Friday, February 06, 2015

WIPIP session 1: Trademark

WIPIP Session 1: TM
Deborah Gerhardt (& Jon McClanahan), Colors
 
20 years of Qualitex: who is registering color? How do marketing folks view color? People remember color images more accurately/longer than B&W; color cues amplify legibility and familiarity; send signals about brand personality—can alter target audiences by changing color; prompts stronger emotional responses than words and images; people make up their minds in 90 second, and 62% or more of that is based on color.
 
What does that mean for TM?  Color can express a lot other than source. Personality, emotion:
 

Various registrations for color—universities, Tiffany’s, Zagat’s cover.  Post-Qualitex: 143 Color only applications, 0.0%; 2071 for design and color, .06%; millions of registrations that are not color-based.  Number of colors claim: mostly just a single color, though a few claim up to ten.  Red/pink & blue are the most popular color combinations, followed by brown and white, then gray/silver & black, then violet/purple & green.  Color marks are registering at a much lower rate than design only, design & color, and neither.  38.1% color only marks go to publication, 23.0% to registration. Some design & color marks are really what we think of as color only, such as Tiffany’s blue for catalog covers—the design is the shape of the cover.  Design and color: 46.0% published, 59.7% registered; overall success rate for design only or “neither” is about 74%.
 
General trends: increase in applications, registrations; very few end up on supplemental register and that’s not increasing.  Marks with design and color (e.g., Target red target)—a lot more marks on the supplemental register, but publication and registration lines are really close together—fewer ITUs here.  Marks claiming color but not design, but there are so few (they are going to recode to move some design + color like the Tiffany one into the color category).  Color only=covers an entire object, or an entire piece of an object—the Louboutin sole is color only, whereas a stripe on a water bottle is not color only.
 
Marks claming one color by class of goods—neat slide with bubbles representing # of color marks by color.  Registered across all sorts of classes.
 
Glynn Lunney: shades?  Color depletion in Qualitex—how many colors does the PTO think there are?
 
A: people tend to register a particular Pantone color.  But how it’s coded: PTO codes 12 colors including clear, white, and black.  (Lunney suggests an inherent masculine bias to this determination.)
 
Lisa Ramsey: what evidence are examiners accepting as evidence of secondary meaning?  If women like purple, then why should any competitor be denied the color purple?
 
A: don’t know.  Red is protected for scaffolding, who knew?
 
Jeremy Sheff: a little dubious of the low numbers here.  It’s difficult to determine going by hand.  But just looking at applications w/colored drawing as part of the file, there’s over 180,000. That could be a word mark in a particular color, but that would still be relevant for color as stimulant for demand. Are you excluding that from your scope?
 
A: they aren’t necessarily claiming color.
 
Sheff: but it’s part of the brand.  May want to deal with that, unless you’re just interested in competitive issues in claming color per se.
 
A: Target has the red target and the outline registered separately, the second for broader protection.
 
Sheff: ultimately, are you issued in competitive issues/foreclosing color for others, or in the use for branding?
 
RT: Any ITUs? Examine Specsavers.  Registration/infringement.
 
A: Wants to understand what’s going on in the areas where similar colors are registered for the same class of goods.  Is there a color depletion issue? Maybe Jacobson was right that you didn’t need color only because color + design is available.  (That would have led to the same result in Qualitex, right?)   Vast majority of filers appear to be very experienced filers.
 
Lunney: are you going to break down reasons for rejection?
 
A: Definitely will look at abandonment data. 80% of color applications have Office Actions; 60% conversion rate, when it’s usually 30%--a lot of them are facing these barriers.
 
Q: year to year trends? Pantone color of the year—do you see it in the PTO?
 
A: another fascinating Q to look at.  Has also heard of different cultural preferences for color, but interestingly comparing color impressions 30 years ago to now there’s less of that—cross-cultural perception of yellow as happy.
 
Jeanne Fromer (& Barton Beebe), The Closing of the Linguistic Frontier in Trademark Law
[early in project: more coming soon]
 
Lisa Ramsey, Trademarking Everything?
 
Are we TMing too many things? How to convince brands to care about the issue/care about competition? Her focus: protectable subject matter.  Need legislative solution, likely international, though domestic reforms are also important.
 
Should we protect anything that’s capable of bearing meaning, as current doctrine allows: Taylor Swift’s “This Sick Beat” applications for everything from nail polish toT-shirts.  TM application for “I Can’t Breathe” for clothing.  Specimen carefully uses that term on the tag, but clearly interested in enforcing against people who are using it on the front of a shirt, despite PTO rule against registering ornamental uses.  People then do use the term on the tags, but threaten ornamental uses, often successfully.  Or Delicious for shoes, and not used ornamentally, but then they go after Victoria’s Secret which uses the word on a T-shirt, and VS can’t win on summary judgment.  VS too has used marks on the front of T-shirts, like “Very Sexy,” which made it hard for them to argue no use as mark. 
 
Etsy store for tiny gold tags on necklaces; taken down because someone else has a registration for Tiny Tags for tiny tags on necklaces (disclaims right to “Tags”).  This is on the Supplemental Register, but the recipient took it down.  Controls results for Google searches.  Facebook went to trial on “Timeline”—FB can at least afford to litigate.  Oprah couldn’t get summary judgment on “Own Your Power.”  Can we get brands to care about these abuses?  E.g., “How” registration leading to lawsuit against Chobani for “How Matters.”  These are descriptive uses.  Need to shift perception of what the point is: whether people should own words in goods/services.  “Candy Crush Saga,” etc.
 
Acquired distinctiveness is not a big barrier. Declaration from company about use of mark. Examiner might search 3d-party use.  But what about future users of descriptive terms/colors/designs.  Rigorous examination as in patent?  Maybe we shouldn’t have protection in the first place.  Likewise w/incontestability.  No independent examination.  Then you can’t challenge it based on lack of distinctiveness.  Can’t do lack of confusion/descriptive fair use on motion to dismiss/often even sj. 
 
Slogans too, highly distinctive.  Wells Fargo claims TM rights in “Envelope Free” for ATMs.  Apple trying to TM store designs.  Bellaband: court says they could prove protectable trade dress in website design.  Not like copyright where actual copying is required.
 
Shaming sanctions for TM bullies? Sometimes people withdraw applications or claims against competitors: Ice Bucket challenge, IPA lawsuit.  Also: require more in the way of combination; require visual perceptibility.  Look to patent law §101 for model for subject matter exclusions. Requires us to consider international reform. Other measures to balance competition/free speech—functionality isn’t doing the job.
 
David Welkowitz: how do you get around free riders? Even if brands get on board, they won’t want to give up their ability to get a TM.
 
A: That’s why we need legislative reform. No TM for use on the front of a T-shirt; no single colors.
 
