The Boston Globe's 1960s Confidential Chat has it all, from pseudonyms to flame wars about women who worked outside the home v. women who didn't. The more things change ...
Full-Time Homemaker No Longer Justified?: Confidential Chat, Boston Globe, Feb 11, 1964.
Thursday, November 07, 2013
Wednesday, November 06, 2013
Can't use your phone on your Delta flight? Blame trademark licensing!
Slate reports on the fact that many Delta-branded planes aren't really Delta planes, but operated by lower-paid carriers, and thus not yet allowed to let passengers keep their electronic devices on during takeoff and landing. This pattern is likely to be repeated with other carriers. As the article points out, passengers are likely to blame the flight attendants, not the practice of outsourcing, and that's a shame.
Tuesday, November 05, 2013
HAMP-ed up UCL claim resurrected on appeal
Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2013 WL 5848859, No.
G046799, --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013)
The new frontier: mortgage-related claims brought under
consumer protection laws. A divided
court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Lueras’ negligence, breach of
contract, fraud, and unfair practice claims against Bank of America and
ReconTrust. The key fact alleged was
that,
a mere 13 days before Bank of
America foreclosed on Lueras’s home, Bank of America falsely represented in
writing to Lueras that no foreclosure sale would occur while Lueras was being
considered for “other foreclosure avoidance programs.” In so doing, Bank of
America expressly and in writing informed Lueras he “will not lose [his] home
during this review period.” A Bank of America representative also informed
Lueras the pending foreclosure sale would be postponed. Nevertheless, days
later, Bank of America foreclosed on Lueras’s home.
The story is familiar and frustrating: Lueras refinanced a
$385,000 loan in 2007, then suffered financial hardship and requested a HAMP
modification in 2009, but Bank of America offered him instead Fannie Mae’s
HomeSaver Forbearance program. Bank of
America’s letter said: “Under the HomeSaver Forbearance program, we are working
with Fannie Mae, a government-sponsored enterprise, to reduce your mortgage
payment by up to 50% for up to 6 months while we work with you to find a
long-term solution.” Thus, Lueras
entered into a forbearance agreement and made the monthly payment for 10
months, but—contrary to the promises it made—Bank of America didn’t work with
him to identify feasible foreclosure prevention alternatives.
Meanwhile, Lueras submitted all required information to
determine whether he qualified for a HAMP modification. While he was waiting,
the trustee ReconTrust served him with a notice of default. Only once this notice was recorded did Bank
of America begin to explore alternatives to foreclosure. Lueras enlisted the California AG, which agreed
to monitor and assist with the modification process. He was served with a notice of trustee’s sale
with a scheduled sale date of Feb. 22, 2011; it was rescheduled four times, to
May 18, 2011.
Bank of America allegedly eventually determined Lueras was
HAMP-eligible and made an oral modification offer, which Lueras accepted. But a May 5 letter told Lueras he wasn’t
eligible. The letter said that Bank of
America was reviewing Lueras’s financial information “to determine if there are
other options available to you” and that Bank of America “will contact you
within 10 days to let you know what other options are available to you and the
next steps you need to take.” The May 5 letter also stated: “If a foreclosure
sale of your home is currently pending and on hold, that hold will continue and
remain in effect while you are considered for other foreclosure avoidance
programs.” While advising Lueras not to ignore any foreclosure notices, the
letter stated, “you will not lose your home during this review period.”
Lueras immediately contacted Bank of America, which told him
that the letter was sent by a third party in error, and that he’d been approved
for a reduced interest rate subject to Fannie Mae’s approval. A May 6 letter said that Bank of America was
reviewing his financial documents, with one of three possible responses: (1)
notification he had been approved for a trial period plan under HAMP, (2)
notification he was not eligible for a HAMP loan modification, or (3) more
information was needed to make a decision. Again, he immediately contacted Bank
of America, but was told that the letter was erroneous because his application
had already “been approved” by Bank of America. Bank of America told Lueras
that the trustee’s sale rescheduled for May 18, 2011 would be reset, pending
approval by Fannie Mae.
