Tuesday, May 27, 2014

Ninth Circuit revives consumer claims against Sony



In re Sony PS3 “Other OS” Litig., 551 Fed.Appx. 916, No. 11–18066 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2014) (belated; just showed up in Westclip)
The court of appeals partially reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against Sony for disabling the ability of the PS3 to use other operating systems (enabling the machine to run as a computer) via a software update. There was no breach of express warranty, though promotional materials allegedly promised that this feature would be available for the advertised ten-year lifespan of the PS3.  The statements didn’t include those exact terms, and the ToS expressly informed consumers that updates and services “may cause some loss of functionality.”  The express one-year warranty applied instead, and the update came after a year.  Similarly, the claims for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were properly dismissed, as was the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim.
However, some of the CLRA claims shouldn’t have been dismissed.  Plaintiffs alleged that Sony’s representations at the time of sale “mischaracterized the dual functionality of the PS3—and were likely to deceive members of the public—because Sony later restricted users to using either the Other OS feature or accessing the PSN [PlayStation Network] feature, but not both.”  Plaintiffs alleged that they reviewed Sony’s website, relevant internet articles, and the box label before buying, and that they relied on Sony’s representations. They also alleged damages because they paid more for the PS3 than they otherwise would.  This was enough.  The CLRA claim that required pleading fraud was properly dismissed because plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite intent; it wasn’t enough to plead that Sony believed that it could terminate the dual functionality when they didn’t allege that Sony planned to terminate the dual functionality at the time of sale.  CLRA claims based on unconscionability also failed.  Plaintiffs failed to allege any underlying “agreement” that promised them dual functionality for the lifespan of the PS3. 
Based on this result, FAL and UCL claims, including UCL unfairness claims, were also revived. For unfairness, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Sony caused them substantial injury by charging a premium for the PS3’s dual functionality and then discontinuing access to both the Other OS and PSN features. They also alleged that they could not have reasonably avoided this injury because they would have lost access to the PSN if they chose not to download the update which disabled the Other OS feature, and that there were no countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that outweigh the substantial injury to consumers.
CFAA claims and unjust enrichment claims were also properly kicked out (the software was voluntarily installed and there were adequate legal remedies available, respectively).

"generic" claims may be governed by FDA standard regardless of regulatory status



Mission Pharmacal Co. v. Virtus Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 2014 WL 2119237, No. 5:13–CA–176 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2014) (magistrate judge, report & recommendation adopted)
This started as a patent infringement suit and added false advertising; the opinion here denies summary judgment to the defendant.  Mission sells CitraNatal prescription prenatal supplements covered by a patent, while Virtus sells prenatal supplements under the name Natalvirt that allegedly infringed the patent.  The false advertising stemmed from Virtus’s representations that Natalvirt used the same ingredients in the same amounts as the Mission products; contained the same iron blend; and were “generic equivalents to and substitutes for” the Mission products while in fact they weren’t bioequivalent.  Mission alleged that Virtus “falsely told national pharmaceutical databases that” the Virtus products “use the ingredient ferrous gluconate and are therefore pharmaceutically equivalent.”  Mission further alleged that the Virtus products wouldn’t be generic, equivalent, or substituable for the Mission products “unless they have been demonstrated to deliver their active ingredients to patients at the same rate and in the same amount as” the Mission products.  But instead, Virtus used a ferrous gluconate “formulated to delay the absorption of the iron compound” instead of the rapid-release compound found in the Mission products.
Among the forms of relief sought was a notice in any ad or promotion that Virtus wasn’t equivalent to Mission and that the substitution of the products “may violate state law.”
More on the facts: Virtus designed around the Mission patent, which focused on combining slow-release with rapid-release ferrous gluconate.  The Virtus products “encapsulate” the ferrous gluconate they contain in “slow dissolving matrix,” and “use[ ] a ferrous gluconate formulated for a delayed release.”  The parties disagreed about whether this infringed the patent.  Virtus’ argument for noninfringement was basically that the ferrous gluconate in the Virtus products was encapsulated in a slow dissolving matrix and was formulated for delayed release, unlike the Mission products which contained a fast-dissolving ferrous gluconate.