Lunney: most of the expansion has come from the courts—symbol was added to the bill specifically to exclude trade dress, yet 40 years later Breyer turns around and says symbol means “anything at all.” May be hard to get legislative action. Problem is that you get sympathetic Ps and the court stretches the law, then generate a rule that applies even to ordinary cases. They don’t think of the case as a regulatory system but it does become such a system.  Lots of businesses in the real world have very small differences in their names; they can register a corporate name w/a small difference in the state corporate registry.
 
A: completely agree that courts are the problem. That’s why we need subject matter reform, because once you get a right it gets stretched.
 
U. Shen Goh, Branding Linguistics: What do Coca-Cola and Chinese Bakeries Have in Common?
 
Coca-Cola’s treatment in Canada v. US. 1975, started filing applications for Chinese language marks in Canada, but not US. Canada hasn’t been very friendly—decided that Pepsi-Cola was not confusing w/Coca-Cola.  Also Canada had no comparable American doctrine of foreign interests.  But in 1992, when renewal came due, they abandoned.  Even though Canada had just rejected the American doctrine of foreign equivalents—another case decided there was no confusion between 2 Chinese bakeries (Vancouver/Toronto)—Chinese word was the same but English translation was different; average Canadian consumer doesn’t understand Chinese and the audience is the relevant public at large.  So Coca-Cola abandoned.  Since then the case law changed and found that the average consumer is the target consumer/actual consumers of goods/services.  US does have a bit of shakiness in the doctrine, but does have foreign equivalents.
 
Currently we classify all foreign languages that don’t use alphabets or numbers as design marks in our databases. This is wrong.  Word marks receive more protection than design marks, and many marks not using Latin/Roman characters have multiple presentations/translations.  Simplified Chinese may not look the same to English-only speakers, but it’s similar to capital letters v. lower case in English.  Fluent = know it’s the same. Western databases should transcribe foreign language marks according to their official phonetic system.
 
Western system depends on letters—type in Coca-Cola, get matches. But if there’s no letter/alphabet, we traditionally treat it as design mark. Phonetic system: allows filing alphabetically and numerically. Improve efficiency of database; impossible to search foreign language marks alphabetically and you have to hire a firm to do a design search.  Would remove incongruity w/case law, which recognizes foreign language marks as word marks.
 
Solves inconsistency w/int’l trade: MFN/national treatment principles.  Mark in China is a word mark; would be a design mark in the US.
 
Judicial treatment: both Canada/US require that the foreign language mark be understood by average Canadian consumer/ordinary American purchaser. This evidence changes constantly depending on immigration, int’l trade, brand extension, and cross-branding. Not just a problem for large corporations.  We should assess foreign marks in the same manner as English language marks: assume a fluent consumer.  We treat “aubergine” as having a meaning; don’t question how high educational level of consumer is. Should always assess for distinctiveness. A trader should not be able to do in a foreign language what it couldn’t do in English.
 
Foreign marks shouldn’t be translated when assessing for confusion w/marks in the same language.  A fluent consumer doesn’t need to translate; the monolingual judge does and wrongly assumes that consumers do the same.  Do need translation for meaning, but that’s just practical.
 
Foreign language marks shouldn’t be translated when assessing for confusion w/English transliteration English language marks can’t expand into claims for homonyms or homophones. Traders who choose to spell an English mark are stuck with that. The same rationale should apply to a trader who decides to use a foreign language mark, and not use any/all of its possible transliterations. One Cantonese transliteration could be Cheung Kong, Chiong Kung, Chang Jiang, or more depending on one’s dialect.  If we do it for foreign language we should do it for English.
 
Foreign language marks shouldn’t be translated for assessing confusion w/ an English translation. English language marks can’t expand to claims for synonyms, etc.
 
Hana Bank: Korean language, want to transfer into English “Hana Bank.”  But there are multiple translations: Hana means one: One Bank, United Bank, Whole Bank: do they get to claim them all? Not fair to other traders.
 
Christine Haight Farley: you’re arguing not just for changed approaches but changed standards? It would be easier w/phonetic searching systems for parties to decide that something is too close in pronunciation, but you seem to advocate at the end for not having to use that.  Chinese companies: script versions of TMs, but Chinese consumers might prefer a different word—Michael Jordan becoming “flying man.”
 
A: you can use transliteration or translation. In China, many companies discover they’ve been usurped. Their Chinese TM may not be as popular as the TM that became colloquially popular. Coca-Cola ran a contest and picked the best—good brand management. 
 
Lemley: struck by statement about not extending protection to synonyms. Correct to say you wouldn’t get a registration, but as a practical matter you get control over them: both in registration where PTO will reject and in practice where likely confusion will control. Why treat foreign translations any differently? If people think of it the same way, why allow anyone else to overlap use?
 
A: There is a Coca-Cola case that allowed them to control Koke.  But that’s more for well-known/popular TMs. 
 
RT: disagree—Lollipops and Jellybeans for roller rinks held to be confusing, because not well known and inherently distinctive. But I love the rest of the proposals.
 
Abraham Bell (& Ted Sichelman & Gideon Parchomovsky), Trademarks as Club Goods
 
Why do people wear T-shirts advertising their affiliation w/brands? Not a new Q, but a new answer.  People are acquiring not any information about the actual physical product. Economic search cost explanation doesn’t give us a very good answer, b/c only the brand and not the product is of concern.  TM in theory incentivizes production of goods w/non-observable qualities, but the value of the brand is fully observable.
 
TMs as expressive goods? Express fealty to NY Yankees, Nike, etc.  Brands serve as self-expressive private goods and linguistic public goods: counsels in favor of weaker protection to foster expression.
 
We think TM has one function of creating clubs/signifying membership. Not simply self-expression but membership/identification w/ a network of others associating w/the mark. Our theory separates club aspects from expressive aspect of the mark.  Deven Desai talks about bits of this but does not delineate badges of loyalty from other expressive aspects.  TM is a way of telling you something about the individual bearing the TM: an entry ticket into a club.
 
Vital that TM owner is the one that owns the right to exclude.  Creating a membership group.  Club goods are intermediate b/t public and private. Semi-enclose things that would otherwise have risk of being public goods/private production of goods that could otherwise only be produced collectively.
 
Ted wears a Harvard T-shirt. Ted is getting branded with Harvard (like ISO standard). Harvard is getting branded w/Ted (other consumers know that Harvard is the kind of school that draws Ted, or at least Ted identifies w/). The value of the T-shirt goes up and down w/Harvard’s activities. Harvard’s control over production and distribution affects the value of the club membership.  So it makes sense for control over entry to be in Harvard’s hands.  If every single consumer controls the TM, it loses the ability to cabin this club.  [RT: But Harvard will sell anyone a T-shirt.  It does not police the boundaries of the club and it can’t police the used market nor should it be able to do so. Compare Republican and Democratic (or “Democrat”) Party.  They can’t protect the “club” aspect and seem to be robust.]
 
