Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL
5483510, Nos. 14-CV-1142, 14-CV-4090 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019)
Here, the consumer class action concerns allegedly false advertising of
“flushable” wipes that have generated municipal lawsuits around the country.
After remand to address concerns about whether plaintiffs can establish injury
and causation with common evidence, the court reaffirmed its conclusion that
plaintiffs’ damages model could provide common evidence of harm, based on
hedonic regression analysis.
Without going into too much detail, hedonic regression was
acceptable and defendants’ criticisms, while deserving of consideration, went
to weight rather than admissibility. “Regressions should not be excluded on the
ground that they fail to meet arbitrary thresholds of statistical significance.
In the current case, there are high degrees of statistical significance and any
dispute about economic conclusions goes to weight not admissibility.”
Developing a hedonic regression is “an art,” as one of defendants’ experts
said, and none of defendants’ experts developed their own hedonic regression
from scratch; “their second-guessing of [the expert’s] choices in attempting to
demonstrate that the methodology is unreliable is unpersuasive.”
Under Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), it
was sufficient that the model measured the damages according to plaintiffs’
theory of the case: consumers paid more because of the flushable label.
“Disagreement about … judgments in developing and performing the model, as well
as disagreement about whether [the expert’s] judgment about extrapolation of
the results of his model to certain time periods or products, are questions
answerable by admitted evidence. [The expert] made reasoned decisions about how
to actually construct and run a model testing Plaintiffs’ theory of liability.
The model fits the theory of Plaintiffs’ case.”
Individual issues, such as variations in the understanding of the term
“flushable,” did not predominate. [I
believe that the reasonable consumer model is normative as well as descriptive,
and a normative reasonable consumer should not think “it’s flushable if it
won’t destroy my pipes but will destroy municipal infrastructure.” I can put
pretty much anything I want into the recycling bin without suffering any
individual consequences. That doesn’t make whatever I put in the bin
“recyclable” and it would be specious for me to claim that I reasonably understood
“recyclable” to mean “you can put it in the recycling bin without doing any
harm to yourself.”]
Disputes about how many consumers bought the wipes for some
other purpose than flushing didn’t weigh against predominance. Evidence about
the average relationship between price and the flushable label was the point of
the price inflation theory. Plaintiffs argued that there was “a marketwide
inflation of price by a particular calculable percentage. For every flushable
wipe product purchased, the consumer paid more because of the flushable
misrepresentation. There is no need for individualized inquiry as to causation
or injury.” And if liability was found, statutory damages could be awarded on a
classwide basis (because of a prior Supreme Court case). “The single question
of whether plaintiffs paid more than they would have for the good because of
the deceptive practices of the defendants-sellers in labeling their products as
‘flushable’ predominates over any individualized damages inquiries.”
In closing, Judge Weinstein commented that nationwide
resolution under some sort of government supervision would be a good idea;
non-New York class claims have already been settled. A common market needs
common labeling. Moreover, the weird situation in which $50 per incident is
available classwide may well be a quirk of federal court/state procedure
interaction. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393 (2010). “Complex Erie problems raising and intermingling substantive
and procedural issues will need thorough consideration as this class action
proceeds.” [Given the ruling on predominance, will they, though? Isn’t it now a
question of what plaintiffs can prove? I read this more as exhortation to
settle—in a way consistent with the non-NY settlement—than identification of
specific troubling issues.]
No comments:
Post a Comment