Tuesday, July 29, 2014

IP norms and a bit on IRBs

Via Jason Schultz in Jotwell, I learned of a great new paper by Julia Bauer et al. on community norms about copying and anticopying enforcement in the Threadless (crowdsourced T-shirt) community.  There are many interesting results, including the evidence they present of procedural fairness norms to go along with the anticopying norms.  But I'm sensitized to a separate question: part of the paper involved deliberately introducing copied designs to the community and waiting for detection and response.  Since the authors knew from their previous research on actual copying cases that community members often reacted with outrage to blatant copying, why is this (rightly) recognized by Jotwell as useful empirical evidence, while Facebook's testing of the effects of altering the newsfeed seems outrageous?  As far as I can tell, the authors do not indicate that they submitted this study to an IRB (institutional review board); I'm informed by my in-house expert that as foreign researchers they likely didn't have to.  This experiment seems a lot closer to human subjects research than what Facebook did.  Is it outrageous?

Music you can't get in a library

Planning for musical obsolescence: How digital licensing is destroying our ability to preserve history. Excerpt:
When one goes to the LA Philharmonic site about this recording of Symphonie Fantastique and tries to purchase it, one is directed to the iTunes site, and the licensing terms that accompany the “purchase” — it is really just a license — restrict the user to personal uses. 
At a recent consultation to discuss this problem, it was interesting to note that several of the lawyers in the room encouraged the librarians to just download the music anyway and ignore the licensing terms, simply treating this piece of music like any other library acquisition.
(I wrote an article that had a bit about this.) 

Monday, July 28, 2014

court says Lexmark doesn't change trademark harm standard

Reynolds Consumer Prods. Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 1:13–CV–214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014)

A jury found Handi-Foil liable for willful infringement of Reynolds’ unregistered trade dress, but in favor of Handi-Foil on all other accounts (including infringement of registered trade dress). The court declined to set aside the verdict and denied Reynolds’ request for attorneys’ fees.

Handi-Foil argued that Lexmark merited judgment as a matter of law because Reynolds didn’t produce “substantial evidence” of harm during trial. The court found Lexmark “totally inapplicable.” That case held that “[t]o invoke the Lanham Act’s cause of action for false advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations.” But nobody ever questioned Reynolds’ standing, and anyway Lexmark was specifically a false advertising case. (The court did not explain why this is, or what language in the Lanham Act justifies a distinction in what a plaintiff must prove in terms of harm.)

The finding of likely confusion was not unreasonable. Confusion is particularly amenable to jury resolution, and the jury was instructed that it could weigh the factors as it saw fit. Handi-Foil’s emphasis on dissimilarity and lack of actual confusion evidence was unpersuasive. Reynolds provided evidence of mark strength; similarity of the parties’ packages; similarity of goods, marketing channels, and advertising; and Handi-Foil’s specific intent to make the packages look similar. (For marketing, the court said, “While Handi-Foil does not advertise to individual aluminum roll foil consumers, almost the entirety of the marketing pitch for the Handi–Foil roll foil centered on the product being ‘comparable to Reynolds Wrap.’” I don’t think that can be relevant evidence—it’s not to consumers, and it’s about comparability of the product, not the packaging; moreover, it indicates an intent to distinguish the product from Reynolds Wrap as a comparison.)

The court also declined to grant a new trial. Handi-Foil argued that the verdict was inconsistent. To invalidate a verdict on such grounds requires that there be no reasonable view of the jury’s verdict that makes it consistent. The core of Handi-Foil’s argument was that Reynolds’ registered marks provided broader rights than its common law trade dress. Thus, it should have been impossible for the jury to find trade dress infringement but not trademark infringement (where, as here, it’s the trade dress that’s registered).

Reynolds registrations
Trade dress means “the total image and overall appearance of a product, product packaging, product label, product design, or a combination of these things.” The registrations here both designated the colors blue (horizontal), silver (diagonal), and pink (vertical) for Reynolds’ mark (plus words for one). As for its common law trade dress, Reynolds claimed
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the use of prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use of silver bands to separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the placement of the quantity information; (f) the inclusion of the “made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the repetition of the color scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the “press here to lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the use of graphics with how-to information; (j) the “Lift” graphic; (k) the positioning of the brand name on the top flap of the box; and (1) the color yellow, placement, and text used to caution the consumer.

Though McCarthy says that distinctions between trademarks and trade dress “have largely disappeared,” that just means that many types of protectable trade dress are registrable. Thus, “although Reynolds could have likely obtained a registered trademark that is identical in all respects to its trade dress, it chose not to.” Plus, the marks Reynolds chose to register differ from the unregistered trade dress.  

Two Pesos says that the Lanham Act’s protection for unregistered trade dress “prohibits a broader range of practices” than trademark infringement (§32). But that doesn’t resolve the question before this court, and the Supreme Court also said that registrability principles mostly apply for protectability of unregistered marks. McCarthy says that “the irony of both patent claims and definitions of trade dress is that the more elements that are listed, the narrower and weaker the claim.” Handi-Foil argued that this meant that Reynolds’ unregistered trade dress had to be narrower than its registered mark. Even if McCarthy’s statement means that a trade dress with more elements is generally weaker than a trademark with fewer elements, that didn’t matter on the facts of this case. The jury was instructed on the elements of Reynolds’ registrations, as well as on the definition of (unregistered) trade dress. The jury thus was told to determine whether Handi-Foil’s packages were likely to cause confusion with (1) the elements that made up the registered marks or (2) the “total image and overall appearance ” of the Reynolds Wrap boxes. While answering (1) no and (2) yes might not have been the most reasonable verdict, it wasn’t unreasonable.

“A picture is worth a thousand words”: The jury “easily” could have looked at the boxes and decided that the absence of “Reynolds Wrap” precluded infringement of the second mark. As for the first, the jury could have noticed that the registration includes three curved silver lines, separating the blue from other colored areas, while the Handi-Foil boxes lacked that feature. But “the similarity between the overall impressions of the two boxes in each set is striking. This is the case even if the boxes’ color schemes are put aside.” Here the court referred to a bunch of descriptive elements and their arrangement: the two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty;” Reynolds says “foods lift right off!” and Handi-Foil says “Food Easily Lifts Off!”; both boxes have identical square footage on the right end of the box, with the metric conversions “typed neatly below.” Also, the side and end panels have “striking” similarity. That, combined with “Made in the USA” on the right in the first example, plus the other likely confusion factors, made the jury’s unregistered trade dress verdict reasonable. “In fact, any other finding may well have been unreasonable.”