This gets us to exactly the opposite of the expressive theory. [But why would this lead to any right to control the image of the club?  Can’t we have the Coca-Cola Kid?] Not simply about T-shirts. Purchase and use of many products have a club goods aspect separate from self-expression. Drinking Coke, driving a Mercedes Benz, riding a Harley Davidson, using an iPhone, eating and McDonald’s.  Commercials for these brands often emphasize club aspects: e.g., Coca-Cola’s “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing.” Create a membership group and police its boundaries.
 
What do we get this?  Facilitate dissemination of goods that can only come in these kinds of networks; large potential increases in social welfare. TM already does this but we haven’t been paying attention.  Best way of understanding dilution is being about this.  [Except then there shouldn’t be expressive exceptions.] Dilution = spreading club benefits outside the club.
 
Do we have some normative suggestions?  Exclusivity is important. Optimal spread of the good if costless is not infinite. Some point at which it’s too widely spread.  [How is “I’d like to buy the world a Coke” in any way limited?]
 
Lunney: complete misuse of the theory of club goods.  (1) getting funding to afford public good, (2) setting price that doesn’t create deadweight losses.  Treadmill in fitness center: could be public if there are few members; congestion = need to set price/fund creation. You haven’t shown me a congestion externality or using the congestion to set the price. This is just “if value, then right.”
 
A: the congestion is the exclusivity. If everyone does it. 
 
Lunney: McDonald’s would lose money if everyone ate there?
 
A: Yes.  Set price to control access. There’s a reason companies like Members Only name it Members Only. Even McD and Coke exclusivity is working to provide profit. [Citation needed.]
 
Gerhardt: Make assumption that TM owners create brand value and channel it down.
 
A: no we don’t.
 
Gerhardt: consumers invest in creating brand, should get return at least in form of being able to use for information.
 
A: the TM owner gets to police the boundaries even if it doesn’t create value.
 
Gerhardt: community rejected New Coke.  Good brands let brand story change in response.
 
A: but mark owners police who can enter the community.
 
Gerhardt: should we shut down Pinterest? TM owner doesn't like being pinned by the kind of person who pins images of its products.
 
A: there are other interests—not saying shut down Pinterest. This is an important interest on the other side.

Wednesday, February 04, 2015

IP question of the day, Harper Lee edition

Amazon's Write On is its project challenging Wattpad, trying to develop writers--including fan writers.  Participants aren't compensated, but this is a commercial endeavor on Amazon's part and presumably it will try to transition the successful ones to paid publishing.  So, here's this morning's email:

Imagine your favorite literary character's past or future.
http://writeon.amazon.com/?ref_=ign_em_hd
Readers, rejoice! This summer, Harper Lee will publish "Go Set a Watchman," which revisits characters from her classic novel "To Kill a Mockingbird," 20 years later.
Inspired by this news, we have a special writing challenge:
In 500 words, write a story featuring your favorite literary character at an earlier or later point in their life.
Good luck, and have fun!

1. Assuming no authorization, is this an infringing commercial use of Harper Lee's name?
2. Inducement?
3. More an advertising law question: Given that this is a new initiative by Amazon, who writes the emails to users, and who reviews them?  A new social media endeavor is often handed off to a specific person/group and not integrated with overall advertising, which is simple but can lead to gaps in review.

Tuesday, February 03, 2015

New article: images and the right of publicity

Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity (38 Columbia J.L. & Arts, forthcoming 2015)
 
Abstract: In their eagerness to reward celebrities for the power of their “images,” and to prevent other people from exploiting those images, courts have allowed the right of publicity to distort the First Amendment. The power of the visual image has allowed courts to create an inconsistent, overly expansive regime that would be easily understood as constitutionally unacceptable were the same rules applied to written words as to drawings and video games. The intersection of a conceptually unbounded right with a category of objects that courts do not handle well has created deep inconsistencies and biases in the treatment of visual and audiovisual media, particularly comics and video games. These problems show up both in First Amendment defenses and in copyright preemption analysis. The possible arguments one might offer for treating images differently are insufficient to justify this disparity. The Article concludes that, absent the distortion produced by images, the right of publicity would properly be understood as sharply limited.

Reading list: Craswell on sports team nicknames

 
Craswell is an excellent writer with an engaging topic even for a non-sports fan like me. Treat yourself to this short monograph.  Excerpt:
 
Here is the Washington Times. . .:
“The Redskins are a private business enterprise, and the owner has the right to call his team whatever he likes.”
What few people realize is that this idea – the idea that nicknames should be controlled by a team’s owner – is a relatively recent invention. As we have seen, nicknames in the early days of spectator sports were almost never chosen by owners or by college officials. Instead, nicknames were chosen by the decentrralized process of the crowd. Anyone could come up with a new nickname, but the nicknames that survived were those that fans and journalists liked well enough to repeat. And in those days, whatever the crowd gaveth, the crowd could also taketh away.

230 defeats false advertising claim against search engines

Baldino’s Lock & Key Service, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00636 (E.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2015)
 
Defendants Yellowbook and Ziplocal provide online search engines for businesses, allowing search by type of service and geographic area.  Baldino’s is a Washington Metro area locksmith and security company, with the required licenses in Maryland and Virginia.  The internet resulted in a drastic decrease in revenue for Baldino’s, which it attributes to advertising of unlicensed and illegal locksmiths.  In 2014, for example, a Google directory search produced results for 1000 locksmiths in Virginia, but only 325 were listed as licensed; other defendants produced similar results.  Baldino’s sued for RICO violations and false advertising.
 
The court found §230 immunity.  The exception for violation of federal criminal law failed because Baldino’s failed to adequately plead RICO violations.  (I thought the exception just protected the feds, rather than preserving civil claims identical to potential criminal claims.) 
 
And the exception for IP didn’t apply because Baldino’s failed to adequately plead a violation of the Lanham Act.  (Apparently treating false advertising as an IP claim.)  Baldino’s failed to plead that the defendants made a false or misleading description of fact; the falsity came from the unlicensed and illegal locksmiths.  “To hold Defendants liable for misinformation appearing on their websites, which originated with third parties, is a drastic conclusion the Court declines to endorse. The Court believes the market incentive for Defendants to provide correct information to consumers is a better tool for accuracy than the Lanham Act.”

Monday, February 02, 2015

Pom squad at the DC Circuit

POM Wonderful, LLC v. Federal Trade Comm’n, No. 13-1060 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2015)
 
POM ran ads from 2003 to 2010 touting medical studies that supposedly showed that daily consumption of POM products could “treat, prevent, or reduce the risk of various ailments, including heart disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction.”  Unfortunately, “[m]any of those ads mischaracterized the scientific evidence concerning the health benefits of POM’s products with regard to those diseases.”  The FTC ordered POM to stop; the D.C. Circuit rejected most of POM’s challenges, except to the portion of the remedial order requiring two randomized clinical trials before making similar health claims.
 
