Jones v. Hollywood Unlocked, Inc., No.:
2:21-cv-07929-MEMF(PVCx), 2022 WL 18674459 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2022)
This is a super messy case with a lot going on; I’m going to
blog about it mainly to highlight a new thing you can apparently do with a
trademark application, which is use it on non-Amazon platforms to gain
advantages.
Jones is “a social media influencer, media personality, and
celebrity gossip blogger.” Defendant Johnson is “a media personality and the
founder, editor-in-chief, and CEO of the celebrity gossip website Hollywood
Unlocked.” The Bigo defendants operate a social network and video platform,
Bigo Live. There’s also a law firm involved (the Pilson defendants).
Jones, performing under the name “Tae the Mahne Tea,” allegedly
rose to popularity through his celebrity gossip broadcast, The Mahne Tea, which
is streamed on Bigo Live. He alleged that he had nearly two million followers
becoming “one of [Bigo Live’s] most popular artists,” and he monetized this
status.
The Hollywood Unlocked Defendants allegedly made various
defamatory statements about Jones and filed an application with the PTO for the
“Mahne Tea” mark. The court says the PTO “granted” the application on June 14,
2021, but that’s the filing date—the ITU application was published for
opposition in April 2022, allowed June 2022, and an extension of time to file a
statement of use has been granted as of this writing.
Using the pending trademark application, in June 2021,
Johnson submitted a complaint to Twitter alleging that Jones violated the
platform’s trademark policy by using The Mahne Tea on his Twitter page, and
Twitter suspended Jones’s account. The Hollywood Unlocked Defendants allegedly informed
Jones that they would surrender the Mark and drop the Twitter complaint in
exchange for $100,000. Jones refused and the account remains suspended. Similar
shenanigans allegedly occurred on Bigo, and Jones was allegedly subsequently
suspended from Bigo Live for three days.
Skipping a bunch of stuff, the big picture is that the US
just doesn’t have a good system for abuse of IP rights.
Tortious interference: Jones did allege the existence of a
business relationship between the plaintiff and a third-party, with the
prospect of a future economic benefit to the plaintiff. He also alleged that
the Hollywood Unlocked defendants had knowledge of his relationship with Bigo.
And he alleged that those defendants’ intentional acts disrupted Jones’s
relationship with his Bigo Live followers. But he failed to sufficiently allege
economic harm—he needed to allege whether he planned to or ordinarily would
have held a Bigo Live broadcast on those three days, or otherwise generated
revenue.
Presumably he could fix this with more pleading, but he also
didn’t plead an independently wrongful act, as required for tortious
interference. The complaint linked the following allegations to the tortious
interference: (1) trademark infringement and related extortion, and (2)
defamation per se and trade libel/business disparagement.
But (see below) Jones didn’t plead trademark infringement
[would fraud on the PTO have worked? I kind of think it ought to have done so].
And the court couldn’t at present determine whether (2) was wrongful given
disputes that required discovery, so they couldn’t serve as the wrongful acts.
[I don’t get this—procedurally, doesn’t that mean the court should wait to
resolve this as well?]
Fraud [not, apparently, pled as fraud on the PTO but argued
that way]: “Fraud in procuring a mark occurs when an applicant knowingly makes
false, material representations of fact in connection with an application.”
“[T]he burden of proving that a party fraudulently procured a trademark
registration is heavy.” [Though of course that’s for an issued registration;
nonetheless this really would be suited for a petition to cancel—the problem
Jones faces is that while we’re waiting for the statement of use, if it ever comes, there doesn’t seem to be anything he can do at the PTO.]
The court notes that there’s no presumption of validity,
recognizing that there is in fact no registration, but then quotes the standard
for filing use-based registrations, highlighting courts’ general lack of
knowledge about registration. The court held that Jones didn’t plead a false
representation regarding a material fact. He alleged that defendants “falsely
claimed [Hollywood Unlocked] owned and used the [Mark]” and that this
representation was “made in writing and communicated over the internet to the
USPTO.”
But the complaint contains no
allegations indicating that the Hollywood Unlocked Defendants did not use the
Mark. Thus, a statement in the trademark application disclosing that the
Hollywood Unlocked Defendants did use the Mark is not necessarily false.
Indeed, if anything, the Hollywood Unlocked Defendants are simply junior users
of the Mark.
This is … bad. It was an ITU! There was no such statement!
The problem is not about defendants’ use, which was not required—the problem is
the separate required statement saying that, to the best of their
knowledge, nobody else has a superior right. (“[T]o the best of the verifier’s
knowledge and belief, no other person has the right to use such mark in
commerce either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance
thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of such
other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ….”) That’s
what was allegedly false, especially when they immediately used the filed
application to target him on Twitter and Bigo, clearly contemplating that the
marks couldn’t coexist without confusion.
Anyway, the trademark infringement claim wasn’t plausibly
pleaded, because Jones didn’t have statutory standing (an argument the court
raised on its own motion, which I’m not sure is right for non-Article III
standing but ok).
Although Jones was within the zone of interests of the
Lanham Act by virtue of his alleged ownership of an unregistered mark, he
didn’t allege proximate cause. And this gets weird: “While Jones may have
alleged that he is personally engaged in interstate commerce, the Complaint
fails to show that the Hollywood Unlocked Defendants, in registering the Mark,
were similarly engaged in interstate commerce.” “Use in commerce” “requires
that the defendant ‘use ... a famous or distinctive mark to sell goods [or
services] other than those produced or authorized by the mark’s owner.’” Alleging
that the Hollywood Unlocked defendants, “citing their pending trademark
application,” had Jones suspended from Twitter and Bigo Live was insufficient
to allege use of the mark in the course of selling any goods or services.
[According to this dismissal, Jones didn't plead that defendants used the mark--so no infringement--but he also didn't plead that they didn't use the mark--so no fraud.]
Even without standing, Jones failed to state a claim for
false association or false advertising. He failed to allege a “valid,
protectable trademark.” He didn’t allege where his putative mark fell on the Abercrombie
spectrum, merely alleging that it “was distinctive and used to identify [Jones]
to his followers.” “Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.” [OK, but isn’t inherent distinctiveness a question of law?
Also, the complaint actually contains a lot more about his use to identify
himself to his followers, which I haven’t discussed and which is ordinarily
accepted as trademark use—I think this opinion is good evidence that trademark
law has a lot of concepts that aren’t transparent to non-TM lawyers.]
He also didn’t state a claim for false advertising, because he didn’t allege any “false statements about any product owned or produced by Jones.” [This at least could have been maybe plausible under a Dastar/Sybersound analysis.]
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