Prescription prenatal vitamins aren’t subject to FDA premarket approval, and therefore aren’t listed in the Orange Book of drugs that can be sold as generic equivalents.  The parties disagreed over whether the products were otherwise regulated as drugs or as prescription dietary supplements.
Virtus argued that its labels weren’t literally false, because they accurately listed the ingredients and their amounts; that there was no requirement to label its ferrous gluconate as sustained release; that there was no substantiated pharmaceutical benefit from fast dissolution of ferrous gluconate even if Mission marketed it as such; that the labels didn’t represent that the products were equivalent; that any such representation wouldn’t be false because of the equivalence in active ingredients; and that there was no evidence that speed of dissolution was material or that consumers were deceived.
Mission argued that these prescription prenatal vitamins were subject to FDA drug regulations because they included folic acid and therefore had to meet FDA standards for claiming “equivalence,” which requires both pharmaceutical equivalence and bioequivalence.  (This seems to me to be the long way around. Even if they aren’t “drugs,” isn’t it likely that consumers’ ordinary standards for judging what is equivalent are set by reference to the usual standard, which happens to be supplied by the FDA?  Consumers really don’t know the drug/supplement distinction.) 
Also, Mission wasn’t challenging the labels.  It was challenging the marketing and promotion of the products as generics—not to doctors but to wholesale distributors and retail pharmacy chains to promote a pharmacist to fill a prescription written for a Mission product with a Virtus product instead, as a generic equivalent.  Virtus often sent its customers a form in which it describes its products as “generic” for Mission’s products.  Likewise, it submitted new product information forms to a database of prescription products indicating that its products were “generic” for Mission products.  It also used a “chart that lists its product, under a column heading “Virtus Name,” right next to Mission’s product, under a column heading “Brand Name.”  Thus, every sale of a Virtus product was substituting for a Mission product.
Virtus responded that “generic” and “brand” had different meanings in a commercial context.  It contended that it made clear to customers that its products weren’t Orange Book products but multivitamins.  It made other distinctions between supplements and drugs and argued that both parties were producing supplements.  As dietary supplements, it argued, the products didn’t need to be bioequivalent to be generic, because there was no proper market definition of “generic” in the supplement context.
A previous case, Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharms., Inc, 273 F. Supp. 2d 769 (W.D. Tex. 2001), held that drug makers using “generic” to describe nonapproved drugs still had to use the FDA’s definition of “generic.”  Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Tex. 2001), likewise concluded that whether one drug was “generic” for another was an issue committed to the FDA.  New definitions of terms of art such as bioequivalence would undercut national uniformity and would confuse the public.  Thus, the Ethex court enjoined ad language claiming that “neither brand nor generic papain-urea compounds are subject to FDA approval or rating,” because, in the context of other representations, “[t]he over-all effect [was] to create the misleading impression that Accuzyme is the ‘brand’ and Ethezyme is a ‘generic substitute for Accuzyme, when it has not been determined that Ethezyme is a ‘generic’ alternative to Accuzyme.”
The court fond that Virtus had failed to provide “any evidence, argument, or authority demonstrating the products fit any applicable definition of a dietary supplement, or countering Mission’s argument that the inclusion of a prescription-level amount of folic acid renders the products drugs,” or to show that products couldn’t be both dietary supplements and drugs.  (I wonder how Pom Wonderful might affect this case.  Is whether a product is a “drug” an issue the FDA alone should determine?)  Virtus also didn’t provide authority to support any other definition of “generic” as applied to the products at issue.  Nor could Virtus dispute literal falsity by arguing about materiality.  (The court considered Virtus’ arguments in the patent arm of the case to be inconsistent—if it wasn’t infringing because its iron was slowly dissolving, that seemed like a material fact-based difference relevant to whether it was misleading to claim that its products were “generic” for or “equivalent” to the Mission products.)   False or misleading claims of equivalency are actionable under the Lanham Act and common law. 