NB: With Tom Goldstein on the brief, the court of appeals may not be the last stop for this case.  I don’t think there’s a split, but a Court eager to expand protection for commercial speech might nonetheless be interested.  I suspect that if cert were granted, though, the Court would find—as it did in Nike v. Kasky—that the prospect of destroying a huge part of the regulatory state by making it much easier to engage in false or misleading advertising was too unappetizing for a majority.
 
The court here concluded that there was no basis to set aside the FTC’s finding of false and misleading statements.  However, it did reverse the FTC’s blanket requirement of at least two randomized controlled studies as a precondition to any disease-related claim—which is either a very interesting constitutionalization of a remedial standard, or maybe not that important; only time will tell.
 
The products at issue include both pomegranate juice and dietary supplements, POMx Pills and POMx Liquid, which contain pomegranate extract in concentrated form. By 2010, POM’s owners (the Resnicks), POM, and POM’s integrated marketing agency Roll had spent more than $35 million on pomegranate-related medical research, sponsoring more than one hundred studies at forty-four different institutions. The claims at issue here dealt with heart disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction. 
 
Take heart disease: One POM-sponsored study involved ten patients in the treatment group and nine in the control, and thus couldn’t be “at all conclusive” in the words of one of POM’s own experts. A larger study followed 73 patients and found no statistically significant difference in the tested measure or any other heart-related measure.  A still larger study followed 289 patients and again found no statistically significant difference; POM initially delayed publication but eventually allowed it. The final report identified some subgroups that appeared to benefit, but this was post hoc massaging of the data (a classic way to claim otherwise absent significance) and posed an increased risk of false positives.  Plus, even for the subgroups, the change was 4-9% decrease in arterial thickness, substantially below the 30% reported by the tiny study. 
 
Even though the bigger studies were done by 2006, “a consumer reading POM’s promotional materials after 2006 would not have known of those studies or that they cast doubt on [the] prior findings.” For example, in 2007, POM published a newsletter claiming that “NEW RESEARCH OFFERS FURTHER PROOF OF THE HEART-HEALTHY BENEFITS OF POM WONDERFUL JUICE.” The newsletter claimed a “30% DECREASE IN ARTERIAL PLAQUE.” Always, POM was silent about the contrary studies.  The evidence went on like this, but I won’t.  POM’s studies had grave limitations and/or found no statistically significant benefits.
 
The full Commission, by a vote of four out of five, found that 36 of POM’s ads made false or misleading claims, though injunctive relief would be justified even if based solely on the 19 ads the ALJ found to be false or misleading.  One commissioner concurred, saying that she, like the ALJ, would have found a smaller number of POM ads to be false or misleading, but agreed that POM and related parties had violated the FTC Act.  The injunctive order barred the POM entities from representing that any food, drug, or dietary supplement “is effective in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of any disease” unless the representation is non-misleading and supported by “competent and reliable scientific evidence that, when considered in light of the entire body of relevant and reliable scientific evidence, is sufficient to substantiate that the representation is true.” For purposes of that order, the FTC defined such evidence as at least two properly conducted, randomized and controlled human clinical trials (RCTs) that yielded statistically significant results. They’d have to be double-blinded unless the POM defendants could show that blinding couldn’t be effectively implemented given the nature of the intervention.
 
The rest of the order barred POM from misrepresenting the results of scientific studies in their ads and from making any claim about the “health benefits” of a food, drug, or dietary supplement unless the representation is non-misleading and supported by “competent and reliable scientific evidence.” But it didn’t require RCTs to support more general claims about health benefits.
 
Statutory claims first: “[t]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.” FTC Act § 5(c). This is basically the APA’s substantial evidence standard.  The FTC is often in a better position than courts to determine deceptiveness, since such a finding “rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic judgment.”  The FTC evaluates what claims are made in an ad; whether the claims are false, misleading, or unsubstantiated; and whether the claims were misleading—that last was not in dispute here.
 
Ads that merely convey efficacy have to be substantiated by a reasonable basis, determined by “the type of product,” “the type of claim,” “the benefit of a truthful claim,” “the ease of developing substantiation for the claim,” “the consequences of a false claim,” and “the amount of substantiation experts in the field would consider reasonable.” But for establishment claims, if the claim is specific, the “advertiser must possess the specific substantiation claimed.”  If the claims aren’t specific—claims like “medically proven” or images that “clearly suggest that the claim is based upon a foundation of scientific evidence”—the advertiser “must possess evidence sufficient to satisfy the relevant scientific community of the claim’s truth.”
 
There was no basis for setting aside the FTC’s “carefully considered findings of efficacy and establishment claims.”  The POM entities argued that the FTC interpreted POM’s claims too broadly by holding that if an ad truthfully references research connecting a food product to possible health benefits, it necessarily implies “the vastly broader claim that there is ‘clinical proof’ that the product treats, cures, or prevents a disease.” That’s not what the FTC did.  It clearly stated that not every reference to a test or study was necessarily an establishment claim. But the ads at issue here went beyond “merely describing specific research in sufficient detail to allow a consumer to judge its validity.” The ads referred to study results “in a way that suggests they are convincing evidence of efficacy,” drawing a “logical connection” between study results and disease effectiveness. “Moreover, they invoked medical symbols, referenced publication in medical journals, and described the substantial funds spent on medical research, fortifying the overall sense that the referenced clinical studies establish the claimed benefits.”  The court agreed with the FTC that when an ad represents that tens of millions of dollars have spent on research, that tends to reinforce the idea that the supporting research wasn’t just preliminary.
 
Nor was the FTC cherry-picking the record for aggressive ads.  There was no meaningful difference between earlier ads and more recent ads’ reliance on medical studies.  For example, in July 2010, less than three months before the FTC complaint, POM advertised that POMx was “backed by $34 million in medical research at the world’s leading universities” revealing “promising results for erectile, prostate and cardiovascular health.” It discussed the same old, tiny studies. The FTC concluded that “at least a significant minority of reasonable consumers” would construe the ad to claim that POM products could treat, prevent, or reduce the risk of erectile dysfunction, prostate cancer, and heart disease. The ad’s references to the described studies as “promising,” “initial” or “preliminary,” in context, were insufficient to neutralize the otherwise unequivocally positive claims of specific results. As the FTC held, the “use of one or two adjectives does not alter the net impression,” especially “when the chosen adjectives” (such as “promising”) “provide a positive spin on the studies rather than a substantive disclaimer.”
 
The FTC might’ve reached a different result if the ads had effective disclaimers, but they didn’t.  (The identified statement, “evidence in support of this claim is inconclusive,” is probably ineffective, by the way, but I can’t imagine that detains the DC Circuit much.)  Thus, the standard POM had to meet was “evidence sufficient to satisfy the relevant scientific community of the truth of their claims.”
 
