CFP: Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM

Call for Papers

Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM

 

Stanford Law School, November 6-7, 2026

 

The Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford law schools are pleased to announce a Call for Papers for the Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM, which will be held at Stanford on November 6-7, 2026. The Forum is dedicated to interdisciplinary scholarship focusing on the intersection of Law and Science-Technology-Engineering-Mathematics (STEM). We are seeking submissions from junior faculty in any discipline interested in presenting papers at the Forum. The submission deadline is June 15, 2026.

 

A group of junior scholars will be chosen on a blind basis from among those submitting papers by a jury of accomplished scholars with expertise in Law and STEM. One or more senior scholars, not necessarily from Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford, will comment on each paper. The audience will include the participating junior faculty, faculty from the host institutions, and invited guests. Participating junior faculty are expected to stay for the full duration of the Forum.

 

Our goal is to promote interdisciplinary research exploring how developments in STEM are affecting law and vice versa. Preference will be given to papers with strong interdisciplinary approaches integrating these two areas of study.

 

We invite submissions on any topic related to the intersection of law and any STEM field. Potential topics include (but are not limited to):

• Artificial intelligence
• Autonomous vehicles
• Biomedical research and drug development
• Biometrics
• Bitcoin and other blockchain technologies
• ChatGPT and large language models
• Climate change technologies
• Computational law and algorithmic decisionmaking
• Cryptocurrency and NFTs
• Digital health and health data
• Genetics, epigenetics, and gene editing
• Machine learning and predictive analytics
• Nanotechnology
• Neuroscience and law
• Online security and privacy
• Personalized medicine
• Regulation of online platforms
• Robotics
• Spectrum policy
• Synthetic biology
• Virtual and augmented reality

 

There is no publication commitment. Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford will cover presenters’ and commentators’ travel expenses, though international flights may be only partially reimbursed. Authors of accepted papers are expected to attend the conference and present their work in person.

 

QUALIFICATIONS: To be eligible, authors must be teaching at a U.S. school of higher education in a tenured or tenure-track position or as a Visiting Assistant Professor or Fellow and must have received their first tenure-track appointment no more than seven years before the conference. Authors in tenured and tenure-track positions will be given priority. American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also eligible to submit provided that they have held a faculty position or the equivalent, including positions comparable to junior faculty positions in research institutions, for less than seven years, and that they earned their last degree within the past ten years. We accept jointly authored submissions so long as the presenting coauthor is individually eligible to participate in the Forum and none of the other coauthors has taught in a tenured or tenure-track position for more than seven years. Papers that will be published prior to the meeting are not eligible. Authors may submit only one paper.

 

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Electronic submissions should be made through this website. Please remove all references to the author(s) in the paper. The submission deadline is June 15, 2026.  We will notify applicants as soon as practicable thereafter whether their papers have been selected.
https://forms.gle/PPPn823V1DmYwQvP6

 

Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed to Professor Lisa Ouellette (ouellette@law.stanford.edu).

 

FURTHER INFORMATION: Inquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to Lisa Ouellette at Stanford Law School, David Schwartz at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, or Christopher Yoo at University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.

Lanham Act requires less in the way of injury from competitors than California FAL/UCL

Eight Sleep Inc. v. Orion Longevity Inc., 2026 WL 1243359, No. 2:26-cv-02460-SB-KS (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2026)

Eight Sleep “developed and patented the Eight Sleep Pod, a ‘bio-tracking mattress cover’ that optimizes sleep by using biometric measurements to automatically adjust the temperature of the user’s bed.” Defendant Orion developed a competing temperature-regulating mattress cover with similar features. Eight Sleep sued for patent infringement, which I will not discuss (the patent claims survive), and false advertising, which I will.

Orion allegedly made false and misleading statements about the Orion Sleep System’s features and availability, including by representing, during development, capabilities not borne out in the product released to the market, in violation of the California UCL and FAL. Orion argued that there was no statutory standing.

