Coleman v. Burger King Corp., No. 22-cv-20925-ALTMAN (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2023)
Plaintiffs alleged that Burger King, through its
advertisements and in-store ordering boards, “materially overstates” the size
of (and the amount of beef contained in) many of its burgers and sandwiches. Allegedly,
“[a] side-by-side comparison of Burger King’s former Whopper advertisement to
the current Whopper advertisement shows that the burger increased in size by
approximately 35% and the amount of beef increased by more than 100%. Although
the size of the Whopper and the beef patty increased materially in Burger
King’s advertisements, the amount of beef or ingredients contained in the
actual Whopper that customers receive did not increase.”
Burger King responded that it makes very clear how much beef
the Whopper contains. Its website says: “Our Whopper Sandwich is a ¼ lb* of
savory flame-grilled beef topped with juicy tomatoes, fresh lettuce, creamy
mayonnaise, ketchup, crunchy pickles, and sliced white onions on a soft sesame
seed bun,” with the asterisk after the burger’s weight referring to the
“[w]eight based on a pre-cooked patty.”
The court first refused to consider the consumer protection
laws of 50 different states without a named plaintiff from every state.
Although the named plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert claims
on behalf of absent class members from other states—they had alleged a
redressable injury—they couldn’t assert claims under the laws of states that
did not apply to them because they hadn’t made their purchases in those states.
Plaintiffs were directed to file an amended complaint for only those states in
which they’d purchased products. They could eventually seek certification to assert
materially identical consumer-protection claims on behalf of class members from
other states, and they could even list the states whose consumer-protection
statutes (they believe) are similar enough to justify certification. They could
also try a nationwide FDUTPA claim based on allegations that, from its
headquarters in Florida, Burger King disseminated throughout the whole country
its allegedly deceptive communications.
Side note: “in deciding whether a named plaintiff has
standing to pursue the claims of out-of-state class members, some of our
colleagues have tried to distinguish between state common-law and state
statutory claims.” That doesn’t work because (1) many states have codified the
traditional common-law claims, and it doesn’t make much sense to think of
traditionally common-law claims as distinct from statutory law. And (2)
regardless, the cause of action is still “a creature of state law,” not some 50-state
blanket.
Breach of contract: Burger King argued that its ads weren’t
binding offers. Generally, ads are
merely “solicitations to bargain,” not offers, and so here with the TV and
online ads. But in-store “menu ordering boards” were different. An ad can
become an offer if a “reasonable person” would have thought that “the
advertisement or solicitation was intended as an offer.” These in-store
ordering boards—unlike BKC’s TV and online ads—list price information and provide
item descriptions. “Their whole purpose is to present to the potential customer
an offering of the available menu items (and their prices). They’re thus very
different from the advertisements one might see on the Internet or on TV—which
cannot constitute offers precisely because they cannot promise that the item
will still be available when, at some future date and time, the customer
finally elects to walk into the store.” Although it’s not reasonable to believe
that an ad promised that inventory would always be available, the menu boards, “by
definition, are only subject to acceptance by the handful (or so) of customers
who are actually in the store looking to purchase a sandwich.”
Burger King argued that a sandwich’s appearance isn’t an
essential term of a contract. But the court wouldn’t “lightly suppose that a
proprietor can offer to sell you a certain amount of food at a specified price
only to provide you with less food for the same price.” Although a 1%
exaggeration wouldn’t be a problem, the court wouldn’t impose its own judgment
about whether “a seemingly substantial difference between what was promised and
what was sold was (or was not) enough to alter the purchasing preferences of
reasonable American consumers.”
Negligent misrepresentation survived (for now) because Florida
doesn’t require a special relationship; unjust enrichment survived as an
alternative claim.
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