Right of Publicity
Stacy Dogan
Unjust enrichment is an underlying theme here and clearly
important to the RoP; makes it very difficult to define what the limits on it
might be. Tabor also seemed to be about the court’s offense at unjust
enrichment. Courts rebelling against the absence of an underlying theory of
dilution—are courts equally frustrated right now by the absence of a normative
definition for the right of publicity? May be bending over backwards to
recognize First Amendment defenses now.
Her paper: the Haelan
case gives as a rationale for creating the right the fact that the baseball
players want it. RoP lacks clearly
defined normative justification, but there is no central justification, and
that makes balancing celebrity interest v. speech interest difficult in any
given case.
Really about unjust enrichment: not fair to make money from
the use of someone’s identity. Courts thus apply their own judgments about the
value of the speech at issues. District courts address identical facts and go
in different directions.
Descriptively: the law protected against the use of name and
identity in certain cases, but it was a harm-based personal right. Haelan’s
innovation was to shift the nature of the right from harm-based to
benefit/unjust enrichment-based. Right
to capture any value stemming from commercial uses of identity. Two sets of following cases: use in
advertising, and use as part of expressive product. Haelan
was amalgam: in theory the cards marketed the chewing gum, but people were
buying the package in large part for the card, part of (or the only important
part of) product itself. Celebrity
always wins ad cases, even allusion or poking fun: Vanna White is the classic
case.
Doctrinally, this results from the less privileged status of
commercial speech paired with the fact that the RoP has no internal
limits. (Note that this result is nuts
insofar as Central Hudson applies to
truthful nonmisleading speech.)
Product cases: courts always find a violation of the RoP
(not in NY, though). All the heavy
lifting falls on the First Amendment.
For noncommercial speech, the First Amendment can carry some of the
weight. But then you balance the interests of the celebrity with no normative
core with the interest in speech, creating a mess. Most courts seem to be
moving towards transformativeness to evaluate whether the speech ought to be
protected. Some courts look at whether
the image itself was transformed—artistically—others are willing to look more
broadly at whether the defendant has created a new product with some new market
value. Courts sometimes engage in tortured approach to find transformativeness,
as in the Hart v. EA case in NJ (which has an opposite result in the Cal. case;
both are presently on appeal). NJ court
said the fact that it was possible to change the likeness of the football
player made it transformativeness; Dogan finds that tortured even though likes
the outcome.
Is there similarity between RoP outcomes on
transformativeness and copyright/TM outcomes?
What is the relationship between TMs incorporated in products and
celebrity images incorporated in products?
As TM licensing spreads, people pay to incorporate products and it
becomes harder to argue you shouldn’t pay the celebrity. The NCAA made tons of money from the game
company’s payments to the NCAA to license the mark, jerseys, etc.
Ginsburg: relationship between copyright & TM—if the
court finds it fair for TM, it will find it fair for copyright; if the court
finds no confusion, as in Rogers, it
won’t find violation of the right of publicity. (RT: which is why sometimes you see the
celebrity plead only RoP.) States where
RoP is based on a statute “for purposes of trade” there’s at least a technique
for limiting the scope: not artistic or editorial.
Report on David Lefranc’s comments: Seems like there’s no
legal basis for RoP in France either.
Singer granted rights to Universal to use his image; 3d
party produced a calendar using his image.
Universal sued the 3d party on the ground that it was exclusive owner of
rights in the image for purposes of merchandising. Decided in 2002, but didn’t get further than
the appellate court. Universal won.
Everyone has over his image an exclusive property right which permits
him to oppose/prevent the distribution of that image without express and
special authorization. The owner can
then contract about it. He should be
able to grant authorization for all uses, not just commercial ones. Universal’s exclusive right is therefore perfectly
lawful. Property right created out of
nothing and made huge and transferable.
Lefranc put together a chart: US and France protect privacy,
but that is in theory inalienable.
Celebrities are protected by the right of publicity in the US and the
right over the image in France. How did
it come about? Originally in US through
privacy waivers; in France for a long time these licenses were in the form of
waivers/abstaining from enforcement as well.
Boundaries are similarly unclear: no decision of the highest court
defining the regime in France. Only
considers the right of the person depicted, not countervailing public interest. Grown out of a moral right into a property
right with no legal basis and therefore incoherent.
Liu: if unjust enrichment is really the focus, then we’d
expect the focus to be more on the user and on the rightsholder. If that’s the case, the lack of separate
defense seems really problematic. If you rely on internal limits, that won’t
work—the right is vague and also you’re focusing on the wrong person. Defenses
tend to be structured more on the actions of the defendant. Important to have open-textured defense that
allows multiple uses. Because we don’t
have a strong theory, rights like dilution become stronger; that same quality can become important in supporting
privileges as you get a richer account of what kinds of uses are privileged.