Non stick boxes

75 foot boxes
It was “perhaps” more difficult to square the jury’s finding of likelihood of unregistered trade dress confusion f with its finding that Handi-Foil wasn’t guilty of common law unfair competition. The jury might’ve misunderstood the instructions, though, and that doesn’t require a new trial. The only relevant instruction was that “Virginia common law unfair competition claim requires the same proof, including likelihood of confusion, as the Lanham Act offenses.” “Reasonable jurors could look at this instruction and determine that a finding of non-infringement on any of the Lanham Act claims required a finding in Handi-Foil’s favor on the unfair competition count.” That didn’t render the verdict irrational.

Okay, but what about the court’s previous nonabandonment finding that the current boxes create the same continuing commercial impression as the registered designs? How then could the jury rationally have seen a substantive difference between the unregistered trade dress and the registered marks? The answer is that the court used a different standard and different boxes than the jury did. The court compared the PTO specimen with the current box for “tacking,” a question of law. (For now; one of the trademark cases before the Supreme Court may change matters.) But the jury made a factual determination by comparing a variety of Handi-Foil and Reynolds boxes. (In other words, shut up, infringer.)

Estoppel by laches didn’t bar injunctive relief, especially given the jury’s finding of willful infringement. Plus, Reynolds sued within ten months, comfortably within the analogous Virginia statute of limitations of two years. Applying eBay and Winter, a permanent injunction was appropriate. Though the circuit precedent instructing that likely confusion ordinarily means irreparable injury is pre-eBay, the Eastern District of Virginia has continued to find that irreparable harm generally stems from likely confusion.

What about Reynolds’ failure to show actual confusion or money damages? The jury still found likely confusion, and likely confusion “primarily represents an injury to reputation.” Thus, infringement “gives rise to irreparable injury, in that plaintiff has lost control of its business reputation ... and there is an inherent injury to the good will and reputation of the plaintiff.” As a result, the jury found that Reynolds suffered irreparable harm. (Making eBay irrelevant in trademark cases.) Importantly, Reynolds’ remedies at law were inadequate.

Though Reynolds failed to prove that Handi-Foil earned profits, likely confusion “demonstrates a palpable risk of continuing and future harm.” The jury found in Handi-Foil’s favor on Reynolds’ false advertising claim (relating to Handi-Foil’s claims to be comparable). Even assuming that means that the jury believed that Handi-Foil was comparable, that doesn’t negate any reputational harm suffered by Reynolds due to the infringement. (Why not? What about Handi-Foil could harm Reynolds’ reputation if the products were of the same quality? There may be an answer—I’m sure a plaintiff’s expert could give one—but these mantras of “reputation” are so entrenchted that courts don’t pause to think about them at all.) Anyway, the quality of goods is irrelevant to infringement. (And, apparently, harm.)

The public interest also favored an injunction because of Handi-Foil’s specific intent to mimic the Reynolds trade dress and corresponding willful infringement. Reynolds was the prevailing party and was entitled to costs, but not attorneys’ fees. Under Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014), a case is exceptional when it “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of the party’s litigating position ... or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” The court found that this case couldn’t be deemed exceptional under this standard.