Both statutes “require[ ] that a plaintiff have ‘lost money or property’ to have standing to sue,” which requires the plaintiff to “demonstrate some form of economic injury.” The economic injury must also be “ ‘as a result of’ the unfair competition or a violation of the false advertising law,” which requires the plaintiff to show “a causal connection or reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.”

Eight Sleep relied on the Ninth Circuit TrafficSchool case’s statement that courts have “generally presumed commercial injury” when the parties “are direct competitors and [the] defendant’s misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead consumers.” But that decision addressed the Lanham Act, which requires only likely injury. Under the UCL and FAL, actual monetary loss is required.

The complaint only conclusorily alleged that as a result of Orion’s false advertising, Eight Sleep’s goodwill was damaged, and it “lost sales because customers who would have otherwise purchased its products, instead purchased Orion.” That wasn’t enough: “First, the law is unsettled as to whether injury derived from a customer’s reliance on fraudulent advertisements may support a false-advertising claim by a competitor who did not rely on the fraud.” Federal district courts are increasingly accepting reliance by deceived consumers rather than the competitor-plaintiff, but, even under that more permissive approach, the complaint was insufficiently detailed. Similarly, allegations Orion “repeatedly approached investors with false claims” about the parties’ products and Eight Sleep’s profits and margins, and that Eight Sleep “lost investment opportunities that would otherwise have been available from investors who would have, but for Orion’s false statements to investors, invested in Eight Sleep” didn’t identify specific misrepresentations, even if it were clear that statements to investors are actionable as advertisements under the UCL and FAL.

What about Lanham Act claims?  At least one false statement was plausibly alleged: a chart purporting to compare the features offered by “Eight Sleep” and “Orion,” suggesting that Orion offered all 10 of the features listed while Eight Sleep offered only one (embedded sleep sensors). One of the features identified for Orion’s product was “5-Stage sleep tracker,” which the complaint alleges “never existed.” The false statement was posted on Orion’s during “some of the busiest shopping dates in the United States, including Black Friday.”

high sugar content doesn't make "Breakfast Essentials" name or health claims misleading

Testori v. Nestlé Health Science US Holdings, Inc., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 1282540, No. 1:25-cv-01318-JLT-CDB (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2026)

The court dismissed California claims against Carnation Breakfast Essentials Nutritional Drink. The drink label highlighted its 10g of protein per serving, while “fail[ing] to disclose with equal prominence that the Product’s first two ingredients are water and ... 11 grams of sugar per serving.” Reasonable consumers would allegedly not expect a product marketed as ‘Breakfast Essentials’ to contain more sugar than protein.

The court first addressed preemption. Health or nutrient content claims are regulated by the FDA, but not every statement is a health or nutrient content claim. “Based on the FDA’s express decision to not recognize sugar as a disqualifying nutrient, various district courts have now adopted the finding that ‘any claim under state law solely premised on the notion that [a product’s] high sugar content made its health or implied nutrient content claims misleading is preempted.’”  

In this case, the “nutritional drink” statement was right above four additional statements stating: “10g protein,” “21 vitamins + minerals,” “3x vitamin vs. milk,” and “2x calcium vs. Greek Yogurt.” The context of the packaging thus “implies that the reason that the drink is a nutrition drink is that it contains the nutrients ... listed directly below that phrase on the bottle.” In Clark v. Perfect Bar, LLC, 816 F. App’x 141 (9th Cir. 2020) (Mem.), the court said: “Allowing a claim of misbranding under California law based on misleading sugar level content would ‘indirectly establish’ a sugar labeling requirement ‘that is not identical to the federal requirements,’ a result foreclosed by our precedent.” Clark dealt with facts almost on all fours with the facts alleged here. The complaint was filled with contentions related to “health” and “nutrition.” Thus, preemption applied.

