Moderator: Patricia E. Lowry, Squire Sanders US LLP
Aashish Desai, Desai Law Firm, P.C.
Dukes and Concepcion made plaintiffs’ lives much
harder. As long as companies don’t make
you sign an arbitration agreement when you buy shoes or toothpaste, that will
be a focus—people have migrated to the consumer class action.
Janine L. Pollack, Milberg LLP
Given the recession, advertisers are pushing the envelope. The balance is strained now. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have started to realize
there are promises being made by ads that can’t be fulfilled. FTC has stepped up to the plate and getting
more active. Gov’t intervention spurs private attorneys. Securities cases are
also getting harder, causing people to migrate to advertising. Lower barriers
to entry.
Robert J. Herrington, Greenberg Traurig LLP
Explosion in past 2-3 years.
Defense perspective: attributing rise to (1) increased regulatory focus
from a number of agencies, esp. FTC pushing companies more. More warning
letters. Plaintiffs’ bar tracks those letters. Can draw a class action in
days. (2) P’s bar has become more
sophisticated in looking at FDA regulations.
Some regs are difficult to comply with. California: P’s bar has been
able to use the UCL to enforce the regs.
(3) Concepcion is a huge
driver. Some sophisticated companies are
trying, but it’s difficult to get an enforceable class action waiver on a
consumer product purchased at the retail level.
Because of the challenge, products at the retail level—not over the
internet, because that’s easier—are easier pickings.
Desai: should we have a lawyer when we buy dental floss?
Herrington: ours have very clear language.
Pollack: easy to understand, but unenforceable!
Timothy G. Blood, Blood Hearst & O’Reardon LLP
Aging population, people trying to take care of themselves
healthwise. Also track the bad economy. Marketing people will say anything to
sell the product; that’s their job. In
house constraints are the downers. In a
soft economy, especially in a mature market like food where you’re grinding out
every tenth of a point, marketing folks win more battles. Other factors contribute, but these companies
are victims because they made themselves so.
Desai: E.g., lose 30 pounds with diet or exercise by
sprinkling powder on your food. Toning
shoes. One case: lose 10 pounds in 48
hours! Another promised 5 pounds in 24,
if you were too lazy for two days. One
case: coconut water—life enhancing with mega-electrolytes. “All natural” cosmetics. Pomegranates make
you live forever. When companies make these claims, no one is watching over
them. And once one starts, e.g. toning shoes, the others feel they have to fall
in line. You’d think consumers would know better, but they don’t.
Q: are companies thinking they’ll make money and then settle
a suit?
Blood: No, they’re not planning to stop—they’re just
ignoring the lawyer. But eventually companies get more sophistitcated.
Pollack: once the message is out there, you can’t unring the
bell. They figure: we got the message out for a year. If we have to change the ad a bit, the math
still works out! Everyone now knows
about toning shoes—she still sees people wearing them.
Lowry: are these actually being certified?
Blood: yes.
Prototypical class actions.
Consumer fraud was the type of case said to be readily certifiable when
Rule 23 was promulgated. One singular uniform representation; then a question
of science—is it true or not—a generalized question. Prone to certification
even after Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Supposed to be defense-side case, but he
cites it all the time, because it reminds the Ps bar of what you’re supposed to
focus on. In the past, the way to defeat class actions was the snowflake
analogy: every snowflake/consumer is unique and different. Wal-Mart pulls back and says we look at big issues with answers to
common questions. You don’t look at snowflakes to answer the big question: did
it snow last night? Discovery is early; when you get to the certification
stage, you’re just about ready to have a trial.
Kara L. McCall, Sidley Austin LLP
Views Dukes
differently: forces meat behind allegations. Can’t ignore the merits. Look at how named P will prove the case and
whether evidence will apply to every single class member. Look at merits to see how you’ll prove every
element of every claim. Discovery is also huge.
Everyone is reviewing what kind of discovery has to take place. Ds have
always argued it should be limited; only discovery necessary to decide
certification. But case management conferences now feature Ps saying under Wal-Mart I need lots of discovery to
prove my case!
Also, the issue of using experts: what kind of Daubert analysis a court is supposed to
conduct. SCt expressed doubt as to 9th
Cir.’s opinion that Daubert didn’t
need to be done, and lots of courts have taken that to court. Claiming that they can prove classwide
damages shouldn’t be taken at face value—take a deposition; courts should
decide whether expert has a methodology that will allow classwide damages.
Pollack: Comcast—obviously,
she loves the dissent. Ginsburg says the case is limited to these facts;
litigants didn’t have the chance to answer the Q the Court ultimately
decided. What’s happening is that all
the costs are shifted a lot sooner, trial-ready at the certification stage.
This may be bad for everyone; Ps no longer have bifurcated discovery because
they have to do the deep dive early on.
There’s no longer a basis to resist that. Experts are now lined up at
the certification stage. Spending a ton of money a lot earlier than they used
to. That has goods and bads. Great to
get in charge of facts much earlier, but higher investment; trial-ready at
cert. stage. Scalia is chipping away at the class mechanism when he can, but
there’s still good out there.