The FTC then found POM’s claims deceptive due to inadequate substantiation.  The court of appeals held that this finding was supported by substantial evidence, mindful of the FTC’s special expertise in determining the necessary substantiation.  For both efficacy and non-specific establishment claims, the FTC found that experts in the relevant fields would require one or more RCTs to establish a causal relationship between a food and the treatment, prevention, or reduction of risk” of heart disease, prostate cancer, or erectile dysfunction.  The FTC emphasized a distinction between “generalized nutritional and health benefit claims” and “the specific disease treatment and prevention claims at issue in this case.”  Also, lesser substantiation might suffice for “claims that do not assert a causal relationship,” unlike POM’s ads, e.g., “POM Wonderful Pomegranate Juice . . . can help prevent premature aging, heart disease, stroke, Alzheimer’s, even cancer” and “Eight ounces a day is enough to keep your heart pumping.”
 
POM’s studies weren’t RCTs.  And their selective touting of ostensibly favorable studies constituted misleading omissions of material facts.  The FTC further found that POM was aware of the misrepresentations and the weaknesses in the studies.
 
POM challenged the FTC’s factual finding that experts in the relevant fields require RCTs to support claims about the disease-related benefits of POM’s products. That finding was supported by substantial record evidence. The FTC explained the need for a control group, random assignment of subjects, and double-blinding.  POM argued that some FTC experts admitted that RCTs aren’t always necessary to substantiate health benefit claims for foods and nutrients, but that contention took the statements out of context.  One acknowledged making recommendations about diet and exercise even without RCTs, but said that making a recommendation based on the “best available evidence” is “not the same as stating that a causal link has been established.”  Another acknowledged that “well-conducted, well-executed observational research is very important” for evaluating foods and nutrients, but he emphasized that a causal link between a food or nutrient and a reduction in disease risk “cannot be proven from an observational [i.e., non-RCT] study.” Yet POM did claim a causal link.  POM’s own experts offered other views about the need for RCT’s, but it’s not the court’s job to make its own appraisal of the testimony. 
 
POM argued that RCTs would be too onerous.  Practically, it’s difficult/impossible to “blind” a fruit.  But that doesn’t apply to the supplements—two of three of the challenged products—and several of the juice studies were double-blinded and placebo-controlled by using a beverage with “similar color and energy content” as pomegranate juice.  Also, the FTC required double-blinding only “when feasible,” acknowledging that, “in some instances . . . it may not be possible to conduct blinded clinical trials of food products.” Ethically, POM said it was “impossible to create a zero intake group for nutrients in an ethical manner—doctors cannot, for example, ethically deprive a control group of patients of all Vitamin C for a decade to determine whether Vitamin C helps prevent cancer.” But many ads made claims about the short-term benefits of consuming POM products.  Plus, there was “no reason to believe that it would be unethical to create a zero intake group for pomegranate juice.” RCTs could be costly, though the court commented that POM somehow sponsored dozens of studies, including RCTs.  But if RCTs were prohibitively costly, POM could choose to specify a lower level of substantiation with an effective disclaimer.  The need for RCTs was Pom’s own choice based on its ad claims.
 
Next, POM argued that the FTC’s substantiation standard amounted to a new legal rule, in violation of APA notice and comment requirements.  (Actually, the requirements for the FTC can be more onerous.) Nope: it “is well settled that an agency ‘is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding,’” and that “‘the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the agency’s discretion.’”  Moreover, the FTC’s decision wasn’t a major substantive legal addition to its substantiation standards.  It was consistent with FTC precedent for scientific establishment claims, and the FTC had required RCTs in other contexts. 
 
Defendant Matthew Tupper challenged the finding of individual liability as to him. He became POM’s COO in 2003 and served as its president 2005-2011. He argued that he shouldn’t be individually liable because Lynda Resnick, one of POM’s founders, had the final say on ads. That’s not the standard for individual liability.  Direct participation in the deceptive practices, or authority to control them, is the standard.  Tupper participated directly in meetings about advertising concepts and content, reviewed and edited ad copy, managed the day- to-day affairs of POM’s marketing team, and possessed hiring and firing authority over the head of POM’s marketing department. Even assuming that “authority to control” was a prerequisite for individual liability under the FTC Act, the court would therefore still affirm.  Nor did the FTC have to show knowledge of misleadingness—that’s only for equitable monetary relief, not injunctive relief.  When no restitution or monetary penalties are sought, the FTCA imposes strict liability. 
 
Tupper also argued that he voluntarily retired from POM, but that doesn’t mean injunctive relief was improper.  An injunction might be unnecessary if someone hasn’t shown a propensity to violate the law and nothing in the record suggested the possibility of further violations, but the FTC found that the POM entities, including Tupper, had a demonstrated propensity for misrepresentation and engaged in a deliberate, consistent course of conduct.  Plus, there was no assurance that Tupper wouldn’t return to POM or join another company that markets food products or dietary supplements.
 
Now, on to the First Amendment. Misleading advertising can be entirely banned.  POM said the court should review the FTC’s finding of misleadingness de novo, citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).  DC Circuit precedent established that the factual finding of deceptiveness was reviewed under the ordinary (and deferential) substantial-evidence standard, even in the First Amendment context. Also, the court of appeals would reach the same conclusion even if it were to exercise de novo review, “at least with respect to the nineteen ads determined misleading by the administrative law judge and held by the Commission to form a sufficient basis for its liability determination and remedial order.”  (That could be a certworthiness problem, I think.)
 
Injunctive relief: Part III of the order barred  representations about a product’s general health benefits “unless the representation is non- misleading” and backed by “competent and reliable scientific evidence that is sufficient in quality and quantity” to “substantiate that the representation is true.” For that part, “competent and reliable evidence” meant studies that are “generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.”
 
Part I, however, governed claims about the treatment or prevention of “any disease.” The baseline that claims must be non-misleading and supported by “competent and reliable scientific evidence” was there, but for Part I purposes that last term was more narrowly defined as at least two RCTs yielding statistically significant results, double-blinded where feasible. The FTC clarified that this requirement applied only to unqualified representations, not effectively qualified disease claims.  But claims characterizing a study’s results as “preliminary” or “initial”—“even if describing a gold-standard RCT yielding results with an extremely high degree of statistical significance”—would fail to count as adequately qualified and thus would be prohibited. Instead, such an ad would need a disclaimer “unambiguously” saying that the evidence is “inconclusive” or that “additional research is necessary,” “even if the ad is substantiated by a well-designed RCT that experts uniformly consider to be conclusive, and regardless of the amount and quality of additional supporting evidence other than RCTs.”
 
The FTC agreed that the remedial order should be examined under Central Hudson. Obviously, the government’s interest in the accuracy of commercial information in the market is substantial. Central Hudson requires a restriction to directly advance the government’s interest and be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.  To the extent that there was a general RCT-substantiation requirement for disease claims—not requiring any particular number of RCTs—the order satisfied Central Hudson.
 