Friday, July 25, 2014

Yelp statements about its filters not protected by anti-SLAPP law or CDA

Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 2014 WL 3661491, No. B247151 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2014)
Demetriades operates restaurants and sued Yelp under California’s UCL and FAL based on claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its “filter” of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted Yelp’s anti-SLAPP motion and the court of appeals reversed.
The court noted that
Yelp expressly tells users that “the filter sometimes affects perfectly legitimate reviews and misses some fake ones, too. After all, legitimate reviews sometimes look questionable, and questionable reviews sometimes look legitimate.” Plaintiff, when purchasing advertising on Yelp, acknowledged in the advertising contract that Yelp’s filtering software sometimes made mistakes. According to Yelp, in addition to relying on the filter, a site user can judge how much weight to give to any particular review by viewing the reviewer’s profile, reading the reviewer’s reviews, and assessing statistics regarding such reviews.
This may ultimately help Yelp prevail on the merits, but it doesn't today.
Demetriades, who’d advertised on Yelp, alleged that Yelp engaged in false advertising by claiming that each user review passed through a filter that gave consumers “the most trusted reviews” and by making related claims about the reliability of its filtering.   Demetriades alleged that these statements were false and misleading, and that the filter suppressed more than a small portion of reviews; allowed “most entertaining” reviews to be shown regardless of the source; allowed reviews on a local business page regardless of whether the source was trustworthy or unbiased; and suppressed a substantial portion of reviews that were unbiased and trustworthy.
The trial court granted Yelp’s special motion to strike, because Yelp met its initial burden of showing that its statements arose from protected activity; statements about filtering on social media are matters of public interest.  The anti-SLAPP law’s public interest exemption didn’t apply because the case wasn’t brought solely in the public interest; Demetriades had a personal financial interest.  The commercial speech exemption didn’t apply because the statements about filtering didn’t relate to selling advertising, and also Demetriades failed to show that they were statements of fact and not puffery.  Demetriades failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because he didn’t own the restaurants and thus lacked standing, and because the statements were puffery/opinion.  (I note some tension between the argument that Demetriades had a personal stake in the claim and that he lacked standing, but the court doesn’t go there.)
First, the court said that the business entity that owned the restaurants was the proper plaintiff, but could be substituted in by amending the complaint. 
 Then, the court found that Yelp’s statements about its review filter were commercial speech squarely within the relevant exemption from the anti-SLAPP law (for the record, § 425.17(c)). This exemption says that the law
does not apply to any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services [when] [¶] (1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that person’s or a business competitor’s business operations, goods, or services, that is made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person’s goods or services, or the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering the person’s goods or services; and [¶] (2) the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer....”
“The legislative history indicates this legislation is aimed squarely at false advertising claims and is designed to permit them to proceed without having to undergo scrutiny under the anti-SLAPP statute.”  Under Kasky v. Nike, distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech requires considering the speaker, the intended audience, and the content of the message.  Here, Yelp’s statements about its review filter are “commercial speech about the quality of its product (the reliability of its review filter) intended to reach third parties to induce them to engage in a commercial transaction (patronizing Yelp’s website, which patronage induces businesses on Yelp to purchase advertising).”  Statements about the efficacy of the review filter were representations of fact, not mere puffery or opinion.  A key factor in distinguishing puffery from fact is specificity.  The following Yelp statements were factual claims:
·         “Yelp uses a filter to give consumers the most trusted reviews”;
·         “All reviews that live on people’s profile pages go through a remarkable filtering process that takes the reviews that are the most trustworthy and from the most established sources and displays them on the business page. This keeps the less trustworthy reviews out so that when it comes time to make a decision you can make that using information and insights that are actually helpful”;
·         “Rest assured that our engineers are working to make sure that whatever is up there is the most unbiased and accurate information you will be able to find about local businesses”; “
·         Yelp is always working to do as good a job as possible on a very complicated task—only showing the most trustworthy and useful content out there”; and
·         “Yelp has an automated filter that suppresses a small portion of reviews—it targets those suspicious ones you see on other sites.”
They were intended to induce consumer reliance on Yelp reviews “by making specific and detailed statements intended to induce reliance.”  The reference to Yelp’s “engineers” would inspire confidence.  Though Yelp used words of emphasis like “remarkable,” its specific representations went beyond mere opinion or puffery.  It would be illogical to conclude that Yelp’s statements that all reviews were filtered was intended to mean anything other than what it said.  “If Yelp intended the statements as puffery or opinion, in the context of Yelp’s advertising-driven website such statements would have limited utility; thus Yelp would have had no legitimate purpose in making those statements about its review filter.”  (This is Ivan Preston’s argument that by default no statement an advertiser takes the trouble to make prominently should be considered puffery.)
The next step was whether the intended audience was an actual or potential buyer or customer or a person likely to influence an actual or potential buyer or customer.  Yelp only receives direct revenue from businesses that advertise, but they wouldn’t do that without the potential benefit from user reviews and without assurances that potential patrons would be reading only reliable reviews.  The user reviews were a device by which Yelp carried out its primary business of providing advertising to business.  “Thus, Yelp’s statements about the accuracy and performance of its review filter are designed to attract users and ultimately purchasers of advertising on its site.”
Demetriades wasn’t trying to stop use of the filter, but to enjoin allegedly false statements of fact. This wouldn’t interfere with reviews or legitimate speech.
Finally, the CDA didn’t bar these claims. “Nowhere does plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the statements of third parties (i.e., reviewers) on its website. Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own statements regarding the accuracy of its filter.”

Transformative work of the day

Pando.com publishes an entire issue of Reason magazine that's not available in Reason's online archives "for reasons that will become obvious"--it's an entire special issue devoted to WWII "revisionism" and Holocaust denial.  Talk to me about fair use factor three!

Reading list: social media flagging

Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the vocabulary of complaint, 4 New Media Society (2014).  One of the points I most liked:
[F]lags speak only in a narrow vocabulary of complaint. A flag, at its most basic, indicates an objection. User opinions about the content are reduced to a set of imprecise proxies: flags, likes or dislikes, and views. Regardless of the proliferating submenus of vocabulary, there remains little room for expressing the degree of concern, or situating the complaint, or taking issue with the rules. There is not, for example, a flag to indicate that something is troubling, but nonetheless worth preserving. The vocabulary of complaint does not extend to protecting forms of speech that may be threatening, but are deemed necessary from a civic perspective. Neither do complaints account for the many complex reasons why people might choose to flag content, but for reasons other than simply being offended. Flags do not allow a community to discuss that concern, nor is there any trace left for future debates.
We often speak of the internet as a boon for communities, but it is so only in certain ways, and it can be structured so that certain kinds of communities have a harder time forming or discussing particular issues.  I have similar concerns with Amazon’s Kindle Worlds compared to the organic, messy world of noncommercial fan fiction, for example.

Thursday, July 24, 2014

FTC announces settlement with "official" ticket seller that wasn't

Details at the FTC's site.  I was interested in this because usually the FTC leaves alone cases in which a business victim is a likely plaintiff; it makes sense to use government resources to go after defendants who otherwise would be ignored.  Here, the defendant impersonated Radio City Music Hall, selling marked-up tickets in a way that looked like they were direct from the venue.  This would've been fodder for an ordinary trademark suit by the various affected venues, but apparently either the trademark owners weren't interested/aware enough (since they were getting paid anyway) or the FTC determined that the separate consumer injury of overpayment justified action. 

