Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Deadly automatic litterbox might be falsely advertised as "safe"

Gomez v. PetPivot, Inc., 2026 WL 507708, No. 25-cv-5622 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026)

“Safe” is the kind of word that is general enough that it might be puffery, but courts think that safety is important enough that they sometimes consider it falsifiable. Here, defendant’s self-cleaning litterbox product gruesomely killed plaintiffs’ cat after they received the litterbox as a Christmas gift. (I will not give you the details but they were awful, and it was difficult to remove the cat’s body.) It was “advertised as remaining partially open at all times, with no complete enclosure that could entrap a pet.” On the PetPivot website, Amazon.com, and promotional materials, PetPivot marketed the Autoscooper as “smart,” “safe,” and “fully automated” and equipped with multiple “safety protection devices,” including that the system would automatically stop operating when a cat was inside the chamber. “The Amazon listing for the PetPivot assured consumers that the device can operate safely without supervision.”

Although individual defendants from PetPivot were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court allowed NY GBL false advertising claims to proceed. GBL Sections 349 and 350 require proof of causation but not “proof of justifiable reliance.” “Reliance is the causal link between an alleged deceptive practice and a consumer’s decision to transact business with the defendant, whereas causation refers to the link between an alleged deceptive practice and an actual injury sustained by a consumer as a result of such practice.” Thus, causation can be shown by evidence either that the plaintiff would not have entered into the transaction or would have taken precautionary measures with the product had they known the truth.

Here, plaintiffs didn’t claim they bought the product in reliance on defendants’ representations, but rather that they relied on those representations when accepting and using the product in the home. That sufficed: they alleged a “connection between the misrepresentation and ... harm from, or failure, of, the product.” Also, applying Rule 8, they adequately identified the misrepresentations at issue.

Can the death of a cat qualify for negligent infliction of emotional distress where neither plaintiff was threatened with physical harm? “Bystander” claims for NIED in New York are limited to “immediate family,” but the courts have declined to define the outer boundaries of that phrase.  New York courts have allowed a grandmother to pursue a claim for bystander recovery following the tragic death of her grandchild, relying on the “legislative recognition of the changing nature of society’s understanding of family and the special relationship between grandparents and grandchildren.” By contrast, the relationship between aunts and uncles and their nieces and nephews didn’t qualify. “[T]he inquiry is objective; it asks not whether the grandmother and her grandchild had an exceptionally close bond, but whether New York law has evolved to recognize grandparents as a ‘discrete, limited class of persons that enjoys a special status under modern New York family law.’” 

A lower NY court also found that a pet dog could be classified as “immediate family.” New York Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) requires a “best interest” framework for determining the custody of pets, similar to the framework for children, in recognition “that ‘for many families, pets are the equivalent of children and must be granted more consideration by courts to ensure that they will be properly cared for after a divorce.’ ” The court also considered societal norms regarding pets in hotel rooms and on planes, and concluded that “considering the various accommodations made for companion animals in general, along with the deep and affectionate bond Plaintiffs shared with their dog, it stands to reason that companion animals ... could also be recognized, as a matter of common sense, as immediate family.” However, it limited the rule to situations in which “the pet was leashed to the plaintiff at the time the negligent act occurred and the plaintiff herself was exposed to danger.” Thus, this case did not support extending NIED to the death of a cat outside the presence of, and danger to, her person. Her exposure to danger “did not go beyond witnessing the mechanical movement of the machine and unplugging it from the wall.”

For the remaining claims, “New York courts treat pets as personal property and consequently do not permit damages for emotional distress or loss of companionship.” But punitive damages might be available for strict products liability and GBL violations under appropriate circumstances.  


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