The RCT standard was the mirror of the FTC’s upheld liability finding: POM’s claims were misleading because they were unsubstantiated by RCTs.  Thus, a RCT requirement was “perfectly commensurate” with liability for past misleadingness.  Sure, POM only made claims about three specific diseases, but the broad scope of the order (covering any disease) was justified by POM’s “demonstrated propensity to make deceptive representations about the health benefits of their products, and also by the expert testimony supporting the necessity of RCTs to establish causation for disease-related claims generally.”
 
But requiring two RCTs was a trial too far.  (If you are from the FDA and you are reading this, you should be sweating.) While Central Hudson isn’t a least restrictive means standard, the FTC still had to show a reasonable fit between its means and its interest. The FTC failed to justify a categorical floor of two RCTs.  All else being equal, two would be better than one; but likewise three would be better than two.  And “[r]equiring additional RCTs without adequate justification exacts considerable costs, and not just in terms of the substantial resources often necessary.”  If two RCTs are required, “consumers may be denied useful, truthful information about products with a demonstrated capacity to treat or prevent serious disease.” That would be contrary to the objectives of the commercial speech doctrine.
 
Suppose, for example, there was a “large-scale, perfectly designed and conducted RCT” showing a significant reduction in risk for a particular disease, “demonstrated to a very high degree of statistical certainty … so much so that experts in the relevant field universally regard the study as conclusively establishing clinical proof of the supplement’s benefits for disease prevention. Perhaps, moreover, a wealth of medical research and evidence apart from RCTs—e.g., observational studies—reinforces the results of the blue-ribbon RCT.”  In that case, there’d be a substantial interest in informing consumers, without any misleading qualifiers that the evidence was inconclusive.  So, apparently the burden is on the FTC to show that this magical study does not exist. Query how much better off advertisers are if they have to figure out on their own which claims require replicated RCTs and which don’t.
 
Even the FDA has held that “[a] single large, well conducted and controlled clinical trial could provide sufficient evidence to establish a substance/disease relationship, provided that there is a supporting body of evidence from observational or mechanistic studies.” U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Significant Scientific Agreement in the Review of Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements 5 (Dec. 1999), 1999 WL 33935287 (withdrawn 2009).  The FTC’s two-RCT requirement “brooks no exception for those circumstances.”  But the FTC has elsewhere told industry that, “[i]n most situations, the quality of studies will be more important than quantity.” U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dietary Supplements: An Advertising Guide for Industry 10 (Apr. 2001).
 
The FTC failed to show how such a rigid remedial rule had the requisite “reasonable fit” with the interest in preventing deceptive speech.  The argument that a two-RCT requirement was consistent with precedent didn’t make it fit this new set of facts.  True, the “FTC has usually required two well-controlled clinical tests” before certain “non-specific establishment claim[s] may be made.” But all the cited cases involved establishment claims about the comparative efficacy of over-the-counter analgesics, and reflected extensive consideration of the specific circumstances of such products, especially the subjective nature of pain sensitivity.  The FDA, as well as the medical/scientific community, required replication for clinical tests involving analgesic drugs. But that shows a history of requiring two RCTs only in “narrow circumstances based on particularized concerns.”  Consent orders have also varied on the quantum of evidence, depending on circumstance.
 
The FTC noted some expert testimony recognizing a need for independent replication, due to the possibility that a single RCT’s results may be due to chance or a unique sample.  But “insofar as the results of any particular RCT may be suspect due to deficiencies in the sample or trial, the baseline requirement for health-related claims independently bars any representations unless supported by ‘competent and reliable scientific evidence that . . . is sufficient to substantiate that the representation is true.’ That in turn requires that a study be “generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.”  Plus, the FTC’s experts themselves thought that one RCT could suffice for the prostate cancer and erectile dysfunction claims at issue.
 
Finally, the FTC appealed to POM’s demonstrated propensity to misrepresent the strength and outcomes of studies. But every party subject to a final FTC order has been found to have advertised unlawfully; the FTC didn’t explain how two RCTs were linked to the particular history of POM’s wrongdoing.  The rest of the order requiring sufficient scientific evidence could address that. Two RCTs might be justified in another case, but not here (even for heart disease, where the experts did testify that two would be required? Or can the FTC argue that later?).  So the order was modified to require at least one RCT before making disease claims.

Laches bars Fitbug's TM claim against Fitbit

Fitbug Ltd. v. Fitbit, Inc., 2015 WL 350923, No. 13-1418 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015)
 
Fitbit and Fitbug both make wearable electronic fitness tracking devices that connect to the internet and to other devices. They both have federal registrations. Their logos:
 

Fitbug comes from the UK and was one of the first companies to enter the market. It sells directly to consumers and to businesses such as health insurance plans and corporate wellness programs, usually involving incentives like bulk discounts as well as special tools for tracking group fitness goals or running fitness competitions. In 2005 it sought to enter the US market, with limited success.
 
Fitbit is one of the leading providers in the market. At the time the name was chosen, as far as its co-founder Park was aware, nobody at Fitbit was aware of Fitbug’s existence. But before the launch of Fitbit’s website or the sale of its first products, the founders were aware of Fitbug, though Park thought little of it at the time. Early on, only a small amount of Fitbit’s sales were B2B, but over time they grew substantially in both B2C and B2B.
 
The day Fitbit announced its product in late 2008, Fitbug received several emails and other contacts about it, a representative of Fitbug sought (unsuccessfully) to contact Fitbit to explore a potential business partnership. Over the next weeks and months, Fitbug expressed concerns about potential competition from Fitbit, and contemplated a C&D. But it first asserted infringement claims in a December 2011 letter. When subsequent letters didn’t resolve the issue, Fitbug sued in March 2013.
 
The court only found it necessary to rule on laches, a defense both to state and federal claims. Laches requires unreasonable delay in suing plus prejudice. Unreasonable delay is measured from the time of actual or constructive notice. September 2008 was when Fitbug had actual notice, and it continued to be reminded. Emails recognized Fitbit as “[a]nother competitor,” suggested aspects of Fitbit’s user interface are a “total ripoff,” and noted that while Fitbit’s entry into the market is “[n]othing to panic about, ... [Fitbit] will become an issue and I’d rather be one step ahead.” Over the next several months, Fitbug explored potential responses, including partnership. In October, an attorney said, “I was wondering if they were infringing on your IP—sounds like some improvements on your idea, but pretty close to [F]itbug including the name.” A month later a Fitbug employee wrote to the CEO “to remind [him] of Fitbit” because he was “thinking of sending them a cease and desist.” Around that time, the CEO referred to Fitbit as “thieving bastards[.]”
 