Trademark exceptionalism wins another round in Maryland

Hershey Co. v. Friends of Steve Hershey, 2014 WL 3571691, No. WDQ–14–1825 (D. Md. July 17, 2014)
Thanks to prodding from Eric Goldman for me to blog about it, here’s a case where we learn that the only constraint on political speech left is intellectual property. Steve Hershey is a local Maryland politician who’s scrapped with Hershey Co. for years about his brown, Hershey-wrapper-esque signs. In 2010, they came to an agreement that Hershey would change the design of his materials. But in 2014, he campaigned for state senate using a campaign logo with a Maryland flag in dual tone brown as the background, the word HERSHEY in white Impact or Helvetica Nueue font, and STATE SENATE in smaller font below.
Hershey Co. sued for trademark infringement and dilution and breach of contract. The court granted a preliminary injunction on infringement grounds (also proving that there is no work left to be done for dilution in modern law).
“In commerce” is a jurisdictional requirement, so that’s not a barrier. The court found substantial similarity between the campaign sign and the widely known Hershey trade dress. “The Maryland flag design is subtle, and would likely be difficult to notice, especially when viewed on a lawn sign from a passing car.” Differences in the parties’ goods and services didn’t matter because confusion over sponsorship or affiliation is also actionable. “On the basis of the substantially similar campaign design, a member of the public could easily—and mistakenly—believe that Senator Hershey is in some way affiliated with Hershey.”
The court also found that Hershey provided “anecdotal” evidence of actual confusion. The problem is that this claim is a huge stretch. Even Hershey’s filing has to conflate recognition of similarity with confusion to get anywhere. From Hershey’s papers:
Online news publications, for example, have referred to Defendants’ “brown campaign signs made to look like the popular chocolate bar” and to “Steve Hershey, who features a modified version of the chocolate bar in his campaign signs.” One online blog has similarly commented on Senator Hershey’s copying of Hershey’s trade dress. And, a number of consumers have contacted Hershey and commented on the similarity of Senator Hershey’s signs to, for example, the Hershey milk chocolate bar wrapper, and/or expressed confusion as to whether Hershey endorsed Senator Hershey or authorized him to use Hershey’s trade dress.
That “and/or” is doing a huge and unwarranted amount of work. Curiosity isn’t confusion, especially since consumers readily understand that most international companies don’t endorse local politicians; confusion is confusion.
I looked at the exhibits cited in this paragraph of Hershey’s submission, which was what the court cited in claiming that there’d been actual confusion. The first is a news article which has a quote from Hershey that the signs are confusing; neither the author nor anyone else expresses confusion. The second is a follow-up article that says nothing about confusion, but states that Steve Hershey has been in negotiations with Hershey for a while. The third is an email asking if Hershey is endorsing Steve Hershey (and how Steve Hershey could have the same last name as the company’s founder, since the founder had no children). It says “One would think so [that Hershey is endorsing Steve Hershey] since the sign is an exact copy of the wrapper (lettering and color),” but it’s not clear that the writer is such a one. The fourth is an email that expresses no confusion, just wants a “footnote” to Hershey. The fifth, another email, isn’t confused, but wants Hershey’s “legal team” to know about the use. The sixth is a letter asking for clarification: “Does he have permission to do this? Is this ok with your company?” The seventh is a report from a customer service call, where the caller reported “blatant copyright infringement” (confused about the law, but not about source or sponsorship). The eighth is a news article about signs “made to look like the popular chocolate bar”; no mention of confusion.
That’s it. The only arguable evidence of actual confusion is the third email, which is from a person who apparently thinks all the other Hersheys in existence should have changed their name. (P.S. to Hershey: the filing didn’t successfully remove identifying information from the emails.)
The weight of the evidence, the court concluded, showed likely confusion.
Defendants argued that they didn’t use the mark in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services.  But “services” has been interpreted broadly, to noncommercial and political speech. “Defendants used their design to promote a political candidate, disseminate political information, host campaign events, and solicit donations,” and that was sufficient.
The First Amendment defense also failed, because First Amendment protection “does not apply when the trademark is used to associate a political candidate with a popular consumer brand.”  (Citing Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002), which actually doesn’t say that, but rather sides with a First Amendment defense in a similar case on the ground that contrary cases where the plaintiff won involved direct source confusion over who was speaking to the audience—which, given the court’s reliance on association/affiliation theories, actually cuts the other way here.)  Here, the court concluded, defendants weren’t using the trade dress “for parody, political commentary, or other communicative purposes.”  (What was it communicating, then?  Even if it was confusing people, it was only doing so through communicating.  The court’s not alone in misusing “communicative” to mean “expressive in an okay way,” but that doesn’t make it right.)
Irreparable harm followed almost automatically from a showing of likely success on the merits in a trademark case.  (eBay/Winter?  Never mind.)  The balance of equities also therefore favored Hershey.  The additional cost of distributing new campaign materials was a self-inflicted harm that didn’t outweigh the irreparable harm to Hershey (not further explained) of continued use.  Defendants didn’t identify any voter information they could only provide through use of the Hershey trade dress, and the general election is almost four months away, giving them enough time to distribute new materials.  Plus, the general election won’t be seriously contested, showing the minimal risk of harm to the defendants in changing campaign materials.  And the public interest favors avoiding confusion.
The defendants offered a disclaimer in addition to the existing sign, stating “Our Senator, not Big Chocolate ... we’re not confused.” But that was still substantially similar, and the disclaimer was “vague, unclear, and would do little, if anything, to reduce public confusion with respect to Hershey’s affiliation with Senator Hershey.”

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Pom doesn't change preclusion analysis for medical devices

Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Medical Corp., 2014 WL 3536573, No. 2:14–CV–70 (D. Utah, July 17, 2014)
The parties compete in the medical device market for infection-control devices.  At issue here are disinfectant caps incorporated into intravenous (IV) lines that deliver fluids and drugs to patients. Ivera markets its product as Curos Tips (Rev. G model).  Before marketing the predecessor model X13 and the Rev. G, Ivera submitted a prototype (known as X10) to the FDA for 510(k) approval and received a clearance letter.  This letter contained an “Indications for Use Statement”:
The Curos Tips are intended for use as a disinfecting cleaner for male luer connectors. Curos Tips will disinfect the male luer (3) minutes after the application and will cover the luer until removed. The effectiveness of the Curos Tips was tested in vitro against Staphylococcus aureus, Staphylococcus epidermidis, Escherichia call, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Candida glabrata, and Dandida albicans. The Curos Tips may be used in the home or healthcare facility.
When Ivera began marketing its new X13, it used this language on its website and product packaging.  After the X13 was enjoined in related patent litigation by Catheter Connections, Ivera marketed the Rev. G, and represented or implied to customers that no additional 510(k) clearance was necessary.
Catheter Connections claimed that Ivera engaged in false advertising by claiming (1) that Rev. G doesn’t need further FDA clearance; (2) that Rev. G keeps its disinfectant from leaking into the infusion line and posing a risk to the patient; (3) that Ivera tested Rev. G and found it to be effective against six specific microorganisms; and (4) that the FDA has found that Rev. G is effective against six specific microorganisms.
Ivera argued FDCA preclusion, contending that all these claims required interpreting FDA regulations, specifically that all the claims were based on Catheter Connections’ argument that a new 510(k) approval was required for the new model.  By regulation, new approval is required where a design modification “could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device.”
The Tenth Circuit has a pre-Pom framework for FDCA/Lanham Act preclusion cases: affirmative misrepresentations are generally actionable even if the product is FDA-regulated.  But FDCA violations can’t be pursued using the Lanham Act, nor can claims that require “direct interpretation and application of the FDCA.”  Catheter Connections argued that Pom meant that the Lanham Act overlaps with the FDCA in “marketing and advertising” matters, thus allowing all its claims to go forward.  It pointed to the language in Pom indicating that the FDA “does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess.”
However, the court found that the first claim—that it was a misrepresentation to claim that no new 510(k) clearance was required—was precluded.  Catheter Connections argued that the court had all the necessary facts to determine that new clearance was required as a matter of law, given that Ivera admitted that it had changed the design elements that it represented to the FDA gave it its “theory of operation.”  However, these facts didn’t answer the question whether the design change “could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device.” That was a decision for the FDA.
By contrast, the remaining claims were within the scope of the Lanham Act, and resolving them wouldn’t require interpretation of the FDCA or FDA regulations. Those claims focused on the substance of Ivera’s representations “in the context of the medical device market and what drives buyers’ purchasing decisions.”  The issue of whether the Rev. G model kept the disinfectant on the exterior of the connector was “fundamental to the attractiveness” of the device, and resolving the claim would require determining facts about how the device worked, not interpretation or application of FDA policy or regulations.  Likewise, whether Ivera tested the Rev. G model for effectiveness on six specific microorganisms, and whether it got the touted results, was an issue going to marketability.  And the fourth claim, about a misleading representation of FDA approval, also went to marketability, since affirmative FDA approval of effectiveness would attract customers.  “The question is not whether the FDA should have granted approval, but whether FDA made a finding of fact about the product.”   (Note that allowing claims based on implicit misrepresentations of FDA approval can have potentially much broader effects.)
Ultimately, “[a]nalysis of the three claims will focus on the effect such representations have on Catheter Connections, as Ivera’s competitor, in the market. Accordingly, they are not precluded by the FDCA.” 
State law duties imposed on medical device makers can only be parallel to the requirements of the FDCA/FDA.  However, the state false advertising laws at issue here didn’t regulate medical devices, only the alleged misrepresentations to consumers.  Thus, the preclusion analysis applied with equal force to the state law claims: there was no preemption of the nonprecluded claims.

regulating TM owner's confusing use of TM doesn't violate First Amendment

AEP Texas Comm. & Indus. Retail Ltd. P’ship v. Public Util. Comm’n, 2014 WL 3558763, No. 03–13–00358–CV, -- S.W.3d – (Tex. Ct. App. July 17, 2014)
A complicated regulatory background is the setting for this case about the evidence required to deem commercial speech—here in the form of trademarks—misleading, and thus its prohibition exempt from Central Hudson review.  Texas deregulated retail energy supply in the 1990s.  Doing so required breaking up vertically integrated entities that previously had been exclusive suppliers to their areas.  Transmission/distribution networks remained monopolies, but networks were required to sell nondiscriminatory access to different energy suppliers.  The issue here concerns “retail electric providers” (REPs), which sell power to end users, and transmission/distribution utilities (TDUs), which were restricted from owning generation assets or selling electricity themselves.  However, separate affilated companies owned by a common holding company were allowed, so holding companies could own both TDUs and REPs.
In order to prevent the unbundled units from retaining market dominance, Texas required a REP affiliated with a TDU to charge an above-market price within the TDU’s service area for a period after customer choice began.  And Texas authorized the Commission to regulate to control market power and protect consumers. The Commission enacted various rules to regulate REPs.  Among other things, a REP’s business name can’t be “deceptive, misleading, vague,” or “otherwise contrary” to the Code of Conduct.
AEP provides retail electric service to industrial and large commercial customers under the name AEP Retail Electric (AEP REP); it would like to expand to all customers under that name.  AEP REP is a subsidiary of AEP; the name it sought to use was “an important part” of a “multi-market, multi-state marketing” strategy of the AEP corporate family that was aimed at “promot[ing] brand name recognition” in the retail electric markets. Members of the AEP corporate family commonly utilize uniform branding that emphasizes the “AEP” abbreviation and a distinctive logo consisting of a red parallelogram with a white “AEP” inside.  AEP REP intended to use the same sort of branding, alongside the “AEP Retail Electric” name.
The Commission, and about 20 other REPs, opposed the use of this name, in the context of the ongoing activities of two other AEP subsidiaries.  AEP previously acquired two TDUs and affiliated REPs; it then sold the affiliated REPs and changed the names of the TDUs to AEP variants which do business under the shared name “AEP Texas” and red parallelogram logo. 
The factual issues centered on evidence that retail consumers in the service areas of the “AEP Texas” TDUs already had extensive familiarity with the AEP name and branding from a decade of use on vehicles, employee uniforms, electric meters on consumers’ properties, a website, and a Facebook page, along with ads and community and charitable contributions.  An AEP REP survey in the AEP Texas service areas indicated that 73% of respondents were already familiar with both the name “AEP Texas” and the name “AEP Retail Energy,” even though the latter had yet to operate as a mass-market REP.  Those entities thus tied for third in market recognition out of a list of fourteen, behind only the two largest REPs.  They were about 20 points higher than the next highest, which happened to be the areas’ original incumbent REPs.  The Commission found the AEP logo to be “omnipresent” in the relevant areas.
The other key piece of evidence was that retail customers tended to overlook the different roles of TDUs and REPs.  Over one-third mistakenly believed that the REP from which they bought electricity also owned the wires that delivered the electricity, and 32% believed that “AEP Retail Energy” provided electric transmission and distribution services.  The opponents argued that this showed that a shared name would exacerbate confusion, while AEP REP cited evidence suggesting that these misunderstandings would exist no matter what name the REP used.
The formerly affiliated REPs contended that using the AEP name for a REP would confuse consumers into thinking that “AEP Retail Electric” and “AEP  Texas” were one and the same or that customers of “AEP Retail Electric” otherwise stood to benefit from that company's affiliation with the TDU.  The Commission agreed that sharing the name and branding would amount to prohibited “joint advertising or promotional activities,” discriminating in favor of the affiliated REP.
The court first rejected statutory/administrative law challenges to this decision (and the dissent would have resolved the administrative law issues in AEP’s favor).  Basically, AEP argued that “joint advertising or promotional activities” had to be something more than sharing a brand name, and that even if shared branding did qualify, it didn’t “favor” AEP REP relative to competitors, which was required for it to be unfair discrimination.  The court found that the Commission didn’t err in considering how retail consumers would likely understand AEP’s marketing strategy.  Even if there were no “direct or overt” attempts by AEP Texas to favor its affiliate, retail consumers would likely perceive that AEP Texas’s use of the shared name, logo, and branding was promoting all of the affiliated entities collectively.  Since a central concern of the regulations was to prevent cross-subsidization between regulated and competitive activities (TDUs and REPs, respectively), this was within the Commission’s power to regulate.  The Commission reasonably found that the “AEP” name and branding would “have the practical effect of promoting both the ‘AEP Texas’ TDUs and AEP REP and leveraging each other”s notoriety and goodwill to benefit the other,” and thus reasonably found a prohibited cross-subsidy.
Given all that, was the regulation nonetheless a violation of the First Amendment?  AEP conceded that its business name and logo were commercial speech.  Central Hudson only protects commercial speech that isn’t unlawful or misleading.  The Commission found as a fact that the use of the name “AEP Retail Electric” and related branding would be misleading in the context of Texas’s retail electric market.  Retail customers would likely to perceive incorrectly that the REP and the TDU were the same or that they otherwise stood to benefit from the entities’ affiliation, such as by receiving more reliable service.  Thus, the name was not entitled to any First Amendment protection at all.
AEP argued that this rationale was mere paternalism.  But past paternalism cases involved the suppression of truthful information.  The regulation here wasn’t just designed to influence consumers’ decisions, but rather to ensure that their decisions weren’t influenced “in a manner that undermines competition itself.” 
The analysis concluded with a big quote from Friedman v. Rogers (another case out of Texas), which allowed the state to ban the use of certain trade names.  Such a ban had only an incidental effect on the content of commercial speech, since “a trade name conveys information only because of the associations that grow up over time between the name and a certain level of price and quality of service,” and the information conveyed is “largely factual, concerning the kind and price of the services offered for sale.”  The same factual information could be communicated to the public in other ways.  The state merely required the information to be presented in a nondeceptive form.  (This informational understanding of trademarks is pretty deeply inconsistent with the modern idea of goodwill.  Also, to the extent that AEP wants to communicate that the TDU and the REP are related—that “largely factual” aspect of trademark—I don’t see how it has any alternatives to communicate that message to the public, since it’s that communication that the Commission found confusing/deceptive.)