Lueras made many attempts to contact Fannie Mae, Bank of
America, and the AG during May 2011, but never received any further response. HAMP’s
guidelines require servicers to wait 30 days after denying a HAMP modification
before foreclosing, allowing an appeal.
On May 18, the AG’s office told Lueras that the foreclosure sale would happen
on that day; minutes later, his home was sold.
The sale was ultimately rescinded.
The court first held that Bank of America and ReconTrust
didn’t have a duty of care to offer a loan modification or offer alternatives
to foreclosure. However, “a lender does
owe a duty to a borrower to not make material misrepresentations about the
status of an application for a loan modification or about the date, time, or
status of a foreclosure sale.” Thus,
Lueras could potentially amend his complaint to state a claim for negligent
misrepresentation of fact.
The court reached similar results on breach of contract. Though Bank of America never signed the
forbearance agreement, it was still bound because it accepted payments during
the deferral period and was entitled to receive a $200 incentive fee “upon
successful reporting to Fannie Mae of the initiation of a HomeSaver Forbearance
plan and the collection of one payment under the forbearance plan.” (Though an
agreement modifying a note and deed of trust is subject to the statute of
frauds, the agreement here stated: “No Modification. I understand that the
Agreement is not a forgiveness of payments on my Loan or a modification of the
Loan Documents.”) The agreement did
require Bank of America to work with Lueras in good faith to identify foreclosure
prevention alternatives within six months.
Thus, Lueras could also amend his complaint to allege that Bank of
America’s failure to act breached its duty.
Bank of America argued that Lueras failed to allege
damages. Payments he made during the
deferral period weren’t contractual damages because they would have been owed
under the mortgage in the absence of the forbearance agreement. But he might be
able to allege some other damages from the failure to work with him in good
faith.
California’s mortgage-specific law was no help because it
only provided the remedy of a one-time postponement of foreclosure where the
lender didn’t look for foreclosure alternatives in time.
Fraud: As with the contract damages, Lueras’ continued
payments on the loan didn’t constitute detrimental reliance. Nor did the money, time and effort he wasted
on compiling over a hundred pages of documents while attempting to modify the
loan, which was de minimis. But he might
be able to amend the complaint to allege detrimental reliance, even if the
trustee’s sale was ultimately rescinded.
UCL violations: Bank of America argued that Lueras hadn’t
lost money or property as a result of its actions, because he’d been in default
for years before suing and his monthly payment under the forbearance agreement
was less than his monthly payment under the mortgage. But the allegation that his home was sold at
foreclosure was sufficient economic injury: “Sale of a home through a
foreclosure sale is certainly a deprivation of property to which a plaintiff
has a cognizable claim.” He might also
be able to amend the complaint to allege that his injury was “caused by” BoA’s
allegedly unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct. After all, BoA told him that any pending
foreclosure sale would be “on hold,” that the May letters were sent in error,
and that he’d been approved for a modification.
Also, Lueras might be able to allege that BoA didn’t work with him in
good faith to evaluate and try to identify and implement a permanent solution,
as a consequence of which he lost his home through foreclosure. Although it was his default that triggered
the foreclosure proceedings, BoA’s subsequent misrepresentations/failure to
work with him in good faith might also have caused the foreclosure sale.
Unfair/unlawful/fraudulent practices: The court held that
some of the alleged conduct could not violate the UCL, to the extent that
Lueras alleged that BoA promised him a solution: “Nothing in the Forbearance
Agreement would mislead a borrower into believing Bank of America would always
determine or identify a permanent solution to ‘save’ the borrower’s home.” However, “[i]t is fraudulent or unfair for a
lender to proceed with foreclosure after informing a borrower he or she has
been approved for a loan modification, or telling the borrower he or she will
be contacted about other options and the borrower’s home will not be foreclosed
on in the meantime, as represented in the May 5 letter. It is fraudulent or
unfair for a lender to misrepresent the status or date of a foreclosure sale.” Lueras
could also allege that BoA violated its duty to act in good faith.
The dissent would have found, among other things, that
Lueras lacked standing for a UCL claim, since he couldn’t have lost money or
property when he was in default. “Rather,
he has experienced an incredible windfall. Lueras has avoided foreclosure on
the Property even though he has not made any payment on the Loan since July
2010.” Also, the dissent would have
held, Lueras couldn’t show reliance on any of the May statements since all his
actions/inactions took place before then.