Still, Fitbit didn’t begin shipping until September 2009. After then, Fitbug received several further emails regarding Fitbit’s activities. Another lawyer contacted Fitbug’s chief marketing officer to point out that Fitbit “could cause confusion in the classic trademark sense.” That’s the key question, because we want to know when Fitbug knew or should have known of its cause of action—here, likely confusion. Given the high degree of similarity in products and names, Fitbug knew or should have known of the problem in September 2008. “[A] prudent business person should have recognized the likelihood of confusion at that point.”
 
Fitbug argued that the laches period shouldn’t run before a defendant actually sells something. But Fitbit was selling in 2008; it just wasn’t shipping the products that were ordered. Anyway, the laches period can run pre-sale, even if that makes some of the Sleekcraft confusion factors difficult to evaluate; Sleekcraft is not to be mechanically applied. Fitbug’s argument that “evidence of widespread actual consumer confusion was not available until 2012” also failed, because actual confusion is not required.
 
Also, Fitbug’s argument that it wasn’t clear that Fitbit would succeed instead of going out of business, was “irreconcilable with the purpose of laches.” It’s inequitable for a trademark owner, with full notice, to wait while the alleged infringer spends a lot of money and intervene only when there’s success. As Learned Hand wrote, “Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the other’s money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.” The court commented, in an interesting demonstration of just how much law & economics has taken over law, “[t]hat result is not just inequitable, it is also inefficient, and renders this argument untenable.”
 
Thus, Fitbug’s delay was about four and a half years. If Fitbug’s claims were filed within the analogous state limitations period, the strong presumption is against laches. Courts have mostly assumed without analysis that the analogous period is four years. Fitbit argued that the California Supreme Court considers trademark infringement to be a species of tort, triggering a two-year limitations period. The court found this argument meritorious, but didn’t need to resolve the issue, because even four years made Fitbug’s claims untimely and created a presumption of laches.
 
Next, the court considered Fitbug’s explanations. Fitbug argued that the doctrine of progressive encroachment justified its delay. Progressive encroachment allows a trademark owner to tolerate de minimis infringement by the junior user, and sue when the junior user “redirects or expands its business into different regions or markets bringing it into direct competition with the trademark owner.” But growth of a junior users’s existing business and the concomitant increase in its use of the mark isn’t progressive encroachment. Fitbug argued that there was progressive encroachment into the B2C market, and that Fitbit wasn’t providing add-on services for business customers (like exercise games or challenges). Fitbit didn’t add a “Corporate Wellness” link on its website, targeting the B2B market, until April 2012. Fitbit’s B2B sales in 2009 were only a small percentage of Fitbit’s overall sales, compared to a substantially larger percentage in 2013.
But this was still all the growth of existing business, not expansion into a new market. Fitbit was selling its products directly to consumers and businesses from the outset. From its inception, Fitbit received inquiries about B2B and made B2B sales. As the Ninth Circuit has said, “growth alone does not infringement make.” Fitbit’s use of the mark was “substantial from the outset, and Fitbit received both national and international media attention at the beginning.” Moreover, in 2009 the parties competed directly to provide a fitness program for several schools. Though the program was to take place in Europe and Fitbug’s CEO was apparently unaware of Fitbit’s participation, a potential customer copied both Fitbit and Fitbug, along with other companies, on the same emails. Despite the CEO’s personal unawareness, a reasonable person would have investigated further and discovered that Fitbit was in the B2B market from the outset.
 
In addition, the B2C and B2B markets weren’t different enough to count as progressive encroachment anyway, given the similarities in the products.
 
Other factors also mattered to whether the delay in suing was reasonable: “(1) the strength and value of the trademark rights asserted; (2) plaintiff’s diligence in enforcing [the] mark; (3) harm to [the] senior user if relief is denied; (4) good faith ignorance by [the] junior user; (5) competition between [the] senior and junior users; and (6) [the] extent of harm suffered by the junior user because of [the] senior user’s delay.” The first two factors favored Fitbit: the marks were descriptive or suggestive, and thus relatively weak, but Fitbit’s mark was substantially more valuable by virtue of its “rapid and continuing growth” relative to Fitbug. Second, Fitbug wasn’t diligent in protecting its mark.
 
Harm to Fitbug and competition between the parties weighed in Fitbug’s paper, or could be assumed to do so. The harm to Fitbug if relief was denied turned on likely confusion; here, there were genuine issues of material fact on some of the Sleekcraft factors (actual confusion, mark similarity, and purchaser sophistication). But even assuming that this factor weighed strongly in Firbug’s favor, it wouldn’t be enough to change the overall weight of the factors.
 
Fitbit’s good faith and harm suffered as the result of Fitbug’s delay weighed in Fitbit’s favor. Though Fitbit was aware of Fitbug’s existence before it announced its products, it selected the mark before it was aware of Fitbug, which is the key time. Even after it found out about Fitbug, Fitbit believed confusion was unlikely. (Interesting that the court doesn’t discuss the constructive notice created by registration, filed as an ITU Dec. 2004. I don’t think Fitbit selected the name before then.)
 
Also, because Fitbit “continued to build a valuable business around its trademark during the time that [Fitbug] delayed the exercise of its legal rights,” it suffered “expectation” or “economic prejudice.” Fitbit expended substantial resources to market its product and expand its business under the “well-known” Fitbit mark, garnering awards and substantial media coverage. “The economic prejudice would be severe if Fitbit were to now lose the rights to the Fitbit name.” Fitbug argued that there couldn’t be prejudice because Fitbit knew of Fitbug’s rights when making those investments. But the 9th Circuit has found prejudice even despite awareness before the prejudice occurred. Given Fitbug’s lack of objection, the court found substantial economic prejudice.
 
Finally, Fitbug argued that willful infringement barred laches. Fitbug argued that (1) Fitbit knew about Fitbug nearly one year before announcing any products; (2) Fitbit “borrowed significant design elements from Fitbug’s website, marketing materials, and original logo”; and (3) Fitbit continued using its marks after receiving a C&D. But at most Fitbug could show infringement, not willful infringement. Prior knowledge doesn’t necessarily indicate bad faith. There was no evidence disputing Fitbit’s asserted good faith belief in noninfringement, and no evidence of intent to capitalize on Fitbug’s goodwill. Knowing use in a belief that there’s no confusion is not bad faith.
 
Summary judgment for laches on the Lanham Act claims.
 
As for the UCL/FAL counterclaims claims, Fitbit alleged that Fitbug-affiliated people posted online reviews and comments about Fitbit products or compared Fitbit’s products to Fitbug’s without disclosing their affiliations with Fitbug. Fitbit stipulated that it didn’t have evidence of “particular instances where individuals who otherwise would have purchased Fitbit products instead purchased Fitbug products in reliance on or as a result of Fitbug’s conduct” that allegedly violated the UCL and FAL. While injury in fact may be presumed for intentionally deceptive advertising in Lanham Act cases, that didn’t mean Fitbit satisfied California’s statutory standing requirement of economic injury. Its sole basis for asserting an injury was speculation. Though Fitbug saw an increase in web traffic and sales following the alleged UCL and FAL violations, Fitbit couldn’t connect that increase with any “quantum of lost money or property” it suffered. Summary judgment on these for Fitbug.

