Discussant: Mark
McKenna
Why is it difficult to stick to product/geographic markets
as a topic? Both dimensions have consumer-facing concerns (how will consumers
actually understand the uses in different markets) and other considerations
(practical admin. of the system, interaction w/registration system, concerns
about commercial interests and when/how they ought to be allowed to expand). If we want both dimensions have similar
rules, we would want to think there’s relatively the same balance between those
consumer and other interests. He’s not sure they do. Geog. scope interacts
w/registration, treaty obligations, sovereignty in ways that make it
distinct/not motivated so much by consumer understanding. This is also somewhat
true in product markets, but we’ve converged on confusion to manage all this.
Insofar as we’re trying to regulate the relations between
parties/not primarily focused on consumer behavior, might treat them
differently. Accession: if granting a
party an adjacent market, is it because we expect the party to have superior
ability to enter/manage? Might expect that skills would be transferable to new
geographic areas, but less so in other product markets.
Brand as persona: Lots of these goods were staples not
individually branded; retailers had a lot of power. Marketing changed in
significant part in order to change relationship between producers and retailers,
so producer could connect more directly w/consumers. This whole system has implications for how we
structure relations between different levels.
A TM system that rewards advertising will give more power to brands than
to retailers. Also, then they had to
focus on non-product characteristics—convince people that they should buy one
kind of salt instead of another. Our TM
system supports delivering these ads where the advertised characteristics are
disconnected from physical aspects of the goods.
Bill McGeveran: to the extent that branding allows producers
leverage against retailers, degree of capacity to extend branding to other
product might make you on the margin less interested in that. But you’re
creating consumer demand for the refreshment of Coke to get better slotting
fees from retailers—most significant incentive for branding is to make consumers
want you and that might not change at all based on Coke’s ability or inability
to extend to other product lines.
McKenna: might change the nature of the ad message. Coke would still say “you want Coke, not some
other soda.” But if you can brand other things w/Coke, you can port the brand
meaning to other goods/services, so you have less incentive to focus on
characteristics specific to your category and more to focus on brand
personality that is portable.
Litman/Burrell suggest that an intentional/causal account of
this phenomenon as driving force of change in TM law doesn’t work (esp. in terms
of British law).
Bone: addition of psychological concepts to advertising does
change how ads are made: become less informational. This does push TM law to change too.
McKenna: agrees that this was a change in marketing that
courts were noticing.
Litman: just doesn’t agree with the idea that TM law was “designed”
to cut retailers out; maybe a wording issue.
McGeveran: consumer v. producer orientation is really
important. In product space, the
product-mark association may have special meaning in TM because you can only
think about distinctiveness w/r/t a particular product; exporting to different
product can take away context that can be legally important, and that’s not
true of geographic space.
Does think that internet makes exposure to other, distant
marks more likely—Google gives me the nearest coffee shop first, but others in
other states will also show up in the search results.
Bently is unconvinced about this increased exposure—need more
evidence.
McGeveran: thinks it’s so but that it won’t necessarily
increase likely confusion. If internet has shrunk geographic and product
spaces, doesn’t necessarily mean consumer perception of the meaning of distance
stays unchanged.
Mike Grynberg: there are a lot of doctrines that have
similar effects in geog. and product markets—one could look at the Rogers test as a kind of “honest
concurrent use” for geography. Lawmakers share a common baseline: tendency of
TM law generally to posit inattentive consumers. Need reason to deviate from that baseline.
Expertise in the age of the internet: not as much of a
gatekeeper function; gatekeeper mattered when space in which knowledge was
stored was somewhat scarce (e.g., library shelves). And now people need filters
more than gatekeepers; build communities online in which people participate in
the construction of truth, for good or ill. Information cosmopolitan: capable
of interacting w/marks and other sources of information—possibility for
multiple ways of constructing meaning. That view would provide a different
foundation for Dawn Donut, saying
that consumers can resist confusion while producers are operating in different
markets, even w/the rise of the internet. But the same notion of consumer
ability to self-protect/make meaning can also be used in product markets, as
w/Sheff’s data and the many Tiffanys in the world. Cascading amount of nonactionable uses that
potentially “dilute” marks—could posit competent consumers who are able to
manage this info.
