Too much to choose from; I prioritized things that were new to me.
Mark Bartholomew, A Right to Be Left Dead
If we can create new works in a dead author’s style after
they’re gone and create conversations with them (including loved ones) after
gone, and populate new entertainment with dead actors, isn’t that something
new? NY State created a postmortem right of publicity specifically for computer-generated
likenesses; Louisiana did so too. IP Subcommittee on AI: was a lot about
whether we need a national ROP to deal with this. Wants to focus on the
relevance of death.
How do other areas of law treat relevance of death? Map onto
3 main rationales for ROP.
Dignitary interests: false light, IIED, privacy typically
expire w/person. There is some exception for actions immediately surrounding death
or moment of burial. Death closes things off.
Consumer protection: laws meant to protect consumers, death
doesn’t matter—Princess Diana’s image on collectible plates—TM claim was maintainable.
So too w/false advertising. Makes sense b/c consumer protection law’s goal is
information safety and not vindicating rights of decedent.
Property law: somewhere between all and nothing. Decedent’s
operative intent to extinguish property right—when you bury people w/jewelry by
their choice, no estate tax; it just disappears. Body parts. Forced share laws
for spouses. To fix suboptimal postmortem allocations.
Need and precedent: how is AI being used to reanimate
people? One use is grieving: used to create a chatbot w/specific person corresponding
to a past entity. Advertising: false endorsement potential. Actors’ strike is in
part about who controls past performances if they’re being used to populate new
media productions? Great deal of variability in postmortem ROP. Okla and Indiana
give 100 years, potentially infinite in Tennessee. Entertainment: stronger ground
to articulate right in performances; incentive story makes more sense for this
than for other invocations of right of identity. Stare decisis: can we really
fight this any more? We can at least
fight how we structure the rules of postmortem ROP when it’s only found in
about half the states.
Solutions: better ways to articulate postmortem wishes,
including a way to abandon postmortem publicity rights. Putting it in a trust like
Robin Williams did might not be enough—might be fiduciary duty to use it
commercially.
Duration: goal is to recreate original; the right shouldn’t
extend long past death, because the key is generational change/asserting
difference from previous one is a key mechanism.
Prior exploitation requirement? Need to have used identity
commercially during life in order to trigger postmortem right. Death is a
demarcation point in many circumstances; we should have a mechanism for free
use for research and other purposes for most people who didn’t have opportunity
to commercially leverage persona during life.
Fred Yen: why analyze things through interests of dead
person at all? Couldn’t we look at it through the interests of the living? Grief
trolls—sending a person messages from deceased loved ones would be IIED; copyright
can handle performances, collective bargaining can handle digital models in
Hollywood. There’s lots of reasons to keep the dead from having too much
influence over our lives.
Mark McKenna: many recent issues over use of personality after
death would have been unanticipated during their lifetimes. How practical is it
to imagine needing affirmative steps to anticipate those uses? Why not just a
set of defaults?
[My thoughts: Intro sounded to me like classic anxieties
over what currently seems like realistic tech of representation—putting words
in mouth that never said happened in written word, in print, in image, in
cartoon, and there have been repeated moral panics about how everyone will
perceive these as real/deceptive; we just keep resetting our expectations.]
Consumer protection/TM: why would ordinary consumers care
about consent of estate or believe there was unified control? And why would
endorsement of estate equate to endorsement of celebrity in consumer’s mind?
Assumptions skipped over in TM/false advertising analysis.]
Lucas Osborn, Christianity & IP
Core: creation, Fall, redemption, restoration. Genesis: G-d
said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let
them have dominion over … all the earth.” Humans are categorically
different from other animals and have some special relationship to G-d, our
creator; we have a purpose in the world. Thus, we are created with creative tendencies/desires
to create.
But all is not well because of the Fall. We also have a
tendency to sin. The legal construct we use for that is the wealth maximizer,
who maximizes their own happiness. We also sometimes act irrationally b/c our
reasoning is messed up. Nonetheless there is still goodness in the world. That
can map onto behavioral law & economics. We will not always act justly or
see correctly what the just thing is to do.
Humans will generally not create at maximum potential or
create things for the common good or use creation in a just way—incentives may
be able to intervene here. Example: drugs that are overpriced; but even within
Christian worldview, fallen humanity may require attending to incentives.