The court determined that Mission had produced evidence “raising a fact issue as to whether the retail pharmacist, filling a prescription for a Mission Product, the ‘brand name product,’ might dispense instead the corresponding Virtus Product, the ‘brand name equivalent,’ under the mistaken assumption the two have been determined to be ‘generic equivalents’ or that otherwise there is factual support for the claim of equivalency.”  Whether the products were in fact equivalent was a contested issue of fact.

all confusion is actionable but some doesn't count



Yes, I know that's contradictory, but it's a result of expansive doctrine which courts then seek to cabin by finding reasons to disregard certain evidence--such as evidence here that people in a sophisticated business still made errors about which entitty they were dealing with.
Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Management, LLC, 2014 WL 2123572, No. 10–161 (D. Del. May 20, 2014)
Arrowpoint Capital sued AAM and a number of related Arrowpoint entities (using names like Arrowpoint Partners GP and Arrowpoint Fundamental Opportunity Fund), alleging trademark infringement through defendants’ use of the Arrowpoint name and logo. The court denied a preliminary injunction.
The plaintiff is a holding corporation; its subsidiaries Arrowood Indemnity Company and Arrowood Surplus Lines Insurance Company  provide insurance and related services under the trade name “Arrowpoint Capital.”  As part of its business, it manages assets derived from policy premiums, and alleged that its primary source of income is the investment of its reserves in fixed-income securities, enabling it to meet its financial obligations.  It also allegedly “provided investment management services to an unaffiliated insurer from March 4, 2007, until October 15, 2009,” and marketed its investment management services to other insurers and pension funds.  Plaintiff has registered ARROWPOINT CAPITAL and its design mark for insurance-related products and services.
Meanwhile, defendants provide investment-related services including individual investment management accounts and three separate private investment funds, commonly referred to as “hedge funds.” They manage over $1.5 billion in assets for “high net worth individuals, companies operating primarily for the benefit of wealthy individuals, family foundations, or trusts.”  Defendants allegedly selected their marks after doing a trademark search and having counsel review their availability.
Defendants' logo
After plaintiff learned about defendants, it applied to register ARROWPOINT CAPITAL for “investment management services”; AAM opposed; and TTAB proceedings are currently suspended because of the pending litigation.
Defendants argued that plaintiff had no rights in investment management services, only insurance. But that’s a question of confusion.  Plaintiff’s rights in insurance related areas were presumptively valid, given the registration, and the marks were inherently distinctive.
Plaintiff argued that there were repeated instances of actual confusion by brokage personnel who handle fixed-income securities transactions.  Defendants disagreed and argued that the high level of consumer sophistication prevented any problem, and also that the alleged confusion was among suppliers, not consumers.  Sadly, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the Lanham Act is about consumer protection and that the law does not protect against confusion generally.  Instead, the Act covers “the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.”
The court first found the parties’ logos not confusingly similar; the similarity was negligible.  Both had a chevron and a horizontal line, but the AC logo chevron was small and uses the chevron as part of the dominant feature, which was the phrase “Arrowpoint Capital.” By contrast, the AAM logo usesd a large chevron surrounded by parallel lines to create its dominant feature, prominently placed in the center of the mark. The full-color versions of the logos were even more distinct: the former was dominated by blue lettering and had a thin red accent line. The AAM logo had four distinct colors, drawing the viewer’s eye to the center of the mark.  But, of course, the word marks were much more similar, with “Arrowpoint” the dominant feature and first world; additional terms “asset management,” “partners,” “fundamental opportunity fund,” and “structured opportunity fund” changed the overall visual impact and sound of the marks, but conveyed a meaning somewhat similar to “capital.”  “But courts in this circuit have found that very similar marks are able to coexist in the financial services market, where consumers take greater care than many others, when the parties use their full names in ‘official’ communications.”  For the word marks, similarity slightly favored the plaintiff.