That’s lacking in the RoP.
Dogan: an external interest seems to be emerging from the
cases, drawing on copyright and TM. To
the extent we see convergence, that’s through external limits/First Amendment
intervention.
Maybe if the court had used the language of unjust
enrichment we’d have better limits (as Beebe suggested for dilution).
Fromer: Rob Merges’ book has a chapter on the RoP and
possible justifications for pulling back.
Any focus on what the rightowner does with her own rights? Kardashian case: Old Navy says she has no
reputation to protect.
Dogan: doesn’t really see that. The question is whether the user gained
value; and the First Amendment interest wouldn’t really be more weighty if the
celebrity had no reputation.
Kur: German law: a written statute on the protection of
images. Born as a defense of the person
whose portrait had been taken against the photographer/painter. Gives the person a right to oppose
distribution and display. Developed into basis for affirmative protection; has
a catalog of limitations. Doesn’t have
any basis for damages. Courts have tried to find a basis for damages, partly
because of the constitution’s protection for human dignity/free will. Courts wanted to regard it as personal;
reluctant to acknowledge financial aspects until a long time had passed.
Strandburg: is there some conception of unjust enrichment on
the side of the plaintiff? To what extent is this value created by the public
v. the person.
Dogan: Michael Madow and others have created a rich
literature. Cardtoons points to this principle as a basis for weighing RoP
interests somewhat less heavily and weighing First Amendment interests more
heavily.
Dreyfuss: interesting that of all these rights there’s no
attempt to internationalize this one.
Dogan: no apparent constituency.
“Paracopyright”
Joseph Liu
Anticircumvention is a relatively recent addition to US law;
hard to look for an untold story of an old case. Most obvious candidate for major case, Corley, is not all that
interesting. In his view, it seemed
pretty straightforward. Raised interesting First Amendment and fair use issues,
but fit factually within what you’d expect the DMCA to cover.
He looked at the other case law. Reported decisions: 50-odd. Something
interesting: most observers are aware that the DMCA has been applied in
questionable circumstances like Chamberlain
and Lexmark. The extent
to which the DMCA has been so employed is surprising—most are cases that pretty
clearly have nothing to do with what Congress was thinking about, which was
protecting an underlying work. Majority of reported opinions at appellate and
trial level had nothing to do with copyright. Being used strategically for some
unrelated purpose. Corley is
interesting as exception rather than rule.
Five categories: (1) Core cases involving CSS, cable TV,
etc. (2) Tying cases, plaintiffs using
DMCA to tie products/services, like Chamberlain,
Lexmark, cellphone. (3) Cheating in
online games: enough to have their own category! (4) Website access cases: people who use
stolen passwords or evade CAPTCHAs; defendants have lost cases. (5) CMI cases, almost all of which involve
non-technical information—removing the credit from the photo as DMCA violation.
Implications: is this a big problem? Maybe reported opinions
don’t reflect what’s happening. Maybe
you just need one big case to set the rules for an industry. Maybe this is just
working out the kinks. Doesn’t think this is true because of the extent of the
non-core cases.
Legislation and judicial role in an era of change: what
should be done? Limits of our predictive
abilities and consequences of failure to predict. Absolutist hopes and fears for perfect
technological control, perfect markets.
Those discussions have faded into the background. One view: this reflects that fears and hopes
haven’t really been realized; maybe we underestimated markets & tech
achieving their own equilibrium. Séverine Dusollier’s contribution: this is a
sinister development as DRM has turned into/displaced social control,
conditioning us to accept a certain kind of access to works in a way that’s
largely invisible and shapes us without thought.
Maybe emphasize statutory rather than judicial origins and
how that affected the development of the law. Lacks open texture, for good or
for ill, making for different “foundational” opinions. Ambiguity inherent in Haelan or Schecter is not the same—DMCA may have ambiguities, but
lacks generative potential, which may be why Corley is not as interesting a case. DMCA limits open texture not so much of the
rights but of the limitations—no broad fair use defense. Expressly substituted
a long list of very narrow exceptions.
Maybe that’s why there are so many cases falling outside congressional
intent: no good avenues to get rid of them.
Dreyfuss: Equilibrium? Consumers have basically rejected
encryption, but piracy hasn’t abated.
Attempt at statutory solution before nature of problem was understood.
Also using the international stage at a very early point, putting it into the
WIPO Copyright Treaty before we knew what would happen. Database Directive is a similar example: the
solution didn’t do anything there either. Semiconductor Chip Act. AHRA.
