Beyond the Dog's tactics in employment dispute may have been beyond the pale

Beyond The Dog, LLC v. Salzer, 2026 WL 884140, No. 3:24-cv-1439 (VAB) (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2026)

Plaintiffs (BTD) sued defendants Salzer and Canine Behavioral Blueprints, LLC over a failed working relationship, resulting in claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, unfair competition, and related counterclaims. I’m going to focus on the advertising-related claims, but some breach of contract claims survive for trial.

Beyond the Dog is a Missouri dog-training business. Dr. Salzer signed its Trainer Non-Compete Agreement /Employment Agreement, which contained restrictive covenants, confidentiality provisions, and a carveout for “[a]ctivities solely for academic purposes and not-for-profit.” During her employment, plaintiff Echterling-Savage supervised Salzer and worked with her on dissertation-related research. The dissertation was published through the University of Kansas. The relationship deteriorated after Salzer moved to Connecticut, started working with a local SPCA and a business called Our Companions, and opened Canine Behavioral Blueprints (CBB).

Plaintiffs took steps to protect contractual and confidentiality interests they believed remained in effect, including sending a letter to the MSPCA, communicating with a third party about CBB, and attending a public Our Companions seminar presented by Salzer. This allegedly interfered with Salzer’s professional opportunities and contributed to the cancellation of her lecture series and the end of her work with Our Companions.

If you want to know how this litigation is going: Previously, the court granted a preliminary injunction against plaintiffs’ use of agents to pretend to be potential clients of defendants in order to obtain defendants’ business documents, or any other covert corporate espionage activities; communication with the MSPCA and Our Companions or with any other of Salzer’s employers or business relationships regarding Dr. Salzer or the claims of this litigation except for the purposes of discovery; or following, or engaging agents to follow, Salzer, park outside her house, places of employment, or at her clients’ houses, or otherwise communicating or speaking with Salzer; telling any third party that Salzer breached her contract with Beyond the Dog or misappropriated trade secrets or confidential information; and “initiating or otherwise promoting further proceedings with the University of Kansas regarding the issues of this litigation.”

Common-law unfair competition under Missouri law: This requires passing off. Here the allegations were, in essence, reverse passing off, and Dastar has much to say. [Although Dastar was federal law specifically interpreting the word “origin” in the Lanham Act, its rationale supports the idea that state laws are preempted by copyright if they don’t follow Dastar.]

Beyond the Dog argued that its unfair competition claim “targets deceptive marketplace conduct non-attribution in credentialing and promotion,” because “CBB’s intake process mirrors BTD’s distinctive two-part system (front-end prompts and non-public back-end scoring that generates a protocol-oriented report), reinforcing a false impression of origin and distinctiveness in the services Defendants sell.” That did not get the job done. “The Supreme Court foreclosed this type of non-attribution or methodology-based claim … in Dastar.”

CUTPA counterclaims: The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” and gives a private right of action to a person who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal.” Defendants argued that their acts targeting Salzer arose from “employment-relationship enforcement, not marketplace conduct.” They also argued that there was no actionable harm because their letter to the MSPCA “did not accuse Dr. Salzer of any wrongdoing,” that it was sent “to ensure non-disclosure, not to interfere with her employment,” and that MSPCA “has continued to employ Dr. Salzer and has even given her a raise.”

Although an employment relationship doesn’t constitute trade or commerce under CUTPA, a jury could find that the acts of which plaintiffs are accused didn’t arise solely from an employment relationship. After all, Salzer’s non-profit work was “specifically excluded from the scope of her Agreement with BTD,” but they targeted the MSPCA anyway. Likewise, plaintiffs allegedly attended Salzer’s seminar, sought access to her presentation materials, and attempted to interfere with Dr. Salzer’s teaching activities and her relationship with Our Companions. Repeatedly dangling the prospect of a recommendation letter, then refusing to provide it unless she agreed to relocate and work for them in Dallas, Texas, allegedly harmed Salzer’s ability to obtain certification and referrals in Connecticut. And the “mystery shopper” activity could be justified pre-suit investigation or instead conduct that a reasonable factfinder could deem deceptive or unfair under CUTPA.  In addition, sending a takedown notice to the University of Kansas could be part of the counterclaim, given that the dissertation was allegedly “used ‘solely for academic purposes’ and thus ‘exempt’ from Dr. Salzer’s non-disclosure agreement with BTD,” and allegations that “BTD made demonstrably false allegations to protect non-existent legal rights knowing that an academic misconduct investigation into Dr. Salzer’s dissertation could be reputationally ruinous.”

For similar reasons, the tortious interference counterclaims survived, as did defamation per se (accusations of theft can be per se defamatory), subject of course to proof and potential defenses like truth or privilege. Connecticut common-law unfair competition is narrower than CUTPA, but that claim also survived. A reasonable jury could find “justified, limited enforcement conduct,” or “fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation, or that the defendant acted maliciously, in interfering with the plaintiff’s business prospects.” Similarly, negligent infliction of emotional distress survived because it targeted conduct “beyond an ordinary employment-termination dispute or distress arising solely from litigation.”