Monday, November 04, 2013
Misleading health insurance letters?
Report on letters discouraging consumers from investigating cheaper alternatives and subsidies here at Talking Points Memo. Exercise for the reader: what's the potential for Lanham Act and state consumer protection law claims (in states that don't exclude insurance from the coverage of their unfair practices/consumer protection statutes)?
No class action against payment processor for multiple sites
Yordy v. Plimus, Inc., No. C12-0229, 2013 WL 5832225 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 29, 2013)
Yordy went to TheNovelNetwork.com, which allegedly promised her
unlimited downloads of bestselling eBooks for a one-time $49.99 fee, which she
paid, only to discover that the website didn’t offer the promised books for
download, but rather only had links to eBooks that were already available
elsewhere on the internet for free (some in violation of copyright law). That site was allegedly one of 19 such “Unlimited
Download Websites” that utilized the same fraudulent advertising scheme. She
alleged that Plimus controlled this scheme and profited by taking a percentage
of each one-time fee as a payment processing fee. She brought the usual
California claims. Plimus denied that it
was involved in the design or implementation of the marketing and advetising,
but was just a processor.
The court denied Yordy’s motion for class
certification. It first rejected
Plimus’s argument that the class was unascertainable because the court would
have to determine if each individual had been exposed to the allegedly false
advertising. But the alleged
misrepresentations here were not “communicated only to select individuals, but
to the public at large on the face of the UDWs.” Screenshots showed these and similar
statements: “Members have unlimited access, no restrictions,” and “MILLIONS of
titles available!” The websites included
images of popular (and in fact unavailable) titles such as Lord of the Rings and The Da
Vinci Code. All putative class members were exposed to this allegedly false
advertising, so no individualized inquiry would be required to determine class
membership. Numerosity was also
satisfied.
The problem was commonality.
Yordy argued that the common questions were: (1) whether Plimus is
liable for facilitating and promoting the UDWs, and (2) whether Plimus had
knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the UDWs. But questions weren’t enough; Yordy needed to
show “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers.” She didn’t.
After the court requested Yordy to identify evidence linking Plimus to
the UDWs’ advertising, she identified communications between Plimus and only
one UDW. Consumer complaints received by
Plimus didn’t demonstrate that it was involved in advertising or
promotion. (Why not contributory
liability? That would seem possible on a
classwide basis.) “While Yordy need not
prove Plimus’s involvement with all the UDWs’ misrepresentations at this stage,
she must present sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the putative
class has common claims.” She didn’t.
Typicality was also absent, for similar reasons. Yordy failed to show that Plimus’s
involvement in the UDW she visited was similar to its involvement with the 18
UDWs she didn’t visit. Though the
misrepresentations may have been similar, there was no evidence that Plimus’s
conduct in bringing about those misrepresentations was similar. “The Court is cognizant of not reaching too
far into the merits in requiring Yordy to prove Plimus’s involvement in
advertising, but, as with commonality, Yordy must at least establish that
Plimus’s involvement in each UDW was substantially similar such that Yordy’s
claims against Plimus relating to TheNovelNetwork.com are representative.” Also, without commonality and typicality,
there couldn’t be adequacy.
Friday, November 01, 2013
Peter Jaszi Lecture: Bernt Hugenholtz on Flexing Authors' Rights
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Soul man is sad man
Moore v. Weinstein Co., LLC, No.12-5715 (6th Cir. Oct. 31,
2013)
Sam Moore, half of the music duo Sam & Dave sued a
number of defendants related to the 2008 fim Soul Man and its accompanying soundtrack. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s rejection of all his trademark, right of publicity, and related claims.
Sam & Dave’s 1967 album, Sam & Dave Soul Men included the hit single “Soul Man,” for
which Moore won a Grammy. They broke up
and reunited in the early 1980s; Prater passed away. Moore continued performing using variations
on “Sam Moore ‘The Legendary Soul Man,’” and his promoters now call him the “Legendary
Soul Man.” Sam & Dave were inducted
into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame in 1992.