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

FTC goes after misleading certification mark

Here's some discussion of the FTC's complaint from the FTC itself, with a link to the proposed settlement.  Unsurprising takeaway: If you purport to certify products as "Made in the USA," it is a good idea to do some verification of the manufacturers you accept into your program.  Manufacturers who licensed the mark from "Made in USA Brand" might want to inform their insurers.

Presumably the certification mark is also now eligible for cancellation.  What effect does the settlement have on a potential cancellation proceeding?  (One possibility under the settlement is for the company to disclose that licensees self-certify.  If the company chooses this option, isn't it engaged in naked licensing and therefore abandoning the mark?)

Monday, July 21, 2014

Georgetown Law's new Center on Privacy and Technology

Learn more here. All my colleagues who worked on this deserve congratulations--Professors Julie Cohen, David Vladeck, Laura Donohue and Angela Campbell worked tirelessly for this achievement.

trademark beats copyright at surviving motion to dismiss

Gorski v. Gymboree Corp., 2014 WL 3533324,  No. 14-CV-01314 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2014)
Via Eric Goldman.  Gorski and Gymboree both make shirts that feature the phrase “lettuce turnip the beet.” Gorski sued for copyright and trademark infringement; Gorski owns trademark registrations for LETTUCE TURNIP THE BEET for “[p]aper for wrapping and packing”; “tote bags” and “[w]earable garments and clothing, namely, shirts”; and “[o]n-line retail store services featuring clothing, accessories and art.”  She alleged that her “light grey heather shirt for children is widely considered one of the most popular children's products ever pinned on Pinterest under their ‘Popular’ heading and has over 120,000 product views on Etsy making it one of the most popular products ever on Etsy.”  In addition, she alleged that “the overall arrangement, shapes, typefaces, sizes and placement of the design elements” of Gymboree’s shirt were “substantially similar” to Gorski’s design.
Gorski Design

