Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distributing, Inc., Nos.
12–1635, 13–1817, 2014 WL 3953734 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2014)
The Sixth Circuit continues to help trademark lawyers and
scholars out by including pictures of the products at issue. There
are a
lot of 5-hour
Energy cases. This one involves a
trial that found N2G and another defendant to have infringed the trademark and
trade dress of 5-hour Energy (5HE), an energy shot. The district court held defendants, and their
common owner Diehl, in contempt for violating the permanent injunction after
trial. The court of appeals affirmed
everything.
FHE’s sales spiked in 2005 and increased “astronomically”
from there. By March 2009, FHE had
nearly 70% of the market for energy shots, and spent about 25% of its gross
sales for advertising (on $620 million of revenue for 2011). While the mark was rejected as descriptive in
2005, and went on the Supplemental Register late that year, FHE was ultimately
registered in August 2011, shortly before this case was tried. FHE also used litigation to protect its “mark
and market position,” suing many alleged infringers, including defendants.
In 2008, defendants began to sell “6 Hour Energy Shot,”
“Nitro2Go Instant Energy,” and “Extreme Monster Energy Shot.” The first of these bore a resemblance to
FHE. Diehl testified that the
similarities were due to other factors, not copying, though the warning labels
were word for word copies of the one on FHE’s bottle. FHE sued, and the district court
preliminarily enjoined 6 Hour Energy and ordered a recall, which resulted in
the return of almost half of the 77,000 bottles defendants had sold, causing a
huge loss. Defendants also had to take
their Extreme Monster Energy Shot off the market after complaints of trademark
and trade dress infringement Monster, “one of the largest players in the energy
drink market.”
5-hour Energy and 6 Hour Energy Shot |
The court noted the size disparity, which isn't present in the photos: the Extreme Monster energy shot is small while the Monster energy drink is large |
Defendants (after consulting with counsel) then came out
with what eventually were seven variations of energy shots about which FHE
amended its complaint to allege that these infringed too. Ultimately, a jury found that six of
defendants’ products infringed the 5 Hour Energy mark, that two infringed FHE’s
trade dress, that the infringement was intentional except for one product, and
that two of the products were falsely advertised. The jury awarded $1.75 million in damages.
The district court permanently enjoined defendants from
selling the six products found to infringe, and from using marks confusingly
similar to FHE’s mark and trade dress.
Defendants were also ordered to surrender all products subject to the
injunction and file a compliance report.
Diehl, who was not personally enjoined, signed the report under penalty
of perjury, stating that he’d long ago stopped selling 6 Hour Energy and Pure
Energy (the first variant he tried); that he had changed the labels for all the
other infringing products; and that he had instructed the enjoined products not
be sold on the N2G website. In 2012, both defendants declared bankruptcy.
However, in July 2012, FHE had three orders placed on the
N2G website, and each order contained enjoined products as well as the
modified-label products advertised on the website. The modified products were marketed by a new
company and the orders were filled by another new company, both of which were
created by Diehl, whose various entities “commingle assets essentially based on
Diehl’s whims.” The presence of the old
products was attributed to a new employee acting without higher-ups’ knowledge. But in April 2013, more than six months after
FHE filed a motion for contempt, enjoined products were still being advertised
on Groupon and an inspection of a warehouse showed that “scores” of enjoined
bottles were still in stock, despite Diehl’s assurances that the products had
been destroyed. The district court found
defendants and Diehl in contempt.
The court of appeals first rejected defendants’ motion for a
new trial. “[T]he likelihood-of-confusion
factors can rarely be applied with mathematical precision—this is a holistic
endeavor.” Here, the jury heard ample
evidence to support its likely confusion findings. “First—and most importantly—the jury could
use their eyes and see that Defendants’ products use similar marks.” The differences in numbers, use of the plural
“hours,” and small “+” or other signs “should not be considered in isolation—we
‘view marks in their entirety and focus on their overall impressions, not
individual features.’”
The jury also heard a lot of testimony on the strength of
the FHE mark. Relatedness of the goods
obviously favored FHE, and the parties used similar marketing channels. “One exhibit even showed the parties’ display
boxes side-by-side next to a convenience store cash register.” And the jury
heard testimony that the products were impulse purchases and consumers just
bought what was prominently displayed to them (which would go to materiality,
if we cared about materiality), so they weren’t tremendously careful and could
easily be confused by proximate placements.
Defendants’ arguments about lack of actual confusion and
lack of bad intent were unavailing. FHE
didn’t need to show actual confusion, but there was testimony from an FHE ad
purchaser about a representative from the Discovery Channel who told her that he
loved FHE, and even said he had one in his pocket, when the bottle in his
pocket was actually a 6 Hour Energy.