In the movie Soul Man,
the two main characters are 2/3 of a 1960s soul trio, Marcus Hooks and the Real
Deal. The third member leaves the group
and has a solo career, while the two continue as a duo, then spit up, then
reunite for a memorial for the third. On
a cross-country trip, they perform Sam & Dave’s song “Hold On, I’m Comin’.” Moore argued that they portrayed Sam &
Dave. The soundtrack, “Soul Men The
Original Motion Picture Soundtrack,” included no Sam & Dave songs.
Moore sued for infringement of his trademarks in “Soul Men,”
“Soul Man,” “The Legendary Soul Man,” “The Original Soul Man,” and “The
Original Soul Men,” the 1967 album “Sam & Dave Soul Men,” and a 2008 documentary DVD, titled “The Original
Soul Men Sam & Dave.”
The appellate court just adopted the district court’s
reasoning granting summary judgment on Moore’s Lanham Act and state unfair
competition claims, and only engaged in its own analysis of the publicity,
state law trademark, and consumer protection claims.
Under the Restatement, the right of publicity doesn’t cover “use
of a person’s identity in . . . entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction,
or in advertising that is incidental to such uses,” including “dissemination of
an unauthorized print or broadcast biography,” or the “[u]se of another’s
identity in a novel, play or motion picture.” Also (and of course we’re not clear on how
this relates to the Restatement), the First Amendment means we use
transformative use as per Comedy III. “[W]e weigh the appropriated likeness against
the appropriating work’s expressiveness, evaluating ‘whether a product containing
a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness,’” which means
“‘something other than the likeness of the celebrity.’” Such
“transformed” works (also?) lie beyond the right of publicity’s reach. A successful publicity claim requires the
challenged work to lack creative components of the defendant’s own. Moore’s claim is weaker than Tiger Woods’ in ETW, given the general protection for
movies, and the movie “[w]ithout a doubt” added significant expressive elements
to any use of Moore’s identity.
Moore argued that there was no protection for the ad insert
featuring his image packaged with the soundtrack’s CD and DVDs. To promote other CDs and DVDs whose rights
were owned by the company that produced the soundtrack, several pages of the
insert—called “THE ORIGINAL SOUL MEN ARE AT STAX”—reprinted cover art from
various Stax Records albums, including Otis Redding, Isaac Hayes and others. Another insert page, “Essential Viewing for
your Soul,” featured the images of three DVDs’ cover art, including “The
Stax/Volt Revue Live in Norway 1967.” That displayed the names and images of
the performers in that 1967 show, including “Double Dynamite!! Sam and
Dave.” However, Moore didn’t dispute
that the company owned the (copy)rights to promote the video depicting a
concert in which he performed. Given
this consent, there was no infringement of the right of publicity. Plus, the insert title page “clearly refers
to the numerous soul albums depicted therein,” of which the concert cover was
but one. There was no evidence that the title page caused confusion, and “[r]ead
in context” no reasonable juror would mistake this reference for Sam &
Dave, or find Sam & Dave “reasonably identifiable” from the reference, even
though the soundtrack was marketed to fans of a variety of soul artists.
Moore also sued for state trademark dilution. Setting choice of law issues aside because
the two relevant state laws were identical, both Tennessee and Arizona require
famousness, and Moore couldn’t satisfy that element, given that he failed on
his federal dilution claim. Indeed, the
only Tennessee factor not present in the Lanham Act was the nature and extent
of use of same or similar mark by third parties, which weighed against Moore.
The district court found at least 34 other albums currently available that
either consist of or incorporate “soul men” or “soul man.” Moore might be well-known, but the test
considers the mark, not the person.
The state consumer protection claims also failed. Moore alleged that defendants caused a
likelihood of confusion about whether he sponsored the movie and soundtrack. But the Lanham Act analysis covered this. Under Rogers
v. Grimaldi, the First Amendment precluded such a claim, and Moore’s “competing
titles” claim also failed to show a likelihood of confusion. He also alleged that defendants made
false/misleading statements about his affiliation or association with the
movie. But he never provided evidence
that Tennessee consumers were injured or deceived, as required.