Gymboree design
Copyright: This can be resolved on a motion to dismiss in appropriate cases.  The court agreed with Gymboree’s argument that Gorski failed to plead substantial similarity by identifying any protected elements that were copied.  Short phrases can’t be copyrighted, even if they’re distinctively arranged or printed.  The claim about similarity in “overall arrangement, shapes, typefaces, sizes  and  placement  of  the  design  elements” merely amounted to arrangements of the short phrase “lettuce turnip the beet.”  That wasn’t protectable.  Because all the alleged similarities related to the arrangement of a short phrase, she didn’t allege copying of anything protected by copyright.  But the court granted leave to amend, because she might be able to allege substantial similarities to other protectable elements. 
Query: what other protectable elements?  I don’t know why the court invited repleading.  As my 7-year-old daughter said on looking at the shirts, the only similarity is the unprotectable words.  Her immediate reaction: “they’re different colors, the letter shapes are different, and the words are different sizes.”  My 8-year-old son concurred.  What possible additional facts could change what the shirts look like?
Gorski’s trademark claim fared much better. On the motion to dismiss, Gymboree only argued fair use.  Descriptive fair use requires a defendant to show that it’s not using the term as a mark, it’s using it fairly and in good faith, and it’s using it only to describe its own goods and services.  Plus, the court continued, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the classic fair use defense is not available if there is a likelihood of customer confusion as to the origin of the product.”  (Citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 911 F.2d 363, 365 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984).)
Note: Whoa, Nelly!  The Supreme Court subsequently informed the 9th Circuit that it was wrong about that, and although the 9th Circuit essentially defied the Court on remand by reinstating confusion as an important consideration and making it impossible to win a descriptive fair use defense on summary judgment, I would at least have expected a citation to KP Permanent instead of to these overruled precedents.
The court then found that descriptive fair use didn’t apply as a matter of law such that the complaint had to be dismissed.  The complaint alleged that Gymboree had appropriated the cachet of Gorski’s products and created confusion, so that’s that.  Gorski alleged that consumers had contacted Gorski, showing actual confusion—though ultimately we need to know the content of the communications; if consumers are contacting Gorski saying “Gymboree is selling shirts with the same phrase,” that doesn’t evidence confusion at all.  And Gorski alleged that consumers associate the phrase only with Gorski.  Note: had the court properly applied KP Permanent, I suspect that the complaint still survives the motion to dismiss because trademark infringement doctrine is just so broad and forgiving.  But this analysis is quite plainly incomplete under the actual governing law, which does require toleration of some confusion in order to protect descriptive uses; pleading confusion by itself shouldn’t be enough, though pleading bad faith might be.
The court proceeded to discuss nominative fair use, which just isn’t an applicable theory here—I don’t see how one could plausibly argue that Gymboree’s use was a reference to Gorski’s mark.  Unfortunately, the court said more than that.  It defined the third element of nominative fair use as requiring Gymboree to show that its use of the phrase “makes no suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement by Gorski,” and of course Gorski’s pleading of confusion trumped that on a motion to dismiss.  (Citing an increasingly appalling list of precedents: Estate of Fuller v. Maxfield & Oberton  Holdings,  LLC, 906 F.Supp.2d 997, 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (holding that an allegation of likely confusion over endorsement was sufficient to deny a motion to dismiss; product name); Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 627 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1178 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (same; mention of plaintiff in press release); Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1076 (C.D.Cal. 1998) (same, use of “The Crime Channel” in a film as the name of a channel a character watches (!)).
This is why this common restatement of the third element of nominative fair use, eliminating the requirement of some affirmative act indicating endorsement other than the use of the mark itself, is so destructive.  New Kids identifies the third element as “the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement.”  If the use of the mark itself can prevent the third element from kicking in, nominative fair use collapses on itself, as many scholars have noted.  I part ways with them insofar as I think that nominative fair use need not collapse on itself, but I can’t deny that lower courts keep inventing new ways to muck it up. Tabari tells us that you can’t use the multifactor test to figure out whether there’s likely confusion over source or sponsorship.  If the courts also abandon the distinction between explicit sponsorship claims (“authorized biography”) and implicit ones, then guessing is the best they can do, and it’s not likely to go that well.

allegations about fake reviews can support false advertising claim

American Bullion, Inc. v. Regal Assets, LLC, 2014 WL 3516252, No. CV 14–01873 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2014)
The parties compete to sell gold and other precious metals as retirement investments.  Plaintiff (ABI) advertises online using third-party affiliates, who get paid for referrals.  ABI alleged that defendants created and operated such affiliate websites.  (I believe, based on this description, that ABI may be alleging that defendants were involved in some competing endeavor that paid affiliates via the same affiliate arrangement as ABI uses, but it's not very clear.)  These sites allegedly purport to contain independent consumer reviews, but falsely advertised for Regal and disparaged ABI.  ABI allged that the websites weren’t independent, but that Regal didn’t publicly disclose its connections thereto.  Reviews on the websites praised Regal and gave ABI negative reviews. Some reviews were allegedly false, others allegedly plagiarized.  Some sites claimed that ABI was a defendant in a fraud suit, was found guilty, and was sued by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.  ABI alleged that this was false, and that a business with a similar name, American Bullion Exchange, was in fact the party found guilty in that action.  In addition, many of the websites allegedly used ABI’s name in a bait and switch: they urged customers to “click here to visit American Bullion,” but customers were linked to Regal’s website upon clicking. (Were those the same sites that disparaged ABI as a fraudster, or different ones?)
Defendants argued that the Lanham Act claim had to fail because ABI didn’t allege trademark ownership, and because the alleged statements were just designed to influence consumers to refrain from buying from ABI, not to induce purchases from Regal.  First, although I must say that the bait and switch allegations would seem to support a traditional trademark claim, the court noted that ABI wasn’t bringing a trademark claim; it didn’t need to own a mark to prevail on a false advertising claim.  Second, as to the disparagement-not-promotion argument, so what?  (Certainly after Lexmark, that’s good enough.)  Also, the complaint clearly alleged that Regal disseminated ostensibly independent reviews promoting its own services.
Regal argued that the litigation privilege protected certain alleged conduct.  This was meritless, since neither side was a party to the fraud claims brought by the CFTC against American Bullion Exchange, and Regal didn’t identify any other relevant proceeding.
Unsurprisingly, trade libel, defamation, and state law unfair competition claims also survived. The court was also forgiving with respect to intentional interference claims—though defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify specific economic relationships with a third party, as is usually required, the complaint did allege that ABI lost several customers to Regal who cited Regal’s “review sites” as their reason for switching.  That was enough.

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Uber/under: false advertising and association claims against Uber continue