Deborah Gerhardt: Tree of knowledge is part of the Fall. Jewish
theology sees this as opportunity to do good, to choose good or evil, a
maturation of knowledge. We wouldn’t need rules if there was no difference.
Jeremy Sheff: Spread of knowledge—evangelical perspectives
may differ from nonevangelical. Catholic tradition about authority over congregation/knowledge
is very different. Control over text is part of some traditions, along with
control of knowledge that might conflict with or comment on the text. Can you
separate those issues from the theological issues? IP is as much about distribution
of knowledge as it is about creation.
Dustin Marlan, Trademark Disclosure
TM registration requires disclosures just as patent does:
undertheorized. First use/use in commerce date, drawing of mark, goods and
services, owner, domicile. Why? Protecting
brand investment and consumers?
The TM bargain: registration can be made in a form prescribed
by the Director, so there’s some statutory flexibility if we think policy justifies
it. Specimens: one per class, as currently required.
Benefits: nationwide right of priority, evidence of
validity/exclusive ownership, right to police imports, incontestability after 5
years, symbolic benefits like ®. Constructive notice to the public is often
thought of as good, but it can put the claimant on the radar (as trade secrecy
is an alternative to patent)—people could find you and send you a C&D;
admissions could be detrimental in later LOC analysis, e.g. conceding to a disclaimer;
might want to file in a jurisdiction without disclosure like Trinidad &
Tobago to avoid tipping off the market; icky mark or brand could be unpalatable
to the public.
Could TM disclosures be tweaked to make them more
consumer-friendly? TESS is a mess. Could it be more consumer-friendly to allow
more comprehensibility to the lay public?
RT: not sure that disclaimers ever matter to future rights,
but collateral estoppel/B&B is a big deal now, as is the loss of potential
defenses after Jack Daniels. Also I’m not sure that you can ever make
registration an engine of consumer protection b/c people never look up classes,
first use date, etc.
Justin Hughes: analogy to patent applications—written description
and enablement are quite different. Classes/goods and services might be the closest
analogy to metes and bounds.
Mark McKenna: natural to think about goods & services as
description of claim in a world where the claim is for a word mark; the
boundaries were clearer for Nike. But many other applications are less clear
for what they are, and we need more rules around that. Courts don’t follow
PTO rules about dotted lines; they aren’t careful about what the mark consists
of or comprises, especially to get to inherent distinctiveness. That’s where
disclosure rules need the most attention: definition and relation to what
courts are going to do with the registration.
Alex Roberts: Different reasons to choose not to use system—stealth
registrations in T&T are different versus “we define trade dress when we
choose to sue over near copies”; Mattel enforces a lot against pink but doesn’t
register it so it doesn’t have to define a specific color.
Bartholomew: Registration is optional, not mandatory as with
patents; is this the right number of sweeteners to encourage people to register?
Hughes: could compare cases where they narrow the claim of
the TM registration v. narrow the claim of the patent—Maker’s Mark case where
they have a registration for a wax seal but claim only red.
McKenna: and the reverse, where they register narrowly but
claim broadly.
Matthew Sipe: connection here with Katyal’s project where
public doesn’t get everything it needs for full agency in consumption.
Elizabeth Townsend Gard: people don’t register color as trade
dress—interesting to consider why not. Same with word marks—they register
standard word mark when color is an important part of what they’re doing.
Lorelei Ritchie, is this generic :( ?
Consumer perceptions need evidence—surveys, declarations,
dictionaries. Consumer perceptions change over time. Can a generic term be
ungenericized? After Booking.com, maybe it can be because consumer perception
is key. Evidentiary standard is not standardized. Merely
descriptive=immediately conveys information about feature, function, or
characteristic. But generic? The thing being named, or if it’s a key aspect or
subgroup, which is where we start running into problems.
Possibilities: allow acquired distinctiveness for any
asserted mark; require acquired distinctiveness for any asserted mark
(requires legislative modification). Should TM registration be w/o much
examination? Allow people to file claims and then go from there.
Another: expand consideration of a “mixed record” where
there is some generic and some nongeneric use. Many people use “google” to mean
“use Google.” Could expand on that more.