Teaching children to see like a state
My second-grade son came home with the following schoolwork last week:
"Numbers that Name You: There are lots of numbers that label, count, measure, or order information just about you. For example, you have a birthday and an address. Do you have an ID number for a club you belong to? What's your shoe size? Think about all the numbers that name you. Write these numbers in the person shape.... Find out what a social security number is. Do you have one? Why is this an important number?"
It's easy to mock theory for having jargon. But if this is anything other than interpellating the child as subject of the modern surveillance state in the form of data, let me know.
"Numbers that Name You: There are lots of numbers that label, count, measure, or order information just about you. For example, you have a birthday and an address. Do you have an ID number for a club you belong to? What's your shoe size? Think about all the numbers that name you. Write these numbers in the person shape.... Find out what a social security number is. Do you have one? Why is this an important number?"
It's easy to mock theory for having jargon. But if this is anything other than interpellating the child as subject of the modern surveillance state in the form of data, let me know.
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Delay notifying insurer until after $13.5 million verdict probably harmless
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Mead Johnson...,
--- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 5788652 (7th Cir. 2013)
An advertising injury case from Posner, with a bonus picture
from the underlying dispute … and it’s not even my birthday. Mead Johnson bought a CGL policy from
National Union, with a $2 million limit for personal/advertising injury, and an
excess liability policy from Lexington with a $25 million limit (both are
subsidiaries of AIG).
PBM’s third lawsuit against Mead Johnson for false
advertising resulted in a jury award of $13.5 million. PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
639 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011). “Mead
wants its insurers to pay that judgment, plus the $15 million settlement that
it made to resolve the [resulting follow-on] class action suit.” PBM’s suit claimed that Mead falsely
disparaged PBM’s less expensive store brand by claiming that it lacked key
lipids that promote brain and eye development.
Mead Johnson’s insurance policies expressly covered disparagement as
advertising injury, but Mead Johnson didn’t notify its insurers until after the
damages verdict was handed down. (Why?
Posner doesn’t know. How about:
companies, like Soylent Green, are made of people, and people forget relevant
information all the time.)
Both policies required notice of any claim or occurrence “as
soon as practicable”; the excess liability policy required notice only if a claim
or suit was “reasonably likely” to trigger damages of more than $2 million. The notice provisions entitle insurers to
control the insured’s defense, subject to their fiduciary duty to the insured.
Mead Johnson said that its Director of Risk Management didn’t
learn of the PBM lawsuit until the trial ended, which would be required for its
duty of providing notice to kick in for “occurrences,” per an amendment to the
agreement. The court found it hard to believe that the Director of Risk
Management didn’t know, and anyway a lawsuit was a suit, not an “occurrence.” Posner understood why insureds wouldn’t want
their duty of notice to kick in for any trivial “occurrence,” e.g., “baby cried
after swallowing Enfamil; crack appeared in Enfamil container.” “But it would be absurd to allow a company served
with a summons and complaint or other legal claim to obtain an indefinite
extension of its duty of notice simply by hiding the claim from its Director of
Risk Management,” especially for a claim of this size (PBM asked for $500
million in damages) by a competitor who’d gotten more than $46 million from
Mead Johnson in settling two previous similar suits. Mead Johnson delayed inexcusably in informing
both insurers.
However, this failure allowed the insurers to disclaim
coverage only if they were prejudiced by the late notice. Late notice creates a presumption of harm,
shifting the burden to the insured to show some evidence, but probably doesn’t
shift the burden of persuasion.
The court found National Union unlikely to have incurred
harm from late notice. “Its policy limit
was only $2 million, and we are hard pressed to understand how, had it
conducted the defense of PBM’s suit, it could have obtained either a jury
verdict or a settlement of less than $2 million.” Not only were the damages much higher than
that, but Mead Johnson used the same firm, and even the same lawyer, that
National Union had hired to defend Mead Johnson in PBM’s previous lawsuits. Had it defended Mead Johnson, National Union
would also have had to pay the fees and expenses of the defense, but National
Union didn’t argue it would have paid less, and had it skimped on legal
expenses the ultimate jury verdict might have been higher, allowing Mead
Johnson to claim a breach of fiduciary duty.