Even if it didn’t, plaintiff failed to state a claim. Although consumers should not be expected to ignore the misleading representation on the front label and discover the truth on the back label, here, “none of the challenged statements reference the sugar content of the product[ ] ... [or] even mention[ ] sugar.” Any ambiguity was cured by the accurate reporting of the sugar content on the Nutrition Facts Panel, especially because the product didn’t make any assertion about overall “health” or “balanced/healthy diet.” The product didn’t become less—or cease to be—“nutritional” due to the added sugar. The reference to “10g protein,” “21 vitamins + minerals,” “3x vitamin vs. milk,” and “2x calcium vs. Greek Yogurt” was not a claim that the product was “nutritionally balanced.” Nor did the front label mention or suggest anything about added sugar.

In a footnote, the court commented that “Modern advertisements frequently use phrases like, ‘You need this,’ ‘You have to use this,’ or ‘This is essential for your health.’ A reasonable consumer would understand the need to view such statements with a grain of salt, and not take an expansive, strenuous, and atextual interpretation of them ….”

plaintiff can use UCL against healer claiming advanced degrees and magical powers

Dwarakanath v. Priyanka, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 1215667, No. 5:25-cv-06465-PCP (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2026)

Dwarakanath sued Vaidyaji Priyanka (VP), AUM Ayurveda (AUM), and some Does, alleging among other things false advertising. VP allegedly ran a cult and encouraged Dwarakanath’s daughters and then-wife to file frivolous domestic violence restraining order applications against him. Although he was granted custody, his now-ex-wife allegedly violated multiple court orders by retaining improper custody of the girls and refusing to deliver them to him, encouraged by VP.

The court allowed UCL claims to proceed under all three UCL prongs, alleging unlawfulness from violation of RICO and various fraud statutes, unfairness because defendants caused him to both relinquish his parental control over his young daughters and pay for unnecessary medical care, and fraudulence because defendants’ untrue and misleading representations about their holistic care practices allegedly deceived him and other members of the public.

Although an earlier false advertising claim failed because plaintiff didn’t allege misrepresentations that were directed to the public rather than to just one individual, the UCL provides standing to people injured by prohibited practices, as alleged here.

Nor did defendants identify specific statements that were nonactionable puffery. Several of the statements Dwarakanath pled were sufficiently specific to preclude a finding of nonactionable puffery.

For example, VP claims to have “multiple degrees in business, medicine, and Ayurvedic medicine, from prestigious institutions like Kings College in London and Columbia University,” and yet allegedly lacks any relevant degree or other qualifications to be a medical doctor. She claims to be in her mid-sixties and has two young children, which she offers as evidence that she “has magical powers that can preserve youth and fertility.” She claims she can cure manic depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia using herbal treatments and prayer. And she claims that she cured [plaintiff’s ex-wife] of cancer three separate times through “healing” massages.

These statements were specific enough: they clearly identified “an illness or health issue (schizophrenia, fertility troubles, cancer) and a promise to cure them,” and claims to be a licensed medical professional were also not puffery. “Defendants might have been more successful if they had argued that it was unreasonable to rely on certain statements, like the claim that VP could cure fertility troubles because of her ‘magical powers,’” but didn’t raise that—and the FTC at least thinks that targeting vulnerable people with magical claims can be deceptive. Historically, courts have not found the First Amendment to be a barrier to fraud claims against healers who solicited money from sick people to heal them through mystical or magical powers. I don’t know whether that pattern would continue today in our fraud-forward economy.

unauthorized sales of books as "new" don't violate the Lanham Act, even with default

Global Brother SRI v. Altun, No. CV-25-00426-TUC-SHR, 2026 WL 1413605 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2026)

I don’t blog many false advertising default judgment opinions; this one is different because it denies the motion. Global alleged that it publishes books, including The Lost Book of Herbal Remedies and The Lost Book of Herbal Remedies II. Altun allegedly, without authorization, advertised and sold these books online, including through Amazon and other marketplaces, labeling their condition as “new” and selling them at a “significantly inflated” price, thereby misleading consumers to believe “the listing reflects a premium authorized version or a limited official release.” Global alleged false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act because they are “likely to mislead a significant portion of consumers” and “resale of these works without Plaintiff’s quality control, branding oversight, or packaging integrity renders the products materially different.”