But is this an elitist argument? Info resources are not
evenly distributed.
Harm stories retain their intuitive appeal.
Dinwoodie: agrees that there is change in “distance” w/out
necessarily changing confusion—may lead to more sophistication. You can see the 9th circuit, over
the course of 15 years, figure this out. But processing info takes time, and it’s
still unclear how much we base our decisions on immediacy and how much we use
the new information.
National marketing impulse may explain both market limits
erosion and territorial limits. Coexistence agreements in registration and
settlements routinely divide both geographic and product markets. Attempts to give certainty—but sometimes what
you think is a clear definition becomes more complex, as in Apple v. Apple.
Many countries had a concept of defensive registration—reserved a product
market removed from the goods on which you actually used the mark; another way
of providing certainty over who has the right to expand into a market. Problem
for use-based regimes. But now US has
ITU. Though ITU has much shorter fuse than the common 5-year period for use.
Heymann: interesting that concurrent use can be divorced
from consumer understanding.
Dinwoodie: finesse that by giving deference to parties’
agreement on the idea that they know better than a court how a market would naturally
flow. But there definitely be a problem of overriding consumer confusion.
McKenna: parties do this all the time—sale and leaseback;
create a blanket entity that leases back to both, but both are really in
control of their own activities; etc.
Dinwoodie: is there marketing literature about territorial
extension as there is about product market extension? Could that be brought in
to help us understand confusion?
DHL case in Europe: now have the possibility,
notwithstanding unitary rights, of having a TM in less than EU and someone else
able to use the same mark for the same goods elsewhere in the EU. That prospect scared the dickens out of the
TM bar. Phrased objection as creating a problem with the single market. His
response: the US is a much more integrated single market with free flow
throughout, but is much more comfortable with geographic restrictions and
concurrent use agreements! Somehow the
US survives, even though goods and people do flow. EU is practically fractured markets, but complete
skepticism about geographic limits in TM.
Is it just nationbuilding?
RT: McKenna says: Might expect that skills would be
transferable to new geographic areas, but less so in other product
markets. My reaction: Really depends on
cultural factors, doesn’t it?
McDonald’s, from yesterday, doesn’t just bring the Big Mac and has had
trouble when it tries a fullscale import.
McGeveran says: exporting to different product can take away context that
can be legally important, and that’s not true of geographic space. Disagree.
Depending on the mark (also true of product space, e.g. Delta) a
geographic distance can make a huge difference.
Recall yesterday’s multiple Tiffany restaurants and strip clubs. Do we think there’s a chain of each? Not likely. And that coffee shop example,
where Google gives you the nearest first, fits w/my objection to the idea that
geography doesn’t provide a context of its own: the search results will be
presented in ways making it unlikely that you’ll think that the different
similarly named coffee shops are linked.
McGeveran: didn’t mean to contrast geography/product. Additional information can be confusion
reducing as much as it can be confusion creating in either case.
Burrell: Assumptions about consumer: consumer has a
smartphone (and thus is not too poor to travel, thus has fewer income
constraints). People who have to buy food where they can get it are not the “consumers”
of the classic cases. The courts are
talking about people who could go to
Paris and would have heard about
Maxim’s. Amazing how easily a notion of
the consumer inserts itself into our thinking so that we know the “consumer”
has more access to information. Gender,
class are part of the differences.
Defensive registration: had to explain to the Office why a
hypothetical reasonable consumer would see the mark on X there would be some
kind of harm/association that would damage the TM owner. Fell out of favor
because brand owners found it really hard to explain, in the absence of use and
in the absence of bad faith, what harm they would be suffering. (I really want a citation for this!)
Dinwoodie: shows again that dilution is really unfair
competition because it’s always what the defendant is doing.
McKenna: agrees that transferability is not necessarily
different, but it’s a question worth asking whether one set of skills is more
transferable than another (new product v. new geographic market). Thinking
about transferability domestically—less significant difference in expanding
from NY to Texas than NY to Mexico.