The court was tempted to direct entry of judgment for Mead on the
National Union/PBM matter, but remanded for factual development on the issue of
harm—at oral argument, National Union’s counsel essentially conceded she couldn’t
show harm, “[b]ut we hesitate to base a decision on a concession made in the
heat of oral argument under a barrage by the judges.”
Lexington’s situation differed: “Conceivably if placed in
control of the defense it could have bargained to a settlement of less than
$13.5 million or, failing that, have presented evidence or argument that would
have convinced the jury to award PBM less.”
But the insurers’ joint defense made no real argument about this,
treating Lexington “as the tail to National Union’s kite,” perhaps because of
their shared parent. So the insurers
hadn’t shown that it would have made any difference if they, rather than Mead
Johnson, had hired the same law firm, but also Mead Johnson had only offered
the bare facts that the firm was the same and that $13.5 million was less than
$41.5 million, one of the previous settlement amounts. And the district court erred by holding that
when untimely notice is given by an insured after trial in the underlying suit,
the presumption of harm became irrebuttable.
The district court should have said that later notice makes it harder to
rebut the presumption of harm, but the presumption is never irrebuttable. So, remand.
Turning to the second question: was National Union entitled
to decline coverage of Mead Johnson’s claims resulting from the consumer class
action? The advertising injury policy
covered “oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that ...
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services.” The policy required “pay[ment to the insured
of] those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of ... advertising injury.”
The class members were consumers who bought Enfamil in
preference to cheaper brands of infant formula “on the basis of the same false
representations by Mead Johnson that underlay PBM’s suit.” The court saw this
as a consumer fraud claim, not a product disparagement claim, since no product
sold by the class members was disparaged.
Instead, Mead Johnson’s disparagement induced consumers to buy
Enfamil. But Mead Johnson argued that
the policy covered damages for an injury “arising out of” disparaging material.
The court disagreed: the policy said
that damages must arise out of the “offense,” here product disparagement;
damages merely having their origin in disparagement were insufficient. A mere indirect causal link was
insufficient. “Such a chain of equations
can’t be taken literally, for that would imply that the claims in the class ‘arise
out of’ the invention of infant formula.”
(Hunh? So what? Is that covered by any policy? Also, the disparagement sure seems like
proximate cause to me, not just but for cause, but the court disagreed.)
Mead Johnson’s argument for “arising out of” went too far:
Suppose that a mother who has been
feeding her baby a store-brand infant formula made by PBM reads Mead Johnson’s
ad which states that “mothers who buy store brand infant formula to save baby
expenses are cutting back on nutrition compared to Enfamil,” or, worse, sees
Mead’s visual-acuity ad, reproduced below, that tells mom that if fed Enfamil
her baby will see an adorable rubber ducky with butterflies, while if fed a
store brand, baby will be able to make out only a blurry yellow monster chased
by bats. Mom, fearing that she has done irrevocable harm to her precious child,
has a nervous breakdown precipitated by Mead’s false, alarmist advertising. If
she sues Mead Johnson for infliction of emotional distress, can Mead require
National Union to defend and indemnify it on the ground that the mother’s
nervous breakdown arose from product disparagement? An affirmative answer—the
answer implied by Mead Johnson’s argument—would, by expanding coverage to
remote consequences, make it very difficult for an insurer to estimate
liability and thus fix a premium for injuries caused by product disparagement.
RT: Except that the consequences at issue in the actual
consumer protection claim are not at all remote. They are, indeed, the very
consequences that the disparagement aimed at: consumers would buy more from
Mead Johnson and less from house brands like PBM, enriching Mead Johnson and
causing damages to PBM. If the damages
to PBM were proximately caused by the disparagement, so too were the damages to
consumers.
In conclusion, the court cautioned that the underlying tort
claim didn’t need to use the magic word disparagement to trigger coverage, as
long as the claim fit the legal definition thereof.
