A World Without Privacy? What Can/Should Law Do?
University of Alabama School of Law
Dr. Austin Sarat
Justice Hugo L. Black Visiting Senior Faculty Scholar, The
University of Alabama School of Law and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of
Jurisprudence and Political Science and Director of Mellon Project on
Student-Faculty Research, Amherst College
If privacy is the right to be left alone, threats come from
discrete actions—warrantless search.
Catharine MacKinnon criticized the idea of privacy for its
inattention to power. If privacy is protection from intrusion by gov’t, think
about what happens in the space we label autonomous/free. Power does not disappear simply because
something is labeled private. Today:
privacy in relationship to autonomy, freedom, architecture of our social lives,
and power.
Session I
Privacy: Observations from a Fifth Columnist
Kevin Haggerty, Professor of Sociology, University of
Alberta
Moderator: Montré
Carodine, Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama
Haggerty: not a lawyer, not in a law school. Sociologist/criminologist/interested in broad
historical trends of privacy, power, surveillance. Effectiveness of the privacy infrastructure
in ability to constrain the expansion of surveillance.
Surveillance: more than cameras. Data collection/visualizing
practices. Searches, facial recognition
technologies, data mining. Lots of
people have talked about limitations that constrain particular surveillance
technologies—he wants to consider the entire privacy infrastructure. On average, does it work?
Lived experience of privacy has been declining for a century
(though this is empirically hard to evaluate)—can look at it
qualitatively/quantitatively. Legal
definitions of privacy are definitions of privacy violation, not privacy
itself, and these are different things. Imagine an extreme exhibitionist who
deliberately exposes every act and speaks every thought, recording on camera. No legal privacy violation, but her lived
experience—data known to others—would be nonexistent.
Privacy serves as a vital check on authoritarian forms of
rule/governance. These are inherent
possibilities in any modern advanced Western nation. Our ability to remain opaque/unknown helps
insulate us from extremes of institutional/organized repression. Unprecedented intensification of info
capabilities of organizations carries with it stark possibilities for
oppression.
Discursively we couldn’t do without the concept of privacy—it’s
a concept that citizens, politicians, lawyers, journalists couldn’t do without
as opposition to the concept of surveillance.
It’s also institutionally successful—a whole series of organizations
that take as their mandate the need to protect privacy—privacy officers,
advocacy organizations; state sponsored organizations in Canada. We’ve never had more expansive privacy laws—but
we’ve also never had more expansion of surveillance across every institutional
realm—education, science, warfare.
Increasingly central to governance.
US dealings with privacy tend to be more legalistic than
other countries. Violation = go to
court, versus administrative solution/privacy commissioner. But there are
problems with this—slow, conservative, disproportionately able to be used by
powerful interests. Groups aligned with greater surveillance tend to be
powerful corporate/state actors. Even in
court there are all kinds of limits.
Concerns about privacy tend to be more future oriented than
pressing needs to increase profits, security, efficiency—always wrongfooted. No one wants to increase the realistic
possibilities of terrorist attacks, but all kinds of issues are now framed as
security issues—securitization—to insulate policy choices from criticism. (Securitization as increased/transfer of risk
despite claims to limit it—I love the resonance with financial
happenings.) Behind the curtain you
often see abuses of power/the desires of powerful interests, not real security.
Canadian regulations: due process, not trying to curtail
surveillance but to allow it while mitigating worst excesses. Bar is not
particulaly high for many of these rules. Not just that they can’t control
expansion, but actually empower surveillance by providing mechanism and
legitimization for the expansion.
Traffic rules: getting a license, obeying signs are not meant to stop
traffic, but to create a system of vehicle flow. Likewise the structures around
privacy. In fact, there’s really low
compliance with regulations—having them doesn’t mean they work. Example: do not call, where people just
offshored and ignored the regulations.
Privacy advocates are constantly betting against the house. May have
short term victories, but will ultimately lose.
The odds are never in their favor.
Especially now that informational capitalism has arrived on the scene.
Analogy: the enclosure movement in England that took away
commoners’ usufruct rights in land. Big
data wants as much data as possible and mine it for unanticipated
connections. Thus, lobbying to change
law so that collectors don’t have to specify uses in advance. Strategic use of privacy principles,
particularly concerning consent. Consent has become a vehicle for allowing
collection of data with gloss of legitimacy.
“Data is oil of the new economy.” This should give you pause given our
demonstrated inability to control institutional access to our other natural
resources.
Potential counterargument: privacy is still robust. There is no way to measure this. But I’ve spent decades studying trends; we
see the same thing but may perceive it differently. Expansion of surveillance
is all around us, in the 500 terabytes of info into Facebook every day, 1
billion phone calls and emails collected by NSA every day, surveillance cameras
now using facial recognition, satellites, and drones. Perhaps each can be
justified. But that’s not his point.