Factors for evaluating whether default judgment should be entered include the merits of the substantive claims: a court must ask whether the complaint stated a claim.

Global failed to show that using “new” to describe the books was literally false. It pointed to no actual differences in defendant’s copies or dissatisfied customers. Global’s lack of authorization or involvement in resales, without more, wasn’t a violation of the Lanham Act.

"toddler drink" plausibly misleads about suitability as next stage after infant formula

Castro v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 184533, No. 25 CV 377 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2026)

Abbott makes Similac, a milk-based formula powder drink for infants and toddlers. “Go & Grow Toddler Drink by Similac” and “Pure Bliss Toddler Drink by Similac” purport to meet the nutritional needs of children between the ages of twelve and thirty-six months. The labels were allegedly similar to the labels for infant drink formula and indicate that toddler drinks are the next step drink following infant formula. Plaintiffs sought to represent consumers from Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.

The toddler drink cans’ similarities to the infant drink cans allegedly falsely represent “that the toddler drink is the logical next nutritional step in formula, even when doctors and experts do not necessarily recommend toddler formula drinks.” The labels were also allegedly false and misleading “because they focus on the products’ purported health benefits while omitting information regarding the health harms of their added sugar content.”

The toddler formula label includes the words “Stage 3,” and that label is visually similar to the infant formula label containing the words “Stage 1” and “Stage 2.” Abbott argued that a reasonable consumer would not ascribe the “next stage” meaning to the label because the similarity of the labels and the words “Stage 3” are not nutritional recommendations.  The court disagreed, given the pleading stage. “Stage” can plausibly indicate a progression. “And the similarity of the cans, as well as their placement on the same shelves as the infant formula, could lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the toddler formula is nutritionally recommended for children aged twelve to thirty-six months in the same way that infant formula is nutritionally recommended for children up to twelve months.”

The court distinguished Martelli v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 21-CV-10079 (PMH), 2023 WL 2058620 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023), which dismissed a similar claim, but there the label also included a disclaimer stating that the product was “intended to supplement the solid-food portion of the older baby’s diet” and was “not intended to replace breast milk or starter formulas.” Whether the disclaimer made a difference was an issue for later.

Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that Abbott’s representations about the health benefits of the drink were misleading because the formula contains four grams of added sugars, which are decidedly unhealthy. The cans did disclose their sugar content on the back labels, but again it was plausible that a reasonable consumer could think they didn’t have to consult the back.

This reasoning also allowed a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability: plaintiffs alleged that “a balanced, nutritious diet excludes sugar-sweetened beverages for children above 12 months, and otherwise limits added sugar to less than 5% of calories, whereas regular consumption of the Toddler Drinks is detrimental, rather than beneficial to health.” They sufficiently alleged that the toddler formula is not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,” namely, to provide a healthy supplement to a toddler’s nutrition.

"complete nutrition" claims for supplements are obviously untrue, but GLP-1 related claims could live again

Cavallaro-Kearins v. Grüns Nutrition Inc., 2026 WL 1398422, No. 25-cv-4998 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2026)

The court dismissed this California & New York false advertising claim against Grüns based on its Superfood Greens Gummies for Adults and Grüns Cubs for Kids, challenging its claims to offer a “comprehensive” and “complete” solution for daily nutrition, to provide “100% of kids’ daily nutrition,” “all-in-one” support for GLP-1 users, and to act as a replacement for essential nutrients. In this specific context, these claims were unbelievable and demanded reference to the ingredient list, which would clarify matters. Grüns also advertised Grüns Adults as containing “more fiber than 2 cups of broccoli per pack,” the same amount as “9 cups of raw spinach,” and as containing more than 6 grams of fiber, stating that “you’d need a whole salad bar to match the fiber in just one pack of Grüns.” Grüns Kids also claimed it was the “very best way to get all the vitamins, minerals, fruits and veggies growing kids … need” and specifically targeted parents of children with sensory processing difficulties.