Strength of the mark: inherently distinctive/suggestive, but low commercial strength.  The plaintiff’s only support for marketplace strength was a claim that it spent about $390,000 promoting its marks. The court couldn’t determine whether that was sufficient to establish marketplace recognition for investment management services. (Defendants claimed to have spent almost double that amount for the same purpose.)  This factor was neutral.
Actual confusion: While actual confusion is highly probative of likely confusion, “isolated and idiosyncratic” confusion can be discounted, as can confusion resulting from “mere carelessness or accident.” Plaintiff argued that broker dealers had been misled.  Its evidence came from third-party inquiries about the relationship between the parties; misdirected trades; and incidents of mistaken identity, which inhibited the plaintiff’s ability to complete trades. 
For example, a Royal Bank of Scotland salesperson contacted the plaintiff regarding a large security purchase that the defendants had made using a different broker, and asked why the plaintiff had not engaged RBS for the transaction.  A Barclays Capital lawyer negotiating a security agreement for the plaintiff asked whether it was “a different entity from the arrowpoint that is being represented by [a different law firm].”  In connection with a securities agreement, Citigroup sent a request for general information regarding the plaintiff, and asked it to do the same exercise for two of the defendants’ entities.  JP Morgan misallocated the defendants’ trades to the plaintiff’s brokerage account three times, though the plaintiff rejected each trade before settlement, and the plaintiff’s representative testified that misallocated trades are not uncommon in the financial services industry.  Also, the plaintiff alleged that it had trouble acquiring certain securities/participating in a corporate bond offering because of confusion, but defendants argued that confusion wasn’t the cause of these difficulties and that there was ultimately no problem.
The court was skeptical about many of the alleged inquiries about the parties’ affiliation, because the testimony came from interested sources instead of the allegedly confused people.  And the court didn’t have enough evidence to distinguish confusion from mere carelessness, mistake, or clerical error on a broker’s part. There was also no evidence that three misdirected trades were significant, absent evidence about the total number of trades. The remaining incidents also didn’t convince the court that confusion was likely. This factor slightly favored the plaintiff.
Consumer care and sophistication strongly favored the defendants. Along with the large sums at issue and sophisticated consumers, the parties make individual, face-to-face presentations to potential investors, “which militates against a likelihood of confusion.”
The court couldn’t evaluate the length of time the mark was used without actual confusion, as the parties had conflicting evidence about the scope of defendants’ activities.
Defendants’ intent:  Defendants argued that “AAM selected its marks because arrowpoints had personal significance to [AAM’s founder] and to suggest a connection between digging for arrowpoints and the thorough manner in which AAM conducts the fundamental research on which it bases its investment management services.” Plus, defendants’ clearance included counsel’s review of a full U.S. availability trademark search report, “which indicated that the plaintiff was engaged in property and casualty insurance, not investment management or related services.” This favored defendants.
Channels of trade and advertising media: both parties promote their services through industry meetings, events, and direct presentations to prospective clients. But defendants target events of interest to hedge fund investors, family foundations, and endowments. Plaintiff doesn’t “because it is not a hedge fund.” “Further, the defendants rely on word-of-mouth referrals, which intuitively eliminate the possibility of confusion.” And the parties use direct client presentations incorporating their respective distinct logos. This factor strongly favored the defendants.
Similarity of target customers and the relationship of the goods in the minds of customers: The parties sought distinct groups of customers.  Plaintiff targeted customers “experiencing some sort of financial distress,” while the defendants pursued “high net worth individuals and institutional investors,” not distressed companies.  While insurance companies and pension funds are potential clients for both parties, those clients would retain the parties for different purposes—the plaintiff’s expertise is in fixed-income investments, while the defendants claim to “offer expertise across the capital spectrum.”  While some potential customers might overlap, there was still little likelihood of confusion because the parties offer “distinctly different investment management strategies to generally different classes of investors.”