Legal standard: preponderance in inter partes case; ex parte
move towards preponderance. She argues that they should go the other way: clear
and convincing for everything. Why? Because generic terms get no protection.
Should look for abandonment and fraud where we have a higher burden of proof.
Consider preclusion as well. W/genericness, we are talking about the same
thing, so preclusion would be appropriate.
Unprotectable generic terms should be precise, like apple for fruit (note that this is a subset). Not a key
aspect or subgroup. “Apple candy” is not generic for candy, it’s just a flavor/key
aspect. Should be descriptive.
Relevant consumer: perceptions can determine commercial
strength but the inputs are often the same as for conceptual strength—dictionaries
w/lower-case references. Keep up with the culture by considering social media. Evolving
norms of communication and branding both have no punctuation/capitalization:
lululemon.
Hughes: Agrees that generic means thing: “highly descriptive”
doctrine should be used to moderate this problem for things like apple candy.
Relevant consumers for determination of genericness should be different for
more narrow descriptiveness group of consumers. Singer was recaptured from
genericity, as was Goodyear (probably).
McKenna: disagree w/Hughes b/c categories aren’t found in
nature. Is diet soda a category or a subgroup? It’s market definition. Is apple
candy a thing? That has no abstract answer. In favor of calling more generic:
once you introduce secondary meaning, you’ve told defendants that the case will
cost hundreds of thousands or millions, whereas genericity is more easily
managed. Before Booking.com there was the competitive need test and that’s why
failure to function has had a resurgence.
Roberts: Nike just got SNKRS w/vowels removed—that’s the Booking
problem.
RT: [I agree on the subgroup issue: soup spoon; car is a
subset of vehicle; apple for fruit is a subgroup; key aspect may be another way
of saying market-defined subgroup.
Spectrum of descriptiveness/ “highly descriptive” category will
likely defeat your attempt unless you take more steps to put that off limits
too.
Clear and convincing: basis in statutory text? There’s a
common-law case for treating fraud differently but I don’t see that for
abandonment or genericity; the “harsh consequence” is the natural consequence
of choosing a generic term. (Not to mention that these days you can still get
unfair competition protection under §43(a), which is not the case for patents.)]
Deborah Gerhardt, Trade Dress Edges
Where does trade dress begin and end? The definition expanded
far beyond packaging/display. Color, product design. This matters b/c we’re supposed
to apply functionality for trade dress, and we often use Seabrook for
distinctiveness, whereas there aren’t many disclaimer practices for trade dress
and there are for word marks. So there are doctrinal differences.
Possibilities: (1) Trade dress a subset of TM (based on the statutory
language in 1127); (2) partially overlapping (Two Pesos, where text might be
included in some trade dress; INTA view of overall look and feel without
functionality); (3) Restatement view of distinct categories. But do you have to
apply functionality analysis if there’s a word involved?
PTO doesn’t use this categorization—it uses text, design,
sound, etc. Traditional/nontraditional is also unhelpful and does no doctrinal
work.
Tyler Ochoa: we call functionality genericity when it
applies to word marks. [Not sure that’s entirely true—the AOL “you’ve got mail”
case is functionality more than genericity.]
Trade dress got overexpansive; Two Pesos got cut back in
Wal-Mart in particular with the tertium quid versus product configuration/packaging.
A: in sound marks we do see genericity and functionality
merging—alarm sound.
RT: Consider substantial similarity—it’s the standard for
everything in © but we recognize that different genres may require different
analysis. Choral music requires experts to tell you what might count as similarity
of expression in choral music, etc. The value is in finding patterns and so I’m
comfortable with being in the subset box (1).
Betsy Rosenblatt: willing to go further—there are lots of
words that are informationally functional and should be denied registration for
that reason for relevant goods/services.
Roberts: what’s inside the “trade dress” circle? Are sounds and
smells trade dress, or are they something else?
[Things that can be inherently distinctive v. things that
can’t be as another important line?]
Sheff: identify where the distinction matters—functionality,
maybe; inherent distinctiveness not available for product design; practical
relevance: defining the unregistered trade dress is a big part of the job for
§43(a)—even though there may not be a doctrinal issue it is a very practical
one where we fight over how specifically we have to claim features.
A: Impetus: some sound marks are treated like text, and
others like product design—analytically unsatisfying. Rules for registering
text don’t work well.
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