But protein, fats, and omega-3 fatty acids are necessary nutrients that aren’t included. Also, the Gummies “contain only minimal amounts of other key minerals like iron and lack others such as calcium altogether.” And the daily recommended amount of fiber for an adult is 28 grams of soluble and insoluble fiber per day, whereas Grüns contain only six grams of “soluble fiber”; the fiber contained in real fruits and vegetables is allegedly fundamentally different from that contained in Grüns, which “may aggravate rather than relieve the very conditions it claims to solve.” Grüns also claimed testosterone benefits that were allegedly misleading, as were claims to multiply, enhance, or substitute for protein. Without calcium or magnesium, the gummies were allegedly not even qualified as a standard multivitamin.

While these challenges (and others) are serious, the court focused on the “comprehensive nutrition” and similar claims. And because it’s obvious that you can’t get complete nutrition from gummies, those claims weren’t plausibly deceptive: combining puffery with ambiguity doctrine, a reasonable consumer would have had to look at the ingredients to figure out the actual nutrient profile:  

Plaintiffs do not contend that the language of the package should be taken literally—that the Gummies provide either complete or comprehensive nutrition such that a person who eats a pack of the Gummies need not eat anything else in order to survive. That is what the plain text read in isolation states. … Such a representation might be reasonably credited if made by a wellness resort or health food spa about the program it offers for visitors. When made by a purveyor of gummies, it is plainly hyperbolic, and no reasonable consumer could understand that a small packet of gummy bear supplements that weighs .7 ounces and that is advertised as a “Dietary Supplement” could replace the need to eat any other foods.

The court thus distinguished Weinstein v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 2024 WL 4250353 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024), which found plausible misleadingness when the advertiser touted “complete multivitamin gummies” accompanied by the language that the product contained “B Vitamins” and “13 Essential Nutrients” but the product did not in fact contain Victims B1, B2, and B3. Likewise, Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, 2019 WL 1146828 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019), held that the claim that a product was a “complete” multivitamin was plausibly misleading when the product was missing 13 vitamins that the body requires. In both cases, the adjective “complete” modified the noun “vitamin.”

Do reasonable consumers understand that, on gummies, “nutrition” literally means all the macro and micronutrients we need? Plaintiffs walked into this problem by talking about fats, protein, etc. They offered the argument that a reasonable consumer would understand that Gummies supply “all essential nutrients,” or “essential nutrients such as calcium and magnesium,” or “all other supplements,” or that the “Gummies provide what fruits and vegetables provide—the same nutrition, in another form.”

But, the court reasoned, if the term “comprehensive nutrition” is not understood by its dictionary definition, then it is ambiguous. [I’m more sympathetic to the “all essential [micro]nutrients” interpretation because that’s what you’d expect from a “comprehensive” supplement: one pill to take! At least I can imagine a substantial number of ordinary consumers thinking that.] And we know that, when there’s ambiguity, a reasonable consumer must consult the ingredient list (and apparently keep track of things like magnesium and iron being missing). I think this is an example of why “ambiguity” is troublesome: the court doesn’t ask whether a reasonable consumer could read the claim as unambiguous and not seek further information, but only whether there’s ambiguity in the abstract.

“No reasonable consumer could understand from the package as a whole that the Gummies contained ‘key macronutrients like protein and fat,’ that it contained adequate “amounts of critical nutrients like fiber and iron,’ or that it contained ‘calcium and omega-3 fatty acids,’ much less that it could ‘replace the nutritional complexity of fruits and vegetables and all other targeted supplementation.’”

As for the off-package claims, they mostly “parrot” the language of “comprehensive nutrition,” or use the adjective “comprehensive” “in an even less specific manner than on the packaging.” They could not save the claim.

What about the specific health issues touted? Some were mere puffery: “Gut health that fits in a lunchbox” and “#1 energy hack.” Grüns also advertises that the Gummies “help reduce colds by 70%,” result in “stronger hair in just 30 days,” and “boost T-levels,” but neither plaintiff alleged that she relied on those ads.

