OK, I admit I'm pretty baffled by this.
Hawaii Foodservice Alliance, LLC v. Meadow Gold Dairies
Hawaii, LLC, 2023 WL 159907, No. 21-00460 LEK-WRP (D. Hawai’i Jan. 11, 2023)
Plaintiff alleged that defendant MGD advertises and sells
milk that is one hundred percent from cows outside of Hawai‘i. Defendant dairy
farmers allegedly apply labels to the pre-packaged milk products “indicating
such products originate from ‘Hawaii’s Dairy,’ are ‘Made with Aloha,’ and, in
some instances, are associated with the farmers in Oahu who produced milk from
their cows in Hawaii through the ‘Dairymen’s Association’ beginning in the late
1800s, before they are shipped to MGD in Hawaii.” Some mainland milk was
allegedly pasteurized in California, shipped to and re-pasteurized on the
Island of Hawaii, and then packaged by MGD with identical labeling. “Hawaii’s
Dairy” and “Made with Aloha” on the labels allegedly falsely represented origin,
as did MGD’s website claims of “AN ISLAND TRADITION,” “that MGD is proud to be
locally owned and operated” and MGD “continue[s] to produce your Meadow Gold
favorites always made with aloha.” “MGD’s website also prominently features the
MGD mascot known as ‘Lani Moo’ in local Hawaii attire, along with several
photographs of farmland and a cow in Hawaii[.]” Plaintiff alleged, however,
that “MGD owns zero cows in Hawaii ... and owns zero dairy farms in Hawaii.” Allegedly,
a different “Meadow Gold” entity long ago operated dairy farms in Hawaii, but
MGD didn’t.
Plaintiffs’ claims sought to hold the dairy farmers directly
or contributorily liable under the Lanham Act, and alleged unfair competition/false
advertising/deceptive trade practices under Hawaii law. The dairy farmers
sought dismissal.
Was a false geographic origin claim one for false
association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), or false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B)? Courts
have treated them as one, the other, or both; the court here said that they
could be both.
Why does this matter? Perhaps because courts are tougher on
false advertising claims in a lot of ways, including with precedent that, for
false advertising, direct liability only attaches to actors who actively make
false or misleading claims, while false association allows direct liability for
those who only “use” such claims (note this doesn’t actually matter to the
outcome of this case, but it matters to retailers). Here, under §43(a)(1)(A), “Plaintiff
need only allege that the Dairy Farmers used in commerce any word (or words)
which is likely to cause confusion as to the geographic origin of their milk
products by another person.” That was sufficiently alleged. The defendants
allegedly put the products in interstate commerce and applied the labels to
them. The court didn’t bother to analyze contributory liability.
What about direct liability for false advertising?
Defendants argued that there was no literal falsity, but misleadingness and
materiality was also alleged. Here, the dairy farmers allegedly individually
produced, packaged, and labeled the milk products on the mainland then sent
them to Hawai’i for MGD to sell on the island. “[H]owever, Plaintiff does not allege that the
Dairy Farmers had control over, or involvement in, creating the statements on
the labels. Thus, the Court cannot determine whether the Dairy Farmers are the
entities that made ‘the specific, false statements at issue in the
litigation[,]’ even if they ultimately applied the labels to the products.”
[This strikes me as a really constrained reading of direct liability, and very
much in contrast to the leniency IP claimants get. Compare an allegedly false statement
presented in an ad as a quote from an endorser: would the advertiser not be
directly liable because it wasn’t the first to make the statement?] Thus, the
direct liability claim for false advertising was dismissed with leave to amend.
Contributory false advertising: This requires that the
defendant contributed to direct false advertising either by knowingly inducing
or causing the conduct, or by materially participating in it. Participation can
occur when “the defendant directly controlled or monitored the third party’s
false advertising,” or possibly when the defendant provided “a necessary
product or service, without which the false advertising would not be possible.”
On a motion to dismiss, courts look for a plausible inference of knowing or
intentional participation, examining “the nature and extent of the
communication” between the third party and the defendant regarding the false
advertising; “whether or not the [defendant] explicitly or implicitly
encouraged” the false advertising; whether the false advertising “is serious
and widespread,” making it more likely that the defendant “kn[ew] about and
condone[d] the acts”; and whether the defendant engaged in “bad faith refusal
to exercise a clear contractual power to halt” the false advertising.
Here, plaintiff sufficiently alleged direct false
advertising against MGD. And it alleged
that the milk producers knew that their respective milk products were not
sourced from Hawai‘i and that the labels they applied to those products were
false, misleading, and/or deceptive, but supplied the milk products to MGD
nonetheless.
But plaintiff didn’t adequately allege that the Dairy
Farmers “intended to participate or actually knew about the false advertising.”
Labeling products with packaging that said “Hawaii’s Dairy” and “Made with
Aloha,” does not on its own “suggest[ ] a plausible inference of knowing or
intentional participation.” [Um, if they were doing it on the mainland, why
not? Surely they knew they were doing it on the mainland, and not in Hawai’i?] Plaintiff
failed to allege “the nature and extent of the communications between” the dairy
farmers and MGD regarding the statements and thus they didn’t allege material
participation. [I also have no idea how a plaintiff is supposed to allege
internal communications.]
In addition, plaintiff failed to plead the requisite
knowledge with particularity. [I’m not a civ pro expert, but I thought that,
even with fraud, knowledge and intent can be alleged generally as matters
entirely within the knowledge of the defendant.]
“Ultimately, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege the
Dairy Farmers induced, caused, or worked to bring about the alleged misleading
statements.” But there was leave to amend.
Unfair competition under Hawai’i law: This requires unfair conduct
that “offends established public policy and … is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,” plus injury that
negatively affects competition or harms fair competition. This too failed as to
the dairy farmers, who allegedly did nothing more than labeling and packaging
their milk product. So too with state law false advertising.
Deceptive trade practices: This applied to a person who,
inter alia, caused likely confusion about source etc. or used deceptive
representations or designations of geographic origin. This was plausibly
alleged. The dairy farmers “used those labels and statements insofar as they
packaged, labeled, and shipped the milk products to Hawai’i.”
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