Each one reduces lived reality of privacy by degrees.
Too sweeping? There
have been some important victories he wouldn’t want eliminated, but should also
step back from nitty gritty. Big picture: series of surveillance surges. New tech expands surveillance;
courts/administrators typically beat it back some but end result is expansion,
cumulatively drifting in only one direction.
Resistance and change is important (he’s a Foucauldian), but
capitalist organizations have demonstrated remarkable ability to secure the conditions
of production.
You don’t have to believe in black helicopters to see the
dangers of allowing organizations access to the minutia of our behavior. This
is dangerous. Surveillance society that
will be inherited by leaders in the future—we don’t know what they’ll do with
that or what groups they’ll target. Already seeing this with China. Totalitarian regimes of 20th
century relied on laughably rudimentary surveillance structures.
What is the alternative?
There’s still value in diagnosis. Mitigate the rote way in which we say “let’s
create more privacy laws/infrastructure.”
Carodine: African-American experience of police able to walk
through their homes, question them.
Invasion of privacy is one of the harms of oppression as well as one of
the ways in which oppression is carried out.
Haggerty: Think about different surveillance
dossiers/profiles. We’re now all under surveillance, but for different purposes
and using different technologies. Surveillance can be useful or oppressive.
Depending who you are, poor people are scrutinized differently—rich people are
profiled financially. Children: what
kind of privacy are they allowed? Rich
opportunity to identify types of profiles.
Sarat: terminological questions. Talk more about fear. What happens if we replace every mention of
surveillance with transparency? Jane
Jacobs, Death and Life of Great American Cities: image of urban life driven by
people on front porch, living under the gaze of others. Normatively desirable to her—versus definition
of people relatively free from interpersonal or institutional scutiny in the
paper. This most liberal imagining of
what makes life good conflicts with Jacobs’ definition of what made a good life—talk
about this? We should crave a space of
freedom v. enriched forms of community.
Haggerty: Fear drives politics. Worries about alarmism, but
thinks this is a concern. Inherent in these structures is something very
disconcerting, and democratic traditions will not save us if/when things go
wrong. The concern is not just that
there will be law-violating patdown, but the massive empowerment of
institutions’ ability to collect info and know populations individually and in
aggregate.
Jacobs overlooked the oppressiveness of small communities—solidarity
but also suppressive of divergence. Don’t be too romantic about small town
communities (though that’s different from Jacobs’ cities in some important
ways, including the ability to be private/unknown in public).
Sarat: transparency can be a way of describing surveillance—things
become clear that weren’t otherwise clear, such as Amazon’s tracking. But on the other side: interested in
transparency of campaign contributions.
You worry about asymmetries in transparency—there’s nothing wrong in the
transparency itself.
Haggerty: asymmetries of visibility are key. Would also call it the politics of
visibility. Power matters a tremendous amount in terms of what groups get to
insulate themselves from scrutiny for what purposes. He’d favor more knowledge
of what the NSA is doing—not opposed to transparency at all levels. Rise of
urbanization transformed everything: politics, race relations, how people found
partners, how they found jobs.
Surveillance is likewise transforming everything.
Q: tried to get legislature to prohibit sale of raw judicial
information (information that wasn’t included in cases that went to trial) to
commercial entities, and got nowhere. It’s not just information, but control of
uses.
Haggerty: that’s a case study—when we have X information,
what can people do with it/how can that be controlled? We don’t do well
restricting access to info but do think about how it can be used. Big data is about finding unpredictable
golden nuggets that might be useful and we worry about restricting them—e.g.,
finding best type of secondhand car (turns out it’s orange). Don’t know why/don’t care, just interested in
correlation.
Q: reasonable expectations as degrading over time—maybe people
are valuing privacy less over time.
Lisa Austin: it’s always context—you have different
overlapping contexts of being known to certain people. Is privacy really
shrinking in that light?
Haggerty: yes.
Because one metric is whether you’re free from scrutiny. There are
societies where you’re almost completely known by your groups, others less so.
What you’re talking about is privacy as subjective violation—the subjective
sense in which I believe that this info should be shared with X people and not
with Y. This is a problem of definitions
of privacy violation, which are incredibly subjective and vary across
time. Privacy as objective, quantifiable
thing in terms of the amount of information that can be known about people
versus privacy as subjective (this is when I feel info has been shared inappropriately).
(Hm, but then I don’t understand the claim he’s making about the change in
privacy as lived experience. I thought the lived experience was at least
subjective in the sense of affecting subjectivity, if not consciously so.)
Exploitative and inappropriate use is a consequence of
getting as much information about people as possible—manipulation to sell as
much as possible. This makes fair info exchanges impossible.
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