Yellow Group LLC v. Uber Technologies Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014)
Taxi medallion owners, taxi affiliations (taxi dispatch services), and livery service providers sued Uber, alleging that it competed unfairly by misrepresenting certain features of its service, misleading customers as to an association between Uber and plaintiffs, and encouraging taxi drivers to breach their agreements with plaintiffs.  People who use Uber’s app may end up getting a driver associated with one of plaintiffs Flash Cab, Yellow Cab, or Your Private Limousine, and take their rides in vehicles bearing one of those plaintiffs’ marks.  The court partially granted Uber’s motion to dismiss.
Treating the Lanham Act and state law as identical in relevant part, the court first addressed claims regarding alleged misrepresentations of rates, licensure, and insurance.  Plaintiffs alleged that Uber deceptively advertised that Uber taxis charged “standard taxi rates,” when in fact riders were charged the meter fare plus a 20% ”gratuity” that was split between the driver and Uber.  They also challenged an Uber blog post stating that all uberX vehicles were “licensed by the city of Chicago, and driven by a licensed chauffeur.”  And they alleged that Uber misrepresented the scope of insurance coverage for uberX drivers and passengers as $2 million and then $1 million, whereas Uber doesn’t provide any insurance coverage.
Uber argued that plaintiffs lacked standing because they weren’t direct competitors at the same level of business.  But then Lexmark happened, so plaintiffs needed only to an allege “an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales, and that the injury must flow directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising, such that the false advertising directly caused consumers to divert their business from the plaintiff.”
Uber argued that bexause the taxi affiliation plaintiffs and Your Private Limousine didn’t receive a percentage of drivers’ fares or a dispatching fee, they couldn’t allege harm from the false advertising.  But at this stage, they plausibly alleged that Uber’s deceptive advertising has caused customers to refrain from using their dispatch services, harming the economic value of their business and their reputation.  Plus, the taxi affiliation plaintiffs are direct competitors on these pleadings, since Uber exercises control over vehicles for hire that compete with plaintiffs. 
But—and here the proximate causation reasoning of Lexmark starts to have bite—the medallion owner plaintiffs didn’t have standing, because they didn’t allege direct injury.  They argued that Uber’s presence decreased the value of medallions by allowing drivers of non-commercially licensed cars to pick up fares.  But that wasn’t injury directly flowing from Uber’s misrepresentations.
As to stating a claim, Uber again argued that plaintiffs’ income came from lease payments from drivers, not a percentage of fares or a dispatch fee, so they couldn’t lose income from diverted fares. However, the taxi affiliation plaintiffs alleged damage because the value of their business depended on the number of passengers; more passengers meant more goodwill.  If customers use Uber instead, their reputation would be damaged and, more importantly, they wouldn’t be able to charge drivers as much for the right to participate in plaintiffs’ services, including dispatching taxis and livery vehicles. They thus plausibly alleged that misrepresentations regarding Uber’s rates and uberX drivers’ licensure and insurance caused them harm.
What about the $2 million/$1 million claim?  Uber didn’t say it would provide the insurance policy.  Rather it said that there would be an insurance policy covering drivers and riders of at least $1-2 million, and plaintiffs didn’t allege this was false.  That claim was dismissed.
§43(a)(1)(A): Plaintiffs alleged that Uber misrepresented an association with them by occasionally referring to its “fleet partners,” and using a yellow colored SUV in one of its advertisements that evoked Yellow Cab. The SUV in the ad didn’t have Yellow Cab’s logo or name, but did include a taxi number 1317, which was assigned to a Yellow Cab of the same make and model. They also alleged that confusion was exacerbated by the fact that “when a customer orders a taxi or livery vehicle via Uber, a vehicle bearing the Flash or Yellow trademarks will often arrive to pick up the fare.”
Mark McKenna and Mark Lemley will be sad (compare a previous Uber case): this plausibly alleged a §43(a)(1)(A) violation.  Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that “Uber’s representations and the very nature of its service is likely to confuse Uber customers regarding an association between Uber and Flash or Yellow Cab, and that this confusion harms Flash and Yellow Cab’s taxi dispatch business.”  Likewise with the taxi affiliation plaintiffs. 
However, the medallion owner plaintiffs didn’t state a claim because they didn’t allege harm from the misrepresentations. Harm from Uber’s existence in the market depressing the value of medallions was insufficient.
Livery services were also different: Your Private Limousine alleged that confusion was even worse in the livery context “[g]iven that trademarks and trade dress are not as prevalent on the livery side of transportation services.”  But that didn’t work, because Your Private Limousine didn’t allege that its cars bore its mark or any other indicia of ownership/operation by Your Private Limousine. Its claims were therefore limited to its allegations that Uber improperly referred to its “fleet partners.”  And that wasn’t enough to plausibly allege likely confusion.  On its own, that’s not a misrepresentation, “as it could accurately refer to the owners and drivers of independent livery vehicles that have contracted directly with Uber.” Without identifying markings, “it is highly unlikely that a customer would even know that he or she was riding in a Your Private Limousine vehicle and would therefore infer that Your Private Limousine is one of Uber’s ‘fleet partners.’”  Plus, “fleet partners” wasn’t a specific, concrete, or measurable statement.  (This is applying §43(a)(1)(B) puffery analysis to a §43(a)(1)(A), but given that this should be a §43(a)(1)(B) claim, I’m not too saddened.)  So there was no plausible allegation of misrepresentation or confusion from “fleet partners” alone.
The plaintiffs who could proceed with these claims could also maintain a common law unfair competition claim.
Tortious interference with contract: This claim included allegations that Uber encouraged drivers to violate the trademark clause in the drivers’ taxi affiliation contracts by providing drivers with Uber branded “hangtags” to suspend from the cabs’ interior rearview mirrors.  Uber also allegedly encouraged drivers to use their cell phones while driving and required drivers to process credit card transactions via the Uber app, actions that violate local laws which are incorporated by reference into the contracts. Plus, these plaintiffs alleged that by subscribing to Uber in the first place, drivers violate their agreements that they will not use competing dispatch services. Uber argued that the plaintiffs didn’t allege harm, but the court inferred damages to their business through losing customers from their dispatch services and refused to dismiss the claim. 
Again, though, the medallion owner plaintiffs lost out. Their argument was based on their licensees’ agreement to abide by Chicago’s rules and regulations, and Uber’s alleged inducement to disobey the same (rules banning use of cell phones while driving and a regulation requiring that taxis “must process electronic forms of payment through their affiliations or licensed medallion managers”).  But the medallion owners didn’t plausibly allege reputational or economic harm from the violation of these contractual provisions.  (Could the medallion be seized if a driver were arrested for using a cell while driving? Would that be enough?)
Finally, Uber argued that the court should dismiss the entire complaint based on Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transportation, Inc., 82 F.3d 484 (D.C.Cir. 1996), which held that a limousine service could not bring a Lanham Act claim against a competing taxicab company when the plaintiff sought only to enforce violations of local taxicab ordinances and regulations. The DC Circuit declined to interpret or enforce municipal regulations; instead, the plaintiff should take its argument to the Taxicab Commission.
However, the point of this complaint was not that Uber’s service was illegal.  Rather, plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation separate from the legality of the service.  To the extent that the complaint alleged that Uber violated the Lanham Act or its Illinois counterpart simply by operating illegally or misrepresenting the legality of its service, those allegations would fail.  (Note that this would not be the result in California, which does allow its consumer protection law to borrow violations of other laws.)