McCall: damages is back into the class certification discussion. Individualized damages doesn’t preclude
certification—but that just means that the number at the end of the day may
differ, and you still need a classwide methodology. Does that help with product price? Yes, because price can differ dramatically
depending on place of purchase, methodology.
Ds job is to develop record—nobody ever has receipts.
Blood: Comcast—P had
four theories of damage, and goes to SCt on one. In an antitrust case, if not everybody
suffered injury, that makes a classwide damage model difficult. Reminds us that the issue is whether the
issue can be tried classwide. For consumers, it’s different. Basically strict
liability statutes in many states. If
reasonable person deceived, people get their money back. So you just need to
show a methodology that works classwide.
Q: how do you find the class members?
Blood: technically not an ascertainability issue, which is
whether there are objective criteria for being members of the class; you don’t
have to actually locate them. If they
bought, there.
McCall: Standing issue—may include people who didn’t read
the label.
Herrington: plenty of these plaintiffs lie about whether
they bought the product, and we have the right to challenge that for each and
every class member. How do you
cross-examine a claim form?
Desai: then you could never have a class action. [This was
my immediate reaction!]
McCall: not in this context, no!
Blood: nationwide class actions are still possible. Mazza
is just a choice of law decision. It
changed the landscape because it’s a recent 9th Circuit case. But the
more you push Mazza, the less there
is. They announce a rule, skip over the analysis, and reach a conclusion, but
they don’t overturn existing Cal. choice of law rules. Ps have to be more
careful than in the past. Ps were
terrible (and Ds too) in analyzing choice of law in the past because it was a
lot of work and took lots of pages, but you have to do it and have to do it
correctly. A lot of post-Mazza
district court cases say they comply with Mazza
and still allow possible nationwide class.
Defendants won’t be happy: now Ps bar is focusing more on
multistate classes. Why fight so hard for Wyoming and Utah? Who cares?
Take laws that are readily, easily on their face similar—California, NJ,
maybe NY and Pa. and Florida—that’s effectively nationwide without the trouble
of states that don’t add much to the mix and create tremendous issues.
Q: will you sue in companies’ home states?
Blood: it’s always been part of the mix. Where a state has the old Restatement test,
you will never get a nationwide class.
Pollack: if the D bar is so bent as keeping it as
single-state class, aren’t you encouraging us to go file in multiple states? Isn’t
that inefficient? Maybe just 6 states.
Herrington: the bar for entry into consumer class actions is
also going up. Some firms have the
wherewithal to do a case right, but there are plenty of garbage cases that you
can make go away if you create enough problems.
In terms of the lesson for today: the Ps bar and the Ds bar are likely
to see better lawyers and cases as the SCt ratchets up the bar for class
action.
Q: how do you minimize risks? Voluntary refunds/recalls.
McCall: Best thing is to be proactive on substantiation and
claims made. Give and take between marketing and R&D/nutrition. Can’t
stress enough that there must be careful, thoughtful, constant review of claims
and underlying science. Focus on one claim makes it easier for Ps so also think
about diversifying message. Consumer research is a double edged sword. If you
have research showing that people take away multiple messages or rely on their
doctors instead of labels, that’s great, but if your research says “this is the
biggest motivating claim” you have an issue. In house counsel should make sure
to control market research, what kinds of questions are being asked, what’s
being tested. Make sure it’s privileged (at least the discussion about whether
it should be done).
Voluntary refunds: interesting body of case law discussing
whether recall/refund affects Rule 23 in terms of superiority. Several courts
have said that it does as another method for adjudicating the controversy. 7th
Cir. has said it’s not a method of adjudication, but said that Ps counsel
bringing the case when a robust refund program is in place makes them question
adequacy, since the transaction costs of litigation v. refund are so much
higher. Check your jurisdiction.
Q: offers of judgment, recent FLSA case?
Blood: Won’t have an impact. Justice Thomas goes out of his
way to distinguish FLSA from class actions.
Pickoff situations: most judges don’t like it. Feels sleazy.
Desai: in California, that won’t insulate you from a state
law claim. Anyway, when you buy off someone in a labor case, that tends to
foment more litigation by other employees; that comes with the statutory atty’s
fees in a FLSA case. So he thinks these cases are not broad as the media would
have you believe.
McCall: Picking off just doesn’t work in the 7th
Circuit if you’ve already filed for certification. Good lawyers immediately file for cert. with
the complaint, so that won’t help if there’s a good lawyer on the P’s side. We
think about it all the time because it doesn’t hurt when you have a
multimillion-dollar class action.
Lowry: talk about settlements!
Pollack: cy pres. Whatever’s left over, to be given to a
charitable cause. Some judges have taken a more active role in policing a link.
McCall: Kellogg:
donation to food bank wasn’t enough; a consumer protection case should go to
consumer protection groups. That makes Ds nervous because some consumer
protection groups are connected to consumer protection lawyers. No longer can you wait to determine the group
later; has to be determined as part of settlement negotiations.