Interesting how easily we all agree, in Mark Lemley’s
absence, that TM is doing much more (and different) than consumer protection.
That contributes to difficulty in defining the relevant consumers—in service of
what? If it’s about protecting them from
disruption in their behavior, you might define them one way. If it’s about
defining them in order to allocate markets/business relations, you might define
them differently. In many settings, consumers are constructed largely as a
stalking horse for how we want to divide up the rights and therefore need do
less to figure out what they really think.
Dinwoodie: surveys, for all their flaws, may be a light on
real consumers if you think there’s a big gap between your judges and your
actual consumers.
On transferability: to the extent that the owner is
licensing, then all they’re selling is their ability to market, not any other
skills which become beside the point.
Bone: what sort of effects should we count? We should
consider TM’s effects on market structure, but we shouldn’t necessarily use TM
to engineer various markets. Dangerous to use TM as engineering device.
Dinwoodie: TM does a lot of things, but that doesn’t mean it
should be used to do everything.
McKenna: his claim is not normative but descriptive.
Sheff: defining the consumer is not just normative but
distributive: helping richer consumers with more brand awareness may hurt
others. Judge may be mistaken about the
consumer in his/her head versus the consumers actually having experience with
the mark; but separately, it may be the case that consumers are heterogenous
and have different experiences. We may
subsidize one by allowing (or suppressing) use that has different effects on
others.
Grynberg: be also clear on what it is we’re
allocating/distributing. Information?
Value?
Dinwoodie: speculates that geographic expansion creates more
heterogeneity in consumers.
RT: I think now of McDonald’s and its beef extract used on
fries, and its resulting difficulties with Hindus, vegetarians, and others who
cared when McDonald’s thought they wouldn’t.
There’s an example of expansion resulting in consumer
heterogeneity. More speculatively: hasn’t
branding itself attempted to create more heterogeneous consumers? Individualizing them, hailing them as unique
and different?
Dinwoodie: maybe there’s convergence between geog. and
product market rules, but more formal on the geog. side because it’s easier to
draw arbitrary lines when political borders are at issue. Then the arbitrary
lines get softened because courts think that they’re arbitrary. (Back to crystals and mud!)
McKenna: thicker set of rules in geog. because of
registration overlay, especially in the US.
In the US, registration is mostly about nationwide rights. Geog. market cases tend to identify areas in
which the parties have rights. And those rights are sticky. They stay in
place. That is less likely to happen in
product spaces, which feel more ad hoc.
It’s not a coincidence that casebooks teach priority and geog. scope of
rights together, and not product market space.
There’s something more systematic and crystalline about geog.
scope. Pragmatism: sovereignty,
registration, etc. which is less fluid than the product market space.
Dinwoodie: the normative qs however may be more acute with
geog. Int’l markets: well-known mark
doctrine has distributive consequences between developed and developing
countries. Maintenance of local culture in a global context is another
question.
McKenna: US lens: registration system is more likely to give
you rights with a geographic scope unrelated to any consumer understanding—in areas
where the mark doesn’t mean anything to consumers (subject to Dawn Donut)—than in distant product
areas.
Heymann: what is it that tells you that it’s McDonald’s even
if the menu/presentation is different to respond to local conditions? What lets
you recognize it as different and yet the same?
Product space offers the same questions—what difference is tolerated
until there’s a crossover and the consumer thinks, ok, that’s a different
source.
McGeveran: told a great story about his daughter asking if
the airline company made their faucet. Navigating meaning is a skill that we
teach people—even at 6 she thought it was unlikely. Learning to parse difference and similarity
is a skill.
We don’t intervene to minimize cognitive load on people in
many circumstances—commercial, political, etc.
We should justify intervening in TM’s name.
Dinwoodie: other jurisdictions suppress false political
speech.
McGeveran: but you don’t have in any democracy rules that
ensure not just that people aren’t deceived by political falsehoods but also
that they don’t draw mistaken inferences.
McKenna: we don’t regulate the incredibly confusing
statements from your insurance company, for example. (Another thing that might be unique to
Americans.)
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