Moreover, “any broker-dealer confusion is attributable to the similarity of the marks and the fungible nature of commonly traded securities” and shouldn’t be weighed again under the similarity of customers factor.  Broker-dealers offering fixed-income securities were selling the same things, no matter who was buying them; any weight given to their confusion was properly addressed under the actual confusion factor.
The balance of the factors tipped (no pun intended) in defendants’ favor.

Apple loses 230 defense to app privacy claims but still wins dismissal



Opperman v. Path, Inc., 2014 WL 1973378,  No. 13-cv-00453 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014)
This big class action against Apple and fourteen app developers has a lot of issues; I’ll try to focus on the consumer protection parts.  Plaintiffs alleged that the apps at issue were surreptitiously “stealing and disseminating” the contact information stored by customers on Apple devices.
Apple exercises strong control over App Store offerings, and its devices have Apple apps that can’t be removed, including Contacts (address book) and the App Store.  Apple allegedly claims to review each app before it’s allowed in the store and claims to protect privacy strongly, representing that its products are “safe and secure.”  While Apple’s app guidelines bar the transmission of user data without prior permission, Apple’s guidance to app developers allegedly encourage data theft. 
Apple tells developers, “don’t force people to give you information you can easily find for yourself, such as their contacts or calendar information,” and “[i]f possible, avoid requiring users to indicate their agreement to your [end user license agreement] when they first start your application. Without an agreement displayed, users can enjoy your application without delay.”  Thus, plaintiffs alleged that “Apple taught Program registrants’ to incorporate forbidden data harvesting functionalities – even for private “contacts” – into their Apps and encouraged Program registrants to design those functions to operate in non-discernible manners that would not be noticed by the iDevice owner. These App Defendants, apparently in accord with Apple’s instructions, did just that with their identified Apps.” In addition, plaintiffs alleged: “Apple’s Program tutorials and developer sites [ ] teach Program registrants how to code and build apps that non-consensually access, manipulate, alter, use and upload the mobile address books maintained on Apple iDevices.”
In some cases, apps allegedly accessed user data without any prompt at all, while in other cases, the apps “surreptitiously accessed and uploaded information from users’ Contacts app through a ‘Find Friends’ feature without disclosing to users that the feature would leave their private information vulnerable to unauthorized download by the third-party app manufacturer.”  As a result, many apps could have users’ address books stored in their own databases.  According to a congressional letter, one developer claimed to have a database containing “Mark Zuckerberg’s cell phone number, Larry Ellison’s home phone number and Bill Gates’ cell phone number.
After controversy about this, in September 2012, Apple released iOS 6, “which updated privacy settings on iDevices in a manner that discloses which apps access users’ contacts, calendars, reminders, photos, and other personal information, and allows users a way to prevent certain apps from accessing certain information.”
Plaintiffs alleged that Apple repeatedly touted its safety and security, sometimes in particular mentioning apps’ access to data.  When the App Store launched, Steve Jobs explained, “[t]here are going to be some apps that we’re not going to distribute. Porn, malicious apps, apps that invade your privacy.”  Similar statements followed from Jobs and others.  In September 2011, Apple’s website stated that “iOS 4 is highly secure from the moment you turn on your iPhone. All apps run in a safe environment, so a website or app can’t access data from other apps.” Apple also assured consumers that, for data-security purposes, “Applications on the device are ‘sandboxed’ so they cannot access data stored by other applications.”  More generally, plaintiffs alleged that Apple cultivated an image in which security and privacy were key promises.
Plaintiffs alleged they saw and relied on Apple’s website, in-store advertisements, and television advertising in purchasing their iDevices, and that they would have paid less for their devices, or not purchased them at all, had they known they were vulnerable to privacy attacks.