Diehl’s testimony didn’t absolve FHE of bad intent; the jury could have
disregard it, and there was circumstantial evidence of copying (the warning
label). In any event, intent isn’t required.
A similar analysis applied to the trade dress claim. FHE didn’t introduce evidence about the
strength of its trade dress, but it did introduce several TV ads that
emphasized the bottle’s look and size.
The relatedness of the goods, actual confusion, marketing channels, low
degree of purchaser care, and defendants’ intent supported the jury’s trade
dress verdict, along with “a brief glance at the parties’ competing products.” Though defendants’ products omitted blue, a
color featured prominently on FHE’s bottle, trade dress is total image and
overall appearance, so “parsing minute differences between products” wasn’t
right. The court didn’t abuse its
discretion in denying a new trial.
What about descriptive fair use? The jury heard evidence that defendants’ use
wasn’t descriptive. The first version
used a symbol after the term “6 Hour Energy,” which would allow the jury to
infer that defendants weren’t simply describing the product but trying to lay
claim to a mark. Also, Diehl testified
that he didn’t have a basis to claim that his products gave 7 (or more) hours
of energy, so the jury could infer that defendants “did not intend to describe
what their products did when Defendants weren’t sure of that themselves.” Plus, the evidence on intent also would
support a finding of bad faith: “circumstantial evidence suggesting that
Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s protected mark and proceeded to copy it.”
It was also ok to deny defendants discovery about FHE’s
formula. Discovery about defendants’
formula was relevant to FHE’s false advertising claim, but reciprocal discovery
about FHE’s formula was only tangentially relevant—if the formulas had been
similar, they could’ve extrapolated from evidence that allegedly existed about
FHE’s effectiveness. But they had a far
easier method to evaluate their own products—they could’ve tested them.
And it was ok to exclude the text of a different FHE case
rejecting a trade dress claim on dissimilarity grounds. Defendants were able to introduce Diehl’s
testimony that his experience with the case taught him that he wasn’t
infringing as long as there were slight differences between packages. The text of the opinion, from another
circuit, “might well have confused the issues at trial or misled the jury.”
The judge likewise allowed photos of defendants’ Extreme
Monster Energy shot contrasted with Hansen’s Monster energy drink, but did not
allow the jury to be shown Hansen’s actual complaint (as FHE had asked
for). FHE argued that this was probative
of defendants’ motive/intent. Defendants
argued that the photos weren’t relevant, but that was “clearly wrong,” for
example as related to the descriptive fair use defense. “The picture of the Monster can side-by-side
with Defendants’ product shows that at the same time Defendants were conceiving
6 Hour Energy, they were also imitating the trade dress of another major player
in the energy drink market. A jury could use this evidence to infer that
Defendants’ choice of trade dress was not a mistake.” Other evidentiary objections were also
resolved against defendants.
On the contempt ruling, defendants appealed the portion
relating to the modified products. The
district court didn’t find that the modified products themselves violated the
Lanham Act, but instead used the “safe distance rule” to find that the modified
products were confusingly similar to FHE’s trademark and trade dress. This was not clear error/an abuse of
discretion. “Equity allows courts, faced
with recalcitrant parties who repeatedly violate the law, to craft permanent
injunctions which ‘proscribe activities that, standing alone, would have been
unassailable.’” In IP, this means the
safe distance rule: barring known infringers from using marks whose use by
noninfringers wouldn’t necessarily be actionable.
This is justified because once infringement has occurred, “the
confusion sowed ‘is not magically remedied’ by de minimis fixes.” Confusion lingers, justifying a requirement
that the infringer move so far from the plaintiff’s mark that the public is on
notice that they’re unrelated. A court
need not retry confusion for each small variation a defendant makes. Nothing in the Lanham Act indicated a
congressional intent to curb the traditional equitable powers of the courts,
including the safe distance rule. That rule was “particularly apt in this
case—where a serial infringer has tinkered with products to skirt a permanent
injunction for commercial gain.” The
court also rejected the idea that the safe distance rule wasn’t appropriate for
trade dress claims because they were too subjective. (In a footnote, the court of appeals said
that it wasn’t addressing whether it would’ve been an abuse of discretion to
require a full likely confusion analysis from FHE—hinting perhaps that it would’ve
been.)
Using the safe distance rule, the district court didn’t
abuse its discretion in finding the modified products confusingly similar. Another “glance” showed that the factual
findings of similarity (“a black bottom with a yellow sunrise fading to red”)
weren’t clearly erroneous. Defendants
argued that they were attempting to make their products look more like Nitro2Go
Instant Energy Extra Strength, which the jury found not to infringe FHE’s mark,
but the jury didn’t make any finding about that product’s trade dress. The district court heard all the trial
evidence and could visually compare the products; that was fine.
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