could a reasonable reader have concluded that
the article was conveying facts about the efficacy of Ony’s product?
Ony pointed to the article’s conclusions that calfactant
(Infasurf) was associated “with a 49.6% greater likelihood of death” or a
“significantly greater likelihood of death” than poractant alfa
(Curosurf). But Ony didn’t allege that
calfactant was in fact more effective.
(Not clear why that’s the standard, as opposed to “not significantly
less effective.) Instead, it alleged
that the article’s conclusions were unreliable and therefore misleading. Thus, the court framed the issue as whether
the article sufficiently stated the facts on which its conclusions were based
or impermissibly implied that the conclusions were supported by additional
undisclosed information.
Commentary: this is a defamation analysis, but applying it
in this way is completely inconsistent with the Lanham Act caselaw about
establishment/“tests prove” claims, where showing unreliability of the tests
used to make the assertion is a well-recognized path to liability. Had Ony picked its defendants better, and
brought only Lanham Act claims against a competitor, the court might not have
been led to apply this standard. While
that would still leave the article out there even if Ony fully succeeded, it
was never very likely that Ony would completely suppress the article, and more reasonable to imagine that Ony might be able to stop its use in advertising and promotion.
Once the court applied this standard, Ony’s claim was
doomed. The peer-reviewed journal at issue
was directed to a highly specialized group familiar with the issues. The article contained an initial section
detailing the patient data and research methods used. Though it didn’t mention length of stay data,
it did disclose the patient criteria considered. Thus, there was no implication of undisclosed
facts. The context also supported the
conclusion that an average reader would perceive the statements as “debatable
hypotheses” rather than “assertions of unassailable fact.” The authors acknowledged that the
retrospective nature of the study posed limitations and that there could be
additional factors affecting the stated conclusions. They specifically stated that the findings
prompted an inquiry into the reasons for the outcomes, and that “[t]he most
likely explanation may be due to different surfactant doses administered to the
infants included in the database,” as doses of poractant alfa tended to be
twice as large as doses of the other two surfactants. Thus, the court couldn’t
conclude that a reasonable reader would have received a message that the
article was conveying proven facts about the efficacy of Ony’s product. “[A]ny perceived fault in the method by which
the authors reached their conclusions should be subjected to peer review rather
than judicial review.”
Ony alleged that the manufacturer/distributor defendants
paid Premier and the authors to compile data to support a favorable conclusion,
but that was clearly indicated in the article under the heading “Conflict of
Interest.” There, the authors
acknolwedged that the “study was sponsored by Chiesi Farmaceutici SpA, the
manufacturer of poractant alfa. Frank R. Ernst is an employee of Premier, which
contracted with Chiesi Farmaceutici SpA to conduct the study. Rangasamy
Ramanathan, Kris Sekar and Jatinder Bhatia have served as consultants to Ciesi
Farmaceutici SpA.” This clearly
signalled that the authors weren’t disinterested, leaving a credibility
assessment to the reader and reinforcing that the conclusions were opinion.
The tortious interference claims also necessarily failed,
even after Ony identified specific hospitals whose relations were allegedly
interfered with; a defendant can advance its own economic interests unless it
employs wrongful means. Since promoting
and distributing the article wasn’t misleading, there was no wrongful conduct
alleged.
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