Apple challenged Article III standing.  The court framed the allegations this way: “Plaintiffs allege, with respect to Apple, that they suffered injury in the form of having overpaid for their iDevices, because they would have paid less for their devices, or not purchased them at all, if Apple had disclosed that it had failed adequately to secure the devices from the alleged intrusion.”  This was a palpable economic injury, long recognized as sufficient for standing.
Apple argued that plaintiffs hadn’t satisfied the causation requirement because they didn’t identify Apple’s specific representations that led to the overpayment.  But standing isn’t merits.  The alleged injury was fairly traceable to Apple, not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. 
The court rejected application of In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013), which held that “something more” was required than overpaying for a defective product, but that was because plaintiffs there were only pleading breach of contract (a difference between what they were promised and what they received).  But once a defect is sufficiently and plausibly pled, economic losses are readily established: defective products aren’t worth as much.  The “something more” could be allegations about value based on market forces, or could be “sufficiently detailed, non-conclusory allegations of the product defect.”  The allegations here, about the product design allowing third parties to take address book information without consent, sufficed.
Plus, plaintiffs established standing through their statutory claims because “[t]he injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”  However, plaintiffs lacked Article III standing based on alleged injury to property rights in the address books, which doomed their claims for conversion and trespass.
Apple then argued that non-resident plaintiffs couldn’t bring California claims.  But that conflated extraterritorial application of California law and choice of law.  Whether a non-resident can assert a California statutory claim is a constitutional question based on whether California has sufficiently significant contacts with the claims.  The court didn’t reach the choice of law issue, but noted that the presumption against extraterritorial application of California law doesn’t apply where the alleged misconduct occurs in California.
Apple moved to dismiss all claims against it under CDA §230, except for claims based on its own alleged misrepresentations.  Plaintiffs’ argument that Apple could choose what apps to remove got nowhere; that’s still editorial/publisher-like.  But Apple could be liable if it was responsible, in whole or in part, for creating or developing the allegedly unlawful material—if it contributed materially to the material’s alleged unlawfulness.  Providing neutral tools wasn’t enough. 
The court found that not all CDA defenses can be resolved on a motion to dismiss.  Here, the complaint pled sufficient conduct to make Apple itself an “information content provider” whose conduct is not protected by the CDA.  Plaintiffs alleged that Apple’s “iOS Human Interface Guidelines” for developers encouraged data theft. “Among the guidelines are several suggestions that do, on their face, appear to encourage the practices Plaintiffs complain of in this case,” such as instructions not to force people to provide information the app could easily find for itself, such as contacts or calendar information, and instructions to avoid having users agree to the EULA when they first launch an app.  Plaintiffs alleged: “Apple taught Program registrants to incorporate forbidden data harvesting functionalities – even for private ‘contacts’– into their Apps and encouraged Program registrants to design those functions to operate in non-discernible manners that would not be noticed by the iDevice owner.” This was conduct that went beyond traditional editorial functions of a publisher, and beyond providing neutral tools.  However, not all of plaintiffs’ allegations about Apple’s conduct took it outside §230.  Apple’s review guidelines and actual review of apps was “fundamental ‘publisher’ activity protected by the CDA,” as was failing to remove offending apps from the App Store and advertising third-party apps for its own financial advantage.  So was mere provision of a software development kit, which was a neutral tool.
Apple argued that plaintiffs’ California statutory and negligent misrepresentation claims failed because plaintiffs didn’t identify any specific misrepresentations on which they relied in buying. Rule 9(b) requires such claims to be pled with particularity, plus plaintiffs had to adequately plead injury and causation/detrimental reliance.  But misrepresentation need not be the only cause of the purchase, and an inference of reliance arises from a material misrepresentation.
The court found the claims of reliance inadequate; allegations that a plaintiff viewed Apple’s website were insufficient to allege viewing of or reliance on particular representations.  The court considered whether Tobacco II’s exception for long-term and extensive ad campaigns applied.  Factors to be considered: “First, to state the obvious, a plaintiff must allege that she actually saw or heard the defendant’s advertising campaign…. Second, the advertising campaign at issue should be sufficiently lengthy in duration, and widespread in dissemination, that it would be unrealistic to require the plaintiff to plead each misrepresentation she saw and relied upon.”  How long and extensive is a fact-intensive question—campaigns could be too short (six months) or insufficiently extensive (two ads over eighteen months). 
