James v. Penguin Group (USA) Inc.,
2014 WL 1407697, No. 13 Civ. 2801 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2014)
Plaintiffs sued Penguin and Author
Solutions, a Penguin company, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
violation of California, NY, and Colorado consumer protection law. The court
dismissed all claims against Penguin, but kept most claims against Author
Solutions.
Author Solutions markets to
self-publishers, and since 2007 allegedly worked with 170,000 authors to
publish over 200,000 book titles. Plaintiffs bought publishing and marketing
services from Author Solutions, and alleged that Author Solutions didn’t
provide promised services, but pressured authors into purchasing “more, equally
bogus” editing, marketing, and publishing services. Author Solutions allegedly
refused to fix errors in manuscripts, implanted new errors, and delayed
publication until authors purchased more services. In addition, it allegedly
didn’t pay authors their earned royalties or provide accurate sales statements.
As an example of the allegations,
plaintiff James bought a “Premier” package for his second book, which includes
a service called Editorial Evaluation, marketed as a “diagnostic tool” to help
authors improve their manuscripts and to determine whether the author will
receive an “Editor’s Choice” designation. James received an “opinion of the
Editorial Board that the Editor’s Choice designation cannot be awarded without
additional revision,” with a recommendation that he buy proofreading and
editorial services. When he didn’t, he allegedly began to suffer delays, and his
published work included multiple errors that were not in the manuscript he
submitted to the publisher. Another plaintiff received the same evaluation and
did buy the recommended services, but alleged that they fell short of what was
advertised. Another plaintiff was told that she received a “Rising Star”
designation, but that it would be removed if she didn’t buy additional
marketing services, though this amount was later refunded. Plaintiffs alleged
that no editorial board actually reviewed the manuscript or made an assessment
that revisions to the manuscripts were necessary.
Other allegations of misfeasance
included: allegedly false claims about the royalty rate; assignment of a
“Check–In Coordinator” or “Product Services Associate” who is instructed not to
correct errors in manuscripts; errors uncorrected and introduced despite the
purported opportunity to correct 50 errors at no cost; demands for a fee to
correct errors; and delayed publication and difficulty contacting editors while
sales representatives continue to call and attempt to upsell authors. Plaintiffs
alleged underpayment of royalties, reflected in contradictory sales statements
or claims that they’ve made no sales. In addition, plaintiffs alleged that Author
Solutions developed websites that resemble independent advice sites on
self-publishing (e.g., chooseyourpublisher.com) to direct readers to itself,
along with “imprints”—essentially sub-brands—that offer identical services, “creating
the impression that authors have more self-publishing options than is actually
the case.”
Penguin bought Author Solutions in
July 2012, publicly stating a desire for its “skills in customer acquisition and
data analytics.” A year later, the president of Penguin International became
Author Solutions’s CEO. Plaintiffs weren’t attempting to pierce the corporate
veil, and they didn’t sufficiently allege that Penguin participated in the
deceptive conduct. Penguin didn’t acquire Author Solutions until after
“virtually all of the conduct alleged with any specificity” in the complaint. So
Penguin was dismissed.
Unjust enrichment under NY law is
available only in the absence of an enforceable contract. Thus, unjust
enrichment claims relating to unpaid royalties were dismissed, while unjust
enrichment claims based on alleged failure to provide services that were
purchased without entering into a contract survived.
The California UCL/FAL claims were
based on allegedly false statements to induce authors to purchase “Publishing
Packages and Services,” false claims that Authors Solution services would
create books “primed for retail success,” and false promises regarding the
quality of its services. The court found the claims adequately pled. The complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) by, for
example, quoting from a plaintiff’s “Editorial Evaluation” and its opinion that
her manuscript might receive a special designation if she purchased additional
services and completed tasks satisfactorily. The complaint pled that the
representations that an “editorial board” had formed an “opinion” about the
quality of the manuscript was false, and explained its reasons for so
concluding. Author Solutions argued that many of the statements alleged in the
complaint were puffery, which isn’t actionable under the FAL. But statements
about providing publishing and marketing services delivered by professionals
were objectively verifiable and likely to trigger reliance.
Author Solutions also failed to kick
out the UCL unfairness claim. When
brought by a competitor, an unfairness claim must “be tethered to some
legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on
competition.” It’s not yet clear whether this applies to consumer claims or
whether the older test, “balancing the harm to the consumer against the utility
of the defendant’s practice,” applies.
But either way, the complaint adequately alleged unfairness. “By alleging that Author Solutions is in
essence a scam, the [complaint] has described conduct that would impact
competition, have no lawful utility, and would harm consumers.”
Turning to the NY GBL § 349 claim,
the court refused to apply Rule 9(b) since it doesn’t require the same
essential elements as common-law fraud; thus the NY plaintiff didn’t need to
identify with specificity the misstatements that deceived him. The complaint adequately pled deceptive
consumer-oriented conduct; “Author Solutions engages in an extensive marketing
scheme that has impacted many would-be authors.” Author Solutions argued that the authors
weren’t consumers, but were instead publishing their own work. See Tasini v.
AOL, Inc., 851 F.Supp.2d 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (blogging contributors to The
Huffington Post were held not to be “consumers” under GBL § 349). However, Karlin v. IVF America, Inc., 712
N.E.2d 662 (N.Y.1999), endorsed a broad reading of the GBL, which applies to “virtually
all economic activity.” Karlin cited with approval a decision in
which a GBL § 349 claim had been brought against an editing company that had
“organized and directed a fraudulent and deceptive scheme to induce authors
seeking to publish their manuscripts to submit them to [the company] for
editing.” Thus, the claim survived. (I don’t think the court has to disagree with
Tasini, and it doesn’t do so
explicitly—Tasini wasn’t suing in his capacity as a consumer of AOL’s services,
whereas these people are.)
Again, Author Solutions argued
puffery, but the plaintiff identified several non-subjective
representations. E.g., “because Author
Solutions represented itself as a publisher that assists authors in publishing
their manuscripts, it promised a base level of quality and speed consistent
with such a publisher.”
Finally, the Colorado consumer
protection law claim also survived. This
one was based on a failure to disclose known material information with intent
to induce the consumer to enter into a transaction. The allegation that
defendants “knowingly made false representations as to the characteristics and
benefits of their editorial and marketing services, and their royalties’
payments structure” was adequate. The Colorado plaintiff wasn’t required to
allege knowledge and intent with particularity; the complaint raised a strong
inference of both by alleging that Author Solutions was aware of numerous
complaints by authors that it routinely failed to provide its promised services
and that Author Services was a fraudulent scheme designed specifically to
induce individuals to purchase its “bogus” services. Though the plaintiff didn’t
specify what the omitted information was, the complaint adequately alleged
specific material misrepresentations and then that those statements had
material omissions, which was enough to provide adequate notice. Because a defendant has a duty to disclose
material facts that in equity or good conscience should be disclosed, the plaintiff
also adequately pleaded a duty to disclose.