Blood: interesting how aggressive the 9th Circuit
has been; other circuits don’t care. Kellogg
was a good settlement—a pool of cash, for a consumer protection organization to
be named later, which makes sense because we didn’t know how much money would
be left over. Makes no sense to give $1000 to each of 5 organizations, nor $5
million to one organization with a $500,000 budget. 9th Circuit
ignored the cash part of the settlement, oh well. We chose Feeding America (he
was on the receiving end of the decision) because more than half of the
indigent in the US are kids and the case was about kids’ nutrition. Other
cases, like the Facebook case—goes the other way with a sensible, creative way
of spending the cy pres money.
Parties used to work really hard on class notice and
distribution. Now most of the settlement
time is spent on the cy pres recipient! D
won’t be willing to give $ to Center for Science in the Public Interest, which
goes after food Ds all the time, even though it’s the best recipient.
Experian case from
9th Circuit: weird and shocking. Had a settlement with a provision
that says a class rep will get $5000 provided they don’t object to the
settlement. That’s a standard settlement
agreement. D lawyers add a bunch of provisions requiring class reps to support
the settlement. These are innocuous to practitioners; never create an issue. If
some class rep didn’t like the settlement, no such provision has ever stopped a
class rep from complaining. It’s just
miscellaneous garbage.
But the 9th Cir. thought they were terrible. Look
back at all your agreements & forms and get rid of such provisions! No
upside and now a downside.
Q: talk about Skechers/Reebok/toning.
Pollack: We filed cases before the FTC acted, though the FTC
was looking into them (we didn’t know that).
We worked with the FTC to bring injunctive and monetary relief to the class.
Filed the complaints and entered into settlement talks. FTC wanted the private
suits to be the mechanism of delivering relief, and were able to get very
substantial refunds. Reebok & Skechers,
about $50, which was substantial. Skechers was the largest FTC settlement ever.
Helpful because of FTC’s big splashy publicity—got 200 claims/minute, crashed
the FTC website.
Blood: savvy defense lawyer informed Ps of FTC
investigation. Investigation is
confidential; typically do sue and settle all together. FTC can’t talk about
investigation w/out subject’s permission. Lawyer had developed a certain level
of trust w/Blood and talked about it.
New for FTC to work with class—great for the class because of the free publicity
getting participation; it is usually expensive to find class members.
Pollack: no professional objectors at all.
Blood: one half-wit who stumbled into it, and he walked away
without money.
Pollack: true—some tried but withdrew. Very clean hearing.
Q: substantiation?
Desai: Claim substantiation is a very powerful theory, based
on FTC standards. Standard isn’t just “we
think it”; can require certain kinds of tests.
He had one case where someone paid for a 30-person test and market
research and said that proved the product caused weight loss. Our claim: we are not acting on behalf of the
FTC, but litigating under the UCL. We aren’t saying we need the same level of
proof, but rather saying that under California (as well as NY and some other
states) law the standard isn’t deception but rather “likely to deceive,” a much
lower standard, and that’s where we try to get in this idea of lack of
substantiation. (Ok, I think I see the
conceptual disconnect here. Ps really
need to be making the Lanham Act move of identifying the necessarily implied claim
of substantiation--which is a straight-up false message received by a consumer as
a result of her receipt of the explicit scientific-sounding claim--rather than
just saying the scientific-sounding claim is unsubstantiated. This is an argument with a pedigree and a lot
of caselaw behind it!)
Herrington: Hughes
v. Ester-C: a product that provided vitamin C. One of the best summaries of the law of
substantiation and whether a consumer fraud claim can be stated and what the
motion to dismiss standard is. Basically: substantiation isn’t a private cause
of action. Also Bronson
v. J&J. Court looked for a study that the P could cite in the complaint
that contradicted D’s claim. If you have that, you can survive motion to
dismiss.
Eckler
v. Wal-Mart, Equate. Substantiation isn’t enough. Can state a claim using a
specific scientific study contradicting D’s claim. P there had 10-12 studies where one of the
ingredients, glucosamine, was studied, and the court did a detailed analysis
and rejected the complaint under Twiqbal
because the studies didn’t study D’s
product which had other ingredients—kind of amazing on a motion to dismiss.
Great defense case.
Chavez
v. Nestle, 9th Cir.: Juicy Juice brain development: dct
dismissed as lack of substantiation claim.
Court of appeals reversed, 2-1. P
is essentially alleging that there’s so little DHA in the product that, even if
DHA works, a kid would have to drink too much to count, and that’s enough to
state a claim. Dissent says, giving guidance to defense: this is a prior
substantiation case on its face. Majority opinion is dishonest because there’s
enough DHA in the Juicy Juice product to say it has DHA; does not claim that it’s
all the DHA the kid needs, just that it helps with brain development.
Desai: old fashioned UCL claim. P’s bar should start thinking about RICO. You
don’t need direct evidence of reliance in a RICO case, so you don’t need that
to certify and would also help with Mazza
because no choice of law.
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