Third, plaintiffs should “describe in the complaint, and preferably attach to it, a ‘representative sample’ of the advertisements at issue in order adequately to notify the defendant of the precise nature of the misrepresentation claim.”  This accommodates defendants’ rights to a sufficiently specific pleading and plaintiffs’ rights against overly burdensome requirements in cases involving multiple misrepresentations.  Fourth, the similarity of the alleged misrepresentations in the campaign is important.  “[T]he advertisements at issue should be similar enough to be considered as part of one campaign, or the delivery of a single message or set of messages, rather than a disparate set of advertising content published in the ordinary course of commerce.” 
“Fifth, in the absence of specific misrepresentations, a complaint subject to Rule 9(b)’s requirements should plead with particularity, and separately, when and how each named plaintiff was exposed to the advertising campaign. It is not sufficient to plead as a group, nor is it sufficient simply to allege general exposure without more detail.”  This ensures that the ads at issue were ones consumers “were likely to have viewed, as opposed to representations that were isolated or more narrowly disseminated, such as statements buried on a rarely-viewed webpage, or made on an investor phone conference. Certainly, such representations could be part of an advertising campaign, but the complaint should describe the mechanism of dissemination for all identified representations.”  Sixth, the date of purchase or reliance must be determinable.  Representations prior to purchase are relevant, but not those after.  Thus, the plaintiff must describe as best she can the date of purchase, the timeframe of the ads at issue, and when she was exposed to them.
Applying these factors, plaintiffs didn’t adequately allege a long-term advertising campaign that exused them from pleading specific reliance. First, it wasn’t clear that they were actually exposed to the ad campaign.  Second, the complaint didn’t have sufficient detail about the extent of the advertising, not just its length—how often the ads were published or in which media.  Third, the complaint didn’t attach or describe a representative sample of the ads at issue. Though they identified some specific representations on Apple’s website/made by Apple employees (including former and current CEOs), that wasn’t enough.  “After reading the complaint asserted against it, a defendant should be able to understand which advertising is alleged to be misleading, and how it is misleading, so that it may prepare a defense and identify in discovery the remainder of the advertising at issue – and just as importantly, that advertising which is not at issue.”  Fourth, because of this insufficient detail, the court couldn’t conclude that the alleged misrepresentations had sufficient similarity to constitute a single message/set of messages susceptible to uniform treatment.  Fifth, plaintiffs didn’t allege how they were exposed—it wasn’t enough to allege that they “viewed Apple’s website, saw in-store advertisements, and/or [were] aware of Apple’s representations regarding the safety and security of the iDevices prior to purchasing their own iDevices.” Sixth, they didn’t allege when specifically they bought their devices.
What about failure to disclose claims?  Plaintiffs alleged that Apple had an affirmative duty to disclose material facts of which it had exclusive knowledge—the vulnerability of plaintiffs’ devices to the theft of their address books by third party apps.  Because plaintiffs didn’t adequately identify Apple’s misrepresentations, they weren’t entitled to claim a duty to disclose arising from Apple’s partial representations.  They also argued that there was a duty to disclose because Apple had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to them and that Apple actively concealed material facts.  But still, “‘[a] manufacturer’s duty to consumers is limited to its warranty obligations absent either an affirmative misrepresentation or a safety issue.’”  Plaintiffs failed to allege anything about Apple’s warranty obligations or duration.  Thus the statutory consumer protection and negligent misrepresentation claims were dismissed.
The CFAA and related California computer fraud law claims were dismissed because Apple didn’t violate them.  The design defect and failure to warn claims failed because there was no physical harm to people or property.  The negligence claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine.
That was it for Apple.  How about the app defendants?
