Robert A. Mikos, Unauthorized
and Unwise: The Lawful Use Requirement in Trademark Law, 75 Vanderbilt Law
Review 161 (2022)
Abstract:
For decades, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has
required trademark owners to comply with sundry nontrademark laws governing the
sale of their trademarked goods and services. Pursuant to this “lawful use
requirement,” the Agency has refused or even cancelled registration of
thousands of marks used on everything from Schedule I controlled substances to
mislabeled soap. This Article subjects the Agency’s lawful use requirement to
longoverdue scrutiny. It suggests that in requiring compliance with other laws
for registration, the PTO has lost sight of the one statute it is supposed to administer.
In the process, the Agency has overstepped the limits of its statutory
authority and undermined federal trademark policy. Whether a mark owner has
used its mark to sell improperly labeled soap or an illicit drug, the PTO has
no mandate, and no convincing policy reason, to deny the owner the substantial
benefits of registration. Simply put, the Agency’s lawful use requirement has
no place in trademark law.
I’d never given the question much thought, and I was initially skeptical but largely convinced by the argument. I doubt that the PTO can’t ever identify “per se” violations of the law—it seems quite possible to distinguish between violations of the law that can’t be corrected by any voluntary action by the claimant other than discontinuing sales of the unlawful product (e.g., marijuana; products that need label approval from another agency but don’t have it) and violations of law that can be corrected by voluntary action while still making use of the putative mark on the goods (e.g., incompletely labeled cosmetic; failure to label country of origin). But that is a different question from whether the PTO has the statutory authority to do this, whether the PTO can apply its rules consistently, or whether it is a good idea to ask the PTO to do so.
1 comment:
I have always thought instinctively this was over-reach by the PTO. Good to see someone work it through more thoroughly. In Chapter 4 of our casebook, Mark Janis and I probe possible cut off points to the doctrine (along the Iines you hint at). But I think the issue of PTO authority is a different conundrum. The Metchup case suggests skepticism too. See Perry v. H.J. Heinz Co. Brands, LLC, 994 F.3d 466, 475 (5th Cir. 2021).
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