DPSRA.
Liu: he means equilibrium not in the sense of solving a
problem but in the sense of not making much difference. Despite all of this, Dusollier
says, hasn’t seemed to be much litigation in EU over the extent of the rights
or the extent of the limitation.
Bechtold: the question is why US cases are so weird. DRM is actually used in cellphones, printers;
not used in music, so maybe not that surprising that you don’t see cases at the
core. European version: we don’t have
that many cases, but the legal situation is different. Access directive covers part of the pay TV
stuff; cellphone cases fall under telecom regs; printer cases don’t work
because of a different law. So tech
adoption may help explain differences.
Liu: you could imagine just a few cases in major industries
that use DRM; counting cases may not be a good proxy, but it’s still
interesting to look at what really gets litigated.
Fromer: fits into story of attempts to broaden IP rights.
Path is closed off and rights claimant tries to find another path: printer
company is trying to protect a function denied protection by copyright. Game Genie: copyright law allows cheat codes,
so rights owners use the DMCA to fix that.
Ginsburg: DMCA and WIPO treaties seemed to create a new
access control right; Liu’s take is not inconsistent with that, especially the
website cases. Was under the impression
that there were abusive cases, but once those got slapped down we weren’t
seeing more.
Liu: not many more tying cases. Cellphone cases though.
Ginsburg: videogame cases, though, she thinks of as an
access right. Consider discussing 1202
as being pressed into service as an attribution right, though drafting makes it
difficult to bring successful claims.
RT: I wonder about the general failure to use the DMCA along
with the “exceed authorized access” cases under the CFAA. You see CFAA claims creeping into other unfair
competition claims and that’s still very much a live issue; trespass to
chattels also had its day in the sun.
Liu: cases have been uniformly negative on simple passwords,
but plaintiffs have won with CAPTCHA.
RT: Also, the DMCA is important in affecting institutional
practices, like those of libraries and publishers: they won’t circumvent
without an exemption even though no one would ever go after them for doing so. Also, and this is more about Dusollier’s
paper, people in Europe create a lot of remix videos despite not having an
exception that applies (as we do for the DMCA and noncommercial remix)—they circumvent
the DRM on DVDs a lot; it may be that there’s an equilibrium of nonenforcement,
but that’s different than an equilibrium of nonuse.
Jacob: we don’t necessarily see the situations where no one
litigates because they think they know where they stand.
Limitations – subject matter
Ted Sichelman
Renewal of interest in patentable subject matter. Funk
Brothers: A law of nature, phenomenon, or abstact idea are not patentable
in themselves but an application of the law to a new and useful end can be
patented. So what’s the pure/applied distinction? Before Prometheus,
the court said don’t split up the claim.
In Prometheus, the Court
adopted point of novelty/inventive concept approach, looking only at the
novel/nonobvious elements for purposes of patentable subject matter. So if the
only thing that’s new in your claim is a law of nature you’re out of luck. You have
to do something novel and nonobvious in applying
the law of nature, not just instantiate it into a practical application.
Funk Bros.:
inoculants to help legumes grow.
Different strains of bacteria and varieties of plants, with different strains
working with each. If you mixed them,
they inhibited each other. Inventor figured out that some strains didn’t
inhibit each other. Then claimed the
broad principle of mixing non-inhibitory strains together.
Majority said: however ingenious the discovery, the
application is hardly more than an advance in packaging. No different results from prior art of
pouring two packages onto the plant. Frankfurter: everything that happens may
be deemed the work of nature. Dissent:
claim was enabled, it’s a practical application embodied in packaging that
serves a commercially useful end.
Frankfurther concurrence offered a scope theory: he didn’t really
contradict the dissent, but Sichelman reads in to say that there are so many
mixtures that are possible—and it turns out that this mix is still sold—that giving
this person a claim over the entire range of mixes is just too broad.
Prometheus then
took a wrong turn. If interpreted
broadly (which the Fed. Cir. is unlikely to do) it could make almost every
invention characterized as an application of a natural law; there are a lot of
conventions, and you could call very narrow things laws.
Has some suggestions for factors that would help figure out
what should be allowed, like whether the patent discloses a small number of
embodiments but claims a broad application. Justine Pila suggests we need
bright lines, but he thinks that ends up excluding too much.
Strandburg: one underlying thought: we have another system
for discovering underlying scientific laws, which is called science. This helps
gesture at the question of when/why we’d want to deny a patent to something new
and nonobvious.
Sichelman: the point of patents is to create thickets and
prevent innovation on downstream research; the question is when that’s ok.
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