A subset of statements were plausibly misleading: those targeting GLP-1 users in particular. “Even if the advertisements could be understood to be ambiguous, there is no surrounding context that would dispel a reasonable consumer’s understanding that the Gummies contain the nutrients needed to fill gaps created by the medication.” However, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead that use of GLP-1 medications creates specific nutritional gaps and that the Gummies do not in fact fill those gaps. It wasn’t enough to allege that the “formulation is not tailored to the specific needs of GLP-1 users and lacks the dosage strength, clinical targeting, or comprehensiveness to meaningfully address the deficiencies it invokes.” This part of the claim was dismissed without prejudice.

it doesn't infringe to use a similar concept in ad photos

Kitsch LLC v. Viori Beauty PBC, 2026 WL 1356424, No. 2:25-cv-10830-SPG-AGP (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2026)

Kitsch is “a leading beauty product and accessories manufacturer and sells its products in major retail stores and online through its website and third-party websites, such as Amazon.” It sells solid shampoo and conditioner products, marketed on Amazon with a photograph depicting the shampoo and conditioner placed on top of the packaging, with images of the ingredients contained in the bars scattered below the packaging.

L: defendant; R: plaintiff. Obvious substantial similarity, right?

Viori also sells solid shampoo and conditioner, including through Amazon’s online marketplace. Its advertising is allegedly highly similar to Kitsch’s, in that “both feature the products shown next to each other with the physical products being placed on top of the packaging and with images of the ingredients contained in the bars scattered below the packaging,” and its packaging contains wording shown in the same order as Kitsch’s packaging, with the same words in larger font.

Viori allegedly didn’t use this ad style until after Kitsch entered the market. Kitsch also alleged that there’s no need for it because other sellers display their products in distinct ways, and that Viori didn’t use this photo on its own website, only on Amazon. 

Plaintiff's examples of noninfringing packaging

Further, purchases from Viori allegedly arrived in different packaging.

All of this allegedly was in the service of confusing consumers, so Kitsch alleged claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, copyright infringement, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. The court dismissed the complaint because look at those pictures.

Kitsch didn’t plausibly allege any false statement of fact, which defeated both federal false advertising and state UCL claims. Among other things, the product shown in the supposedly different packaging was not the same product as the product shown in the Viori photo. “Viori Hidden Waterfall Shampoo and Conditioner Bar Set Made with Rice Water” is not “Viori Shampoo Bar & Conditioner Bar + Bamboo Holder.” They didn’t show that Viori’s advertised packaging is any different from the actual product. Where, as here, “the allegations of the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the allegations as being true.”

Even if the actual packaging differed from that in the image, that didn’t plausibly injure Kitsch. Kitsch argued that it was injured because Viori copied its advertising. “Thus, it would make no difference to Plaintiff’s alleged injury whether Defendant’s products arrive in the same packages as advertised.”

Copyright infringement: Not always resolvable at the motion to dismiss stage; very much so here. The photos here received relatively thin protection: a “commercial product shoot” allows for only a “narrow range of artistic expression.” None of the photos contained any particularly unusual elements that defy “the conventions commonly followed” in such photos. Indeed, the competitors’ submitted photographs “bear numerous similarities to the parties’ photographs”:

(1) all five photographs depict a set of two products, including both solid shampoo and conditioner; (2) all five photographs depict both the packaging and the shampoo and conditioner outside the packaging; (3) all five photographs are set against an off-white background with no other foreground or background features; and (4) three of the five photographs include images of the ingredients contained inside the products. Thus, these elements appear to be standard features commonly associated with such advertising images.

Given the thinness of the copyright, only “virtual identical” copies would infringe; those were not present:

Most significantly, while Plaintiff’s photograph places the products directly on top of the packages, Defendant’s photograph places the products behind the package, suspended in mid-air and partially obscured by the package. Defendant’s image also contains reflections underneath the packaging and ingredients, while Plaintiff’s image contains no reflections. Further, Defendant’s photograph contains a larger foreground and places the ingredients closer to the packaging than Plaintiff’s photograph.

For some reason, the court grants leave to amend.