Georgetown Law Journal technology symposium, Nov. 8
The Georgetown Law Journal cordially invites you to its Volume 102 Symposium, “Law in an Age of Disruptive Technology”
Featuring a Keynote Address by Professor Neal Katyal and panels on:
3-D Printing
Chaired by Professors Deven Desai and Gerard Magliocca
Driverless Cars & Tort Liability
Chaired by Professor Bryant Walker Smith
Mass Surveillance Technology
Chaired by Professor Christopher Slobogin
Friday, Nov. 8, 9 am
Gewirz Hall, 12th Floor
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, Northwest
Washington, District of Columbia
Click here to RSVP
Facebook Page and Website
This event is sponsored in part by ACLU, NSLS, and the Federalist Society
Featuring a Keynote Address by Professor Neal Katyal and panels on:
3-D Printing
Chaired by Professors Deven Desai and Gerard Magliocca
Driverless Cars & Tort Liability
Chaired by Professor Bryant Walker Smith
Mass Surveillance Technology
Chaired by Professor Christopher Slobogin
Friday, Nov. 8, 9 am
Gewirz Hall, 12th Floor
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, Northwest
Washington, District of Columbia
Click here to RSVP
Facebook Page and Website
This event is sponsored in part by ACLU, NSLS, and the Federalist Society
Transformative work of the year
I know, we still have a couple of months, but I find it hard to imagine this being topped: the Golden
Girls, reimagined as Cold War superspies/soldiers.
Tuesday, October 29, 2013
9th Circuit requires arbitration for consumer protection claims
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., --- F.3d ----, No.
11–56965, 2013 WL 5779514 (9th Cir. 2013)
Plaintiffs were former students at for-profit schools owned
by Corinthian and sued alleging that Corinthian used deceptive practices to get
them to enroll. The court of appeals,
reversing the district court, compelled arbitration of the claims under the
UCL, FAL and CLRA, holding that the California Supreme Court’s exemption of claims
for “public injunctive relief” from arbitration was preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act.
Class ascertainability exists without purchase records
Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–02890, 2013 WL
5664985 (S.D. Cal. July 30, 2013)
The court certified a California class of purchasers of Bear
Naked products marked as 100% natural that contained hexane-processed soy. Of note, the court rejected Bear Naked’s
argument that the class wasn’t ascertainable because nobody had purchase
records. The class definition wasn’t
vague or confusing: it was purchasers of the products so labeled, and because
the alleged misrepresentation was on the labels there was no issue of sweeping
in people not exposed to the misrepresentation.
There’s no requirement that class members’ identity be known at the time
of certification, and indeed that would destroy the class action
mechanism. As long as the definition is
sufficiently definite to identify members, administrative challenges don’t
defeat class certification. Relatedly,
the court rejected Bear Naked’s argument that the definition had to ensure that
all class members had standing, and that some purchasers would have been
unaffected by the misrepresentation and thus suffered no injury. Standing of the named plaintiff was enough;
causation on a classwide basis may be established by materiality.
"All Natural" too undefined to be the basis of a claim
Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2013 WL 5764644, No. CV 13–5213 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)
Pelayo sued Nestle alleging claims about 13 Nestle stuffed
pasta products using the term “All Natural” on the labeling while containing synthetic
xanthan gum and soy lecithin.
The court dismissed the claim because Pelayo failed to offer
an objective or plausible definition of “All Natural.” One possibility, “produced or existing in
nature” and “not artificial or manufactured,” clearly wouldn’t apply to the
manufactured pasta: the reasonable consumer is aware that Buitoni Pastas are
not “springing fully-formed from Ravioli trees and Tortellini bushes.” Nor were the other definitions Pelayo offered
plausible. She alleged that none of the
ingredients in a “natural” product would be “artificial” under FDA definitions.
But she failed to allege that any of the challenged ingredients were
“artificial” as defined by the FDA; anyway, the cited definition only applied
to flavor additives, and she didn’t allege that the challenged ingredients were
added flavors.
Pelayo also alleged that none of the ingredients in a
“natural” product are “synthetic” as that term is defined by the National
Organic Program. But the challenged
products weren’t labeled as organic and the NOP didn’t apply. Plus, the
challenged ingredients were expressly permitted in organic-labeled products
(though they are defined as synthetic).