Dastar doesn't bar true reverse passing off claim

Luxul Technology Inc. v. NectarLux, LLC, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 352048, No. 14-CV-03656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015)
 
Luxul makes LED products. Its patented EazyLux LED tube lamps can replace fluorescent tube lamps without rewiring. The parties contracted so that NectarLux would be Luxul’s “exclusive, independent representative for the sale of Luxul products” in certain regions, for certain customers. “NectarLux was obligated to make good faith efforts to meet its sales commitments, work with Luxul to accelerate sales, understand ‘deal flow,’ and establish factory and distribution channels on the east coast,” among other things. Luxul agreed to disclose confidential information, and NectarLux agreed not to disclose it.
 
Luxul alleged that the parties met with a potential manufacturer, and then NectarLux contained the same manufacturer to discuss alternative proposals and set up meetings with competing LED companies. NectarLux allegedly “made and continue[s] to make false representations to actual and potential customers,” regarding Luxul’s alleged legal problems. Luxul also found that defendants Keeney and JKeeney Consulting posted a document called “NectarLux—HOA Whitepaper AG” on JKeeney’s LinkedIn profile, using several images that Luxul “uses to represent and promote its technology.” Some were copyrighted by Luxul Taiwan Inc., Luxul’s parent company, and the document allegedly used an image of Luxul’s president and quotation that were misleading about whether NectarLux was responsible for the technological innovation behind the EasyLux LED tube lamps. Products and images identical to those on Luxul’s website allegedly appeared on NectarLux’s website, but the Luxul brand name had been replaced with Nectar.
 
Luxul terminated its agreement with NectarLux and sued.
 
NectarLux argued that Luxul failed to allege Article III standing. The court disagreed; breach of contract and misrepresentation of source/misappropriation of the Luxul name was enough, along with alleged lost customers and sales and damage to Luxul’s reputation and brand.
 
Lanham Act standing: NectarLux alleged that there was no commercial injury and that the parties weren’t competitors. Citing pre-Lexmark precedent, the court stated that the two prongs of §43(a) have different standing requirements. False association only requires alleged commercial injury based on deceptive use of a trademark or its equivalent, whereas false advertising requires alleged “injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation that is “proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations.” Lexmark. (Why not proximate cause for false designation of origin?)
 
Allegations that NectarLux’s misrepresentations regarding the source of the LED tube lamps resulted in harm to the distinctiveness of Plaintiff’s product, brand, goodwill, and reputation, plus allegations that NectarLux replaced “Luxul” with “Nectar” on the actual goods themselves sufficed. NectarLux argued that the marketing materials at issue were “created and used to sell Plaintiff’s light bulbs, and to benefit Plaintiff,” but that didn’t show that Luxul hadn’t suffered commercial injury. Also, although NectarLux was a marketing consultant, not a competitor, that wasn’t required for false association or false advertising.
 
Luxul properly alleged reverse passing off: that NectarLux replaced “Luxul” with “Nectar” on the actual goods and sold the goods to consumers. Also, the alleged alterations of images of Luxul lamps to read “Nectar” instead plausibly would cause confusion, even though that wasn’t a traditional reverse passing off claim. Dastar didn’t bar the claim, because, while NectarLux contended that it was the source of the marketing materials at issue, the tangible goods at issue were the lamps. Plus, there was no conflict between copyright and trademark here.
 
False advertising: While Luxul alleged that NectarLux falsely claimed that the “Nectar product is UL certified with the intent to induce prospective customers of Luxul to purchase Defendant’s product in lieu of Luxul’s product,” the rest of its alleations were “bare recitations of the elements of a false advertising claim, bereft of any factual allegations.” Dismissed with leave to amend.
 
California UCL/FAL: These claims were based on allegations of the rebranding, discussed above, and wrongful representations to third parties that Luxul’s business and products were affected by false legal issues. Luxul adequately alleged lost money or property, even if it might not be entitled to restitution. It also alleged unlawfulness through its Lanham Act claim, and unfairness through its claims about false representations about legal issues—an alleged patent action against Luxul in Taiwan.
 
Copyright infringement: Luxul pled itself out of statutory damages, and NectarLux argued that Luxul failed to allege damages because any works it copied and altered were used to sell Luxul products. But that didn’t matter: Luxul sufficiently alleged ownership and infringement; NectarLux might have a claim of implied license as the case continued.

failure to conform exclusion precludes insurance coverage of false advertising

General Star Indem. Co. v. Driven Sports, Inc., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 307017, No. 14–CV–3579 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015)
 
General Star issued an insurance policy to Driven, which sold a “pre-workout energy supplement” called “Craze.” Driven was sued by plaintiffs alleging that Craze contained an illegal and potentially dangerous methamphetamine analog, and sought coverage. The court found the underlying lawsuits excluded from coverage by a provision excluding personal and advertising injury arising out of the failure of goods to conform with any statement of quality or performance made in an ad. The underlying lawsuits alleged that Craze claimed to contain only natural ingredients, but didn’t conform with those statements because of the methamphetamine analog. All the injuries alleged in the underlying lawsuits arose out of this failure to conform.
 
Driven argued that there could be both covered and excluded claims in the underlying complaints, which would trigger a duty to defend—here, the argument was, the underlying allegations also concerned whether it disparaged its competitor’s product (one of the underlying cases was a Lanham Act claim). But none of the allegations could be proven without proving a failure to conform, and thus they all arose out of “the allegation that defendant placed an illegal and potentially dangerous synthetic ingredient into Craze while advertising that it contained only natural ingredients.” Though Driven’s statements on the Craze website compared Craze favorably to other products generally and disparaged them, that didn’t create a link to the underlying allegations in the lawsuits, and the complaints didn’t refer to those web posts. The complaints clearly depended on failure to conform, so the website wasn’t extrinsic evidence giving rise to coverage. A non-excluded alleged injury “would have to exist even if Craze had performed as advertised, and contained only natural ingredients. However, under that scenario, the underlying plaintiff would have no claim, because the comparison between Craze and its competitors would be based upon true facts.” Neither competitors nor consumers could prove their claims without proving failure to conform.
 
The insurer agreed to provide a defense, subject to a reservation of its rights, including the right to recoup any amounts paid in defense if the policy were ultimately determined not to require coverage. I omit a really interesting discussion about whether the insurer should be able to recoup its costs in representing Driven to this point in the underlying litigation because the underlying claims were in fact excluded. However, the court did agree that the policy was self-liquidating, which meant that the insurer’s expenses in defending the underlying actions counted against the policy’s limit of liability.