They too argued Article III standing.  Plaintiffs alleged diminished mobile device resources (storage, battery life, bandwidth), but there was no quantification or other indication that this was anything more than de minimis.  Nor could plaintiffs allege a continuing need for injunctive relief, since all the defendants discontinued their practices when the practice of transmitting user address books was made public, and Apple has instituted new privacy controls.
Plaintiffs argued that the app defendants interfered with their property rights in their address books.  But standing can’t be based solely on the theory that the value of a plaintiff’s personal information has been diminished.  The plaintiff needs to allege how the defendant’s use of the information deprived the plaintiff of the information’s economic value. “Put another way, a plaintiff must do more than point to the dollars in a defendant’s pocket; he must sufficiently allege that in the process he lost dollars of his own.”  Plaintiffs didn’t do this.  Although other privacy cases involved computer-generated information and not user-entered information, in any case plaintiffs must tie allegations that their personal information has value to the alleged injury they suffered.
However, two theories of injury were sufficient for standing.  First, the statutory claims: injury required by Article III can exist solely from statutes creating legal rights. Second, the common law claim for invasion of privacy conferred standing, regardless of the merits.  Thus, the common law claims against the app defendants went, except for the invasion of privacy claims.
The California UCL claims were dismissed because plaintiffs couldn’t show they lost money or property.
How about invasion of privacy through intrusion upon seclusion?  Plaintiffs alleged that the intrusion was “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” as evidenced by the “myriad newspaper articles, blogs, op eds., and investigative exposes’ [that] were written complaining and objecting vehemently to these defendants’ practices.”  Congress opened inquiries to investigate, and some defendants publicly apologized. 
The app defendants didn’t contest that plaintiffs had a legally protectable privacy interest in their address books, nor did they contest that the apps intruded upon that interest. Instead, they argued that plaintiffs didn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information, and that the intrusion wasn’t sufficiently offensive to create a claim.  This tort requires an “objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source.”  Advance notice may create or inhibit reasonable expectations, as may the presence or absence of opportunities to consent to activities affecting privacy interests.
Here, the court found that plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy in their address books contained on their iDevices in this circumstance was reasonable; apps that copied the address books without consent or any prompt interfered with that reasonable expectation.  But other apps copied address books after prompting users to “find friends” who used the same app, notifying users that the app would scan their address books.  “Although the prompts required Plaintiffs to consent, Plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy in that circumstance was still reasonable. Plaintiffs allege that they would not have consented had they known that their apps would not only scan their address books to determine whether their friends were using the same app, but then upload the address books to the app developer for other purposes.”  Plaintiffs alleged that their consent was obtained by fraud; this was enough to plead that their consent was invalid.
Was the intrusion at issue “highly offensive”? According to the Restatement, “[a] court determining the existence of ‘offensiveness’ would consider the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.”  A previous case held that the surreptitious tracking of personal data and geolocation information was not an “egregious breach of social norms.”  But that was distinguishable.  The theft of information in personal contact lists is more private than a mailing address.  And the court didn’t believe that it qualified as “routine commercial behavior.”  Also, the tort didn’t require a highly offensive use of the private information, only an intrusion; for example, a California court found an intrusion upon seclusion claim viable where a patient’s doctor performed a breast examination in front of a pharmaceutical salesperson without revealing that the salesperson was not a medical professional. The Restatement expressly disavows any limitation requiring use of the information. The offensiveness of the intrusion was a question better left to a jury.
The app defendants also argued that plaintiffs failed to allege economic injury from the intrusion, but that wasn’t required. Damages are available for “anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, shame, depression, feelings of powerlessness, anguish, etc.”
However, the claim based on public disclosure of private facts failed. It wasn’t enough that plaintiffs’ address books were transmitted unencrypted, or over public wifi.
The CFAA and California computer fraud claims were also dismissed; the apps didn’t circumvent any restrictions on access.  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and state wiretap statute claims were also dismissed.