“Consumers generally conflate the notions of ‘natural’ and ‘organic,’ or
hold products labeled ‘organic’ to a higher standard than products labeled
“natural,” and, thus, it is implausible that a reasonable consumer would
believe ingredients allowed in a product labeled ‘organic,’ such as the
Challenged Ingredients, would not be allowed in a product labeled ‘all natural.’”
Then, Pelayo offered the FDA’s 1991 informal statement on
“natural,” but that’s not a legal requirement.
The FDA/FTC declined to define natural because the term “may be used in
numerous contexts and may convey different meanings depending on that context.”
Given that finding, it was implausible
that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted
consumers would be deceived or mislead by the use of the term “All Natural” on
the pastas. Also, even the FDA’s
informal policy would allow the use of some artificial and synthetic
ingredients, such as the ones challenged here.
Finally, the ingredient list clarified any ambiguity about
“All Natural,” and was consistent with the use of that term. Thus, plaintiff failed to allege either a
plausible objective definition or a subjective definition shared by the
reasonable consumer.
Singaporean bank finds no relief from Lanham Act
Hong Leong Finance Limited (Singapore) v. Pinnacle
Performance Ltd., 2013 WL 5746126, No. 12 Civ. 6010 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013)
My former classmate, the Honorable Jesse Furman, got this
Lanham Act extraterritoriality case.
Plaintiff HLF sued Morgan Stanley and certain affiliates
related to credit-linked notes issued by Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley entered into a distribution
agreement with HLF, and HLF then sold the notes to Singaporean investors. Credit-linked notes shift credit risk
associated with the “reference entities” from a “protection buyer” (the bank
arranging the notes) to a “protection seller” (the note investors), which uses
a special purpose vehicle to stand in the middle and engage in a credit default
swap. The principal received from the
investors in the notes is used to buy highly-rated securities as collateral in
the event that reference entities default.
Investors get interest in the form of credit protection payments from
the sponsoring bank and any interest generated by the underlying assets. The underlying assets are typically safe and
liquid, but HLF alleged that Morgan Stanley selected very risky assets
here—single-tranche synthetic CDOs (in other words, clusterbombs). They weren’t just risky; they were allegedly
designed to fail, because Morgan Stanley took a short position on those very
same assets.
HLF alleged that Morgan Stanley persuaded HLF to sell the
notes to its customers by emphasizing that they were “conservative” and
“low-risk products” suitable for HLF’s customers: middleclass and working-class
Singaporeans, and small—and medium-sized enterprises. HLF eventually sold its
customers $72.4 million worth of notes. When the notes failed, Singapore’s de facto
central bank stepped in and mandated that HLF pay its investors over $32
million.
The Lanham Act claim, the sole basis of federal
jurisdiction, was dismissed because it failed to allege facts supporting
application of the statute extraterritorially.
The Lanham Act covers conduct outside the US when necessary to prevent
harm to commerce in the US. The Second
Circuit looks at three factors: “(i) whether the defendant is a United States
citizen; (ii) whether there exists a conflict between the defendant’s trademark
rights under foreign law and the plaintiff’s trademark rights under domestic
law; and (iii) whether the defendant’s conduct has a substantial effect on
United States commerce.” The first two
factors are significant, but the third is “critical and often dispositive.”
Here, HLF failed to allege facts plausibly satisfying the
third factor. There was no alleged consumer confusion or harm to HLF’s goodwill
in the US, because HLF doesn’t exist in the US—indeed, it alleged that it had “no
expertise in foreign markets”—and the customers Morgan Stanley screwed were middle-class
and working-class Singaporeans. HLF
argued that Morgan Stanley’s scheme was executed largely in New York, but mere
preparation of a scheme within US borders wasn’t enough.
In any event, HLF failed to allege domestic activity
“sufficiently essential” to the allegedly unlawful activity abroad. Morgan Stanley allegedly issued and
structured the notes in and around NYC.
But the gravamen of the complaint was false advertising—whether Morgan
Stanley made statements that were likely to deceive or confuse investors, not
statements made to HLF. And HLF didn’t
allege that Morgan Stanley directed any false ads from the US to the
Singaporean investors; there wasn’t even any allegation of contact with the
investors, as opposed to contact with HLF.
There was therefore no nexus between US activities and the allegedly
unlawful activities abroad.
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